| Ethiopian civil conflict (2018 present) | |||||||
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| Part of theconflicts in the Horn of Africa | |||||||
Territorial control as of July 2025.[a] (For a more detailed, up-to-date, interactive map, seehere). Pro-federal government troops Ethiopian federal government and regional allies Anti-federal government rebels Controlled by theTigray People's Liberation Front | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
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| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Units involved | |||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
8,000 captured[17][18] 2MiG-23 lost[19][20] 2 Mi-35 lost[21][22][23] 1 C-130 lost[24] | |||||||
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The ongoingEthiopian civil conflict began with the 2018 dissolution of theEthiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), anethnic federalist,dominant partypolitical coalition. After the20-year border conflict between Ethiopia andEritrea, a decade of internal tensions,two years of protests, and astate of emergency,Hailemariam Desalegnresigned on 15 February 2018 as prime minister and EPRDF chairman, and there were hopes of peace under his successorAbiy Ahmed.[28] However,war broke out in theTigray Region, with resurgent regional and ethnic factional attacks throughout Ethiopia.[29][30][31][32] The civil wars caused substantial human rights violations, war crimes, and extrajudicial killings.[33]
In March 2018, the EPRDF nominatedAbiy Ahmed to succeed Desalegn, and he was made Prime Minister by the Ethiopian parliament on 2 April.[34] The 42-year-old Abiy reformed the country's economy, released political opponents, allowed the return of exiles, relaxed press restrictions, and freed diverse political groups to organize. He was awarded theNobel Peace Prize in 2019 for ending the war with Eritrea. He reversed the former regime's ethnic politics enshrined in the1995 Constitution. However, his policies exacerbated competition among the former coalition parties and pushed the country toward further ethnic strife.
InNovember 2020, war broke out in Tigray between the federal government and the regional government. TheEthiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) andEritrean Defence Forces (EDF) occupied Tigray's capital ofMekelle. TheTigray Defense Forces retook most of Tigray in mid-2021, and in late 2021 allied with theOromo Liberation Army (OLA)[35][15] along with seven smaller rebel groups includingTigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), forming theUnited Front of Ethiopian Federalist and Confederalist Forces.[36] After two years of shifting alliances and conflicts, TPLF and the Ethiopian government signed apeace treaty in Pretoria on 2 November 2022. However, sporadic civil conflicts continued such as theGambela unrest,OLA insurgency, andWar in Amhara, the latter two carried out byOLA andFano militants against the federal government.
Most modernconflicts in Ethiopia are the result ofAbyssinian expansionism in the late 19th- and 20th centuries under EmperorMenelik II, whose period saw the plurality of ethnicity in Ethiopia split into multiethnic states. Since then, the political system has failed as a result of not adequately recognising ethnolinguistic diversity.[37] In addition, Menelik II forced regional lords to pay taxes to theShewan government for the sake of administering their lands. This was especially done by these other kingdoms in the present day:Jimma,Benishangul-Gumuz Region,Wellega andBale. Historians correspond this type of system as a prototype of the current federalism in Ethiopia.
Throughout the 20th century, Ethiopia witnessed prolonged political turmoil. Starting fromfascist Italian occupation (1935–1941), imperialHaile Selassie period (1930–1974) andDerg regime (1974–1991), political violence has increasingly engendered Ethiopia to instability and severe human rights violations.[38]

Many scholars and authors believe that the current source of internal conflict in Ethiopia is the implementation of ethnic federalism since 1991.[39] Evidence suggests the implementation of ethnic federalism "politicized tribal identity" and scholars refuted its application in Ethiopian state context.[40] TheEthiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) believes by applying ethnic federalism, Ethiopia would be safer and peaceful if ethnolinguistic groups granted autonomy while maintaining unity of state.[41] This notion is actively opposed byEthiopian nationalist groups, contending the present system of ethnic-based government should be changed to non-ethnic and consider individuals as subjects of political order.[42] Notwithstanding, the ruling coalition EPRDF underMeles Zenawi's premiership, took advantage to justify authoritarian dictatorship by initiating crackdowns and jailing opposition groups, concentrating mass media, violating democratic and human rights, and by committing electoral fraud in the2005 general election.[43]

On 20 August 2012, Melesdied inBrussels and was replaced byHailemariam Desalegn as Prime Minister of Ethiopia, who remained in power as his party was in control of every parliamentary seat. On 15 February 2018, Hailemariamresigned followingyears-long protests and astate of emergency. He was succeeded byAbiy Ahmed in April 2018.[44] Shortly afterwards, the 42-years old Abiyreformed the country's economy and politics, released political prisoners and opposition group members as well as returned the exiled members, relaxed the press freedom and granted diverse political groups the freedom to mobilize and organize. In 2019, he was awardedNobel Peace Prize for his contribution of ending the20-years war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. As opponent of ethnic federalism, his transformative politics saw the reversal of the former regime policies of ethnic-based politics enshrined in the1995 Constitution. However, it exacerbated competition and resentment over the former coalition parties and pushed the country toward further interethnic tensions.[45] As noted in his 2019 bookMedemer, Abiy's initial plan was to merge all ethnic based political parties into one national party what is calledProsperity Party, founded in 2019.[46][47]
In 2014, the federal government under the EPRDF, redrew the boundary between the two regions ofAfar Region and theSomali Region. As a result, the Afar Region gained three towns from the Somali Region which has tried to gain them back since. Border clashes in April 2021 killed around 100 civilians.[30]
On 10–11 January 2019, 58Qemant people were killed by theFano militia. The ENDF failed to intervene to stop the massacre.[48]
On 22 June 2019 elements of The Amhara Region's Peace and Security Bureau and allied militias loyal by Brigadier GeneralAsaminew Tsige Chief of the Amhara Region security began a coup d'état. Starting with the targeted assassinations of political and military leaders includingSe'are Mekonnen (Chief of the General Staff), Gizae Aberra (Aide-de-camp to the Chief of the General Staff), andAmbachew Mekonnen (Chief Administrator of the Amhara Region). The coup d'état ultimately failed with Asaminew Tsige being killed by police nearBahir Dar 36 hours after the start of the coup.[49][50][51][52]
Throughout much ofWestern Tigray, security is mostly maintained by uniformed "special forces" from neighboring Amhara states and civil servants have also arrived from Amhara to take over the administration of some Tigrayan towns and cities, a move that risks inflaming ethnic tensions.[53] On 18 December 2020, looting was reported byEEPA, including 500 dairy cows and hundreds of calves stolen by Amhara forces.[54]
On 23 November 2020, anAFP news agency journalist visited the western Tigray town ofHumera, and observed that the administration of the conquered parts ofWestern Tigray was taken over by officials from Amhara region.[53] As of 1 March 2021, several geographical places had been renamed by the new authorities and many residents of Tigrayan ethnicity had been deported to Central Zone.[55] Eyewitnesses report ongoingethnic cleansing and settlements void of inhabitants.[56]
TheHumera massacres in 2020 that killed around 92 people of Tigrayan origin was attributed to Fano and ENDF. TheHumera massacres in 2021 that killed Tigrayans were also attributed to Fano and possibly Eritrean soldiers.[57][58] Fano are also accused of participating in theMai Kadra massacre, which had both Amhara and Tigrayan victims, whileAmnesty International, theEthiopian Human Rights Commission, and theEthiopian Human Rights Council attributed it to local Tigrayan youths.[59][60]
Starting in March 2021 clashes erupted in the town ofAtaye after Amhara special forces killed a person on the steps of the main mosque in the city. This started off a wave of inter ethnic clashes that spread throughout theOromia Zone leading to the deaths of 303 people.[61][62] On 16 April Clashes once again started after OLA fighters attacked the city of Ataye, The clashes continued for two days leading to the deaths of 281 people and the destruction of a quarter of Ataye.[63][64]
By November 2021, fighting in theTigray War had moved south of the Tigray Region into the Amhara Region, leading to ajoint military campaign by theTigray Defense Forces (TDF) and theOromo Liberation Army (OLA) against federal forces, threateningAddis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia.[65]
The killings continued through 2021, with people being tortured, tied up and thrown into theTekeze River. The Italian weekly magazinePanorama published a graphic video in which Amhara soldiers killed a group of 9 people in Humera in August 2021 and then set fire to their bodies. The video also shows torturing of one man by Amhara soldiers, then tying him up, preparing to throw him into the river.[66]
A relation between Amhara militia Fano and the Ethiopian government in post-Tigray War worsened in 2023, culminated inWar in Amhara.[67] By April 2023, major crackdowns and unrest was skyrocketed after the Ethiopian army raided to Amhara Region to disarm regional military force. The Fano militiamen played central role on fighting against the government force, pinnacling themajor clashes with ENDF forces on 1 August. Fighting was intense in major hot spot ofDebre Tabor,Kobo andGondar.[68][69] The Ethiopian government declared asix-month state of emergency on 4 August, imposing restrictions on public gathering,gun ownership and media outlets and arresting without providingarrest warrants.[70]
Benishangul-Gumuz is home to several different ethnicities including theGumuz,Berta,Shinasha,Mao,Komo andFadashi. The Gumuz have had tensions with agriculturalAmhara,Oromos,Tigrayans andAgaw migrants, who in Metekel Zone constitute minority ethnic groups with some Amhara groups calling for Metekel to be incorporated into Amhara. Large scale land acquisitions by both local and foreign investors have also pushed the Gumuz off the land.[71][72]
Gumuz are alleged to have formed militias such as Buadin and the Gumuz Liberation Front that have staged attacks against those seen as "settlers".[73][74][31] In theMetekel massacre in December 2020, about 200[31] mostly Amharas, Oromos, and Shinashas were killed by a suspected Gumuz militia.[72] An unidentified armed group took over the county of Sedal Woreda in theKamashi Zone of the Benishangul-Gumuz Region in April 2021.[75]
In March 2020, the leader of one of the groups calledFano, Solomon Atanaw, stated that theFano would not disarm untilBenishangul-Gumuz Region'sMetekel Zone and theTigray Region districts ofWelkait andRaya are placed under the control ofAmhara Region.[76]
TheGambela Region has seen sporadic fighting over decades between theAnuak,Nuer and migrants from the highlands in what is called theGambela conflict with about 300 people being killed in 2002 in theGambela massacre. In June 2022, the OLA and the Gambella Liberation Front (GLF) attacked the region's capitalGambella city.[77]
This section needs to beupdated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information.(December 2022) |
On 13 September 2018, clashes broke out in the town ofBurayu between various ethnic groups including theOromo,Amharas,Dorzes,Gamos,Wolayitas,Gurages, andSilt'e. These clashes continued for three days leading to 55 people being killed and 670 people being injured.[78]
After the murder of Oromo singerHachalu Hundessa on 29 June 2020 in the Gelan Condominiums area of Addis Ababa, protests and riots broke out across theOromia region. In Hachalu Hundessa's home town ofAmbo 83 people were killed in riots.[79] InShashamane, dozens of buildings were destroyed and at least 150 people were killed in ethnic riots and pogroms.[80]
On 2 November 2020, between 32 and 54 people were killed when an armed group of about 60 men suspected of being members of theOromo Liberation Army (OLA) gathered 200 people in a schoolyard in the village of Gawa Qanqa before opening fire. The attacks were said to be targeted at Amhara people.[81]
On 5 March 2021, 29 people were killed when a suspected OLA fighter attacked a church in the village of Abo. The OLA denied responsibility saying that the attack was carried out by an OLA splinter group led by Faqadaa Abdiisaa.[82][83]
On 5 November 2021, theTigray Defense Forces andOromo Liberation Army joined with other armed and opposition groups in declaring an alliance against the government known as theUnited Front of Ethiopian Federalist and Confederalist Forces. The alliance includes theAfar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, Agaw Democratic Movement,Benishangul People's Liberation Movement, Gambella Peoples Liberation Army, Global Kimant People Right and Justice Movement/Kimant Democratic Party,Sidama National Liberation Front and theSomali State Resistance.[84] They further pledged to dismantle the government of Prime Minister Abiy, by force if necessary, and form a transitional government.[85] But analysts state that most of the groups “do not have a strong fighting force,” and some of the political groups “have even weaker political programs.” thus making their impact unclear.[86]
Between 30 and 31 August 2022, eyewitnesses said that militants from the Amhara Region (whom they claimed wereFano militias) massacred more than 60 people inHoro Guduru, Western Oromia, and displaced 20,000 more. On 6 September, theEthiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) confirmed this attack happened, though they declined to say whether the attackers were part of Fano.[87][88]
The administrator of Kiramu district in theEast Welega Zone, Fikadu Hunde, alleged that on 15 October 2022, Fano militias entered the district, killing 30 people and burning down over 50 houses. The EHRC learned of this information, but stated that there "was difficulty in verifying and obtaining accurate information due to the lack of network in the area," according to a statement they made toAddis Standard.[89]
Clashes between the two largest regions, theOromia region, which constitutes primarily those of theOromo ethnic group, andSomali region, which primarily constitutes those of theSomali ethnic group, began in December 2016 followingterritorial disputes. Somalis are mostly pastoralists and Oromos tend to be farmers, as well as pastoralists. It has been difficult to demarcate clear borders between the states as pastoral communities tend to cross borders in search of pasture for their animals.[90]
This has led to competition, such as for wells and grazing land, over the years, with tens of thousands of people being displaced in some conflicts. In 2004, a referendum to decide on the fate of more than 420 kebeles, the country's smallest administrative unit, gave 80% of them to Oromia, leading to Somali minorities fleeing those areas.[90]
By 2018, hundreds of people were killed[91] and 200,0000 fled their homes from the resulting conflict.[92] The regional special police of both states, called theLiyu in the Somali region and the Liyu Hail of Oromia state, were both accused of committing atrocities.[93]
With the succession of Abiy Ahmed to the position of Prime Minister friction began to build between the federal government and Somali regional governments due to Ahmed's reformist vision which clashed withAbdi Mohamed Omar (Abdi Illey) who had ruled over the region with an iron fist for the past 8 years. Despite attempts to negotiate a path forward, the tension between the two men would boil over, when in late July 2018, Abdi Illey ordered theLiyu Police to enter intoDire Dawa, an Ethiopian city outside of the Somali region's jurisdiction.[94] The Liyu police, up to this point, had mainly been a counterinsurgency force created by the federal government in 2007 to help fight theOgaden National Liberation Front and were commanded by then Somali regional security chiefAbdi Mohammed Omar who would later become the region's president in 2010. Although he was no longer the region's security chief, the Liyu would still continue to report to him.[95] In response to the "illegal act," federal forces confronted the Liyu and entered Jijiga on August 4.[94]
In November 2021, theSomali State Resistance allied with the Tigray People's Liberation Front andUFEFCF.[96][97][98]
In July 2022, theIslamist militant groupal-Shabaab launched an invasion fromSomalia into Ethiopia'sSomali Region; the invasion was the largest attack by al-Shabaab in Ethiopian territory to date.[99]
The Sidama zone split from theSouthern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR) to become theSidama region after the2019 Sidama Region referendum. TheSouth West Ethiopia Peoples' Region became its own region, splitting off from SNNPR following the2021 South West Region referendum. After theSouth Ethiopia Regional State was formed following the2023 South Ethiopia Region referendum, the remaining area of SNNPR became theCentral Ethiopia Regional State.
In theGuraferdaworeda of theBench Maji Zone in the SNNPR in October 2020, about 30 people were killed by an unidentified armed group. The victims were said to have been Amhara.[32][100]
In 2018, clashes began between theGedeo Zone in theSouthern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR), made up of mostlyGedeo people, and theGuji Zone in the Oromia region, made up of mostlyGuji Oromos. The clashes led to about 800,000 mostly ethnic Gedeos fleeing their homes. This was a higher number of people and over a shorter period of time than occurred at the height of the more publicizedRohingya crisis inMyanmar the year before. The government pressured the refugees to return to their homes even though they fear for their lives, often by denying refugees access tohumanitarian aid.[101]
The Segen Area Peoples' Zone, formerly a zone in the SNNPR, split in 2018 to form theKonso Zone, inhabited mostly byKonso people, as well as theBurji special woreda,Dirashe special woreda andAmaro special woreda and there has been intermittent violence since then. Violence in the latter half of 2020 attributed to Oromo and Konso communities[102] killed dozens of civilians and displaced at least 90,000 people.[103]
The Sidama Zone was previously part of the SNNPR and theSidama people were the largest ethnic group in that region. In July 2019, clashes between groups on the issue of greater autonomy for Sidama led to deaths and internal displacement.[104] A vote in favor of greater autonomy in the2019 Sidama Region referendum resulted in Sidama Zone becoming the country's 10th region. A number of other ethnic groups in the region are also pursuing demands to form their ethnic-based state.[105]
In theWolayita Zone, at least 17 people were killed in August 2020 by security forces. This was following calls for making a separate region for theWelayta people in the same fashion as the Sidama region for the Sidama people.[32]
In theGurage Zone, there is a call for gurage region since November 2018. This was following two times zonal council approvals calls for making a separate region for theGurage people in the same fashion as the Sidama region for the Sidama people.[32]
The Tigray Regional Government was led by theTigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which formerly dominated the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition. Hostilities between the central government and the TPLF escalated after the TPLF rejected the federal government's decision to postponing August 2020 elections to mid-2021 as a result of theCOVID-19 pandemic, accusing the government of violating theEthiopian constitution.[106]
The TPLF carried outits own regional elections, winning all contested seats in the region's parliament.[107] In the months before November 2020, Abiy moved troops toward Tigray and sent military cargo planes into Eritrea. Behind closed doors, his advisers and military generals debated the merits of a conflict. Those who disagreed were fired, interrogated at gunpoint or forced to leave.[108]
Afterattacks on the Northern Command by armed forces loyal to the TPLF, which the TPLF called a pre-emptive strike, theEthiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) launched an offensive, capturingMekelle, the capital of Tigray in November 2020.[108][109] The ENDF was assisted by forces from neighboringEritrea.[110]
After half a year of guerilla campaign, the TPLF launched a counter-offensive and by July 2021 recaptured Mekelle inOperation Alula. By 31 October 2021, theTDF had claimed to have taken the strategically located city ofKombolcha, 380 kilometres fromAddis Ababa, as well as the nearby city ofDessie. The government denied the claims, reporting that fighting was still going on in and around the two cities.[111] The Ethiopian government further claimed that as the TDF entered Kombolcha, they massacred more than 100 youths. TPLF spokespersonGetachew Reda denied the claim.[112]