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Domain specificity is a theoretical position incognitive science (especially moderncognitive development) that argues that many aspects ofcognition are supported by specialized, presumably evolutionarily specified, learning devices.[1] The position is a close relative ofmodularity of mind, but is considered more general in that it does not necessarily entail all the assumptions ofFodorian modularity (e.g., informational encapsulation). Instead, it is properly described as a variant ofpsychological nativism. Other cognitive scientists also hold the mind to be modular, without the modules necessarily possessing the characteristics of Fodorian modularity.
Domain specificity emerged in the aftermath of thecognitive revolution as a theoretical alternative toempiricist theories that believed all learning can be driven by the operation of a few such general learning devices. Prominent examples of such domain-general views includeJean Piaget's theory of cognitive development, and the views of many modernconnectionists. Proponents of domain specificity argue that domain-general learning mechanisms are unable to overcome theepistemological problems facing learners in many domains, especially language. In addition, domain-specific accounts draw support from the surprising competencies of infants, who are able to reason about things like numerosity, goal-directed behavior, and the physical properties of objects all in the first months of life. Domain-specific theorists argue that these competencies are too sophisticated to have been learned via a domain-general process likeassociative learning, especially over such a short time and in the face of the infant's perceptual, attentional, and motor deficits. Current proponents of domain specificity argue thatevolution equipped humans (and indeed most other species) with specificadaptations designed to overcome persistent problems in the environment. For humans, popular candidates include reasoning about objects, other intentional agents, language, and number.[2] Researchers in this field seek evidence for domain specificity in a variety of ways. Some look for unique cognitive signatures thought to characterize a domain (e.g. differences in ways infants reason about inanimate versus animate entities). Others try to show selective impairment or competence within but not across domains (e.g. the increased ease of solving theWason Selection Task when the content is social in nature). Still, others use learnability arguments to argue that a cognitive process or specific cognitive content could not be learned, as inNoam Chomsky'spoverty of the stimulus argument for language.
Prominent proponents of domain specificity includeJerry Fodor,Noam Chomsky,Steven Pinker, Elizabeth Spelke,[3]Susan Carey,[4]Lawrence A. Hirschfeld,[5]Susan Gelman[6]and many others.
Abstracts from chapters inMapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture, a collection of essays on domain-specificity.
