Epiphenomenalism is aphilosophical theory on themind–body problem inphilosophy of mind. It holds that subjectivemental events are completely dependent for their existence on corresponding physical andbiochemical events within the human body, but do not themselves influence physical events. According to epiphenomenalism, the appearance that subjective mental states (such asthoughts andintentions) are causally effective themselves and directly influence physical events is an illusion generated by brain regions such as the prefrontal cortex, with consciousness itself being aby-product of physical states of the world. For instance, the emotion offear seems to make the heart beat faster, but according to epiphenomenalism the biochemical secretions of thebrain andnervous system (such as thestress hormoneadrenaline)—not the subjective experience of fear itself—is what causes the rapid rise in heartbeat. Because mental events are a kind of overflow that cannot cause anything physical, yet have non-physical properties, epiphenomenalism has traditionally been viewed as a form ofproperty dualism. In contemporary thought, there are a number of epiphenomenalistic questions that arise within a broadlymaterialistmonism.[1]
During the 17th century,René Descartes argued thatanimals are subject tomechanical laws of nature. He defended the idea ofautomatic behavior, or the performance of actions without conscious thought. Descartes questioned how the immaterial mind and the material body can interact causally.[2] Hisinteractionist model (1649) held that the body relates to the mind through thepineal gland.[3]La Mettrie,Leibniz, andSpinoza all in their own way began this way of thinking. The idea that even if the animal were conscious nothing would be added to the production of behavior, even in animals of the human type, was first voiced by La Mettrie (1745), and then byCabanis (1802), and was further explicated byHodgson (1870)[4] andThomas Henry Huxley (1874).[5][6]
Huxley agreed with Descartes that behavior is determined solely by physical mechanisms, but he also believed that humans enjoy an intelligent life. In 1874, Huxley argued, in the Presidential Address to theBritish Association for the Advancement of Science, that animals areconscious automata based on his experiments showing that movement was still possible without certain parts of thecentral nervous system being intact. Based on these results, Huxley proposed that consciousness itself was not in control of an animal's behavior, concluding that psychical changes are collateral products of physical changes. Like the bell of a clock that has no role in keeping the time, consciousness has no role in determining behavior.[2][3]
Huxley defendedautomatism by testing reflex actions, originally supported by Descartes. Huxley hypothesized that frogs that undergo lobotomy would swim when thrown into water, despite being unable to initiate actions. He argued that the ability to swim was solely dependent on the molecular change in the brain, concluding that consciousness is not necessary for reflex actions. According to epiphenomenalism, animals experience pain only as a result ofneurophysiology.[2][3]
In 1870, Huxley conducted a case study on a French soldier who had sustained a shot in theFranco-Prussian War that fractured his leftparietal bone. Every few weeks the soldier would enter a trance-like state, smoking, dressing himself, and aiming his cane like a rifle all while being insensitive to pins, electric shocks, odorous substances, vinegar, noise, and certain light conditions. Huxley used this study to show that consciousness was not necessary to execute these purposeful actions, justifying the assumption that humans are insensible machines. Huxley's mechanistic attitude towards the body convinced him that the brain alone causes behavior.[2][3]
In the early 1900s, scientificbehaviorists such asIvan Pavlov,John B. Watson, andB. F. Skinner began the attempt to uncover laws describing the relationship between stimuli and responses, without reference to inner mental phenomena. Instead of adopting a form ofeliminativism or mentalfictionalism, positions that deny that inner mental phenomena exist, a behaviorist was able to adopt epiphenomenalism in order to allow for the existence of mind.George Santayana (1905) believed that all motion has physical causes. Because consciousness is accessory to life and not essential to it, natural selection is responsible for ingraining tendencies to avoid certain contingencies without any conscious achievement involved.[7] By the 1960s, scientific behaviorism met substantial difficulties and eventually gave way to thecognitive revolution. Participants in that revolution, such asJerry Fodor, reject epiphenomenalism and insist upon the efficacy of the mind. Fodor even speaks of "epiphobia"—fear that one is becoming an epiphenomenalist.
However, since the cognitive revolution, there have been several who have argued for a version of epiphenomenalism. In 1970,Keith Campbell proposed his "new epiphenomenalism", which states that the body produces a spiritual mind that does not act on the body. How the brain causes a spiritual mind, according to Campbell, is destined to remain beyond our understanding forever.[8] In 2001,David Chalmers andFrank Cameron Jackson argued that claims about conscious states should be deduced a priori from claims about physical states alone. They offered that epiphenomenalism bridges, but does not close, theexplanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal realms.[9] These more recent versions maintain that only the subjective, qualitative aspects of mental states are epiphenomenal. Imagine both Pierre and a robot eating a cupcake. Unlike the robot, Pierre is conscious of eating the cupcake while the behavior is under way. This subjective experience is often called aquale (pluralqualia), and it describes the private "raw feel" or the subjective "what-it-is-like" that is the inner accompaniment of many mental states. Thus, while Pierre and the robot are both doing the same thing, only Pierre has the inner conscious experience.
Frank Cameron Jackson (1982), for example, once espoused the following view:
I am what is sometimes known as a "qualia freak". I think that there are certain features of bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical information includes. Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain... you won't have told me about the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy....[10]
Some thinkers draw distinctions between different varieties of epiphenomenalism. InConsciousness Explained,Daniel Dennett distinguishes between a purely metaphysical sense of epiphenomenalism, in which the epiphenomenon has no causal impact at all, and Huxley's "steam whistle" epiphenomenalism, in which effects exist but are not functionally relevant.
Some neurophysiological data has been proffered in support of epiphenomenalism,[by whom?][citation needed] suggesting that at least some choices and actions appear to be actually controlled by subconscious brain processes for which the conscious mind later takes credit. Some of the oldest such data is theBereitschaftspotential or "readiness potential" in which electrical activity related to voluntary actions can be recorded up to two seconds before the subject is aware of making a decision to perform the action. More recentlyBenjamin Libet, et al. (1979) have shown that it can take 0.5 seconds before a stimulus becomes part of conscious experience even though subjects can respond to the stimulus in reaction time tests within 200 milliseconds. The methods and conclusions of this experiment have received much criticism (e.g., see the many critical commentaries in Libet's (1985) target article), including fairly recently byneuroscientists such asPeter Tse, who claim to show that the readiness potential has nothing to do with consciousness at all.[11]
One argument against epiphenomenalism is that it is self-contradictory: if we have knowledge of epiphenomenalism, then our brains know the mind exists, but if epiphenomenalism were true, our brains should not have any knowledge of the mind, because the mind does not affect anything physical.[12]
However, some philosophers do not accept this as a rigorous refutation. For example, philosopherVictor Argonov states that epiphenomenalism is a questionable, but experimentally falsifiable theory. He argues that the personal mind is not the only source of knowledge about the mind's existence in the world. A creature (even aphilosophical zombie) could have knowledge about the mind and the mind-body problem by virtue of some innate knowledge.[13] The information about the mind (and its problematic properties such asqualia and thehard problem of consciousness) could have been, in principle, implicitly "written" in the material world since its creation. Epiphenomenalists can say that God created an immaterial mind and a detailed "program" of material human behavior that makes it possible to speak about themind–body problem. That version of epiphenomenalism seems highly exotic, but it cannot be ruled out by pure theory. However, Argonov suggests that experiments could refute epiphenomenalism. In particular, epiphenomenalism could be refuted if neural correlates of consciousness are found in the human brain and it is proven that human speech about consciousness is caused by them.
Some philosophers, such asDaniel Dennett, reject both epiphenomenalism and the existence of qualia with the same charge thatGilbert Ryle leveled against aCartesian "ghost in the machine", that they too arecategory mistakes. A quale or conscious experience would not belong to the category of objects of reference on this account, but rather to the category of ways of doing things.
Functionalists assert that mental states are well described by their overall role, their activity in relation to the organism as a whole. "This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's conception of the mind as a 'calculating machine', but it has become fully articulated (and popularly endorsed) only in the last third of the 20th century."[14] In so far as it mediates stimulus and response, a mentalfunction is analogous to a program that processesinput/output inautomata theory. In principle,multiple realisability would guaranteeplatform dependencies can be avoided, whether in terms of hardware and operating system or,ex hypothesi, biology and philosophy. Because ahigh-level language is a practical requirement for developing the most complex programs, functionalism implies that anon-reductive physicalism would offer a similar advantage over a strictly eliminative materialism.
Eliminative materialists often state thatfolk psychology is sounscientific that, ultimately, it will be better to eliminate primitive concepts such asmind,desire andbelief, in favor of a future neuroscientific account.[citation needed] A more moderate position such asJ. L. Mackie'serror theory suggests that false beliefs should be stripped away from a mental concept without eliminating the concept itself, the legitimate core meaning being left intact.
Benjamin Libet's results are quoted[15] in favor of epiphenomenalism, but he believes subjects still have a "conscious veto", since the readiness potential does not invariably lead to an action. InFreedom Evolves, Daniel Dennett argues that a no-free-will conclusion is based on dubious assumptions about the location of consciousness, as well as questioning the accuracy and interpretation of Libet's results.[16] Similar criticism of Libet-style research has been made by neuroscientistAdina Roskies and cognitive theorists Tim Bayne andAlfred Mele.
Others have argued that data such as theBereitschaftspotential undermine epiphenomenalism for the same reason: such experiments rely on a subject reporting the point in time at which a conscious experience and a conscious decision occur, thus requiring the subject to be able to perform an action consciously. That ability would seem to be at odds with early epiphenomenalism, which according to Huxley is the broad claim that consciousness is "completely without any power… as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery".[17]Mind–body dualists reject epiphenomenalism on the same grounds. Some philosophers[who?] have also pointed out how strange it is that the brain expends copious amounts of energy and glucose maintaining the state of consciousness, yet the conscious mind may play no role in making the final decision. It remains difficult to provide a coherent mechanistic explanation of how a non-physical mind could actually influence any part of the physical body or the physical world at large.[citation needed]
Adrian G. Guggisberg and Annaïs Mottaz have also challenged those findings.[18]
A study by Aaron Schurger and colleagues published in PNAS[19] challenged assumptions about the causal nature of the readiness potential itself (and the "pre-movement buildup" of neural activity in general), thus denying the conclusions drawn from studies such as Libet's[20] and Fried's.[21]
In favor of interactionism,Celia Green (2003) argues that epiphenomenalism does not even provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of interaction posed by substance dualism. Although it does not entail substance dualism, according to Green, epiphenomenalism implies a one-way form of interactionism that is just as hard to conceive of as the two-way form embodied in substance dualism. Green suggests that the assumption that it is less of a problem may arise from the unexamined belief that physical events have some primacy over mental ones.
A number ofscientists and philosophers, includingWilliam James,Karl Popper,John C. Eccles andDonald Symons, dismiss epiphenomenalism from anevolutionary perspective.[22][23][24][25][26] They point out that the view that the mind is an epiphenomenon of brain activity is not consistent with evolutionary theory, because if the mind were functionless, it would have disappeared long ago, as it would not have been favoured by evolution.
