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| East Pomeranian Offensive East Pomeranian strategic offensive operation | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theEastern Front ofWorld War II | |||||||
 Soviet troops manning twoM16 Multiple Gun Motor Carriage (MGMC)self-propelled anti-aircraft vehicles (half-tracks) in Danzig, March 1945. | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 Germany |  Soviet Union Poland | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Walter WeißDietrich von Saucken (2nd Army) | Konstantin Rokossovsky (2nd Belorussian Front) | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| Unknown | 996,100[1] | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| Unknown | 234,360
Materiel destroyed or captured | ||||||
TheEast Pomeranian strategic offensive operation (Russian:Восточно-Померанская наступательная операция) was anoffensive by theSovietRed Army against theGermanWehrmacht on theEastern Front. It took place inPomerania andWest Prussia from 10 February – 4 April 1945.
The operation happened in four phases:
It was the East Pomeranian offensive that preventedZhukov from reaching Berlin in February (the object of the massiveVistula–Oder offensive), since it became a priority to clear German forces from Pomerania first.
The2nd Belorussian Front—underKonstantin Rokossovsky—had initially been tasked with advancing westward north of theVistula River toward Pomerania and the major port city ofDanzig, with the primary aim of protecting the right flank of Zhukov's1st Belorussian Front, which was pushing towards Berlin. During theEast Prussian offensive, however, Rokossovsky was ordered to wheel directly north towardElbing.[3] This left substantial German forces intact in Pomerania, where they threatened the right flank of Zhukov's formations.
As a result, once the initial phase of the East Prussian offensive was over, the 2nd Belorussian Front was redeployed with the intention of attacking westwards into Pomerania, eliminating the possibility of a German counter-offensive (similarly, the parallelSilesian offensives of Konev's1st Ukrainian Front in the south were in part designed to protect the 1st Belorussian Front's left flank). The need to secure the flanks delayedthe Soviets' final push towards Berlin, which was originally planned for February, until April.
Joseph Stalin's decision to delay the push toward Berlin from February to April has been a subject of some controversy among both the Soviet generals and military historians, with one side arguing that the Soviets had a chance of securing Berlin much quicker and with much lower losses in February, and the other arguing that the danger of leaving large German formations on the flanks could have resulted in a successful German counter-attack and prolonged the war further: the Germans did in fact mount a surprise counter-attack in Pomerania in mid-February,Operation Solstice. The delay did, however, allow the Soviets to occupy significant parts of Austria in theVienna offensive.
As early as 13 February, German intelligence services had deduced that the Soviets would seek to clear Pomerania before advancing on Berlin. The2nd Army—defending a large and exposed sector running through Pomerania eastward toward the edge ofEast Prussia at Elbing—sought permission to withdraw, but this was denied byAdolf Hitler.[4]Graudenz, on the Vistula, was surrounded on 18 February (the garrison, from the83rd Infantry Division, finally surrendered the following month).
The corps of the Second Army were seriously understrength by this time, being composed largely of fragmentary orad hoc units. The3rd Panzer Army had been rebuilt using thekorps of the recently formed11th SS Panzer Army, the original formation having been largely destroyed inLithuania and East Prussia, where its remnants were nowdefending Königsberg.
Rokossovsky opened the offensive on 24 February using the fresh troops of Kozlov's 19th Army, but after an initial advance of some 20 km (12 mi) they were halted by intense German resistance. On 26 February, he inserted the3rd Guards Tank Corps east ofNeustettin, where they achieved a penetration of 40 km (25 mi), and relieved Kozlov of command.[5] The 3rd Guards Tank Corps broke through atBaldenburg, while Neustettin on the Front's left flank fell to the3rd Guards Cavalry Corps on 27 February.
Weiß had hurriedly assembled theVII Panzer Corps, including the remnants of the7th Panzer Division, atRummelsburg to threaten 19th Army's flank. However, after a Soviet breakthrough atKöslin on 2 March, the 2nd Army found itself completely cut off from the rest of its Army Group.
Zhukov's right wing—a grouping of the3rd Shock Army and1st and2nd Guards Tank Armies—went over to the offensive on 1 March, striking northward with the main force concentrated atReetz. The entire left wing of 3rd Panzer Army was cut off by their breakthrough, afterGuderian refused Raus' request for withdrawal; the right flank withdrew towardsStettin.[6]
On 4 March, forward Soviet tank units reached theBaltic, and the German forces in Pomerania were trapped in a series of encirclements. The 2nd Army began to fall back on the Danzig fortified area, while the X SS Corps of the 3rd Panzer Army had been surrounded atDramburg.
Rokossovsky opened the second phase of his offensive on March 6. The2nd Shock Army threatened to cut off the defending forces in thefortress ofMarienburg, which was evacuated two days later, while in the east Elbing finally fell on 10 March. The defence of Marienburg was conducted by aKampfgruppe under the nominal control of the staff of the7th Infantry Division, including marine, SS and other units. Weiß, having warned that the Elbing pocket could not be held, was relieved of command on 9 March and replaced byDietrich von Saucken. The troops of the German 2nd Army withdrew in disarray into Danzig andGdingen, where the 2nd Belorussian Front besieged them. Zhukov's forces meanwhile, cleared the remainder of 3rd Panzer Army from the east bank of the lowerOder, driving the Germans from their last positions in a bridgehead atAltdamm.
Many civilian refugees from Pomerania had fled into the coastal town ofKolberg, which was surrounded by 4 March. Nevertheless, the town was successfully defended until 18 March, by which time evacuation was almost complete.
The Danzig-Gotenhafen Fortified Area—also the main port for refugees from East Prussia escaping to the west—was ordered to be defended for as long as possible by Saucken in order to keep the evacuation routes open.
Rokossovsky opened his final offensive on 15 March 1945; the main thrust, toward the coast atZoppot between Gdingen and Danzig, being undertaken by the70th and49th Army advancing in parallel.[7] The fighting was savage, but by 19 March 1945 the Soviet spearheads had reached the heights over Zoppot, while the4th Panzer Division had been pushed back to the outskirts of Danzig itself. By 22 March 1945, the 70th Army reached the sea, splitting the German defence. Gdingen was taken on 26 March 1945, its defenders and many civilians retreating to the headland atOxhöft, from where they were evacuated to theHel Peninsula.
Danzig finally fell on 30 March 1945, after which the remnants of the 2nd Army withdrew to the Vistula delta southeast of the city. Evacuation of civilians and military personnel from there and from the Hel Peninsula continued until 10 May 1945. The Soviets declared the East Pomeranian offensive complete a week after the fall of Danzig.
According to Soviet claims, in the Battle of Danzig the Germans lost 39,000 soldiers dead and 10,000 captured.[8]
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