| February Countercurrent | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theCultural Revolution | |||
| Date | 11 February 1967 – 18 February 1967 (1 week) | ||
| Location | |||
| Caused by |
| ||
| Resulted in | Cultural Revolution Group victory, party elders criticized and are made to conduct self-criticism | ||
| Parties | |||
| Lead figures | |||
TheFebruary Countercurrent (Chinese:二月逆流;pinyin:Èryuè nìliú), or theFebruary Adverse Current,[1] was a group within theChinese Communist Party (CCP) that opposed the early direction of theCultural Revolution, as led by the "radicals" of theCultural Revolution Group (CRG). The Countercurrent included senior party andPeople's Liberation Army officers (PLA) - the "old guard" - who protested the revolution's high-levelpurges and persecutions. In February 1967, arguments between the Countercurrent and the radicals[2] led to the intervention ofMao Zedong who resolved the confrontation by supporting the CRG.[3] The leaders of the Countercurrent were punished, but did not purge; Mao wanted to prevent the "old guard" from uniting against him.[4][5]
The CRG was created by the16 May Notification in 1966 to write Cultural Revolution policy for thePolitburo Standing Committee (PSC). In practice, it led the Cultural Revolution. The CRG reported directly to Mao,[6] and its organization expanded to replace theCentral Committee Secretariat.[7]Jiang Qing, Mao's wife and a leading radical, was the CRG's deputy director from September 1966. The meetings were chaired byPermierZhou Enlai.[8]
The Cultural Revolution spread during 1966. TheRed Guards waged a destructive campaign against the "Four Olds". University students persecuted faculty.[9] Concerns over economic disruption were raised by the end of the year.[10] In early January 1967, Red Guards broke intoZhongnanhai and persecuted senior party and PLA members and their families.[11] That same month Mao made the state an acceptable target.[12] The frequency of such persecutions increased.[11]
The position of the PLA was unclear. It was required to support the revolution on ideological grounds, but also to oppose it to maintain order. In general, the PLA had been noninterventionist. By January 1967, military effectiveness was being impaired as the revolution spread into the organization and senior officers were being attacked.[13]MarshalLin Biao, the vice-chairman of theCentral Military Commission and head of the PLA,[14] sought to prevent the further erosion of his power base. In late-January, Lin persuaded Mao to allow the PLA to suppress the revolutionaries under limited circumstances to maintain order.[15]
Mao was not entirely pleased with how the CRG operated. In December 1966 and January 1967, the radicals accusedTao Zhu - the head of theparty's propaganda department - of holding the same views of other recently purged officials. Mao agreed to replace Tao at the end of January, but complained that the CRG had neither sought his input nor permission before attacking Tao. On February 10, Mao explicitly directed these criticisms against Jiang Qing and CRG directorChen Boda. Given Mao's often contradictory and mercurial behaviour, this clear indication of Mao's displeasure with senior radical leaders may have emboldened the Countercurrent to confront the radicals.[16]
According to Chinese historians, the Countercurrent sought clarification from the CRG on the future composition of the country's leadership - and whether the existing leadership was to replaced wholesale - and its effects on the PLA.[17]
The confrontations occurred during two meetings of the Central Caucus,[17] an unofficial party body that handled routine political matters after August 1966[18] and whose creation increased the power of the radicals.[19] It functioned - in membership and responsibilities - as an enlarged PSC and was chaired by Zhou Enlai.[18] The agenda for the meetings was "grasping revolution and promoting production"[20]: 154 [21] but leadership issues were actually discussed. Jiang did not attend the meetings do to illness.[22]
The first meeting was held on February 11 at Li Fuchun's home.[20]: 154 The meeting became a "verbal brawl" between the CRG—represented by Chen Boda,Kang Sheng, andWang Li—and the PLA marshals andvice premiers of theState Council. MarshalsYe Jianying - the day-to-day head of the PLA - andXu Xiangqian accused the CRG of making a "mess" of the country, and trying to undermine the PLA ("a pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat")[21] by inciting radical insurgency against the troops.[23]
The Central Caucus met again on February 16. Vice PremierTan Zhenlin labelled the radicals as "reactionary" for rejecting the leadership of the party and for persecuting individuals based on their family (" reactionary blood lineage theory").[22] MarshalChen Yi defended the revolutionary credentials of purged leadership members and accused the radicals of revisionism, comparing their ascension to power to the Soviet transition fromJoseph Stalin toNikita Khrushchev.[24]
Zhou Enlai did not support the old guard during the meetings.[24]
The radicals moved to control the narrative. In the evening of February 16,Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Li andYao Wenyuan - on Jiang Qing's instructions - reported the meeting to Mao. According to Wang Li, Mao seemed unconcerned with events until coming to Chen Yi's comment;[25] Mao found Chen's comments to be particularly offensive.[26] On February 19, Mao told members of the Politburo that he supported the CRG, and ordered Tan Zhenlin, Chen Yi, and Xu Xiangqian to "request leave of absence to self-criticize." Kang Sheng later remarked that he had never seen Mao so angry.[26] Tan Zhenlin, Chen Yi, and Xu Xiangqian underwent criticism sessions from late-February to mid-March, involving many of the Politburo members.[26]Yu Qiuli, who held a post junior to others in the Countercurrent, was permitted to retain his position; he became a target of the Red Guards in Beijing and was subjected tostruggle sessions.[20]: 154
In March 1968, Lin Biao and the Gang of Four accusedYang Chengwu, Yu Lijian (second secretary of the Party Committee of the Air Force), and Fu Chongbi (commander of the Beijing garrison) of "overturning the case of the February Countercurrent."[27]: 76–77 This event became known as the "Yang, Yu, Fu Incident."[27]: 76 Based on allegations later deemed by the Party to be false, the Gang of Four and their allies contended that Yang, Yu, and Fu sought to had sought to seize power with respect to the air force and the Beijing garrison.[27]: 76 Yang, Yu, and Fu were persecuted and some of their allies attacked and even killed.[27]: 76
At a plenum of the Central Committee in October 1968, Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao denounced the Countercurrent. Lin's denunciation was noticeably stronger than that of Zhou's. At the end of the plenum, Mao concluded in conciliation that - as party members - the Countercurrent had been correct to communicate their views and that they had been honest in doing so. As in February, Mao did not purge the Countercurrent's members and recommended that their election to the nextparty congress. According to MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao effectively pardoned the convicted members of the Countercurrent to avoid alienating the old guard; Mao valued the old guard - and its members with long histories of loyalty and support to Mao - as a fall back position.[28]
The post-Mao CCP reversed the judgment of the February Countercurrent, particularly following the downfall of theGang of Four.[29] On November 25, 1978,Hua Guofeng announced at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee that the Politburo would openly and thoroughly redress a number of historic matters, including the February Countercurrent.[27]: 54
In March 1979, the Central Committee issued a Notice of Open Rehabilitation and repudiated the allegations made by the Gang of Four during the "Yang, Yu, Fu Incident."[27]: 76 The Central Committee resolved that the accusations were slanderous, officially restored the reputations of those targeted in the incident, and paid compensation for those who were injured or killed as a result.[27]: 76
