Fictionalism is a view inphilosophy that posits that statements appearing to be descriptions of the world should not be construed as such, but should instead be understood as cases of "make believe", thus allowing individuals to treat something as literally true (a "useful fiction").
Fictionalism consists in at least the following three theses:
Two important strands of fictionalism are:modal fictionalism developed byGideon Rosen, which states thatpossible worlds, regardless of whether they exist or not, may be a part of a useful discourse, andmathematical fictionalism advocated byHartry Field.[1]
Modal fictionalism is recognized as further refinement to the basic fictionalism as it holds that representations of possible worlds in texts are useful fictions.[2] Conceptualization explains that it is a descriptive theorizing of what a text, such as theBible, amounts to.[2] It is also associated with linguistic ersatzism in the sense that both are views possible worlds.[3]
Fictionalism, on the other hand, in thephilosophy of mathematics states that talk of numbers and other mathematical objects is nothing more than a convenience for computation. According to Field, there is no reason to treat parts of mathematics that involve reference to or quantification as true.[4] In this discourse, mathematical objects are accorded the same metaphysical status as literary figures such asMacbeth.[4]
Also inmeta-ethics, there is an equivalent position called moral fictionalism (championed byRichard Joyce)[5]. Many modern versions of fictionalism are influenced by the work ofKendall Walton in aesthetics.
