TheExtradition Clause orInterstate Rendition Clause[1] of theUnited States Constitution isArticle IV,Section 2, Clause 2, which provides for the extradition of an accused criminal back to the state where they allegedly committed a crime.
Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2:
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
Similar to a clause found in theArticles of Confederation, the Extradition Clause was included because the founders found that interstaterendition was separate from internationalextradition. Fearing that the clause was not self-executing, Congress passed the first rendition act in 1793 – now found under18 U.S.C. § 3182.[1]
According to a book review inThe New York Times in January 2015:
TheNorthwest Ordinance of July 1787 held thatslaves "may be lawfully reclaimed" from free states and territories, and soon after, afugitive slave clause — Article IV, Section 2 — was woven into the Constitution at the insistence of the Southern delegates, leadingSouth Carolina'sCharles Cotesworth Pinckney to boast, "We have obtained a right to recover our slaves in whatever part of America they may take refuge, which is a right we had not before."[2]
The meaning of the Extradition Clause was first tested before theSupreme Court in the case ofKentucky v. Dennison (1861). The case involved a man named Willis Lago who was wanted inKentucky for helping a slave girl escape. He had fled toOhio, where the governor,William Dennison, Jr., refused to extradite him back to Kentucky. In this case, the court ruled that, while it was the duty of a governor to return a fugitive to the state where the crime was committed, a governor could not be compelled through awrit of mandamus to do so.
In 1987, the court reversed its decision underDennison. The case involved an Iowan, Ronald Calder, who struck a married couple nearAguadilla, Puerto Rico. The husband survived but the wife, who was eight months pregnant, did not. Following the incident, Calder was charged with murder and let out on bail. While on bail, Ronald Calder fled to his home-state ofIowa. In May 1981, theGovernor of Puerto Rico submitted a request to theGovernor of Iowa for the extradition of Ronald Calder to face the murder charges. The Governor of Iowa refused the request, and the Governor of Puerto Rico filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in theUnited States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The Court rejected it, ruling that, underKentucky v. Dennison, the Governor of Iowa was not obligated to return Calder. TheUnited States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court, overruling its existing precedent, reversed, ruling unanimously that the Federal Courts did indeed have the power to enforce a writ of mandamus and thatKentucky v. Dennison was outdated.
Fugitives for whom extradition had been refused under the former rule are now subject to extradition.[3]