Fedor von Bock | |
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.jpg) Bock in 1939 | |
| Birth name | Moritz Albrecht Franz Friedrich Fedor von Bock |
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| Born | (1880-12-03)3 December 1880 |
| Died | 4 May 1945(1945-05-04) (aged 64) |
| Buried | Friedhof Lensahn |
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| Years of service | 1898–1942 |
| Rank | Generalfeldmarschall |
| Commands | Reichswehr: II. (light) Battalion, 4th Prussian Infantry Regiment 4th Prussian Infantry Regiment 1st Cavalry Division Military District II Wehrmacht: Gruppenkommando 3 Gruppenkommando 1 Army Group North Army Group B Army Group Center Army Group South |
| Battles / wars | See battles |
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| Children | 1 |
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| Signature |  |
Moritz Albrecht Franz Friedrich Fedor von Bock (3 December 1880 – 4 May 1945) was a GermanGeneralfeldmarschall (Field Marshal) who served in theGerman Army during theSecond World War. Bock served as the commander ofArmy Group North during theInvasion of Poland in 1939, ofArmy Group B during theInvasion of France in 1940, ofArmy Group Center duringOperation Barbarossa in 1941, and ofArmy Group South on theEastern Front in 1942.
Bock was astaff officer of theImperial German Army duringWorld War I and rose through the ranks of the post-warReichswehr during theWeimar Republic. Bock was given his firstcommand post in 1935, playing a key role in theAnschluss, theannexation of the Sudetenland, theinvasion of Poland, and theinvasion of France for which he was promoted toGeneralfeldmarschall. Bock was successful during Operation Barbarossa and commandedOperation Typhoon, the German attempt to captureMoscow during the autumn and winter of 1941, which was slowed by therasputitsa and stiffSoviet resistance aroundMozhaisk.[2]
Bock was amonarchist neutral to theNazi regime and not heavily involved inpolitics, but he did not sympathize with plots to overthrow Hitler. Bock was outspoken in his disagreement with Hitler and theArmy High Command's strategy on the Eastern Front, a privilege extended to him only because he had been successful in battle.[2] Bock was relieved of his command by Hitler after the failure of Operation Typhoon and the German retreat from theRed Army in July 1942, forcing him into retirement for the rest of the war. Bock was killed by a strafingRoyal New Zealand Air Force plane on 4 May 1945 while travelling by car towardsHamburg.
Fedor von Bock was born on 3 December 1880 inCüstrin,Province of Brandenburg (nowKostrzyn,Poland), into an oldPrussian military family.[3] His father, Moritz Albert Karl von Bock, had commanded adivision of thePrussian Army in theFranco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 and wasennobled by KaiserWilhelm I for his achievements during the conflict.[4] His mother, Olga Helene Franziska von Falkenhayn, was the sister ofErich von Falkenhayn, theChief of the German General Staff during theFirst World War,[5] and had relatives within theRussian aristocracy.[6]
At the age of eight, Bock went to study at a military academy inBerlin, receiving an education that emphasized Prussianmilitarism. He quickly became adept in academic subjects such asmodern languages,mathematics, andhistory. He spoke fluentFrench, and someEnglish andRussian.[7] At an early age, and largely due to his father, Bock developed an unquestioning loyalty to the German state and dedication to the military profession.[8] While not a brillianttheoretician, Bock was a highly motivatedofficer. As one of the highest-ranking officers in theReichswehr, he often addressed graduating cadets at hisalma mater, which closed in 1920. His theme was always that the greatest glory that could come to a German soldier was to die for theFatherland. He quickly earned the nickname "Holy Fire of Küstrin".[9] In 1905, Bock married Mally von Reichenbach (1887–1910), a young Prussian noblewoman.[9] They had a daughter. In 1908, Bock entered thePrussian Staff College in Berlin, and after a year's study he joined the ranks of theGeneral Staff. He soon joined the Army League (Deutscher Wehrverein) and came to knowWalther von Brauchitsch,Franz Halder, andGerd von Rundstedt.
By the timeWorld War I began in 1914, Bock had reached the rank ofHauptmann and astaff officer of theGuards Corps, which was deployed to theWestern Front. In May 1915, he was transferred to the11th Army on theEastern Front and participated in theGorlice–Tarnów offensive. The following year he joined the General Staff of the200th Infantry Division, taking part in themountain warfare in theCarpathians and in the defense of theBrusilov Offensive. In April 1917, he was transferred to the General Staff of theGerman Crown Prince's Army Group on the Western Front. On 1 April 1918, he was decorated withPour le Mérite for his work on the General Staff during theSpring Offensive. He had previously received both classes of theIron Cross and theKnight's Cross of theRoyal House Order of Hohenzollern with Swords.
Bock stayed on as an officer of theReichswehr after the war and rose through the ranks. In the early 1920s, GeneralHans von Seeckt, chief of the Army Command, named Bock head of a group tasked with building up what came to be known as theBlack Reichswehr. It consisted of "labour battalions" (Arbeitskommandos), purportedly made up of civilian volunteers attached toReichswehr units, but its members woreReichswehr uniforms and received their training and orders from it. Its actual purpose was to provide a way for theReichswehr to circumvent the restriction in theTreaty of Versailles which limited Germany's army to 100,000 men. Bock chose MajorBruno Ernst Buchrucker to build up the force.[10] The Black Reichswehr under Buchrucker became infamous for theFeme murders to punish "traitors" who, for example, revealed the locations of weapons' stockpiles or names of members. During the trials of some of those charged with the murders, prosecutors alleged that the killings were ordered by the officers from Bock's group. The journalistCarl von Ossietzky wrote: "... [the accused] did nothing but carry out the orders given him, and that certainly Colonel von Bock, and probably ... General Seeckt, should be sitting in the dock beside him."[11] Several times Bock denied in court that theReichswehr ministry had had any knowledge the "Black Reichswehr" or the murders they had committed.[12]
On 27 September 1923, Buchrucker ordered 4,500 men of the Black Reichswehr to assemble outside of Berlin as the first preparatory step toward acoup d'état. Bock, who was Buchrucker's contact with theReichswehr, was enraged, and in a stormy meeting berated Buchrucker for mobilizing without orders.[13] Bock stated that theReichswehr wanted no part in Buchrucker's coup and, despite his orders to demobilize at once, Buchrucker went ahead with theKüstrin Putsch on 1 October 1923, which ended in total failure.[14] Following the coup attempt, Seeckt disbanded the Black Reichswehr.[15]
After theNazi cames to power in 1933, Bock was neutral towards the new regime and remained amonarchist. In 1935,Adolf Hitler promoted Bock toGeneral der Infanterie and appointed him as commander of the Third Army Group, and he was one of the officers who was not removed from his position when Hitler reorganized the armed forces during theGerman rearmament. Hitler reportedly said of him, "Nobody in the world but Bock can teach soldiers to die."[16] In 1936 Bock married Wilhelmine,née von Boddien (1893–1945). Bock marched intoVienna at the head of the8th Army in March 1938 during theAnschluss, and played a key role in theannexation of the Sudetenland, also in 1938.[17][18]
By 25 August 1939, Bock was in command ofArmy Group North in preparation for the imminentinvasion of Poland. The objective of Army Group North was to destroy the Polish forces north of theVistula with a force composed of GeneralGeorg von Küchler's3rd Army, and GeneralGünther von Kluge's4th Army. These struck southward fromEast Prussia and eastward across the base of thePolish Corridor, respectively.[citation needed]
On 10 September, Bock ordered the forces under his command to burn Polish villages located behind thefront line to the ground if they were fired upon from the settlement and "if it proves impossible to identify the house from which the shots came". By the end of the military occupation of Poland on 26 October 1939, 531 towns and villages had been destroyed across the country.[19] In five weeks, Poland was overrun by Germans and thenSoviet forces aftertheir occupation of Poland from the east.[citation needed]
On 12 October 1939, shortly after the conquest of Poland, Bock was given command ofArmy Group B, with 29½ divisions, including three armoured divisions. These were tasked with advancing through theLow Countries and luring the northern units of theAllied armies into apocket. Army Group B consisted of the18th and6th Armies. While his units were overrunning theNetherlands, in May 1940, Bock attempted to call on the exiled former KaiserWilhelm II at his home inDoorn, but was unable to gain admittance, as the German troops guarding the residence having been instructed to prevent such visits.[20]
Bock participated in theArmistice with France in late June 1940.[21]
On 19 July 1940, Bock was promoted to the rank offield marshal during the1940 Field Marshal Ceremony.[22] At the end of August, theArmy High Command transferred Army Group B to East Prussia; this included Kluge's 4th Army. On 11 September, Bock relinquished command of his occupation area in France to Field MarshalWilhelm Ritter von Leeb.[citation needed]
On 2 February 1941, Bock met with Hitler and questioned whether the Soviets could be forced to make peace even if theRed Army was brought to battle and defeated. Hitler airily assured Bock that Germany's resources were more than sufficient and that he was determined to fight.[23] On 1 April 1941, in preparation for the invasion of the Soviet Union, Army Group B was re-designated asArmy Group Center.[24] Deployed in Poland, it was one of the three army formations which were to lead the invasion. It included the 4th and9th Armies, the3rd and2nd Panzer Armies, andLuftflotte 2 of theLuftwaffe. On the left flank of Bock's Army Group Center wasArmy Group North, commanded byWilhelm Ritter von Leeb; on the right flank wasArmy Group South, commanded byGerd von Rundstedt.[citation needed] The main objective of Army Group Center was to follow the route north of thePripyat Marshes to the Soviet capitalMoscow. Following the border battles, the task of Army Group Center was to drive towards the cities ofMinsk andSmolensk, and destroy the Soviet armies stationed there inencirclement battles.[citation needed]
At 03:15 on 22 June 1941, a Sunday, the first shots of Operation Barbarossa were fired; Germany invaded the Soviet Union with a timeddeclaration of war.[25] Elements ofHeinz Guderian's force had crossed theBug River and were bypassing the city ofBrest-Litovsk.Hermann Hoth's tanks were heading forGrodno on theNieman River to seize the important river crossings. Severalreconnaissance units from the 4th and 9th Armies had already crossed the Bug andDesna rivers.[citation needed] At 07:00, Bock flew fromPosen to anadvance airfield near the headquarters of XIII Infantry Corps. There, Major GeneralErich Jaschke gave Bock a summary of the progress of the invasion. Following this meeting, Bock visited Guderian's forward command post at Bokhaly. Bock then visitedJoachim Lemelsen, who gave a report from the front. The roads on the Soviet side of the Bug River were already becoming too soft to support the weight of tanks. Despite this, the first day of the invasion had been spectacularly successful.Soviet resistance was reported as being light and complete surprise was achieved. All along the front rapid progress was being made.[citation needed]
On the second day of Barbarossa, Bock crossed the Bug River escorted by Major GeneralGustav Schmidt. Later that day Bock was presented with reports that Soviet resistance was stiffening all along the front, especially on Guderian's southern flank. Meanwhile, Hoth's forces were advancing with much more ease through theBaltic states andBelarus. The first two days of Army Group Center's advance proved to be highly successful.[citation needed] Hoth's army advanced so quickly that Bock immediately contactedWalter von Brauchitsch, requesting the bypassing of Minsk in favour of attacking towardVitebsk so that a drive could be made for Moscow. Initially, the change in plan was accepted but it was soon overruled by Hitler, who favoured the encirclement and destruction of the large Soviet armies near Minsk. Bock wrote in his diary:
The envelopment of Minsk is not decisive. Besides, I am sure that the enemy expects us to attack Minsk, the next natural objective, and will concentrate defence forces there.[26]
Differences between the strategic intent of Bock and Brauchitsch's Army High Command repeatedly surfaced. Bock continued to favour a direct drive toward Moscow, bypassing Soviet armies and leaving them to be destroyed by infantry, which advanced on foot well behind tank columns. Bock argued that if encirclement were truly necessary then instead of diverting his tanks north and south to encircle and destroy smaller Soviet armies, a larger encirclement should be made eastward toward theDvina-Dnieper riverbasins.[26] Hitler decided against this plan, and insisted that the pockets containing Soviet armies must be destroyed before advancing deeper intoRussia.[citation needed] Bock, enraged by this decision, was quoted as saying: "We are permitting our greatest chance of success to escape us by this restriction placed on our armour!"[26] He hesitantly gave the order to abandon the drive toward Vitebsk and assist in the destruction of the pockets. On 25 June, Bock moved his headquarters from Posen toKobryn, a town about 15 mi (24 km) northeast of Brest-Litovsk. On 30 June, the 4th and 9th Armies met each other nearSlonim, trapping thousands of Soviet soldiers. However, many Soviet soldiers managed to escape eastward. Bock soon gave the order to disengage from the encirclement and prepare for a full-scale drive to the east. This order once again caused a confrontation between Bock and Brauchitsch.[citation needed]
On 3 July, Bock's forces were once again advancing eastward, with Guderian's tanks crossing theBerezina and Hoth's tanks crossing the Duna. This day marked the furthest distance covered by Bock's troops in a single day, with over 100 mi (160 km) travelled.[26] Four days later, Guderian's tanks crossed the Dnieper, the last great obstacle before Smolensk. However, Guderian was soon ordered byGünther von Kluge to withdraw back across the river. Bock soon reversed this order, and Guderian was allowed to re-cross the river. Bock protested against Kluge's actions to High Command, to no avail.[26] On 11 July, Bock moved his headquarters again toBorisov, a Soviet town near the Berezina River.[citation needed] According to GeneralGünther Blumentritt, as reported by British military historianB.H. Liddell Hart, one reason Kluge privately gave for preferring to interrupt his and Guderian's drive for Moscow in July 1941 and to use their tanks instead for the proposedKiev encirclement was that the change would temporarily put Kluge under the command of the amiable Rundstedt rather than leaving him under the thumb of Bock, who was "a very difficult man to serve."[27]
On 9 September, Army High Command instructed Bock to prepare an operational order for the assault on Moscow, which was to begin no later than 30 September. Bock supervised the planning and preparation of the operation, and a few days later it was approved by the Army High Command.[citation needed] As part of the preparation, Army Group Center would be reinforced and replenished with men and vehicles; it would be composed of three infantry armies (the2nd, 4th, and 9th) and three tank armies (2nd, 3rd, and 4thPanzers). Colonel GeneralErich Hoepner would command the 4thPanzer Army, while the former two were outgrowths of Hoth's and Guderian's originalPanzer Groups. The replenishment of Army Group Center for the operation caused it to increase greatly in size: with almost 1.5 million soldiers, it was now larger than it was at the outset of Barbarossa. Bock spent most of the remainder of September on inspection tours of his reinforced Army Group Center. On one occasion, Bock — along withAlbert Kesselring — flew over Moscow.[28]
On 29 September, Bock held a conference with his senior commandersAdolf Strauss,Maximilian von Weichs, Hoth, Kluge, Hoepner, Guderian, and Kesselring. During the meeting, the main operational plan was reviewed, with Bock again stressing that Moscow must be taken by 7 November, before the onset of winter, and to coincide with the anniversary of theRussian Revolution.[29] The following day, the operation began with attacks from Guderian's and Hoth's armored forces. Several days later, the infantry armies began to move toward Moscow. With less than 150 km between the most advanced troops and Moscow, Bock estimated that his troops would enter the city in three to four weeks.[30] Almost immediately, Bock's forces encountered stiff Soviet resistance on the road to Moscow.[citation needed] The 2ndPanzer Army, along with the XLVIIIPanzer Corps, attacked important rail junctions nearOryol andBryansk. Hoepner's 4thPanzer Army soon crossed the Desna river and gained access to deep Russian territory. Meanwhile, Hoth's 3rdPanzer Army struck towardRzhev on theVolga River.
On 3 October, Guderian's forces captured Oryol and subsequently gained access to a paved highway which led to Moscow, some 180 mi (290 km) away. Meanwhile, elements of the 2ndPanzer Army reported that they had bypassed Bryansk and were heading towardKarachev. Bock ordered Guderian to press on towardTula, but within hours this order had been reversed by Army High Command. The reversal of the order called for Guderian to attack Bryansk where, along withVyazma, two massive encirclements of Soviet forces were occurring. Bock argued that the area between Oryol and Tula remained relatively free of Soviet forces, and that Tula could be captured within hours. Ultimately, Bock agreed to divert Guderian's tanks toward Bryansk.[citation needed] Cold rain soon began to fall over the northern sectors of Army Group Center's front, and the roads soon turned intoquagmires as part of theRasputitsa. Virtually the entire front became stuck; the only vehicles capable of negotiating the mud were tanks and othertracked vehicles. However, these moved at an extremely slow pace (sometimes less than 2 mi (3.2 km) per day[2]), and fuel consumption soared. This further aggravated the problem of already poorsupply lines.[2] Slight improvements in the weather soon made it possible for Bock's forces to continue to seal the pockets around Bryansk and Vyazma. The dual encirclements of Soviet forces around Vyazma and Bryansk yielded some of the largest Soviet casualties since the beginning of Operation Barbarossa: some 650,000prisoners of war were taken during these two encirclements, after which the Soviet armies facing Bock's Army Group Center no longer had the advantage of superior numbers.[2] Bock was one of the few German officers to protest against the systematicmaltreatment of Soviet prisoners of war, but took few steps to improve the conditions of those being held in the areas under his command.[31] The weather soon deteriorated again, with the roads once more turning into impassable, muddy quagmires. Since 30 September, Bock had lost some 35,000 men, 250 tanks andartillery pieces, and several hundred other vehicles, many of which were mired in the mud. Fuel andammunition supplies became dangerously low. Despite these problems, the advance toward Moscow continued as Hitler became increasingly impatient. When advance units of the 4thPanzer Army reachedKaluga andMaloyaroslavets, German forces were within 40 mi (64 km) of Moscow. Guderian's advance in the south was much slower – an attempt by his forces to capture Tula had failed, with considerable losses of men and tanks. However, other units capturedStalinogorsk andVenyov, indicating the possibility of bypassing Tula.
Bock's forces smashed through the Red Army'sMozhaisk defense lines in mid-October, causing panic to strike in Moscow. Hundreds of thousands of civilians began to evacuate the city while others were forced into emergency volunteer units.Martial law was instituted aslooting and pillaging of deserted stores increased. MarshalSemyon Timoshenko was relieved of command in favor ofGeorgy Zhukov, who had been organizing the defense ofLeningrad. The main bulk of the Soviet government was evacuated toKuibyshev, 500 mi (800 km) southeast of Moscow. However, Soviet leaderJoseph Stalin remained in the capital after being reassured by Zhukov that the capital would not fall.[32] The further Bock's forces advanced, the stiffer Soviet resistance became. The paved roads leading to Moscow became craters under constant Russian artillery fire, rendering them impassable. This forced the German troops into the mud and Army Group Center soon became stuck once again. The goal of capturing Moscow by mid-October could no longer be achieved. However, the sheer weight of the German advance could not be fully stopped, and on 21 October units of the 9th Army capturedKalinin.[citation needed]
As November arrived, the mud soon turned into ice as temperatures dropped to −28 °C (−20 °F). While the ground hardened sufficiently enough to support vehicles, the cold weather added to the miseries of the German soldiers as many had not received sufficient winter clothing.Frostbite soon took its toll; many soldiers were severely affected and had to be evacuated.[citation needed] On 20 November, Bock moved his field headquarters to an advanced forward position near the front lines. There he visited an artillery command post, where he could see the buildings of Moscow through his field glasses.[33] Several days later, German forces crossed theMoscow-Volga Canal and reachedKhimki but soon fell back due to Soviet resistance. On 29 November, elements of the 4thPanzer Army reached the western suburbs of Moscow. On 4 December, units of the 2nd Army reachedKuntsevo, a westernsuburb of Moscow. Several units of Guderian's army bypassedKolomna and reached theMoskva River. Meanwhile, the 3rdPanzer Army once again fought into Khimki. These were the last advances made by Army Group Center under Bock's command.[34]
On 6 December, with the temperature at −45 °C (−50 °F), fresh Soviet troops commanded by Zhukov launched a hugecounterattack. German troops along the front near Moscow retreated, destroying whatever equipment they could not salvage. Several days later, Army High Command ordered a halt to all offensive operations. Bock wrote in his diary:
All along, I demanded of Army High Command the authority to strike down the enemy when he was wobbling. We could have finished the enemy last summer. We could have destroyed him completely. Last August, the road to Moscow was open; we could have entered theBolshevik capital in triumph and in summery weather. The high military leadership of the Fatherland made a terrible mistake when it forced my army group to adopt a position of defense last August. Now all of us are paying for that mistake.[35]
By 13 December, German forces had retreated more than 80 km (50 mi) from Moscow. On 18 December, Bock was relieved of his command of Army Group Center. The official pretext of this decision was health problems.[36] However, this was just one case out of some 40 high-ranking officers being relieved of their command following the failure to capture Moscow.[2]
Bock was reassigned to leadArmy Group South on 20 January 1942, after the death ofGeneralfeldmarshallWalter von Reichenau from astroke inUkraine.[37] Thus, in May 1942, he commanded the defending forces that delivered the devastating defeat to the Soviet winter offensive, and severely depleted Soviet tank strength in theSecond Battle of Kharkov. On 28 June 1942, Bock's offensive split the Soviet front into fragments on either side ofKursk. Three armies (Weich's 2nd Army, Hoth's 4th Panzer, andFriedrich Paulus' 6th Army), along with 11panzer divisions, fanned out towardVoronezh and theDon river. Paulus' armoured divisions reached the Don on either side of Voronezh on 5 July. The Soviet High Command created aVoronezh Front underNikolai Vatutin, who reported directly to Moscow. Bock wanted to eliminate Vatutin's forces before extending his own flank too deeply into the void created by the strength and speed of the German offensive. Hitler was not pleased with Bock's plan to delay the push towardStalingrad.
On 7 July, Hitler split Army Group South into Army Groups A and B. Army Group A was given to Field MarshalWilhelm List to command.[37] On 17 July, Hitler relieved Bock as commander of Army Group B, replacing him withMaximilian von Weichs. Bock was moved to theFührerreserve but never again occupied a senior command position.[38] He spent the rest of the war living a quiet life inBavaria after effectively being forced into retirement.Henning von Tresckow, who was married to a cousin of Bock, tried several times to win him over to the resistance against Hitler within the military. He condemned the20 July plot, the assassination attempt on Hitler on 20 July 1944, as a crime. AfterHitler's suicide on 30 April 1945, he offered himself to the new government under AdmiralKarl Dönitz.
On 3 May 1945, Bock's car wasstrafed by aRoyal New Zealand Air ForceHawker Tempest fromNo. 486 Squadron RNZAF nearLensahn while evacuating toHamburg.[39] The strafe severely wounded Bock, and killed his wife Wilhelmina, his stepdaughter Katharina, and a friend driving the car. Initially the only survivor of the attack, Bock died of his injuries the following day at a naval hospital inOldenburg in Holstein.[40] He was buried in Friedhof Lensahn cemetery in Lensahn.[citation needed]
His mother, Baroness Olga Helene von Falkenhayn von Bock [...] had relatives in the Russian aristocracy,
| Military offices | ||
|---|---|---|
| Preceded by none | Commander ofHeeresgruppe Nord 27 August 1939 – 20 June 1941 | Succeeded by |
| Preceded by none | Commander ofHeeresgruppe Mitte 22 June – 19 December 1941 | Succeeded by |
| Awards and achievements | ||
| Preceded by | Cover ofTime magazine 8 December 1941 | Succeeded by |
| Preceded by | Cover ofTime magazine 21 September 1942 | Succeeded by |
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