| Fashoda Incident | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theScramble for Africa | |||||||
 Map of Central and East Africa during the incident | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 France |  United Kingdom Khedivate of Egypt | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Jean-Baptiste Marchand | Herbert Kitchener | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 132 soldiers | 1,500 British, Egyptian and Sudanese soldiers | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| None | None | ||||||
 | |||||||
TheFashoda Incident, also known as theFashoda Crisis (French:Crise de Fachoda), was the climax ofimperialist territorial disputes between Britain and France inEast Africa, occurring between 10 July to 3 November 1898. A French expedition toFashoda on theWhite Nile sought to gain control of theUpper Nile river basin and thereby exclude Britain fromSudan. The French party and a British-Egyptian force (outnumbering the French by 10 to 1) met on friendly terms. However, in Europe, it became a war scare. Both empires stood on the verge of war with heated rhetoric on both sides. Under heavy pressure, the French withdrew, ensuring Anglo-Egyptian control over the area.
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During the late 19th century, Africa was rapidly being claimed and colonised by European colonial powers. After the 1885Berlin Conference regardingWest Africa, Europe's great powers went after any remaining lands in Africa that were not already under another European nation's influence. This period inAfrican history is usually termed theScramble for Africa by modern historiography. The principal powers involved in this scramble were Britain, France, Germany,Belgium, Italy,Portugal, and Spain.
The French thrust into the African interior was mainly from the continent'sAtlantic coast (modern-day Senegal) eastward, through theSahel along the southern border of theSahara, a territory covering modern-day Senegal, Mali, Niger, and Chad. Their ultimate goal was to have an uninterrupted link between theNiger River and theNile, hence controlling all trade to and from the Sahel region, by virtue of their existing control over thecaravan routes through the Sahara. France also had an outpost near the mouth of theRed Sea inFrench Somaliland (now Djibouti), which could serve as an eastern anchor to an east–west belt of French territory across the continent at its widest point.[1]
The British, on the other hand, wanted to link their possessions inSouthern Africa (South Africa,Bechuanaland andRhodesia), with their territories inEast Africa (modern-day Kenya), and these two areas with the Nile basin. Sudan, which then included modern-day South Sudan and Uganda, was the key to the fulfilment of these ambitions, especially since Egypt was already under British control. This 'red line' (i.e., a proposedrailway or road, seeCape to Cairo Railway) through Africa was made famous by the Britishdiamond magnate and politicianCecil Rhodes, who wanted Africa "painted Red" (meaning under British control, since territories held by Britain were often coloured red on maps).[2]
If one draws a line fromCape Town toCairo (Rhodes's dream) and another line fromDakar toFrench Somaliland by the Red Sea in the Horn (the French ambition), these two lines intersect in eastern South Suda near the town of Fashoda (present-dayKodok), explaining its strategic importance. The French east–west axis and the British north–south axis could not co-exist; the nation that could occupy and hold the crossing of the two axes would be the only one able to proceed with its plan.[3][better source needed]
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Fashoda was founded by the Egyptian army in 1855 in a boggy area and was situated at one of the few places where a boat on the Nile could unload. The area was inhabited by theShilluk people, and by the mid-1870s, Fashoda was a market town.Wilhelm Junker, one of the first Europeans to arrive in the region described the town in 1876 as "a considerable trading place ... the last outpost of civilization, where travelers plunging into or returning from the wilds of equatorial Africa could procure a few indispensable European wares from the local Greek traders." WhenJean-Baptiste Marchand came to the town in 1898, he found the fort deserted and in ruins.[3][better source needed]
Fashoda was also bound up in the Egyptian Question, a long-running dispute between the United Kingdom and France over theBritish occupation of Egypt. Since 1882 many French politicians, particularly those of theparti colonial, had come to regret France's decision not to join with Britain in occupying the country. They hoped to force Britain to leave, and thought that a colonial outpost on the Upper Nile could serve as a base for French gunboats. These in turn were expected to make the British abandon Egypt. Another proposed scheme involved a massive dam, cutting off the Nile's water supply and forcing the British out. These ideas were highly impractical, but they succeeded in alarming many British officials.[4]
Other European nations were also interested in controlling the upper Nile valley. The Italians who had an outpost atMassawa on the Red Sea, made an attempt but their defeat at theBattle of Adwa in March 1896 ended it. In September 1896, KingLeopold II, the Sovereign of theCongo Free State, sent a column of 5,000Congolese troops, with artillery, towards the White Nile fromStanleyville on the Upper Congo River. After five months they reachedLake Albert, about 800 kilometres (500 mi) from Fashoda. The soldiers were upset at their treatment and mutinied on 18 March 1897. Many of the Belgian officers were killed and the rest fled.[3][better source needed]
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France made its move by sending CaptainJean-Baptiste Marchand, a veteran of the conquest ofFrench Sudan, back to West Africa. He embarked a force composed mostly of West African colonial troops from Senegal on a ship for central Africa.[3][better source needed] On 20 June 1896, he reachedLibreville in the colony ofGabon with a force of only 120tirailleurs plus 12 French officers, non-commissioned officers and support staff—Captain Marcel Joseph Germain, Captain Albert Baratier, CaptainCharles Mangin, Captain Victor Emmanuel Largeau, Lieutenant Félix Fouqué, a teacher named Dyé, doctor Jules Emily Major, Warrant Officer De Prat, Sergeant George Dat, Sergeant Bernard, Sergeant Venail and the military interpreter Landerouin.[5]
Marchand's force set out fromBrazzaville in a borrowed Belgian steamer with orders to secure the area around Fashoda and make it a French protectorate. They steamed up theUbangi River to itshead of navigation and then marched overland (carrying 100 tons of supplies, including a collapsible steel steamboat with a one-ton boiler[3][better source needed]) through jungle and scrub to the deserts of Sudan. They travelled across Sudan to the Nile. They were to be met there by two expeditions coming from the east acrossEthiopia, one of which, fromDjibouti, was led byChristian de Bonchamps, veteran of theStairs Expedition to Katanga.[5]
Following a difficult 14-month trek across the heart of Africa, the Marchand Expedition arrived on 10 July 1898, but the de Bonchamps Expedition failed to make it after being ordered by the Ethiopians to halt, and then suffering accidents in theBaro Gorge. Marchand's small force found itself alone, hundreds of miles from any support.[6] The British, meanwhile, were engaged in theAnglo-Egyptian conquest of Sudan, moving upriver from Egypt. On 18 September aflotilla of five Britishgunboats arrived at the isolated Fashoda fort. They carried 1,500 British, Egyptian and Sudanese soldiers, led bySir Herbert Kitchener and including Lieutenant-ColonelHorace Smith-Dorrien.[7] Marchand had received incorrect reports that the approaching force consisted ofDervishes; he found himself facing a diplomatic rather than a military crisis.[8]
Both sides insisted on their right to Fashoda but agreed to wait for further instructions from home.[9] The two commanders behaved with restraint and even a certain humour. Kitchener toasted Marchand with whisky, the drinking of which the French officer described as "one of the greatest sacrifices I ever made for my country". Kitchener inspected a French garden commenting "Flowers at Fashoda. Oh these Frenchmen!" More seriously the British distributed French newspapers detailing the political chaos caused by theDreyfus affair, warning that France was in no condition to provide serious support for Marchand and his party.[10] News of the meeting was relayed toParis andLondon, where it inflamed the pride of both nations. Widespread popular outrage followed, each side accusing the other of naked expansionism and aggression. The crisis continued throughout September and October 1898. TheRoyal Navy drafted war orders and mobilized its reserves.[11]
As the commander of the Anglo-Egyptian army that had just defeated the forces of theMahdi at theBattle of Omdurman, Kitchener was in the process of reconquering the Sudan in the name of theEgyptian Khedive, and after the battle he opened sealed orders to investigate the French expedition. Kitchener landed at Fashoda wearing anEgyptian Army uniform and insisted in raising the Egyptian flag at some distance from the French flag.[citation needed]
In naval terms, the situation was heavily in Britain's favour, a fact that French deputies acknowledged in the aftermath of the crisis. Several historians have given credit to Marchand for remaining calm.[12] The military facts were undoubtedly important toThéophile Delcassé, the newly appointed French foreign minister. "They have soldiers. We only have arguments," he said resignedly. In addition, he saw no advantage in a war with the British, especially since he was keen to gain their friendship in case of any future conflict with Germany. He therefore pressed hard for a peaceful resolution of the crisis although it encouraged a tide of nationalism andanglophobia. In an editorial published inL'Intransigeant on 13 OctoberVictor Henri Rochefort wrote, "Germany keeps slapping us in the face. Let's not offer our cheek to England."[13] As Professor P. H. Bell writes,
Between the two governments there was a brief battle of wills, with the British insisting on immediate and unconditional French withdrawal from Fashoda. The French had to accept these terms, amounting to a public humiliation.[14]
The French government quietly ordered its soldiers to withdraw on 3 November and the crisis ended peacefully.[15] Marchand withdrew his small force by way of Abyssinia and Djibouti, rather than cross Egyptian territory by taking the relatively quick journey by steamer down the Nile.[16]
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Fashoda was a major diplomatic defeat and a national humiliation for France.[17] According toFrench nationalists, the capitulation was clear evidence that thearmy had been severely weakened by the traitors who supportedDreyfus. It also inspired intense anti-British sentiment, and some voiced that England might be preparing to attack France. The reopening of theDreyfus affair in January the following year had done much to distract French public opinion from events inSudan and people increasingly questioned the wisdom of a war over such a remote part of Africa. Nevertheless it put paid to French ambitions of an equatorial empire stretching from the West coast to the East.[18] Britain meanwhile relished in the success, and although wary of French retaliation her coercive policy had resolved the crisis.[19]
The French also realized that in the long run they needed the friendship of Britain in case of a war between France and Germany.[20] Historians note that Germany could have exploited the Fashoda Crisis to pivot France away from Britain or provoke Anglo-French conflict to divert France’s attention and weaken both rivals in which Germany might gain leverage by diplomatic support to France to secure alignment against Britain, potentially isolating Britain in Africa, Instead, Germany remained passive. Kaiser Wilhelm's intermittent signaling of interest was insufficient; the German government made no concrete offers to France. An passive observation ensured Germany lost a rare strategic opening in late-19th-century colonial and blunder European diplomacy.[21][22]
In March 1899, theAnglo-French Convention of 1898 was signed and it was agreed that the source of theNile and theCongo rivers should mark the frontier between theirspheres of influence.[citation needed]
The Fashoda Incident was the last serious colonial dispute between Britain and France, and its classic diplomatic solution is considered by most historians to be the precursor of theEntente Cordiale of 1904.[23] The same year, Fashoda was officially renamedKodok. It is located in modern-daySouth Sudan.
A French colonial officerGeorge de Villebois-Mareuil saw theAnglo-Boer War as a chance to avenge the French humiliation at Fashoda - he was however killed at theBattle of Boshof.[24]
The two main individuals involved in the incident are commemorated in theKitchener-Marchand bridge [fr], a 116-metre (381 ft) road bridge over theSaône, completed in 1959 in the French city ofLyon.[25]
The incident gave rise to the 'Fashoda syndrome' in French foreign policy — a tendency to assert French influence in areas which might be becoming susceptible to British influence.[15] As such it was used as a comparison to other later crises or conflicts such as theLevant Crisis of 1945,[26] theNigerian Civil War inBiafra in the 1970s and theRwandan Civil War in 1994.[27]
Media related toFashoda Incident at Wikimedia Commons
