Movatterモバイル変換


[0]ホーム

URL:


Jump to content
WikipediaThe Free Encyclopedia
Search

Euroscepticism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Body of criticism of the European Union
This article is about opposition to or scepticism on the European Union. For negative sentiment towards people of European descent, seeAnti-Europeanism.

This article is part ofa series on
Other bodies
European Investment Bank Group

European Stability Mechanism

European University Institute

Unified Patent Court


Other independent bodies


Inter-institutional bodies


Foreign relations of EU member states



flagEuropean Union portal

Euroscepticism, also spelled asEuroskepticism orEU-scepticism,[1][2][3] is a political position involving criticism of theEuropean Union (EU) andEuropean integration. It ranges from those who oppose someEU institutions and policies and seek reform (Eurorealism,Eurocritical, orsoft Euroscepticism), to those who opposeEU membership and see the EU as unreformable (anti-European Unionism,anti-EUism, orhard Euroscepticism).[4][5][6] The opposite of Euroscepticism is known aspro-Europeanism.

The main drivers of Euroscepticism have been beliefs that integration undermines nationalsovereignty and thenation state,[7][8] that the EU iselitist andlacks democratic legitimacy andtransparency,[7][8] that it is toobureaucratic and wasteful,[7][9][10] that it encourages high levels ofimmigration,[7] or perceptions that it is aneoliberal organisation serving thebig business elite at the expense of theworking class,[11] that it is responsible forausterity,[7] and drivesprivatization.[12]

Euroscepticism is found in groups across thepolitical spectrum, bothleft-wing andright-wing, and is often found inpopulist parties.[13][7] Although they criticise the EU for many of the same reasons, Euroscepticleft-wing populists focus more on economic issues, such as theEuropean debt crisis and theTransatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership,[12][14][15][16] while Euroscepticright-wing populists focus more on nationalism and immigration, such as the2015 European migrant crisis.[17] The rise inradical-right parties since the 2000s is strongly linked to a rise in Euroscepticism.[18]

Eurobarometer surveys of EU citizens show that trust in the EU and its institutions declined strongly from 2007 to 2015.[19] In that period, it was consistently below 50%.[20] A 2009 survey showed that support for EU membership was lowest in theUnited Kingdom (UK),Latvia, andHungary.[21] By 2016, the countries viewing the EU most unfavourably were the UK,Greece,France, andSpain.[22] The2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum resulted in a 51.9% vote in favour of leaving the EU (Brexit), a decision that came into effect on 31 January 2020.

Since 2015, trust in the EU has risen in most EU countries as a result of falling unemployment rates and the end of the migrant crisis.[23] A post-2019 election Eurobarometer survey showed that 68% of citizens support the EU, the highest level since 1983; however, sentiment that things are not going in the right direction in the EU had increased to 50%.[24] Trust in the EU had increased significantly at the beginning of theCOVID-19 pandemic with levels varying across member states.[25][26]

In March 2025, support for the European Union reached an all-time high among citizens of EU members states.[27] A Eurobarometer poll conducted in January and February found that 74% of EU citizens believe their country’s membership in the bloc is beneficial, the highest level recorded since the question was first introduced in 1983.[28] The decline in Euroscepticism has been attributed to growing security concerns amid ongoing geopolitical instability, including the continuation ofRussia’s invasion of Ukraine and renewed transatlantic tensions underDonald Trump, who has been critical ofNATO and the European Union.[27][29]

Reasoning

[edit]

The main reasons for Euroscepticism include beliefs that:

Terminology

[edit]

There can be considered to be several different types of Eurosceptic thought, which differ in the extent to which adherents reject integration between member states of theEU and in their reasons for doing so. Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart described two of these as hard and soft Euroscepticism.[30][31][32][33][34] At the same time, some scholars have said that there is no clear line between the presumed hard and soft Euroscepticism.[citation needed]Cas Mudde and Petr Kopecky have said that if the demarcation line is the number of and which policies a party opposes, then the question arises of how many must a party oppose and which ones should a party oppose that makes them hard Eurosceptic instead of soft.[35]

Hard Euroscepticism

[edit]

According to Taggart and Szczerbiak, hard Euroscepticism, or anti-EU-ism,[30][31][32][33][34] is "a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived".[33] TheEurope of Freedom and Direct Democracy group in theEuropean Parliament (2014–2019) displayed hard Euroscepticism, but following the 2019 EU elections the group was disbanded due to too few members, as its largest member, the BritishBrexit Party, withdrew ahead of the United Kingdom's formal exit from the EU.[36]

Some hard Eurosceptics regard their position as pragmatic rather than in principle. Additionally,Tony Benn, a left-wingLabour Party MP who fought againstEuropean integration in 1975 by opposing membership of theEuropean Communities inthat year's referendum on the issue, emphasised his opposition toxenophobia and his support ofdemocracy, saying: "My view about the European Union has always been not that I am hostile to foreigners, but that I am in favour of democracy. ... I think they're building an empire there, they want us to be a part of their empire and I don't want that."[37]

The Czech presidentVáclav Klaus rejected the termEuroscepticism for its purported negative undertones, saying at a meeting in April 2012 that the expressions for a Eurosceptic and their opponent should be "a Euro-realist" and someone who is "Euro-naïve", respectively.[38]François Asselineau of the FrenchPopular Republican Union has criticised the use of the term 'sceptic' to describe hard Eurosceptics, and would rather advocate the use of the term "Euro opponent".[39] He believes the use of the term 'sceptic' for soft Eurosceptics to be correct, since other Eurosceptic parties in France are "merely criticising" the EU without taking into account the fact that theTreaty of Rome can be modified only with a unanimous agreement of all the EU member states, something he considers impossible to achieve.[40]

Soft Euroscepticism

[edit]

Soft Euroscepticism, also known asEurorealism, reflects a support for the existence of, and membership of, a form of EU but with opposition to specific EU policies, or in Taggart's and Szczerbiak's words, "where there is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU's trajectory."[41]

Both theEuropean Conservatives and Reformists Group, dominated by the right-wing Polish partyLaw and Justice, andThe Left Group, which is an alliance of the left-wing parties in the European Parliament, display soft Euroscepticism. The European Conservatives and Reformist Group does not itself use the descriptions Euroscepticism or soft Euroscepticism and instead describes its position as one of Eurorealism, a distinction described by Leruth as being one that is "quite subtle but should not be ignored" given the association of the term Euroscepticism with "European disintegration". Leruth describes Eurorealism as "a pragmatic, anti-federalist, and flexible vision of European integration where the principle of subsidiarity prevails, aiming to reform the current institutional framework to extend the role of national parliaments in the decision-making process." Steven states that "Eurorealism is a form of conservativism, first and foremost, rather than a form or Euroscepticism, even if it obviously very much also has the 'soft' Eurosceptic tendencies which are present in a number of ECR member parties."[42][43][44][45][46][47]

Anti-Europeanism

[edit]
Main article:Anti-Europeanism

While having some overlaps, Euroscepticism andanti-Europeanism are different. Euroscepticism is criticism of theEuropean Union (EU) andEuropean integration. Anti-Europeanism is sentiment or policies in opposition toEurope. For example,American exceptionalism in the United States has long led to criticism of Europeandomestic policy,[48] such as the size of thewelfare state in European countries,[citation needed] andforeign policy, such as European countries that did not support the US-led2003 invasion of Iraq.[citation needed]

Other terms

[edit]

Some scholars consider the gradual difference in terminology between hard and soft Euroscepticism inadequate to accommodate the large differences in terms of political agenda;hard Euroscepticism has also been referred to asEurophobia as opposed to mereEuroscepticism.[49] Other alternative names for hard and soft Euroscepticism includewithdrawalist andreformist, respectively.[50]

Eurobarometer surveys

[edit]
Percentage responding that their country on balance benefited from being a member of the EU atEurobarometer 2023:[51]
  91–100%
  81–90%
  71–80%
  61–70%
  51–60%

A survey in November 2015[update], conducted byTNS Opinion and Social on behalf of theEuropean Commission, showed that, across the EU as a whole, those with a positive image of the EU were down from a high of 52% in 2007 to 37% in autumn 2015; this compares with 23% with a negative image of the EU, and 38% with a neutral image.[52] About 43% of Europeans thought things were "going in the wrong direction" in the EU, compared with 23% who thought things were going "in the right direction" (11% "don't know").[53] About 32% of EU citizens tend to trust the EU as an institution, and about 55% do not tend to trust it (13% "don't know").[19] Distrust of the EU was highest inGreece (81%),Cyprus (72%),Austria (65%),France (65%), theUnited Kingdom (UK) and theCzech Republic (both 63%). Overall, more respondents distrusted their own government (66%) than they distrusted the EU (55%). Distrust of national government was highest in Greece (82%),Slovenia (80%),Portugal (79%), Cyprus (76%), and France (76%).[54]

A Eurobarometer survey carried out four days prior to and six days after the2016 United States presidential election revealed that the surprise victory ofDonald Trump caused an increase in the popularity of the EU in Europe. The increase was strongest among the political right and among respondents who perceived their country as economically struggling.[55]

A survey carried out in April 2018 for the European Parliament by Kantar Public consulting found that support for the EU was "the highest score ever measured since 1983". Support for the EU was up in 26 out of 28 EU countries, the exceptions being Germany and the UK, where support had dropped by about 2% since the previous survey. Almost half (48%) of the 27,601 EU citizens surveyed agreed that their voice counted in the EU, up from 37% in 2016, whereas 46% disagreed with this statement. Two-thirds (67%) of respondents felt that their country had benefited from EU membership and 60% said that being part of the bloc was a good thing, as opposed to 12% who felt the opposite. At the height of the EU's financial and economic crises in 2011, just 47% had been of the view that EU membership was a good thing. Support for EU membership was greatest inMalta (93%),Ireland (91%),Lithuania (90%),Poland (88%),Luxembourg (88%),Estonia (86%), andDenmark (84%), and lowest inGreece (57%),Bulgaria (57%),Cyprus (56%),Austria (54%), theUnited Kingdom (53%), andItaly (44%).[56]

When asked which issues should be a priority for the European Parliament, survey respondents picked terrorism as the most pressing topic of discussion, ahead of youth unemployment and immigration. Not all countries shared the same priorities. Immigration topped the list in Italy (66% of citizens surveyed considered it a priority issue), Malta (65%), andHungary (62%) but fighting youth unemployment and support for economic growth were top concerns inSpain, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, andCroatia. Social protection of citizens was the top concern for Dutch, Swedish, and Danish respondents.[56]

The April 2019Eurobarometer showed that despite the challenges of the past years, and in cases such as the ongoing debate surrounding Brexit, possibly even because of it, the European sense of togetherness had not weakened, with 68% of respondents across the EU27 believing that their countries have benefited from being part of the EU, a historically high level since 1983. On the other hand, more Europeans (27%) were uncertain and saw the EU as "neither a good thing nor a bad thing", an increase in 19 countries. Despite the overall positive attitude towards the EU but in line with the uncertainty expressed by a growing number of Europeans, the feeling that things were not going in the right direction in both the EU and in their own countries had increased to 50% on EU average since September 2018.[24]

The Eurobarometer 93.1 survey was in the field across Europe when theEuropean Council summit reached political agreement on a pandemic economic recovery fund (later namedNext Generation EU) on 21 July 2020. A comparison of Eurobarometer responses gathered before this seminal decision and interviews conducted shortly thereafter indicates that the European Council's endorsement of pandemic economic relief increased popular support of COVID-19 economic recovery aid - but only among Europeans who view EU decisionmakers as trustworthy.[57]

History in the European Parliament

[edit]
General public image of EU by country according toEurobarometer 2024[58]
CountryPositive %Neutral %Negative %Pos - Neg
 Czech Republic
35%
35%
30%
+5
 France
33%
38%
28%
+5
 Austria
38%
24%
27%
+11
 Greece
38%
37%
25%
+13
 Cyprus
39%
40%
21%
+18
 Spain
42%
44%
13%
+19
 Slovenia
37%
46%
16%
+21
 Slovakia
44%
34%
22%
+22
 Malta
39%
45%
16%
+23
 Germany
42%
41%
17%
+25
 Hungary
42%
42%
16%
+26
 Belgium
47%
33%
20%
+27
 Italy
44%
40%
16%
+28
 Estonia
43%
41%
15%
+28
 Netherlands
44%
29%
15%
+29
 Croatia
53%
34%
13%
+30
 Poland
54%
33%
13%
+31
 Romania
46%
39%
14%
+32
 Sweden
55%
33%
12%
+33
 Latvia
44%
45%
10%
+34
 Bulgaria
53%
28%
18%
+35
 Luxembourg
54%
29%
16%
+38
 Finland
49%
40%
10%
+39
 Denmark
59%
31%
9%
+50
 Lithuania
58%
35%
6%
+52
 Ireland
66%
24%
10%
+56
 Portugal
68%
26%
5%
+61

1999–2004

[edit]

A study analysed voting records of the Fifth European Parliament and ranked groups, concluding:[59] "Towards the top of the figure are the more pro-European parties (PES, EPP-ED, and ALDE), whereas towards the bottom of the figure are the more anti-European parties (EUL/NGL, G/EFA, UEN and EDD)."

2004–2009

[edit]

In 2004, 37Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the UK,Poland,Denmark andSweden founded a new European Parliament group called "Independence and Democracy" from the oldEurope of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) group.

The main goal of the ID group was to reject the proposedTreaty establishing a constitution for Europe. Some delegations within the group, notably that from UKIP, also advocated the complete withdrawal of their country from the EU, while others only wished to limit further European integration.

2009 elections

[edit]

Theelections of 2009 saw a significant fall in support in some areas for Eurosceptic parties, with all such MEPs from Poland, Denmark and Sweden losing their seats. In the UK, the Eurosceptic UKIP achieved second place in the election, finishing ahead of the governing Labour Party, and theBritish National Party (BNP) won its first-ever two MEPs. Although new members joined the ID group from Greece and theNetherlands, it was unclear whether the group would reform in the new parliament.[citation needed]

The ID group did reform, as theEurope of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) and is represented by 32 MEPs from nine countries.[60]

2014 elections

[edit]

Theelections of 2014 saw a big anti-establishment vote in favour of Eurosceptic parties, which took around a quarter of the seats available. Those that came first their national elections included: UKIP in the UK (the first time since 1906 that a party other than Labour or the Conservatives had won a national vote), theNational Front in France, thePeople's Party in Denmark andSyriza in Greece. Second places were taken bySinn Féin in Ireland and theFive Star Movement in Italy.Herman Van Rompuy, thePresident of the European Council, agreed following the election to re-evaluate the economic area's agenda and to launch consultations on future policy areas with the 28 member states.[citation needed]

2019 elections

[edit]

Theelections of 2019 saw the centre-left and centre-right parties suffer significant losses including losing their overall majority, whilegreen,pro-EU liberal, and some Eurosceptic right wing parties saw significant gains.[61][62] Those that came first in their national elections included: theBrexit Party in the UK (which was only launched on 12 April 2019 by former UKIP leaderNigel Farage), theNational Rally of France (formerly the National Front party until June 2018),Fidesz in Hungary,Lega in Italy, andLaw and Justice in Poland. There were also notable falls in support for theDanish People's Party (previously topped the 2014 European election). WhilstVox got elected with 3 seats, Spain's first Eurosceptic party and Belgium'sVlaams Belang rallied to gain second place after its poor 2014 result.

2024 elections

[edit]

In theelections of 2024, 24 EU countries elected at least one member of a Eurosceptic group (European Conservatives and Reformists Group,Patriots for Europe orEurope of Sovereign Nations). The three exceptions wereIreland,Malta andSlovenia.[63][64]

In EU member states

[edit]
See also:2015 European migrant crisis

Austria

[edit]
Heinz-Christian Strache, former leader of the Austrian hard Eurosceptic partyFPÖ

TheFreedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), established in 1956, is a right-wing populist party that mainly attracts support from young people and workers.[65] In 1989, it changed its stance over the EU to Euroscepticism. It opposed Austria joining the EU in 1994, and opposed the introduction of theeuro in 1998. The party would like to leave the EU if it threatens to develop intoa country, or ifTurkey joins. The FPÖ received 20–27% of the national vote in the 1990s, and more recently received 18% in 2008. Following the2017 Austrian legislative election, it has 51/183 National Council seats, 16/62 Federal Council seats, and 4/19 European Parliament seats.

TheBündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ), established in 2005, is a socially conservative party that has always held Eurosceptic elements. In 2011 the party openly supported leaving theeurozone, and in 2012 it announced that it supported a full withdrawal from the European Union.[66] The party has also called upon a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.[67] In polls it generally received around 10–15%, although in one state it did receive 45% of the vote in 2009. Since the 2017 election, it has 0/183 National Council seats, 0/62 Federal Council seats, and 0/19 European Parliament seats.

Team Stronach, established in 2012, has campaigned to reform the European Union, as well as to replace the euro with an Austrian Euro. In 2012, it regularly received 8–10% support in national polls.[68] Politicians from many different parties (including the Social Democratic Party and the BZÖ) as well as previous independents switched their allegiances to the new party upon creation.[69][70] In two local elections in March 2013, it won 11% of the vote inCarinthia, and 10% of the vote inLower Austria. It dissolved in 2017.

Ewald Stadler, a former member of FPÖ (and later of BZÖ) was very Eurosceptic, but in 2011 became a member of the European Parliament due to the Lisbon Treaty. Before Stadler accepted the seat, this led to heavy critics by Jörg Leichtfried (SPÖ) "Stadler wants to just rescue his political career" because Stadler before mentioned he would never accept a seat as MEP if this was only due to the Lisbon Treaty.[71] On 23 December 2013 he founded a conservative and Eurosceptic party calledThe Reform Conservatives, although it has been inactive since June 2016.

In the2014 European Parliament election, the FPÖ increased its vote to 19.7% (up 7.0%), gaining 2 new MEPs, making a total of 4; the party came third, behind the ÖVP and the SPÖ. EU-STOP (the electoral alliance of theEU Withdrawal Party and theNeutral Free Austria Federation) polled 2.8%, gaining no seats, and theReform Conservatives 1.2%, with Team Stronach putting up no candidates.[72]

In the2019 European Parliament election, the FPÖ came 3rd with 17.2% of the vote which was only slightly down on 2014 despite a scandal allegedly promising public contracts to a woman posing as a Russian backer. This precipitated the collapse of the ruling coalition and a new election being called.[73][74]

Belgium

[edit]

According toEurostat, in the fall of 2018, 44% of Belgians stated that they did not trust theEuropean Union.[75] The main Eurosceptic party inBelgium is thefar-rightVlaams Belang which is active in theDutch-speaking part of Belgium. However, theleft-wingPTB-PVDA also opposes the EU on many issues, primarilyausterity and social policy,[76] while defending a fundamental reform of the existing European framework instead of an exit from it.[77]

In the2014 European Parliament election, Vlaams Belang lost over half of its previous vote share, polling 4.3% (down 5.5%) and losing 1 of its 2 members of the European Parliament.[78] Despite the presence of Eurosceptic parties in Belgium, their weight is relatively low, as Belgium is predominantlyEuropeanist.[75][79]

In 2019, Vlaams Belang stated in its program[80] for the2019 European Parliament election that it opposes the creation of a European state, would like to change theEconomic and Monetary Union of the EU, and to end theSchengen Area, and refuses the accession ofTurkey to the EU. More widely, the euro-sceptic arguments of the Vlaams Belang are based on four pillars:

  1. loss ofsovereignty (for instance on economic sovereignty or on the binding legal order);
  2. the financial cost of the European Union;
  3. less competences for European Union;
  4. leaving the euro (even though in 2019 the party has changed its line and now wants to reform the euro).[81] During the2019 European Parliament election in Belgium, Vlaams Belang made substantial gains in both and polled in second place in Flemish region. At the beginning of 2019, the party was enrolled in the group ofEuropean Alliance of People and Nations in theEuropean Parliament.

TheNew Flemish Alliance (N-VA) is a soft Eurosceptic party in the Dutch-speaking region of Belgium. Before 2010, the N-VA waspro-European and supported the idea of a democratic European confederation, but has since altered this policy to a more sceptical stance on further European integration and now calls for more democratic transparency within the EU, changes to the EU's common asylum policy and economic reforms to theEurozone. The N-VA has obtained 26.8% of the votes or 4 seats of the Dutch-language college out of 12 (21 MEPs for Belgium) in the2014 European Parliament election. In April 2019, it stood in theEuropean Conservatives and Reformists Group of the European Parliament, and can be considered a moderate Eurosceptic party.

In the French-speaking part of Belgium (Walloons), there are four parties that are Eurosceptic to a varying extent. The first one is theNation Movement, a far-right party which was a member of theAlliance for Peace and Freedom in the European Parliament. The second one is theNational Front, also a far-right party which criticizes the European bureaucracy, intends to guarantee and preserve national independence and freedom in a liberated Europe; it also reaffirms the Christian roots of Europe. The third one is thePeople's Party, classified as right or extreme right. In its program[82] for the2019 European elections, the People's Party proposed to abolish theEuropean Commission, reduce the number of European parliamentarians and fight against the worker-posted directive.[83] For this party, the EU must be led by a president elected byuniversal suffrage with clear but limited competences. It also wants to renegotiate the European Union treaties, restrict thejudicial activism of theEuropean Court of Human Rights. It declares itself against theGlobal Compact for Migration. The last one is theParti libertarien [fr]. In early 2019, the party aims to reduce the powers of the European Commission, to abolish theCommon Agricultural Policy, to abandon common defense projects, to simplify the exit procedure of theEuropean Union, to rejectfederalism and to forbid the European Union to direct economic, fiscal or social policy,[84]

Finally, theWorkers' Party of Belgium (PTB-PVDA) is aMarxist electoral and unitary party. It intends to revise the European treaties considered tooneoliberal for their enforcement of austerity measures.[77] One of the Party's slogans is "The left that stings, against the Europe of money".[85] The PTB-PVDA politicianMarc Botenga (who went on to become the party's firstMEP in 2019[86]) published an extensive piece on EU politics in the magazineLava [nl] in 2018. In it, Botenga criticized the EU structures, noting that the scope for economicallyprogressive politics in the EU was limited due to its budget rules and pro-corporate frameworks. However, because the European market had already become integrated to a high extent, he also rejected an outright exit from the EU as he did not believe this would lead either to true sovereignty or to short-term economic benefits (an argument for which he citedYanis Varoufakis). Instead of retreating intonationalism, Botenga argued thatorganized labour had to combat neoliberal policies on an EU-wide scale.[87]

Bulgaria

[edit]
Volen Siderov, leader of the Bulgarian Eurosceptic partyAttack
European flag in Bulgaria torn down by supporters of the Eurosceptic party Attack

Parties with mainly Eurosceptic views areNFSB,Attack, andVMRO – BND, which is a member of the EuroscepticEuropean Conservatives and Reformists Group.Bulgaria's Minister of Finance,Simeon Djankov, stated in 2011 that ERM II membership to enter the Euro zone would be postponed until after theEurozone crisis had stabilised.[88]

In the2014 European Parliament election Bulgaria remained overwhelmingly pro-EU, with the Eurosceptic Attack party receiving 3% of the vote, down 9%, with the splinter groupNational Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria taking 3; neither party secured any MEPs. A coalition betweenVMRO – BND andBulgaria Without Censorship secured an MEP position forAngel Dzhambazki from IMRO, who is a hard Eurosceptic.

Followers of Eurosceptic Attack tore down and trampled theEuropean flag on 3 March 2016 at a meeting of the party in the Bulgarian capitalSofia, dedicated to the commemoration of the 138th anniversary of theliberation of Bulgaria from theOttoman Empire.[89]

In the2019 European Parliament election, Bulgaria remained overwhelmingly pro-EU with the ruling centre-right Gerb party winning with 31%, against 26% for the socialist BSP.[90]

Since the2021–2023 Bulgarian political crisis, the far-right hard Eurosceptic partyRevival has outplaced Attack, with it getting 14% on the most recent2023 Bulgarian parliamentary election.[91][92]

Croatia

[edit]

Parties with Eurosceptic views are mainly small right-wing parties likeCroatian Party of Rights,Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starčević,Croatian Pure Party of Rights,Autochthonous Croatian Party of Rights,Croatian Christian Democratic Party, andOnly Croatia – Movement for Croatia.

The onlyparliamentary party that is vocally Eurosceptic isThe Key of Croatia (formerly known as Human Shield) that won 5 out of 151 seats at the2016 parliamentary election. Their position is generally considered to waver between hard and soft Euroscepticism; it requests thorough reform of the EU so that all member states would be perfectly equal.

In the2019 European Parliament election, the Key of Croatia gained its first seat in the European Parliament with 6% of the vote putting it in 5th place.[93]

The Key of Croatia would go on to lose all of its seats in the2020 Croatian parliamentary election, and merge into theLaw and Justice party in 2024.[94] Law and Justice won a single seat (now vacant) in the2024 parliamentary elections as part of a coalition with theHomeland Movement.[95] Its only remaining MEPs would lose re-election in the2024 European Parliament election.

Cyprus

[edit]

Parties with mainly Eurosceptic views in Cyprus are theProgressive Party of Working People andELAM.

In the2019 European Parliament election, there was little change politically – the conservatives won narrowly, the ruling DISY taking two seats with 29%, followed by socialist AKEL (27.5%, two seats) with no seats taken by Eurosceptic parties.

Czech Republic

[edit]
Main article:Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic
Václav Klaus, former EuroscepticPresident of the Czech Republic

In May 2010, the Czech presidentVáclav Klaus said that they "needn't hurry to enter the Eurozone".[96]

Petr Mach, an economist, a close associate of president Václav Klaus and a member of theCivic Democratic Party between 1997 and 2007, founded theFree Citizens Party in 2009. The party aims to mainly attract dissatisfied Civic Democratic Party voters.[97] At the time of theLisbon Treaty ratification, they were actively campaigning against it, supported by the president Vaclav Klaus, who demanded opt-outs such as were granted to the United Kingdom and Poland,[98][99][100] unlike the governing Civic Democratic Party, who endorsed it in theChamber of Deputies.[101] After the treaty has been ratified, Mach's party is in favour of withdrawing from the European Union completely.[102] In the2014 European Parliament election, the Free Citizens Party won one mandate and allied with UKIP in theEurope of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFD).

The2025 Czech legislative election brought into the Chamber of Deputies three soft eurosceptic parties, the populistANO 2011 (ANO), the centre-rightCivic Democratic Party (ODS), and the right-wingMotorists for Themselves (AUTO). The election also brought into the Chamber of Deputies one hard eurosceptic party, the far-rightFreedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) with representatives ofSvobodní,PRO Law Respect Expertise and Tricolour running on its list. The hard euroscepticCommunist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) did not enter the Chamber of Deputies.

Denmark

[edit]
Main articles:Denmark and the European Union § Euroscepticism, andDanish withdrawal from the European Union
Pia Kjærsgaard, member (and former leader) of the hard Eurosceptic partyDanish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti), the fifth-largest represented in theDanish parliament and the fifth-most represented in the European Parliament

ThePeople's Movement against the EU only takes part in European Parliament elections and has one member in the European Parliament. The soft EuroscepticJune Movement, originally a split-off from the People's Movement against the EU, existed from 1992 to 2009.

In the DanishParliament, theRed-Green Alliance previously advocated withdrawal from the EU, but in March 2019, the party announced it would no longer campaign for a referendum to leave the EU, pointing toBrexit illustrating the need for clarity before withdrawal can be considered.[103] TheDanish People's Party also advocates withdrawal, but says it supports some EU structures such as theinternal market, and supported the EU-positiveLiberal-Conservative coalition between 2001 and 2011 and again from 2015 to 2019.

TheSocialist People's Party, minorities within theSocial Liberal Party andSocial Democratic Party, and some smaller parties were against accession to the European Union in 1972. Still in 1986, these parties advocated a no vote in theSingle European Act referendum. Later, the Social Liberal Party changed to a strongly EU-positive party, and EU opposition within the Social Democratic Party faded. The Socialist People's Party were against theAmsterdam Treaty in 1998 andDenmark's joining the euro in 2000, but has become increasingly EU-positive, for example when MEPMargrete Auken left theEuropean United Left–Nordic Green Left and joinedThe Greens–European Free Alliance in 2004.

In the2014 European Parliament election, theDanish People's Party came first by a large margin with 27% of the vote, gaining 2 extra seats for a total of 4 MEPs. ThePeople's Movement against the EU polled 8%, retaining its single MEP.

In the2019 European Parliament election, theDanish People's Party lost around two-thirds of their previous vote share dropping from 4 seats to just 1. ThePeople's Movement against the EU lost their seat and theRed-Green Alliance got one seat.[104]

The2019 Danish general election saw the emergence of a new hard Eurosceptic partyNye Borgerlige which supports Denmark leaving the EU. The party won four seats in parliament.[105]

Estonia

[edit]

TheIndependence Party andCentre Party were against accession to the EU, but only the Independence Party still wants Estonia to withdraw from the EU. TheConservative People's Party (EKRE) also has some Eurosceptic policies and increased its vote share from 4% in 2014 to 13% in the 2019 European Elections winning one seat.[106]

Finland

[edit]

The largest Eurosceptic party in Finland is theFinns Party. In theEuropean Parliament election, 2014, the Finns Party increased their vote share by 3% to 13%, adding a second MEP. With their 39 seats, the Finns Party are also the second-biggest party in the 200-seat FinnishEduskunta.[107]

In theEuropean Parliament election, 2019, the Finns Party increased their vote share slightly from 13% to 14% and retained their 2 seats.

In its latest party platform written in 2019, the Finns Party is strongly opposed to further EU integration. The party proposes introducing a parallel currency within Finland in tandem with the Euro in order to phase out Finnish membership of the Eurozone and argues that while Finland is needed in the short-term in the European Parliament to defend Finland's interests, the country should also enact policies to help gradually withdraw Finland from the EU.[108] During the2018 Finnish presidential election, the Finns Party candidateLaura Huhtasaari stated that her campaign would support exiting the EU.[109]

France

[edit]
See also:Frexit
Marine Le Pen, prominent French MEP, former leader and former presidential candidate of theNational Front (France) and of theEurope of Nations and Freedom group

In France there are multiple parties that are Eurosceptic to different degrees, varying from advocating less EU intervention in national affairs, to advocating outright withdrawal from the EU and the Eurozone. These parties belong to all sides of the political spectrum, so the reasons for their Euroscepticism may differ. In the past many French people appeared to be uninterested in such matters, with only 40% of the French electorate voting in the2009 European Parliament elections.[110]

Right-wing Eurosceptic parties include theGaullistDebout la République, andMouvement pour la France, which was part ofLibertas, a pan-European Eurosceptic party.[111] In the2009 European Parliament elections, Debout la République received 1.8% of the national vote, and Libertas 4.8%. In a similar way to some moderate parties, the French right and far-right in general are naturally opposed to the EU, as they criticise France's loss of political and economic sovereignty to asupranational entity. Some of these hard Eurosceptic parties include thePopular Republican Union andThe Patriots and formerly theFront National (FN).[112] Popular Republican Union seek France's withdrawal from the EU and the euro as well as France's withdrawal from NATO. The FN received 33.9% of the votes in the2017 French presidential election, making it the largest Eurosceptic party in France. In June 2018, the National Front was renamed as National Rally (RN) and in 2019 dropped support for France leaving the European Union and the Eurozone from its manifesto, instead calling for "reform from within" the union.[113][114]

Eurosceptic parties on the left in France tend to criticise what they see as theneoliberal agenda of the EU, as well as the elements of its structure which are undemocratic and seen as top-down. These parties include theParti de Gauche and theFrench Communist Party, which formed theFront de Gauche for the 2009 European Parliament elections and received 6.3% of the votes. The leader of theLeft Front defends a complete reform of the Monetary Union, rather than the withdrawal of France from theEurozone.[115] Some of the major far-left Eurosceptic parties in France include theNew Anticapitalist Party[116] which received 4.8% andLutte Ouvrière[117] which received 1.2%. TheCitizen and Republican Movement, a left-wing Eurosceptic andsouverainist party, have not participated in any elections for the European Parliament.

The partyChasse, Pêche, Nature & Traditions, is anagrarianist Eurosceptic party that says it is neither left nor right.

In theEuropean Parliament election, 2014, theNational Front won the elections with 24.9% of the vote, a swing of 18.6%, winning 24 seats, up from 3 previously. The former French PresidentFrançois Hollande had called for the EU to be reformed and for a scaling back of its power.[118]

In theEuropean Parliament election, 2019, the renamedNational Rally won the elections with 23.3% of the vote, winning 22 seats, down from 23 previously when their vote share was 24.9%.

Germany

[edit]
This section needs to beupdated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information.(November 2017)
"Referendum on saving the euro!" Poster from the party Alternative for Germany (AfD) regarding Germany's financial contributions during theEurozone crisis

TheAlternative for Germany (AfD) is Germany's largest Eurosceptic party.[119] It was elected into theGerman Parliament with 94 seats in September 2017.[120] Initially the AfD was a soft Eurosceptic party, that considered itself pro-Europe and pro-EU, but opposed the euro, which it believed had undermined European integration, and called for reforms to theEurozone.[121]

In theEuropean Parliament election, 2014, the Alternative for Germany came 5th with 7% of the vote, winning 7 seats and is a member of the Eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists Group. The Alternative for Germany went on to take seats in three state legislatures in the Autumn of 2014.[122]

The party became purely Eurosceptic in 2015, when an internal split occurred, leading toFrauke Petry's leadership and a more hard-line approach to the European Union, including its calling for an end for GermanEurozone membership, withdrawal from EU common asylum policies and significantly reducing the power of the EU with some AfD members supporting a complete exit from the EU altogether.[123][124]

In July 2015 an AfD splinter group created a new soft Eurosceptic party calledAlliance for Progress and Renewal.

In theEuropean Parliament election, 2019, the Alternative for Germany increased their vote share from 7% and 7 seats to 11% and 11 seats.

In the2021 German Federal Election, AfD won 10.3% of the vote and 94 seats whereas in 2017, they received 12.6% of the vote and 83 seats; this meant they moved from third place to fifth place, falling behind theGreen Party andFDP, both of which had been less popular than the AfD in 2017. Despite their overall electoral decline, the AfD still emerged as the largest in the states ofSaxony andThuringia, and saw a strong performance ineastern Germany.[125]

Greece

[edit]
Main articles:Greek withdrawal from the Eurozone andGreek government-debt crisis

Golden Dawn,Communist Party of Greece (KKE),Greek Solution,ANEL,Course of Freedom,Popular Unity, andLAOS have been the main Eurosceptic parties in Greece. According to theLondon School of Economics, Greece used to be the second most Eurosceptic country in the European Union, with 50% of Greeks thinking that their country has not benefited at all from the EU (only behind the UK). Meanwhile, 33% of Greeks viewed Greek membership in EU as a good thing, marginally ahead of the UK. 81% of Greeks felt that the EU was going in the wrong direction.[126] These figures represented a major increase in Euroscepticism in Greece since 2009.

In June 2012, the Eurosceptic parties in Greece that were represented in the parliament before the Election in January 2015 (ANEL, Golden Dawn, KKE) got 45.8% of the votes and 40.3% of the seats in the parliament. In thelegislative election of January 2015 thepro-European (left and right-wing) parties (ND,PASOK,Potami,KIDISO,EK andPrasinoi-DIMAR) got 43.3% of the votes. The Eurosceptic parties got 54.6%. The Eurosceptic left (KKE,ANTARSYA-MARS andKKE (M–L)/M–L KKE) got 42.6% of the votes and the Eurosceptic right (Golden Dawn,ANEL andLAOS) got 12.1% of the votes, with Syriza ahead with 36.3%. The Eurosceptic parties got 194 seats in the new parliament and the pro-EU parties got 106 seats.[127]

According to thepolls conducted in June and July 2015 (12 polls), the Eurosceptic left would get on average 48.0% (excluding extraparliamentary parties as ANTARSYA-MARS and KKE (m–l)/ML-KKE), the parliamentary pro-EU parties (Potami, New Democracy and PASOK) would get 33.8%, the extra-parliamentary (not represented in the Hellenic Parliament) pro-EU parties (KIDISO and EK) would get 4.4% and the Eurosceptic right would get 10.2% (excluding extraparliamentary parties, such asLAOS, not displayed on recent opinion polls). The soft Eurosceptic parties would get 42.3%, the hard Eurosceptic parties (includingKKE,ANEL andGolden Dawn) would get 15.9%, and the pro-EU parties (including extra-parliamentary parties displayed on opinion polls) would get 38.3% of the votes.[citation needed]

In theEuropean Parliament election, 2014,Syriza won the election with 26.6% of the vote (a swing of 21.9%) taking 6 seats (up 5), withGolden Dawn coming 3rd taking 3 seats, theCommunist Party taking 2 seats and theIndependent Greeks gaining their first ever seat. Syriza's leader Tsipras said he's not anti-European and does not want to leave the euro. According toThe Economist, Tsipras is willing to negotiate with Greece's European partners, and it is believed a Syriza victory could encourage radical leftist parties across Europe. Alexis Tsipras vowed to reverse many of the austerity measures adopted by Greece since a series of bailouts began in 2010, at odds with the Eurogroup's positions.[128][129]The government coalition in Greece was composed by Syriza andANEL (right-wing hard Eurosceptic party, led byPanos Kammenos, who is the current Minister of Defence).

Euroscepticism has softened in Greece as the economy improved. According to a research in early 2018, 68% of Greeks judge as positive the participation of Greece in the EU (instead of 53.5% in 2017).[130]

In theEuropean Parliament election, 2019, the New Democracy movement, beat the ruling left-wing Syriza formation with 33.1% and 23.8% of the vote respectively, maintaining Syriza's 6 seats and prompting the Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras to call alegislative election on 7 July 2019. In this election, which was won by ND, the pro-European parties (ND, SYRIZA, KINAL, MeRA25, and the extra-parliamentary Union of Centrists and Recreate Greece) got 84.9% of the vote and the Eurosceptic parties (KKE, Greek Solution, the extraparliamentary Golden Dawn and a host of other small mainly left-wing parties) got 15.1%. That drastic change in the balance is mostly the result of SYRIZA abandoning Euroscepticism.[citation needed]

Hungary

[edit]
See also:Hungarian withdrawal from the European Union
Viktor Orbán,Prime Minister of Hungary
An anti-EU poster in Hungary

Viktor Orbán is the soft Eurosceptic[131]Prime Minister of Hungary for the national-conservativeFidesz Party. Another Eurosceptic party that was present in Hungary wasJobbik, which until around 2016, was identified as aradical andfar-right party. Those far-right factions, who left Jobbik, decided to form theOur Homeland Movement party.

In 2015, 39% of the Hungarian population had a positive image of the EU, 20% had a negative image, and 40% neutral (1% "Don't know").[52]

In the2014 Hungarian parliamentary election, Fidesz got 44.5% of the votes, Jobbik got 20.5% of the votes and the communistHungarian Workers' Party got 0.6% of the votes. Thus at the time, Eurosceptic parties in Hungary obtained 65.7% of the votes, one of the highest figures in Europe.

The green-liberalPolitics Can Be Different (Lehet Más a Politika, LMP) classifies as a soft or reformist Eurosceptic party given its self-professedeuro-critical stance. During theEuropean parliamentary campaign of 2014 party Co-presidentAndrás Schiffer described LMP as having a pronounced pro-integration position onenvironmental, wage andlabour policy as supporting member state autonomy on the self-determination of local communities concerning land resources. So as to combat thedifferentiated integration of themulti-speed Europe which discriminates against Eastern and Southern member states, LMP would like to initiate aneco-social market economy within the union.[132]

In theEuropean Parliament election, 2019, Fidesz consolidated their position by increasing their vote share to 51.5% and adding a seat to take their tally to 13. Former Eurosceptic (now pro-European) Jobbik dropped to 6.3% of the votes, losing 2 of its 3 seats. TheMomentum Movement, a newly created pro-European party, came 3rd with 9.3% of the vote, with the strongly pro-EuropeanDemocratic Coalition coming second with 16.1% of the vote.Our Homeland Movement got 3.3% of the votes, gaining no seats.

Ireland

[edit]
Main article:Euroscepticism in the Republic of Ireland

Euroscepticism is a minority view inIreland, with opinion polls from 2016 to 2018 indicating growing support for EU membership, moving from 70% to 92% in that time.[133][134][135][136][137][138][139]

TheIrish people initially voted against ratifying the Nice and Lisbon Treaties. Following renegotiations, second referendums on both were passed with approximately 2:1 majorities in both cases.[140] Some commentators and smaller political groups questioned the validity of the Irish Government's decision to call second referendums.[141][142]

The left-wingIrish republican partySinn Féin expressessoft Eurosceptic positions on the current structure of the European Union and the direction in which it is moving.[143]The party expresses, "support for Europe-wide measures that promote and enhance human rights, equality andthe all-Ireland agenda", but has a "principled opposition" to aEuropean superstate.[144] In its manifesto for the2015 UK general election, Sinn Féin pledged that the party would campaign for the UK to stay within the EU.[145] Inthe 2019 European Parliament election, Sinn Féin won one seat and 11.7% of the vote, down 7.8%.[146]

TheSocialist Party, aTrotskyist organisation, supports Ireland leaving the EU and supported theBrexit result.[147] It argues that the European Union is institutionally capitalist and neoliberal.[148] The Socialist Party campaigned against the Lisbon and Nice Treaties and favours the foundation of an alternative Socialist European Union.[149]

Italy

[edit]
"Italexit" redirects here. For the political party with this name, seeItalexit (political party).

TheFive Star Movement (M5S), ananti-establishment movement founded by comedianBeppe Grillo, originally set itself out as a Eurosceptic party. The M5S received 25.5% of vote in the2013 general election, becoming the largest anti-establishment and Eurosceptic party in Europe. The party used to advocate a non-binding referendum on the withdrawal of Italy from theEurozone (but not from the European Union) and the return to thelira.[150] Since then, the party has toned down its eurosceptic rhetoric[151] and such policy was rejected in 2018,[152] and the M5S's leader has since stated that the "European Union is the Five Star Movement's home", clarifying that the party wants Italy to stay in the EU, even though it remains critical of some of its treaties.[153][154] The M5S's popular support is distributed all across Italy: in the2018 general election the party won 32.7% of the popular vote nationwide, and was particularly successful incentral andsouthern Italy.[155]

A party that retains a Eurosceptic identity is theNorthern League (LN), aregionalist movement led byMatteo Salvini favouring Italy's exit from the Eurozone and the re-introduction of the lira. When in government, Lega approved theTreaty of Lisbon.[156] The party won 6.2% of the vote in the2014 European Parliament elections, but two of its leading members are presidents ofLombardy andVeneto (where Lega gained 40.9% of the vote in2015).

Matteo Salvini with the Eurosceptic economistsClaudio Borghi Aquilini,Alberto Bagnai andAntonio Maria Rinaldi during theNo Euro Day in Milan, 2013. All economists were later elected MPs in different assemblies.

In the2014 European Parliament election the Five Star Movement came second, with 17 seats and 21.2% of the vote after contesting EP seats for the first time. Northern League had five seats andThe Other Europe with Tsipras had three seats.

Other minor Eurosceptic organizations include right-wing political parties (e.g.,Brothers of Italy,[157]Tricolour Flame,[158]New Force,[159]National Front,[160]CasaPound,[161]National Movement for Sovereignty, theNo Euro Movement), far-left political parties (e.g., theCommunist Party ofMarco Rizzo,[162] theItalian Communist Party[163] and the political movementPower to the People) and other political movements (e.g., the Sovereignist Front,[164]MMT Italy[165]). In addition, the European Union is criticized (especially for theausterity and the creation of the euro) by some left-wing thinkers, like thetrade unionist Giorgio Cremaschi[166] and the journalistPaolo Barnard,[167] and someacademics, such asAlberto Bagnai[168][169] the philosopherDiego Fusaro.[170]

According to the StandardEurobarometer 87 conducted by theEuropean Commission in spring 2017, 48% of Italians tend not to trust theEuropean Union compared to 36% of Italians who do.[171]

In the2019 European election, the Italian Eurosceptic andsouverainist right-wing, represented in large part by the League, increased its number of seats in the EP, but was not assigned any presidency in thecommittees of the European Parliament.[172] Despite its national political alliance with the League during theConte Cabinet, theFive Star Movement voted forUrsula von der Leyen, member of pro-EUChristian Democratic Union of Germany, asPresident of the European Commission.[173]

In July 2020, senatorGianluigi Paragone formedItalexit, a new political party with a main goal to withdraw Italy from the European Union.[174]

Latvia

[edit]

TheNational Alliance (For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK/All for Latvia!),Union of Greens and Farmers andFor Latvia from the Heart are parties that are described by some political commentators as bearing soft Eurosceptic views.[175] A small hard Eurosceptic partyEurosceptic Party of Action [lv] exists, but it has failed to gain any administrative seats throughout history of its existence.

Lithuania

[edit]

TheOrder and Justice party had mainly Eurosceptic views.[176]

Luxembourg

[edit]

TheAlternative Democratic Reform Party is a soft Eurosceptic party.[177] It is a member of theAlliance of European Conservatives and Reformists.

Malta

[edit]

In the 2000s, theLabour Party (MLP/PL) was vehemently opposed toMalta entering the European Union. Instead of EU membership, the PL was in favour of a partnership with the EU in the broader context of theEuro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euromed).[178] After a long battle, a majority of the electorate voted to join the EU in the2003 referendum and theNationalist Party (PN) led byEddie Fenech Adami, which took a pro-European stance,[179] won thesubsequent election. This led Malta to become one of the states to enter the European Union on 1 May 2004.[178]

After Malta joined the EU, the PL underJoseph Muscat quickly moved towards a strongly pro-European stance.[180][181][182] Current-day Eurosceptic forces in Maltese politics arefar-right parties such as theMaltese Brotherhood[183] andImperium Europa.[184]

According to Mark Harwood, Euroscepticism in Malta has moved from being aleftist stance in the early 2000s, connected to opposition to the EU's forced adoption ofneoliberal policies such asausterity, towards a position that is more concerned with far-right talking points such asanti-immigrant sentiment in the 2010s.[184]

Netherlands

[edit]
See also:Dutch withdrawal from the European Union
Geert Wilders, leader of theParty for Freedom, a hardline Dutch Eurosceptic party that has been criticised asanti-Polish andIslamophobic[185][186]

Historically, the Netherlands have been a very pro-European country, being one of the six founding members of theEuropean Coal and Steel Community in 1952, and campaigning with much effort to include the United Kingdom into the Community in the 1970s and others after that. It has become slightly more Eurosceptic in the 2000s,rejecting the European Constitution in 2005 and complaining about the relatively high financial investment into the Union or the democratic deficit amongst other issues.

A number of hard and soft eurosceptic parties have politicians elected to the Dutch House of Representatives and European Parliament which include:

  • The nationalistParty for Freedom (founded in 2006) is a hard-eurosceptic party and wants the Netherlands to leave the EU in its entirety, because it believes the EU is undemocratic, costs money and cannot close the borders for immigrants.[187]
  • The conservative and right-wing populistForum for Democracy (FvD) party was originally founded byThierry Baudet as a think tank to campaign against theAssociation Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine. In 2016, the FvD was established as a fully fledged party. It is opposed to many of the policies of theEuropean Union and calls for a referendum on Dutch membership in which it would endorse withdrawal.
  • The conservative-liberalJA21 party (founded in 2021 as a splinter from the FvD) is opposed to Dutch participation severalEuropean Union agreements, including its immigration and asylum policies, and believes Dutch identity and self-determination should be prioritized above the EU. It supports Dutch withdrawal from theEurozone and for the Netherlands to exit EU treaties it deems a threat to national sovereignty.[188]
  • TheSocialist Party believes the European Union has already brought Europe 50 years of peace and prosperity and argues that European co-operation is essential for tackling global problems like climate change and international crime. The SP opines that the current Union is dominated by the big businesses and the big countries, while the labour movement, consumer organisations and smaller companies are often left behind. "Neoliberal" measures have supposedly increased social inequality, and perhaps the Union is expanding too fast and taking on too much power in issues that should be dealt with on a national level.[189]
  • The conservative ProtestantReformed Political Party and theChristian Union favour co-operation within Europe, but reject a superstate, especially one that is dominated by Catholics, or that infringes on religious rights and/or privileges.
  • The pensioner's interest party50PLUS is moderately Eurosceptic.
  • The ecologistParty for the Animals favours European co-operation, but believes the current EU does not respect animal rights enough and should have a more active policy on environment protection.
  • The agrarian and rural interestsFarmer–Citizen Movement (BBB) was founded in 2019 and is a soft-eurosceptic party. It supports membership of the EU for economic and trade purposes, but argues the political power of the EU should be stripped back so the bloc is closer to the model of the former EEC, wants reforms made to the Eurozone and is against the EU becoming a superstate.[190]

A prominent former Eurosceptic party in the Netherlands was thePim Fortuyn List (LPF) established by politician and academicPim Fortuyn in 2002. The party campaigned to reduce Dutch financial contributions to the EU, was against Turkish membership and opposed what it saw as the excessive bureaucracy and threat to national sovereignty posed by the EU. During the2002 general election, the LPF polled in second place with 17% of the vote. Following the assassination of Fortuyn in the run-up to the election, support for the party declined soon after and it was disbanded in 2008 with many of its former supporters transferring to theParty for Freedom.

Despite these concerns, in 2014 the majority of the Dutch electorate continued to support parties that favour ongoing European integration: theSocial Democrats, theChristian Democrats, theLiberals, but most of all the(Liberal) Democrats.[191]

In 2016, a substantial majority in a low-turnout referendum rejected the ratification of an EU trade and association treaty withUkraine.[192][193]

In the2019 European Parliament election, Eurosceptic parties had mixed results withGeert Wilders'Party for Freedom losing all 4 of its seats taking only 3.5% of the vote. The newForum for Democracy established in late 2016 took 11.0% of the vote and entered the European Parliament with 3 seats.

Poland

[edit]
See also:Polexit

The main parties with Eurosceptic views areLaw and Justice (PiS),United Poland (SP) and theConfederation Liberty and Independence and the main Eurosceptic politicians includeRyszard Bender,Andrzej Grzesik,Krzysztof Bosak,Dariusz Grabowski,Janusz Korwin-Mikke,Marian Kowalski,Paweł Kukiz,Zbigniew Ziobro,Anna Sobecka,Robert Winnicki,Artur Zawisza, andStanisław Żółtek.[citation needed]

Former president of PolandLech Kaczyński resisted giving his signature on behalf of Poland to theTreaty of Lisbon, objecting specifically to theCharter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Subsequently, Poland got anopt-out from this charter. As Polish President, Kaczyński also opposed the Polish government's intentions to join the euro.[194][195]

Polish PresidentAndrzej Duda, Polish Prime MinisterMateusz Morawiecki andJarosław Kaczyński, 9 April 2018

In 2015, it was reported that Euroscepticism was growing in Poland, which was thought to be due to the "economic crisis, concern over perceived interference from Brussels and migration".[citation needed] Polish presidentAndrzej Duda indicated that he wished for Poland to step back from further EU integration. He suggested that the country should "hold a referendum on joining the euro, resist further integration and fight the EU's green policies", despite getting the largest share of EU cash.[196]

In the2019 European Parliament election, the Law and Justice party won the largest number of seats, with a vote share increase up from 31.8% to 45.4%, increasing its seats from 19 to 27.[197]

"Trumna dla rybaków" ("Coffin for fishermen"). A sign visible on the sides of many Polish fishing boats. It depicts anobscene Slavic gesture. Polish fishermen protest against theEU's prohibition of cod fishing on Polish ships.

In 2019, the formerMEPStanisław Żółtek created a political party called PolEXIT, whose flagship ideology is Euroscepticism.[198] Its candidate forpresident of Poland in the2020 elections was the party's leader, Żółtek,[199] who got 45 419 votes (0.23%), ranking 7th out of 11 candidates and did not qualify to the second round.[200]

Portugal

[edit]

The main Eurosceptic parties in Portugal areChega, thePortuguese Communist Party (PCP), andLeft Bloc (BE). Opinion polling in Portugal in 2015 indicated that 48 per cent tended not to trust the EU,[19] while 79 per cent tended not to trust the Portuguese government (then led byPortugal Ahead).[54] Eurosceptic political parties hold a combined total of 23 seats out of 230 inPortugal's parliament (BE 5, PCP 6, PNR 0, CHEGA 12) and a combined total of 4 out of Portugal's 21 seats in the European Parliament (PCP 2, BE 2, PNR 0, CHEGA 0).

In the last2014 European Parliament election, thePortuguese Communist Party won three seats and theLeft Bloc won one seat.

In the2019 European Parliament election,Left Bloc took 9.8% and gained 1 seat,Portuguese Communist Party working in coalition withEcologist Party "The Greens" took 6.9% and 2 seats andNational Renovator Party (PNR) polled just 0.5%, with no seats.

2019 saw the emergence of a new Eurosceptic political party,Chega, who gained a seat inthat year's legislative election. The party did not capture any seats in the 2019 European Parliament elections, but saw its leaderAndré Ventura finish third in the2021 presidential election, securing 11.9% of those voting.

In the2022 Portuguese snap election, Chega got 7.2% of the vote and 12 out of the 230 seats in theAssembly of the Republic.

Romania

[edit]
See also:Romanian withdrawal from the European Union

Several parties espousing Eurosceptic views exist on the right, such as theNew Republic, theGreater Romania Party andNoua Dreaptă, but as of June 2020 none of these parties are represented in European Parliament. Euroscepticism is relatively unpopular in Romania, a 2015 survey found 65% of Romanians had a positive view of the country's EU membership.[201]

The Eurosceptic parties remained unrepresented in the2019 European Parliament election.

The soft EuroscepticAlliance for the Union of Romanians, which was founded in September 2019, entered the Romanian parliament in 2020.

Slovakia

[edit]

Parties with Eurosceptic views are theSlovak National Party,Republic,We Are Family,People's Party Our Slovakia. Prominent Slovak Eurosceptic politicians includeAndrej Danko,Milan Uhrík,Boris Kollár,Marian Kotleba.

In the2024 European Parliament election, Republic came 3rd securing 12.5% and winning their first 2 seats in the European Parliament.

Slovenia

[edit]

Parties with mainly Eurosceptic views areSlovenian National Party andThe Left. Neither won seats in the2019 European Parliament election in Slovenia.

Spain

[edit]
Santiago Abascal, leader ofVox

The process of Europeanization changed during the years inSpain. In 1986 Spain entered in theEuropean Community. Since then, Spain has been one of the most Europeanist countries. Therefore, when Spain became part of the European Community, the country had a strongpro-Europeanist feeling, according toEurobarometer, as it reflected a 60% of the population.[202][203] In Spain different reasons explain its entrance to the European Community. On the one hand, democracy has just been established in Spain afterFrancisco Franco dictatorship. On the other hand, the main objectives of Spain were to achieveeconomic development, and also a social modernization.[204] Spain was one of the few countries to vote Yes for the European Constitution in a referendum in February 2005, though by a lower margin inCatalonia and theBasque Country.[205]

In 2008, after thefinancial crisis reached Spain, the percentage of pro European persons started to fall. Thus, during the five years of the economic crisis, the Eurobarometer[206] shows how the trust in the EU increasingly fell in Spain, and the confidence of the Spanish citizens in the European Union decreased for more than 50 points. Spain became one of the most Eurosceptic countries among all European Union Members, as it happened in pretty much European countries, where nationalist and eurosceptic characterised parties became stronger.[207][208]

The historical two-parties system, composed by the conservativePartido Popular and the social-democraticPartido Socialista Obrero Español, collapsed. In the 2000s, the liberalCiudadanos and leftist partyPodemos became part of the political context, gaining electoral consensus, followed years later byultranationalist partyVox. The new parties were the effect of the disaffection of most Spaniards towards politics and politicians, that increased for several reasons: firstly,corruption at all political levels, reaching theRoyal Family too; secondly, recession intensified distrust of the population towards national government; thirdly, a phase of renovation of theautonomous regions which extended the distance between the National government and the Regional ones.[209]

Candidatura d'Unitat Popular, a left-wing to far-left political party with about 1,300 members advocates independence forCatalonia outside of the European Union. Up to 2014 European elections, there were no Spanish parties present in the Eurosceptic groups at the European Parliament. In the2015 Spanish general election,Podemos became the first left-wing Eurosceptic political party to win seats in theCongress of Deputies, obtaining 69 seats, and in the2019 Spanish general election,Vox became the first far-right Eurosceptic political party to win seats in theCongress of Deputies, obtaining 24 seats.

Sweden

[edit]

TheLeft Party of Sweden is against accession to the eurozone and previously wanted Sweden to leave the European Union until 2019.[210][211] The new party program, adapted in 2024, is highly EU-critical but states that an EU-withdrawal is only a "last option".[212] Their youth organizationYoung Left is still campaigning for Sweden to leave the EU.[213]

The nationalist andright-wing populist partySweden Democrats (SD) support closer political, economic and military cooperation with neighboring Nordic and certain Northern European countries, but strongly oppose further EU integration and further transfers of Swedish sovereignty to the EU as a whole. The party is also against Swedish accession to the eurozone, the creation of a combined EU military budget and want to renegotiate Swedish membership of theSchengen Agreement. The SD also want a constitutional amendment to require that all EU treaties must be voted on by the Swedish public first and that if the EU cannot be reformed and assumes more power at the expense of national sovereignty Sweden must exit the bloc.[214]

TheJune List, a Eurosceptic list consisting of members from both the political right and left won three seats in the 2004 Elections to the European Parliament and sat in the EU-criticalIND/DEM group in the European Parliament. The movementFolkrörelsen Nej till EU [sv] favours a withdrawal from the EU.

Around 75% of theRiksdag members represent parties that officially supports the Sweden membership.

In theEuropean Parliament election, 2014, theSweden Democrats gained 2 seats with 9.7% of the vote, up 6.4%, and theLeft Party took one seat with 6.3% of the vote.

In theEuropean Parliament election, 2019, theSweden Democrats increased from 2 to 3 seats with 15.3% of the vote, up from 9.7%, and theLeft Party retained its one seat with 6.8% of the vote.

In winter 2019–2020, in connection with the request from "poor" member countries of much higher membership fees for "rich" member countries, for the reason of keeping support levels so "poor" countries would not suffer fromBrexit, where a "rich" country left the union in part due to high membership fees, a media and social media debate for a "Swexit" increased.[215] This was still rejected by parties representing a majority of the parliament, with theCOVID-19 pandemic quickly taking over the debate.

In other European countries

[edit]

Armenia

[edit]

Prosperous Armenia represents the main Eurosceptic party inArmenia. Following the2018 Armenian parliamentary election, the party gained 26 seats in theNational Assembly, becoming the official opposition. Following the2021 Armenian parliamentary election, the party lost all political representation and currently acts as an extra-parliamentary force. The party was a member of theAlliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe.[216]

Bosnia and Herzegovina

[edit]

Despite an uncritical attitude towards the EU informed by a strong Europeanizing ideology as the consequence of a lack of coherent policy agendas from local political actors,[217] Euroscepticism exists in Bosnia and Herzegovina. An example is theAlliance of Independent Social Democrats is a Bosnian Serb political party in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Founded in 1996, it is the governing party in Bosnia and Herzegovina's entity calledRepublika Srpska, with its leader beingMilorad Dodik.[218]

Georgia

[edit]

Georgian March is the main Eurosceptic party inGeorgia. The party supports a slight distancing of Georgia from the West, as well as rejecting the country's entrance intoNATO.[219][220]

In March 2022, Georgia submitted a formal application for membership of the EU.[221]

Iceland

[edit]

The three main Eurosceptic parties in Iceland are theIndependence Party,Left-Green Movement and theProgressive Party. The Independence Party and the Progressive Party won theparliamentary election in April 2013 and they have halted the current negotiations with the European Union regarding Icelandic membership and tabled a parliamentary resolution on 21 February 2014 to withdraw the application completely.[222][223]

In 2017, Iceland'snewly elected government announced that it would hold a vote in parliament on whether to hold a referendum on resuming EU membership negotiations.[224][225] In November 2017 that government was replaced by a coalition of the Independence Party, the Left Green Movement and the Progressive Party; all of whom oppose membership. Only 11 out of 63 MPs are in favour of EU membership.[226]

Moldova

[edit]

The main Eurosceptic parties in Moldova are the left-wingParty of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova, which officially declared its main purpose to be the integration of Moldova in theEurasian Economic Union,Our Party, and theParty of Communists of the Republic of Moldova. As of October 2025 all the parties are represented inMoldovan Parliament, with 32 MPs out of a total of 101 MPs.

In March 2022, Moldova submitted a formal application for membership of the EU.[221]

Montenegro

[edit]

The right-wingDemocratic Front alliance are the main moderate eurosceptic subject in theParliament of Montenegro, although its initially declaratively supported country's bid for accession to theEuropean Union, all other parliamentary subjects officially advocates Montenegrin access to EU. The only parties that advocates Montenegro's rejecting the European integration are the extra-parliamentary right-wing populist to far-right parties, such asTrue Montenegro,Party of Serb Radicals,Democratic Party of Unity and theSerb List, all four are known for their close cooperation with the parliamentary Democratic Front.

Norway

[edit]
See also:Norway–European Union relations

Norway has rejected EU membership in two referendums,1972 and1994. TheCentre Party,Christian Democratic Party,Socialist Left Party andLiberal Party were against EU membership in both referendums. The Liberal Party was particularly divided on the issue, and a large pro-EEC minority split off from the party before the 1972 referendum. In 2020, the Liberal Party officially reversed its position and since then, supports Norwegian EU membership.[227]

Among the established political parties of Norway, the Centre Party, Socialist Left Party, andRed Party are also against Norway's current membership of theEuropean Economic Area.[228] In addition, the libertarianCapitalist Party and Christian-conservativeThe Christians, both of whom have never held a seat in the Norwegian parliament, are also against Norway's membership in the EEA.

Russia

[edit]
See also:Russia–European Union relations
Russian PresidentVladimir Putin is an outspoken Eurosceptic who has promoted an alternative Economic Union withArmenia,Belarus,Kazakhstan, andKyrgyzstan – theEurasian Economic Union.

Parties with mainly Eurosceptic views are the rulingUnited Russia, and opposition parties theCommunist Party of the Russian Federation andLiberal Democratic Party of Russia.

Following theannexation of Crimea, the European Union issued sanctions on the Russian Federation in response to what it regards as an "illegal" annexation and "deliberate destabilisation" of a neighbouring sovereign country.[229] In response to this,Alexey Borodavkin – Russia's permanent representative with the UN – said "The EU is committing a direct violation of human rights by its actions against Russia. The unilateral sanctions introduced against us are not only illegitimate according to international law, they also undermine Russian citizens' freedom of travel, freedom of development, freedom of work and others".[citation needed] In the same year, Russian presidentVladimir Putin said: "What are the so-called European values? Maintaining the coup, the armed seizure of power and the suppression of dissent with the help of the armed forces?"[230]

A February 2014 poll conducted by theLevada Center, Russia's largest independent polling organization, found that nearly 80% of Russian respondents had a "good" impression of the EU. This changed dramatically in 2014 with the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, resulting in 70% taking a hostile view of the EU compared to 20% viewing it positively.[231]

A Levada poll released in August 2018 found that 68% of Russians polled believe that Russia needs to dramatically improve relations with Western countries. 42% of Russian respondents said they had a positive view of the EU, up from 28% in May 2018.[232]

San Marino

[edit]

Areferendum was held in thelandlockedmicrostate on 20 October 2013 in which the citizens were asked whether the country should submit an application to join theEuropean Union. The proposal was rejected because of a low turnout, even though 50.3% of voters approved it. The "Yes" campaign was supported by the main left-wing parties (Socialist Party,United Left) and theUnion for the Republic whereas theSammarinese Christian Democratic Party suggested voting with ablank ballot, thePopular Alliance declared itself neutral, andWe Sammarinese and the RETE movement supported the "No" campaign. TheCitizens' Rights Directive, which defines theright of free movement for theEuropean citizens, may have been an important reason for those voting no.[233][234][235]

Serbia

[edit]
Serbian politicianMiloš Jovanović, a prominent Eurosceptic

In Serbia, political parties with eurosceptic views tend to be right-orientated. The most notable examples are theultranationalistSerbian Radical Party (SRS) which since its inception has opposed entering the European Union[236] and theright-wing populistDveri.[237] Political parties such as theDemocratic Party of Serbia (DSS) hadpro-Western views and was initially supportive of the accession into the European Union but under the late 2000s leadership ofVojislav Koštunica they turned eurosceptic,[238] and theEnough is Enough (DJB) political party, initially a liberal centrist party that also supported the accession turned towards the right-wing eurosceptic position shortly after 2018.[239]

Historically, theSocialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and theYugoslav Left (JUL) were the only two left-leaning political parties that imposed eurosceptic and anti-Western views. The ruling coalition in Serbia,Serbia Must Not Stop, which is predominantly pro-European orientated is also composed of two minor eurosceptic parties, the right-wingSerbian People's Party[240] that advocates closer ties to Russia,[241] and the left-leaningMovement of Socialists which was formed as the eurosceptic split from SPS in the 2000s.

Other minor political parties in Serbia that have eurosceptic views areHealthy Serbia,People's Freedom Movement,Russian Party, Love, Faith, Hope,Serbian Party Oathkeepers,Serbian Right,Leviathan Movement,We – Voice from the People, andWe – Power of the People.

Switzerland

[edit]
See also:Switzerland–European Union relations

Switzerland has long been known forits neutrality in international politics. Swiss voters rejectedEEA membershipin 1992, and EU membershipin 2001. Despite the passing of several referendums calling for closer relations betweenSwitzerland and the European Union such as the adoption of bilateral treaties and the joining of theSchengen Area, a second referendum of the joining of the EEA or the EU is not expected,[242] and the general public remains opposed to joining.[243]

In February 2014, the Swiss voters narrowly approved areferendum limiting the freedom of movement of EU citizens to Switzerland.

Eurosceptic political parties include theSwiss People's Party, which is the largestpolitical party in Switzerland, with 29.4% of the popular vote as of the2015 federal election. Smaller Eurosceptic parties include, but are not limited to, theFederal Democratic Union, theTicino League, and theGeneva Citizens' Movement, all of which are considered right-wing parties.

In addition, theCampaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland is a political organisation in Switzerland that is strongly opposed to Swiss membership of or further integration otherwise with the European Union.[244][245]

Regionally, the German-speaking majority as well as the Italian-speaking areas are the most Eurosceptic, whileFrench-speaking Switzerland tends to be more pro-European integration. In the 2001 referendum, the majority of French-speakers voted against EU membership.[citation needed] According to a 2016 survey conducted by M.I.S Trend and published inL'Hebdo, 69 percent of the Swiss population supports systematic border controls, and 53 percent want restrictions on the EU accord of the free movements of peoples and 14 percent want it completely abolished.[246] 54% of the Swiss population said that if necessary, they would ultimately keep the freedom of movement of people's accord.[246]

Turkey

[edit]

The two main Eurosceptic parties are the far-right ultranationalist,Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which secured 11.1% of votes, and 49 seats in theParliament at thelast election, and theFelicity Party (Saadet Partisi), a far-rightSunni Islamist party, which has no seats in the Parliament, as it only secured 0.7% of the votes in the last election, far below the 10% threshold necessary to be represented in the Parliament.

Many left-wing nationalist and far-left parties hold no seats at parliament but they control many activist and student movements in Turkey. ThePatriotic Party (formerly called Workers' Party) consider the European Union as a front-runner of global imperialism.[247][248]

Founded on 26 August 2021 under the leadership ofÜmit Özdağ,Victory Party (Turkey) is aTurkish nationalist andanti-immigrant political party. It is represented by two deputies in theTurkish Grand National Assembly.[249] "TheEuropean Union does not want to negotiate with Turkey. We will not humiliate Turkey anymore." Özdağ said.

Ukraine

[edit]
See also:Ukraine–European Union relations

Parties with mainly Eurosceptic views areOpposition Platform – For Life,Opposition Bloc,Party of Shariy andRight Sector.

The far-right Ukrainian groupRight Sector opposes joining the European Union. It regards the EU as an "oppressor" of European nations.[250]

In the 2019 parliamentary election theOpposition Platform – For Life won 37 seats on the nationwide party list and 6 constituency seats.[251]

The leader of theParty of Shariy Anatoly Shariy is one of the closest associates ofViktor Medvedchuk, whom Ukraine's special services suspect of financing terrorism.[252]

United Kingdom

[edit]
Main articles:Brexit andEuroscepticism in the United Kingdom
Nigel Farage, former Leader ofUKIP and current leader ofReform UK and former co-leader of theEurope of Freedom and Direct Democracy group in the European Parliament. Farage is one of the most prominent Eurosceptic figures in the UK.

The European Union, and Britain's place in relation to it, is one of the primary issues today dividing opinion among the British public, political parties, media and civil society.[253]

Euroscepticism has been an element in British politics ever since the inception of theEuropean Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor to the EU, and its salience as an issue has fluctuated widely over the years. TheEuropean Communities membership referendum of 1975 took place in the context of Conservative and Liberal parties which were generally in favour of membership (in the 1971 House of Commons vote on whether the UK should join the European Economic Community, only 39 of the then 330 Conservative MPs had been opposed to membership[254][255]), and a Labour party which was sharply divided. After the referendum, which gave a strong assent to continued membership, Euroscepticism was a strand of opinion characteristic of the Labour party; at the1983 general election, for example, Labour campaigned on a promise to withdraw from the EEC.[256] This opposition to membership faded quickly after the election ofNeil Kinnock as leader of the party, and Euroscepticism gradually came to be less popular on the left of politics than on the right - though left-wing opposition to membership continues to this day. Current and recent supporters on the left of British politics includeFrank Field,Graham Stringer,Ian Austin,John Mann,Tom Harris,Gisela Stuart,Austin Mitchell,Kate Hoey andGeorge Galloway.[257]

WhenMargaret Thatcher came into power as the Prime Minister in 1979, she was as strongly in favour of membership as most Conservative MPs, having campaigned for "yes" in the 1975 referendum. By the time she left office, however, she had developed what at the time was a strongly Eurosceptic stance; she has been called the "spiritual mother"[258] of Euroscepticism. She never argued for secession while Prime Minister, envisioning continued membership of a less integrationist EEC, and became one of the most significant Eurosceptic voices in the United Kingdom in the 1990s, influencing the Conservatives’ view on the EU. In 2009 the Conservative Party actively campaigned against theLisbon Treaty, which it believed would give away too much sovereignty to Brussels.Shadow Foreign SecretaryWilliam Hague stated that, should the treaty be in force by the time of an incoming Conservative government, he would "not let matters rest there".[259]

The right-wingUK Independence Party (UKIP) was set up for the specific purpose of advocating for the UK unilaterallyseceding the European Union (Brexit) from its foundation in 1993.[260] This party initially had very little support from the UK population as a whole. It was initially eclipsed by theReferendum Party, which fought the 1997 general election on the single issue of a referendum to leave the EU. The party's main success was found in elections to the European Parliament, where they experienced a continuous rise in their support from1999, when they came fourth and won their first seats. In2004 they came third, becoming the first "small" party to overtake the Liberals in a national vote since Labour in the 1920s. In2009 UKIP came second, and then,in 2014, they topped the poll, pushing the Conservatives into third for the first time in their history. UKIP also had some strong support locally in solidly working class areas, with 163 councillors elected to local authorities and gaining overall control in 2015 ofThanet District Council.[261]

However, UKIP — like most small parties in the UK — found it almost impossible to break into Westminster politics, only ever achieving one elected MP, in 2015.[262] Accordingly, after theinconclusive general election result of 2010, resulting in ahung Parliament, the issue of EU membership remained low on the political priority agenda at Westminster — broadly speaking a non-issue. This changed with UKIP's victory in the2014 European Parliament election, in the wake of which two Conservative MPs defected to UKIP.[263] The party with the largest number of seats in the 2010 Parliament wasthe Conservatives, which was firstly deeply divided on the issue, being led by a pro-European leadership on the whole, but with a large number of very vociferous Euroscepticbackbenchers, and secondly concerned at UKIP's possible electoral threat to the party at the following election. The Conservative leaderDavid Cameron promised a referendum on EU membership in the party's2015 general election manifesto.

By 2015, support for the Liberal Democrats had shrunk considerably, a phenomenon widely attributed to a policy U-turn onuniversity tuition fees.[264] In theelection, the Lib Dem vote collapsed, leading to an outright Conservative victory, to the surprise of many, as national polling had consistently predicted another hung Parliament. This majority meant that David Cameron's pledge now had to be fulfilled. In an effort to reduce Euroscepticism, Cameron sought and gained from the EU arenegotiation of some of the terms of Britain's EU membership, to a mixed response from the media and his party.[265][266]

For the 23 June 2016referendum on the EU membership, whilst the Conservatives had no official political policy position either way, its leader Cameron was avowedly in favour of remaining in the EU — though with the renegotiation of the terms of membership little political mileage was gained — and the party remained profoundly split, as it had been for many years.[267][268]

Labour Party policy officially supported remaining in the EU, although with long-standing EuroscepticJeremy Corbyn party leader, he and hisMomentum supporters gave a lacklustre defence against secession. Since first being elected in 1984 as a stalwart adherent of EuroscepticTony Benn on the left wing of the party, Corbin had personally advocated withdrawal throughout his terms as a Labour MP, so he suggested early on in the campaign that he would willingly consider withdrawal contrary to official party policy.[269][270] TheLiberal Democrats were the most adamantly pro-EU of the main parties, and since the referendum, pro-Europeanism has been their main policy.[271]

The referendumresulted in an overall vote to leave the EU, as opposed to remaining an EU member, by 52% to 48%, on a turnout of 72%.[272] The vote was split between theconstituent countries of the United Kingdom, with a majority inEngland andWales voting to leave, and a majority inScotland andNorthern Ireland, as well as an overwhelming 96% inGibraltar, aBritish Overseas Territory, voting to remain.[273] As a result of the referendum, the UK Government notified the EU of its intention to withdraw on 29 March 2017 byinvoking Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.

On 12 April 2019, a new Eurosceptic party, theBrexit Party, was officially launched by the formerUKIP leaderNigel Farage, to use the2019 European Parliament election to put pressure on a Conservative government perceived to be failing to pursue Brexit with adequate enthusiasm or success.[274] In the event, although overall pro-EU parties score a similar share of the vote to Eurosceptic parties, the Brexit Party topped the national poll by a large margin, with 32% of the vote. The Conservatives, on the other hand, suffered their lowest ever national vote share at 9%, with just 4 seats. This historic electoral defeat – along with an inability to navigate an agreeable route between a "soft" or "hard" Brexit in Parliament – led to Theresa May announcing the day after the election that she would step down as the Conservatives' leader and Prime Minister on 7 June.[274] After the elections, the EuroscepticBlue Collar Conservative grouping ofConservative MPs was formed.[275]

The Conservatives' resounding defeat led them to elect a new leader who might gain votes back from the Brexit Party, by pursuing a "harder" Brexit more determinedly than Theresa May had done.[276] Following theelection of Boris Johnson as leader in July, the Conservatives' new Cabinet became strongly supportive of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. Its platform was changed to unequivocally support EU withdrawal, and there was a systematic campaign in preparation for the2019 general election to enforce loyalty to this aim by deselecting all MPs and candidates from the party who refused to explicitly undertake to support it. The Conservatives fought the election on the slogan "Get Brexit Done", a slogan which attracted strong criticism from almost all the other parties in Parliament. The election resulted in the largest overall majority for the Conservatives since the 1980s, the highest percentage of the popular vote for any party since 1979, and significant losses for the opposition Labour and Liberal Democrats.[277]

A month later, on 23 January 2020, Parliament ratified a withdrawal agreement from the European Union, which was in turn ratified by the EU Parliament on 30 January. On 31 January, the United Kingdom officially left the European Union after 47 years. During a transition period until 31 December 2020, the UK still followed EU rules and continued free trade and free movement for people within the European Union.

Counter-criticism

[edit]

Ben Chu, writing forThe Independent, argued against the left-wing notion that the EU is a neoliberal organization, pointing to "high levels of social protection, state-owned rail companies, nationalised utilities and banks, various price controls and industrial interventions".[278]Unlike other left-wing critiques of the European Union—which are more focused on failure to achieve a social Europe—Hans Kundnani's bookEurowhiteness takes aim at the goals of European integration itself, as Kundani argues that the European Union reproduces the same failings ofnationalism on a larger scale.[279]

See also

[edit]
Wikimedia Commons has media related toEuroscepticism.

References

[edit]
  1. ^"EU-Scepticism vs. Euroscepticism. Re-assessing the Party Positions in the Accession Countries towards EU Membership" in Laursen, Finn (ed.) EU Enlargement: Current Challenges and Strategic Choices, Bruxelles: Peter Lang.
  2. ^Kirk, Lisbeth (22 June 2011)."EU scepticism threatens European integration".EU Observer. Retrieved1 February 2016.
  3. ^Therése Hultén"Swedish EU-Scepticism: How is it Compatible with the Support for Enlargement?"
  4. ^"Marine Le Pen's Real Victory".The Atlantic, 7 May 2017.
  5. ^Erkanor Saka (2009).Mediating the EU: Deciphering the Transformation of Turkish Elites (PhD Thesis). p. 202.ISBN 978-1109216639. Retrieved9 March 2016.[permanent dead link]
  6. ^Matthew (26 October 2011)."Why anti-EUism is not left-wing".Workers' Liberty.Alliance for Workers' Liberty. Retrieved31 January 2016.
  7. ^abcdefghijkBertoncini & Koenig (2014), pp. 4–6.
  8. ^abcdAlibert (2015).
  9. ^abKopel, David,Silencing opposition in the EU, Davekopel.org, archived fromthe original on 29 December 2016, retrieved18 February 2015
  10. ^abHannan, Daniel (14 November 2007)."Why aren't we shocked by a corrupt EU?".The Daily Telegraph. London.Archived from the original on 12 January 2022. Retrieved2 May 2010.(Op-Ed
  11. ^abFitzGibbon, Leruth & Startin (2016), p. 133.
  12. ^abcJones, Owen (14 July 2015)."The left must put Britain's EU withdrawal on the agenda".The Guardian.ISSN 0261-3077. (Op-Ed)
  13. ^Fortunato, Piergiuseppe; Pecoraro, Marco (2022)."Social media, education, and the rise of populist Euroscepticism".Humanities and Social Sciences Communications.9 (1): 301.doi:10.1057/s41599-022-01317-y.PMC 9428866.PMID 36065426.
  14. ^Carden, Edward (2 November 2015)."Party like it's 1975: how the Left got Eurosceptic all over again".New Statesman.
  15. ^FitzGibbon, Leruth & Startin (2016), p. 105.
  16. ^Pirro, Andrea LP; Taggart, Paul; Kessel, Stijn van (4 July 2018)."The populist politics of Euroscepticism in times of crisis: Comparative conclusions"(PDF).Politics.38 (3):378–390.doi:10.1177/0263395718784704.S2CID 149472625.
  17. ^Hobolt, Sara. "The Crisis of Legitimacy of European Institutions", inEurope's Crises. John Wiley & Sons, 2018. p.256
  18. ^Han Werts, Marcel Lubbers, and Peer Scheepers (2013)Euro-scepticism and radical right-wing voting in Europe, 2002–2008: Social cleavages, socio-political attitudes and contextual characteristics determining voting for the radical rightArchived 5 February 2016 at theWayback Machine, European Union Politics, vol. 14 no. 2: 183–205.
  19. ^abcEuropean Commission. Directorate General for Communication; TNS Opinion & Social (2016).Standard Eurobarometer 84 Autumn 2015 Report: Public opinion in the European Union, Language version EN.European Union. pp. 104–113.doi:10.2775/89997.ISBN 978-9279577819. Catalogue No. NA-04-16-323-EN-N. Retrieved26 October 2016.
  20. ^Spring 2015 Standard Eurobarometer: Citizens see immigration as top challenge for EU to tackle.European Commission. 31 July 2015.
  21. ^"Standard Eurobarometer 71 (fieldwork June–July 2009)"(PDF).European Commission. September 2009. pp. 91–3. Retrieved26 November 2009.
  22. ^Wright, Oliver (7 June 2016),"Euroscepticism on the rise across Europe as analysis finds increasing opposition to the EU in France, Germany and Spain",The Independent, retrieved1 August 2016
  23. ^"European spring – Trust in the EU and democracy is recovering".Bruegel.org. 4 May 2023.
  24. ^ab"Closer to the Citizens, Closer to the Ballot".Closer to the Citizens, Closer to the Ballot. Retrieved15 August 2019.
  25. ^"Living, working and COVID-19 data".Eurofound. Archived fromthe original on 27 February 2022. Retrieved27 February 2022.
  26. ^"Trust has increased in EU but dropped in national governments: Survey".Politico. 28 September 2020. Retrieved27 February 2022.
  27. ^ab"EU basks in all-time high citizen approval rate amid tense geopolitics".euronews. 26 March 2025. Retrieved5 April 2025.
  28. ^"Eurobarometer".europa.eu. Retrieved5 April 2025.
  29. ^Strupczewski, Jan (25 March 2025)."EU approval among its citizens hits record high as security fears grow, poll shows".Reuters.
  30. ^abArato, Krisztina; Kaniok, Petr (2009).Euroscepticism and European Integration. CPI/PSRC. p. 162.ISBN 978-9537022204.
  31. ^abHarmsen & Spiering (2004), p. 18.
  32. ^abGifford, Chris (2008).The Making of Eurosceptic Britain. Ashgate Publishing. p. 5.ISBN 978-0754670742.
  33. ^abcSzczerbiak & Taggart (2008), p. 7.
  34. ^abLewis, Paul G; Webb, Paul D (2003).Pan-European Perspectives on Party Politics. Brill. p. 211.ISBN 978-9004130142.
  35. ^Sofia Vasilopoulou.Varieties of Euroscepticism:The Case of the European Extreme Right.
  36. ^de La Baume, Maïa (26 June 2019)."Brexit Party misses first deadline to form political group in European Parliament".Politico. Retrieved30 August 2023.
  37. ^Tony Benn (25 March 2013).European Union.Oxford Union.Archived from the original on 11 December 2021.
  38. ^"Radio Prague: Current Affairs". Archived fromthe original on 3 March 2016. Retrieved28 July 2013.
  39. ^Asselineau, François."« Européens convaincus » contre « Eurosceptiques » : Le retour de la Sainte Inquisition"Archived 8 April 2014 at theWayback Machine,Popular Republican Union, 16 December 2010. Retrieved 29 October 2013.
  40. ^Laurent De Boissieu (15 March 2012)."Présidentielle: Ces "petits" candidats qui veulent se faire entendre" [Presidential election: These "small" candidates who want to be heard].La Croix (in French). Retrieved9 March 2016.
  41. ^Szczerbiak, Aleks; Taggart, Paul (2003),Theorizing party-based Euroskepticism: Problems of definition, measurement and causality
  42. ^Szczerbiak & Taggart (2008), p. 8.
  43. ^Taggart, Paul; Szczerbiak, Aleks (2001).The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States. Sussex European Institute. p. 7. Retrieved4 August 2015.
  44. ^Hooghe, Liesbet; Marks, Gary (1 July 2007). "Sources of Euroscepticism".Acta Politica.42 (2):119–127.doi:10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500192.ISSN 1741-1416.S2CID 144256307.
  45. ^Leruth, Benjamin (2020). Leruth, Benjamin; Startin, Nicholas; Usherwood, Simon (eds.).The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism (1st ed.). Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge. pp. 391–392.ISBN 978-0-367-50003-0.
  46. ^Leruth, Benjamin (2018). FitzGibbon, John; Leruth, Benjamin; Startin, Nick (eds.).Euroscepticism as a Transnational and Pan-European Phenomenon (1st ed.). Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. p. 50.ISBN 978-1-138-59843-0.
  47. ^Steven, Martin (2020).The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) (1st ed.). Manchester: Manchester University Press. p. 124.ISBN 978-1-5261-3914-6.
  48. ^Anti-Europeanism and Euroscepticism in the United StatesArchived 6 January 2016 at theWayback Machine, Patrick Chamorel No 25, EUI-RSCAS Working Papers from European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS) 2004
  49. ^Bertoncini & Koenig (2014), pp. pages=6 ff.
  50. ^"European Sources Online Information Guide: Euroscepticism"(PDF).Cardiff University Press. April 2015. p. 3. Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 23 September 2015. Retrieved9 March 2016.
  51. ^"Socio-demographic trends in national public opinion".europarl.europa.eu. October 2023. Retrieved29 July 2023.
  52. ^abEuropean Commission. Directorate General for Communication; TNS Opinion & Social (2016).Standard Eurobarometer 84 Autumn 2015 Report: Public opinion in the European Union, Language version EN.European Union. pp. 114–119.doi:10.2775/89997.ISBN 978-9279577819. Catalogue No. NA-04-16-323-EN-N. Retrieved26 October 2016.
  53. ^European Commission. Directorate General for Communication; TNS Opinion & Social (2016).Standard Eurobarometer 84 Autumn 2015 Report: Public opinion in the European Union, Language version EN.European Union. pp. 87–92.doi:10.2775/89997.ISBN 978-9279577819. Catalogue No. NA-04-16-323-EN-N. Retrieved26 October 2016.
  54. ^abEuropean Commission. Directorate General for Communication; TNS Opinion & Social (2016).Standard Eurobarometer 84 Autumn 2015 Report: Public opinion in the European Union, Language version EN.European Union. pp. 73–75.doi:10.2775/89997.ISBN 978-9279577819. Catalogue No. NA-04-16-323-EN-N. Retrieved26 October 2016.
  55. ^Minkus, Lara; Deutschmann, Emanuel; Delhey, Jan (October 2018)."A Trump Effect on the EU's Popularity? The U.S. Presidential Election as a Natural Experiment".Perspectives on Politics.17 (2):399–416.doi:10.1017/S1537592718003262.ISSN 1537-5927.
  56. ^abHeath, Ryan (23 May 2018)."Europeans love the EU (and populists too)".Politico.eu.
  57. ^Mikulaschek, Christoph (29 August 2023)."The responsive public: How European Union decisions shape public opinion on salient policies".European Union Politics.24 (4):645–665.doi:10.1177/14651165231190322.ISSN 1465-1165.S2CID 261386222.
  58. ^European Commission. Directorate General for Communication. (2024).Public opinion in the European Union: first results : report (Report). Publications Office of the European Union. p. 13.doi:10.2775/437940.
  59. ^Simon Hix; Abdul Noury (17 March 2006)."After Enlargement: Voting Behaviour in the Sixth European Parliament"(PDF).The UK Federal Trust for Education and Research. Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 25 September 2006.
  60. ^FitzGibbon, Leruth & Startin (2016), p. 4–6.
  61. ^"European elections 2019: Country-by-country roundup – BBC News".BBC News. Bbc.co.uk. 27 May 2019. Retrieved15 July 2019.
  62. ^Adler, Katya (27 May 2019)."European elections 2019: What were the clear trends? – BBC News".BBC News. Bbc.co.uk. Retrieved15 July 2019.
  63. ^Poloni, Giulia (20 December 2023)."European Election results, polls and election news".POLITICO. Retrieved15 June 2024.
  64. ^"European Parliament Election 2024".Europe Elects. 14 June 2024. Retrieved15 June 2024.
  65. ^Nordland, Rod (4 October 2008).Charging To The Right.Newsweek. Retrieved 13 June 2010.
  66. ^"BZÖ will raus aus der Euro-Zone".Österreich (in German). 21 June 2012. Retrieved9 November 2012.
  67. ^"BZÖ wird "rechtsliberal"".Die Presse (in German). 15 October 2009. Archived fromthe original on 19 May 2015. Retrieved9 July 2011.
  68. ^"Austrian magnate's new party wants to dump euro".The Irish Times. 23 August 2012. Retrieved26 August 2012.
  69. ^"Stronach-Partei: Gerüchte um vierten Mandatar "falsch"".Die Presse (in German). 26 August 2012. Retrieved12 May 2012.
  70. ^"Zerfallserscheinungen beim BZÖ".Kurier (in German). 12 October 2012. Retrieved12 October 2012.
  71. ^"Leichtfried zu Stadler: Chaos bei BZÖ – EU-Mandat durch Lissabon plötzlich akzeptabel" (in German). 17 December 2009. Retrieved21 February 2014.
  72. ^"Nachbaur: "Die Neos sind ein moderner Männerklub" – derStandard.at".Der Standard (in Austrian German). Retrieved4 April 2019.
  73. ^Jon Henley and Philip Oltermann (18 May 2019)."Austria to move fast to hold elections after coalition collapses | World news".The Guardian. Retrieved15 July 2019.
  74. ^"National results Austria | 2019 Election results | 2019 European election results | European Parliament".europarl.europa.eu. Archived fromthe original on 27 May 2019. Retrieved27 May 2019.
  75. ^ab"Standard Eurobarometer 90".European Commission. Retrieved2 May 2019.
  76. ^Realfonzo, Ugo (6 December 2023)."No 'Bexit' on the cards for Belgium, EU poll says".The Brussels Times.Archived from the original on 6 December 2023. Retrieved6 December 2023.
  77. ^ab"Een Europa voor de mensen".PVDA. 2025. Retrieved1 November 2025.
  78. ^"Result of the 2014 European election". European Parliament. Retrieved13 May 2019.
  79. ^A Thorn in the side of European Elites:The new Euroscepticism. Wilfried Martens Centre. Archived fromthe original on 3 May 2019. Retrieved3 May 2019.
  80. ^"Vlaams Belang program".Vlaams Belang. Retrieved2 May 2019.
  81. ^"" L'Europe contre les peuples " : euroscepticisme et populisme dans le discours des partis politiques". Université de Louvain. Retrieved13 May 2019.
  82. ^"Parti populaire". Parti populaire. Archived fromthe original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved13 May 2019.
  83. ^"Posted worker directive". European Commission. Retrieved13 May 2019.
  84. ^"Program Libertarian Party"(PDF). Libertarian Party. Retrieved13 May 2019.
  85. ^"Parti du travail de Belgique". Parti du travail de Belgique. Archived fromthe original on 2 May 2019. Retrieved13 May 2019.
  86. ^"Marc Botenga MEP".Brussels Watch. Retrieved1 November 2025.
  87. ^Botenga, Marc (5 April 2018)."De illusies van de "lexit"".Lava [nl].4:79–97. Retrieved1 November 2025.
  88. ^"Bulgaria puts off Eurozone membership for 2015". Radio Bulgaria. 26 July 2011. Archived fromthe original on 29 March 2012. Retrieved2 September 2012.
  89. ^"Привърженици на "Атака" свалиха знамето на ЕС от пилоните пред НДК" (in Bulgarian). Дневник. 3 March 2016. Retrieved3 March 2016.
  90. ^"National results Bulgaria | 2019 Election results | 2019 European election results | European Parliament".europarl.europa.eu. Archived fromthe original on 24 May 2019. Retrieved27 May 2019.
  91. ^Simeonova, Elitsa; Wesolowsky, Tony (October 2022)."Revival On The Rise: Ahead Of Elections, Far-Right Party Is Tapping Into Bulgarian Public Anger".Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
  92. ^"Резултати :: Избори за народни представители 02 април 2023".cik.bg (in Bulgarian).
  93. ^"National results Croatia | 2019 Election results | 2019 European election results | European Parliament".europarl.europa.eu. Archived fromthe original on 4 June 2019. Retrieved27 May 2019.
  94. ^"O Pravu i Pravdi".pravoipravda.hr. Pravo i Pravda. 19 February 2024. Retrieved7 April 2024.
  95. ^Kolar, Helena (27 March 2024)."DP i Kolakušić predstavili liste: 'Molim sve one sa zrnom soli u glavi da glasaju za nas i ne rasipaju glasove. Otići će HDZ-u'" [DP and Kolakušić presented the lists: 'I am asking all those with a grain of salt in their heads to vote for us and not waste their votes. They will go to HDZ'].Telegram (in Croatian). Retrieved27 March 2024.
  96. ^Kolyako, Nina."Czech Republic is in no rush to implement euro". The Baltic Course. Retrieved4 March 2011.
  97. ^Petr Mach zvolen do čela Strany svobodných občanů (in Czech), CZ: CT24, 14 February 2009
  98. ^"Svobodní: Výzva senátorům". Svobodni.cz. 5 February 2009. Archived fromthe original on 18 July 2011. Retrieved18 February 2015.
  99. ^"Svobodní: Veřejné čtení Lisabonské smlouvy již tuto neděli". Svobodni.cz. 15 April 2009. Archived fromthe original on 20 August 2011. Retrieved18 February 2015.
  100. ^"Lisbon treaty turmoil as Czechs demand opt-out".The Guardian. 9 October 2009. Retrieved29 July 2015.
  101. ^EU Dodges Constitutional Hurdle as Czechs Back Treaty (Update 2), Bloomberg, 18 February 2009, archived fromthe original on 12 April 2012
  102. ^"Svobodní: Evropa svobodných států". Svobodni.cz. Archived fromthe original on 1 September 2010. Retrieved18 February 2015.
  103. ^Hvass, Jesper; Rytgaard, Nikolaj (15 March 2019)."Enhedslisten parkerer krav om dansk udmeldelse af EU efter britisk kaos".Jyllands-Posten (in Danish). Retrieved15 March 2019.
  104. ^"National results Denmark | 2019 Election results | 2019 European election results | European Parliament".election-results.eu. Archived fromthe original on 24 May 2019. Retrieved27 May 2019.
  105. ^nyeborgerlige.dkArchived 19 October 2019 at theWayback Machine. "We want fewer laws and rules (...) We want to (...) [a]bolish more laws than are passed". Retrieved 8 November 2017.
  106. ^"National results Estonia | 2019 Election results | 2019 European election results | European Parliament".europarl.europa.eu. Archived fromthe original on 3 June 2019. Retrieved9 June 2019.
  107. ^"Yle – Tulospalvelu – Koko maa – Eduskuntavaalit 2019 – Yle.fi".vaalit.yle.fi.
  108. ^"The Finn's European Union Policy"(PDF). Finns Party. Retrieved3 February 2022.
  109. ^"Presidential hopeful wants Finland out of EU, says nationalists will bounce back". reuters. 13 December 2017. Retrieved21 April 2020.
  110. ^"Européenes : l'UMP en tête, le PS en fort recul".Le Monde (in French). 7 June 2010. Retrieved12 February 2010.
  111. ^"Européenes : la dynamique inédite du eurosceptcism" (in French). Euros du village. 29 April 2010. Archived fromthe original on 16 November 2010. Retrieved12 February 2010.
  112. ^"Europe" (in French). Front National. Archived fromthe original on 13 October 2009. Retrieved12 February 2010.
  113. ^"Le Rassemblement national abandonne définitivement la sortie de l'euro".lefigaro.fr. 16 January 2019.
  114. ^"Retreating Eurosceptics now settle for 'reforms from within'". 6 November 2019.
  115. ^"Résolution du Parti de Gauche sur l'euro" (in French). Worldpress – Politique à Gauche. 10 April 2011. Archived fromthe original on 8 June 2011. Retrieved29 July 2015.
  116. ^"Leur Europe n'est pas la nôtre !" (in French). NPA. 19 May 2010. Archived fromthe original on 24 May 2009. Retrieved12 February 2010.
  117. ^"L'Europe" (in French). Lutte Ouvrière. Archived fromthe original on 8 October 2009. Retrieved12 February 2010.
  118. ^"EU election: France's Hollande calls for reform of 'remote' EU". BBC. 27 May 2014. Retrieved28 January 2015.
  119. ^"Parties and Election in Europe". 2014.
  120. ^"Bundestagswahl 2017". Wahl.tagesschau.de. Archived fromthe original on 9 July 2019. Retrieved15 July 2019.
  121. ^Carla Bleiker (11 March 2013)."German party says 'no' to the euro, 'yes' to the EU".DW Online. Retrieved9 March 2016.
  122. ^"German anti-euro AfD party wins seats in east".BBC News. 15 September 2014. Retrieved28 January 2015.
  123. ^"AfD chief Lucke denies plans to split the party". Deutsche Welle. 19 May 2015. Retrieved27 May 2015.
  124. ^Orlando, Vittorio; Conrad, Maximilian (24 January 2024). "Reinforcing or moderating? The impact of Brexit on Italian and German Euroscepticism".Frontiers in Political Science. Vol. 6.doi:10.3389/fpos.2024.1063039.
  125. ^"Results Germany - The Federal Returning Officer".www.bundeswahlleiter.de. Retrieved8 June 2022.
  126. ^"The Eurozone crisis has increased soft Euroscepticism in Greece, where Greeks wish to remain in the euro, but no longer trust the EU".Europp. 2 March 2013. Retrieved25 November 2020.
  127. ^"Parliamentary Elections January 2015". Ministry of Interior. Retrieved28 July 2015.
  128. ^"Greece turns, Europe wobbles".The Economist. Retrieved19 July 2015.
  129. ^"BBC News Greece election: Anti-austerity Syriza wins election".BBC News. Retrieved28 January 2015.
  130. ^"Tι πιστεύουν οι Έλληνες για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση: Μια μεγάλη έρευνα της διαΝΕΟσις". 24 March 2018.
  131. ^Batory, A. (2008) 'Euroscepticism in the Hungarian Party System: Voices from the Wilderness?' In Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (eds).
  132. ^"hu:Új politikai hangnemet szorgalmaz az LMP" [LMP to encourage new political voice] (in Hungarian). Hungarian News Broadcast. 17 April 2014. Archived fromthe original on 13 May 2014. Retrieved22 April 2014.
  133. ^"Almost 80% say Ireland should stay in the EU, even if UK leaves". NewsTalk. 29 May 2015.According to the poll, 84% of adults here also believe that Ireland has, on balance, benefited from membership. [..] These figures are higher than those in a similar poll carried out in 2013
  134. ^"Over 60% of people say the EU is more important to Ireland than the UK".newstalk.com. Retrieved19 December 2016.
  135. ^"Strong majority want a Minister for Brexit, according to poll".irishtimes.com.
  136. ^Galvin, Grainne (27 February 2017)."Little public support for "Irexit" – Latest national Eurobarometer results".Ireland – European Commission.
  137. ^"Poll suggests 88% of Irish people want Ireland in EU".RTÉ News. 9 May 2017.
  138. ^"Should Ireland leave the EU? New poll shows only 10% of voters would back 'Irexit'". The Journal. 10 February 2018.
  139. ^@dfatirl (8 May 2018)."Support for Ireland remaining in the EU has jumped to over 90%" (Tweet) – viaTwitter.
  140. ^Richard Sinnott; Johan A. Elkink (July 2010)."Attitudes and Behaviour in the Second Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon"(PDF).Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland. Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 25 December 2010.
  141. ^"Lisbon Treaty is unchanged and must be rejected". peoplebeforeprofit.ie. Archived fromthe original on 4 June 2016.
  142. ^"Oppose Second Referendum:But Urge a No Vote". IRSP. Archived fromthe original on 19 May 2015. Retrieved16 January 2017.
  143. ^"General Election Manifesto 2016"(PDF).Sinn Féin. p. 30. Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 5 December 2024. Retrieved1 May 2018.Recent governments have been totally deferential to the EU and its most powerful member states. ...[W]e will: uphold the right of democratically elected governments to decide their social and economic priorities in the interests of their own people; seek to return powers to EU member states and increase the influence of member state parliaments in the EU legislative process; support reforms of the EU which are aimed at reducing the power of the European Commission, making it more transparent and accountable to the European and member state parliaments; and increasing the influence of smaller member states.
  144. ^Bean, Kevin (2008).The New Politics of Sinn Fein. Oxford University Press. p. 171.ISBN 978-1781387801. Retrieved9 March 2016.
  145. ^Moriarty, Gerry (20 April 2015)."SF says North should be able stay in EU in a Brexit".The Irish Times. Retrieved29 January 2016.
  146. ^Johnston, Samuel A. T. (2 January 2020)."The 2019 European Parliament elections in Ireland".Irish Political Studies.35 (1):18–28.doi:10.1080/07907184.2019.1652165.ISSN 0790-7184.S2CID 210559430.
  147. ^"Ireland, Brexit and why the EU must be opposed". Socialist Party. 28 June 2016. Retrieved10 February 2017.
  148. ^"EU – A force for progress or profits?". Socialist Party. 17 June 2015. Retrieved10 February 2017.
  149. ^"For a European struggle against austerity – For a socialist Europe". Socialist Party. 20 April 2012. Retrieved10 February 2017.
  150. ^"Grillo: «Referendum sull'euro entro un anno".Corriere della Sera. 23 May 2013. Retrieved28 January 2015.
  151. ^Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose (9 January 2018)."Italy's new radicals denounce EU Brexit strategy as foolish dogma".The Telegraph.Archived from the original on 12 January 2022.
  152. ^"Di Maio fa dietrofront: "Non è più il momento di uscire dall'euro"".Il Tempo. 9 January 2018.
  153. ^Salvatori, Pietro (6 February 2018)."Luigi Di Maio torna a casa Europa e rottama la politica estera a 5 stelle".Huffington Post.
  154. ^"New Five Star Movement leader: 'We want to stay in the EU'".The Local (Italy edition). 25 September 2017. Retrieved30 December 2019.
  155. ^"Populists vie for power after Italy vote". 5 March 2018. Retrieved31 December 2019.
  156. ^Caprara, Maurizio (24 July 2008)."Passa all'unanimità il Trattato europeo".Corriere della Sera. Milan. Archived fromthe original on 22 July 2011.
  157. ^"The small political parties that risk obliteration under Italy's new electoral law".The Local. 2 June 2017. Retrieved16 August 2017.
  158. ^"Programma del Movimento La Fiamma Tricolore" [Programme of the Movement Tricolour Flame] (in Italian).Tricolour Flame. Archived from the original on 16 August 2017. Retrieved16 August 2017.
  159. ^Durantini, Ermanno (28 September 2016)."Intervista a Roberto Fiore" [Interview with Roberto Fiore] (in Italian). Archived fromthe original on 16 August 2017. Retrieved16 August 2017.
  160. ^"Solidarietà ed Unione Europea" [Solidarity and the European Unione] (in Italian).National Front. 21 January 2017. Retrieved16 August 2017.
  161. ^"Intervista a Simone Di Stefano sull'Unione europea" [Interview with Simone Di Stefano onEuropean Union] (in Italian).CasaPound. Archived fromthe original on 16 August 2017. Retrieved16 August 2017.
  162. ^Marco Rizzo rips a copy of the Treaty of Rome (in Italian) onYouTube
  163. ^"Il PCI alla manifestazione del 25 Marzo contro l'UE e la NATO" (in Italian).Italian Communist Party. 20 March 2017. Archived fromthe original on 16 August 2017. Retrieved16 August 2017.
  164. ^"Atto costitutivo e statuto"(PDF) (in Italian). Sovereignist Front. Retrieved16 August 2017.
  165. ^"L'Unione europea" [The European Union](PDF) (in Italian).MMT Italy. Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 16 August 2017. Retrieved16 August 2017.
  166. ^Cremaschi, Giorgio (20 March 2013)."Il fallimento dell'euro" [The failure of the euro] (in Italian). Retrieved16 August 2017.
  167. ^Paolo Barnard: "Italexit, now!" (in Italian) onYouTube
  168. ^"Will Italy be next to reverse out of the EU".The Irish Times. 16 March 2017.
  169. ^Armellini, Alvise (24 April 2015)."Anti-euro talk spreads in Italy".EUobserver. Retrieved16 August 2017.
  170. ^"Passaparola – Euromaniacs? The real buzz is to say no, by Diego Fusaro". Beppe Grillo' Blog. Archived fromthe original on 16 August 2017. Retrieved16 August 2017.
  171. ^"Standard Eurobarometer 87".European Commission. Retrieved17 August 2017.
  172. ^"Ai sovranisti nessuna Commissione del Parlamento europeo" [No committees of European Parliament to souverainists)].lettera43 (in Italian). 10 July 2019. Retrieved15 August 2019.
  173. ^"Von der Leyen vote may trigger snap elections in Italy".Euractiv. 18 July 2019. Retrieved15 August 2019.
  174. ^Amante, Angelo (21 July 2020)."Italexit! Popular senator launches party to take Italy out of EU".Reuters. Retrieved21 July 2020.
  175. ^"Eiroskepticisms – no ideoloģijas par politisku līdzekli" (in Latvian).
  176. ^Ivaldi, Gilles (2011), "The Populist Radical Right in European Elections 1979–2009",The Extreme Right in Europe: Current Trends and Perspectives, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, p. 19
  177. ^Patrick Dumont; Fernand Fehlen; Raphaël Kies; Philippe Poirier (January 2006).Les élections législatives et européennes de 2004 au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg [The Legislative and European elections in 2004 in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg](PDF) (Report) (in French).Chamber of Deputies. p. 220. Retrieved9 March 2016.
  178. ^abPace, Roderick (2011)."Malta: Euroscepticism in a Polarised Polity".South European Society and Politics.16 (1):133–157.doi:10.1080/13608740903454155.ISSN 1360-8746.S2CID 55655902. Retrieved1 November 2025.
  179. ^Mitchell, Jon P. (2002).Ambivalent Europeans: Ritual, Memory and the Public Sphere in Malta.Taylor & Francis. p. 156.ISBN 9780415271530. Retrieved18 August 2019.
  180. ^Xuereb, Matthew (24 May 2008)."European Socialist head endorses Joseph Muscat".Times of Malta. Retrieved1 November 2025.
  181. ^"Labour Will become pro-active in EU matters – Muscat".The Malta Independent. 24 July 2008. Retrieved1 November 2025.
  182. ^Eder, Florian (24 February 2019)."Joseph Muscat: May's Sharm offensive won't change EU's Brexit course".Politico. Retrieved1 November 2025.
  183. ^"Popular Party presents proposals for Gozo, among them a referendum on EU membership".TVM News. 6 March 2022. Retrieved1 November 2025.
  184. ^abHarwood, Mark (28 October 2017)."How Euroscepticism was marginalised – Malta's post-membership Euro-enthusiasm and the impact of BREXIT".European Politics and Society.19 (2):182–196.doi:10.1080/23745118.2017.1391515. Retrieved1 November 2025.
  185. ^Subramanian, Samanth (9 March 2017)."Could the anti-Islam Party for Freedom come out on top in upcoming Netherlands election?".The National.Archived from the original on 18 March 2017. Retrieved16 April 2017.
  186. ^Thompson, Wayne C. (2014).Western Europe 2014. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 185.ISBN 9781475812305.Archived from the original on 23 November 2023. Retrieved19 October 2020.
  187. ^"PVV: EU-droom is nu nachtmerrie" (in Dutch). NOS. 19 May 2014. Retrieved26 May 2014.
  188. ^"EU en euro - Standpunten - Ja21! - Het Juiste Antwoord". Archived fromthe original on 18 January 2021. Retrieved19 January 2022.
  189. ^"Standpunt: Europese Unie – superstaat nee, samenwerken ja" (in Dutch). SP website. Archived fromthe original on 24 May 2014. Retrieved26 May 2014.
  190. ^"Healthy farmers With each other, for each other!". Retrieved22 April 2022.
  191. ^"Stemden we voor of tegen Europa?" (in Dutch). NOS. 23 May 2014. Retrieved26 May 2014.
  192. ^"Dutch referendum voters overwhelmingly reject closer EU links to Ukraine".The Guardian. Amsterdam.Reuters. 7 April 2016. Retrieved7 April 2016.
  193. ^"Dutch referendum a difficult result for EU and Ukraine".BBC News. 7 April 2016. Retrieved7 April 2016.
  194. ^Hilary White (9 April 2008)."Poland Ratifies Lisbon Treaty with Opt-Out from EU Human Rights Charter". Catholic Exchange – Sophia Institute Press. Retrieved29 July 2015.
  195. ^"Polish President slams government eurozone drive".The Times. Malta. 25 May 2009. Retrieved29 July 2015.
  196. ^Poland 'more anti-Brussels' despite getting largest share of EU cash. Euronews. Author – Chris Harris. Last updated 8 July 2015. Retrieved 22 August 2017.
  197. ^"Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego 2019".pe2019.pkw.gov.pl (in Polish). Retrieved27 April 2025.
  198. ^"#PolEXIT stał się faktem. Powstała partia o takiej nazwie. | Kongres Nowej Prawicy" (in Polish). 15 October 2019. Archived from the original on 15 October 2019. Retrieved17 August 2022.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
  199. ^"Stanisław Żółtek kandydatem na Prezydenta RP | Kongres Nowej Prawicy" (in Polish). 8 May 2020. Archived from the original on 8 May 2020. Retrieved17 August 2022.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
  200. ^"Wybory Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w 2020 r."prezydent20200628.pkw.gov.pl (in Polish). Retrieved17 August 2022.
  201. ^"SONDAJ – Euroscepticismul nu prinde la români". 8 May 2015. Retrieved5 August 2016.
  202. ^"Standard Eurobarometer 26".European Commission. November 1986.
  203. ^"El legado de la crisis en el europeísmo en España".El Diario (6 February 2019). 6 February 2019.
  204. ^Mitchell, Kristine (2014). "Does European Identification Increase Support for Further Economic Integration?".Journal of European Integration.36 (6):602–618.doi:10.1080/07036337.2014.916286.S2CID 154597995.
  205. ^"Constitución Europea – Resultados del Referéndum 2005" [European Constitution – Referendum Results 2005] (in Spanish). European Parliament. 2005. Archived fromthe original on 26 February 2005.
  206. ^"Standard Eurobarometer 68".European Commission. January 2008.
  207. ^Rodon, Toni (2016). "Podemos and Ciudadanos Shake up the Spanish party System: The 2015 Local and Regional elections".South European Society & Politics.21 (3):339–358.doi:10.1080/13608746.2016.1151127.S2CID 156799574.
  208. ^Bosch, Agusti (2019). "How does economic crisis impel emerging parties on the road to elections? The case of the Spanish Podemos and Ciudadanos".Party Politics.25 (2):257–268.doi:10.1177/1354068817710223.S2CID 149417027.
  209. ^Bosco, Anna (2018).Le quattro crisi della Spagna. Bologna: Il Mulino.ISBN 978-8815273925.
  210. ^Szczerbiak & Taggart (2008), p. 183.
  211. ^TT (17 February 2019)."V ska inte driva EU-utträde i valet" [V will not push for EU exit in election].SVT Nyheter (in Swedish). Retrieved21 November 2020.
  212. ^"Vänsterpartiet släpper kravet på att lämna EU". 11 May 2024.
  213. ^"Internationell solidaritet - inte överstatlighet". 7 May 2024.
  214. ^Vår politik A till Ö | SverigedemokraternaArchived 9 October 2018 at theWayback Machine. Sverigedemokraterna.se (9 October 2018).
  215. ^"Debatt: Kasta in EU-handduken och bilda ny frihandelsunion".www.expressen.se. 21 July 2020.
  216. ^Ուղիղ հեռարձակում (21 March 2017)."Tsarukian Endorsed By Euroskeptic EU Politicians".«Ազատ Եվրոպա/Ազատություն» Ռադիոկայան (in Armenian). Azatutyun.am. Retrieved15 July 2019.
  217. ^Hasanović, Jasmin; Kapidžić, Damir (2023). "European But Not EU: Inside and Outside Perceptions of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Path to European Integration". In Giovanni Finizio (ed.).The EU Seen from the Outside. Perspectives from Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. T.wai - Torino World Affairs Institute.ISBN 978-88-940803-2-2.
  218. ^Passarelli, Gianluca (2018).The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in the Western Balkans. Springer.ISBN 978-3319973524.
  219. ^"The Georgian March against migrants and NATO".JAMnews. 2 May 2018. Retrieved6 December 2019.
  220. ^Crosby, Alan (20 July 2017)."Opposition To Xenophobic March Earns Georgian Activist Threats, Show Of Support".Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Retrieved6 December 2019.
  221. ^abFoy, Henry; Fleming, Sam (3 March 2022)."Georgia and Moldova apply to join EU".Financial Times. London. Archived fromthe original on 10 December 2022.
  222. ^"Stjórnarsáttmáli kynntur á Laugarvatni". 22 May 2013. Archived fromthe original on 11 November 2013. Retrieved22 May 2013.
  223. ^Fox, Benjamin (16 June 2013)."Iceland's EU bid is over, commission told". Reuters. Retrieved16 June 2013.
  224. ^Lawless, Jill (7 March 2017)."Iceland gets new govt, could restart talks on entering EU".Associated Press. Archived fromthe original on 12 January 2017. Retrieved19 March 2017.
  225. ^"New Icelandic center-right coalition to give parliament vote on EU referendum".Reuters. 11 January 2017. Retrieved28 March 2017.
  226. ^Iceland: further from EU membership than ever, euobserver 11 December 2017
  227. ^Venstre sier ja til EU (27 September 2020).
  228. ^"NOU 2012: 2: Utenfor og innenfor" [NOU 2012: 2: From outside and within].Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in Norwegian). 2010. Archived fromthe original on 20 October 2013. Retrieved28 September 2012.
  229. ^"EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis"; via the official website of the European Union.
  230. ^"Ukraine dismisses Russia's call for cease-fire".Boston Globe. 1 September 2014.
  231. ^What Russia thinks of EuropeArchived 3 December 2018 at theWayback Machine 2 February 2016
  232. ^"Favorable Attitudes Toward U.S., EU Rising In Russia, Poll Finds".Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 2 August 2018.
  233. ^Keating, Dave (23 October 2013)."San Marino rejects EU accession".Politico.
  234. ^Marceddu, David (19 October 2013)."San Marino al voto per l'ingresso in Ue".Il Fatto Quotidiano (in Italian).
  235. ^"San Marino dice no all'Europa: il referendum non raggiunge il quorum".Il Fatto Quotidiano (in Italian). 21 October 2013.
  236. ^"The changing nature of Serbian political parties' attitudes towards Serbian EU membership".Sussex European Institute. August 2011. Retrieved18 April 2016.
  237. ^Ljubomir Delevic (6 November 2013)."Introduction to nationalism in Serbia".your-art.sk. Retrieved18 March 2019.
  238. ^Antonić, Slobodan (2012)."Eurosceptism in Serbia"(PDF).Serbian Political Thought.5 (1).Institute of Political Studies in Belgrade: 69.doi:10.22182/spt.512012.4.
  239. ^"DJB: Suverenizam podrazumeva dostojanstvenu i slobodnu državu".rs.n1info.com (in Serbian). N1. 18 June 2020.
  240. ^Stojić, Marko (2017).Party Responses to the EU in the Western Balkans. Springer. p. 134.
  241. ^"Srpska Narodna Narodna Partija: Vodi se agresivna kampanja protiv Rusije i Putina".kurir.rs (in Serbian). Kurir. 10 July 2020.
  242. ^Miserez, Marc-Andre (2 December 2012)."Switzerland poised to keep EU at arm's length".swissinfo. Retrieved10 April 2014.
  243. ^Keiser, Andreas (30 November 2012)."Swiss still prefer bilateral accords with EU".Swissinfo. Retrieved10 April 2014.
  244. ^Kuenzi, Renat (15 May 2014)."'We're Not the Only EU Sceptics'".Swissinfo. Retrieved4 April 2016.
  245. ^"Über Uns". Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland official website. Archived fromthe original on 13 April 2016. Retrieved4 April 2016.
  246. ^ab"Survey: Tighten Borders but Keep EU Accords, Say Swiss". thelocal.ch. 19 May 2016. Retrieved17 June 2016.
  247. ^"Vatan Partisi hariç hepsi NATO ve AB yanlısı! İşte partilerin dış politikaları" [All parties except Homeland Party are pro-NATO and the EU! Here are the foreign policy of the party] (in Turkish). Ulusalkanal.com.tr. 6 May 2015. Retrieved29 July 2015.
  248. ^"TKP, NATO'ya, ABD'ye ve Avrupa Birliği'ne neden karşı?" [CAP, NATO, the United States and the European Union against reason?] (in Turkish). Tkp.org.tr. 13 August 2013. Archived fromthe original on 18 May 2015. Retrieved29 July 2015.
  249. ^"Ümit Özdağ received the founding document of the Victory Party". 26 August 2021.
  250. ^"Profile: Ukraine's 'Right Sector' movement".BBC News. 21 January 2014.
  251. ^"CEC counts 100 percent of vote in Ukraine's parliamentary elections".www.ukrinform.net. 26 July 2019. Retrieved3 March 2021.
  252. ^"Why Ukraine sanctioned Putin's ally Medvedchuk – Atlantic Council".Atlantic Council. 26 February 2021. Retrieved3 March 2021.
  253. ^Williamson, Adrian (5 May 2015)."The case for Brexit: lessons from the 1960s and 1970s".History & Policy. Retrieved13 July 2016.
  254. ^Georgiou, Christakis (April 2017)."British Capitalism and European Unification, from Ottawa to the Brexit Referendum".Historical Materialism.25 (1):90–129.doi:10.1163/1569206X-12341511.
  255. ^Lewis, Anthony (29 October 1971)."Commons Votes, 356 to 242, for Britain's Membership in the European Market".The New York Times. p. 1. Retrieved14 September 2019.
  256. ^"Michael Foot: What did the 'longest suicide note' say?".
  257. ^Mance, Henry (19 February 2016)."George Galloway joins anti-EU rally as Brussels talks reach climax".Financial Times. London, UK. Archived fromthe original on 10 December 2022. Retrieved19 February 2016.
  258. ^Alexandre-Collier, Agnès (2015)."Euroscepticism under Margaret Thatcher and David Cameron : From Theory to Practice"(PDF).Observatoire de la société britannique (17):115–133.doi:10.4000/osb.1778.S2CID 55603749.
  259. ^Mardell, Mark (26 June 2008)."Cameron's Britain: Euro-doubts".BBC News.Archived from the original on 12 February 2009. Retrieved1 April 2010.
  260. ^"How UKIP became a British political force".BBC News. 3 May 2013. Retrieved6 February 2017.
  261. ^"Election 2015: UKIP controls Thanet council". Retrieved8 November 2024.
  262. ^"UKIP gains first elected MP with Clacton win".
  263. ^"Mark Reckless defects to UKIP from Tories".
  264. ^"Ed Davey: Lib Dems are winning back trust after 2010 U-turn on pledge to scrap tuition fees".
  265. ^"Tory MPs attack David Cameron's EU reforms plan as 'pretty thin gruel'".
  266. ^"EU renegotiation: What David Cameron wanted – and what he really got".
  267. ^"The Conservative Party split over Brexit".LSE BREXIT. 5 April 2016. Retrieved6 February 2017.
  268. ^Goodenough, Tom (16 February 2016)."Which Tory MPs back Brexit, who doesn't and who is still on the fence?".Coffee House. The Spectator. Archived fromthe original on 22 October 2016. Retrieved6 February 2017.
  269. ^Mason, Rowena (30 May 2016)."Labour voters in the dark about party's stance on Brexit, research says".The Guardian. Retrieved6 February 2017.
  270. ^Cooper, Charlie (21 June 2016)."Corbyn is now genuinely against Brexit – but is it too little too late?".The Independent. Retrieved6 February 2017.
  271. ^"Liberal Democrats regroup around pro-Europe message".Financial Times. Archived fromthe original on 10 December 2022.
  272. ^Withnall, Adam (24 June 2016)."It's official: Britain has voted to Leave the EU".The Independent.
  273. ^Dickie, Mure (24 June 2016)."Scots' backing for Remain raises threat of union's demise".Financial Times.
  274. ^abForgey, Quint (24 May 2019)."Inside Theresa May's Great British Failure". Politico.eu. Retrieved15 July 2019.
  275. ^"Tory MPs launch rival campaign groups".BBC News. 20 May 2019. Retrieved25 March 2020.
  276. ^"Notes from the first Tory leadership hustings".
  277. ^"'Get Brexit Done.' The 3 Words That Helped Boris Johnson Win Britain's 2019 Election".
  278. ^"Opinion: The European Union is not a 'neoliberal conspiracy' – and it's disturbing that some in the Labour Party apparently believe this nonsense".The Independent. 14 May 2018. Retrieved30 June 2023.
  279. ^"Book Forum on Hans Kundnani's Eurowhiteness: Culture, Empire and Race in the European Project".Czech Journal of International Relations.3 (59):129–168. 2024.ISSN 2788-2985.

Cited sources

[edit]
International
National
European Union articles
History
Timeline
Predecessors
Defence policy
European Communities (1967–2009)
Central bank
Financial stability
Enlargements
Withdrawals
Geography
Bodies
Institutions
Legislature
Executive
Judiciary
Central bank
Supreme audit institution
Other
international-law
EU bodies
Independent
offices
Agencies
Advisory
bodies
Military
bodies
Law
Economy
Politics
Concepts
Policies
Foreign
relations
Culture
Lists
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Euroscepticism&oldid=1321022119"
Category:
Hidden categories:

[8]ページ先頭

©2009-2025 Movatter.jp