^A: The party is also described asconservative left,[25] left-authoritarian[26] and sometimes asright-wing.[27] This is due to its more conservative positions on social issues.[28]
Founded by Fico in 1999 as a split from thepost-communistParty of the Democratic Left, Smer initially defined itself as theThird Way party.[33] It incorporated ‘Social Democracy’ into its name after merging with several minor centre-left parties in 2005.[34] It has dominatedSlovak politics since 2006, leading three coalition governments (2006–2010,2016–2020,2023–present) and one single-party government (2012–2016). During its time in power, it continued the European integration of Slovakia, reversed someeconomically liberal reforms implemented by previouscentre-right governments and introduced varioussocial welfare measures.[35] Smer-led governments have been associated with numerouspolitical corruption scandals, and have been accused by opponents to have resulted in a deterioration of therule of law in Slovakia.[41]
After the2020 parliamentary election, which marked Smer's return to the opposition, Slovak authorities investigated a number of corruption-related crimes involving multiple Smer politicians and individuals reportedly linked to the party. A total of 42 of them were convicted.[47] At the party congress in July 2020, following a major internal split that resulted in the founding of a new party namedVoice – Social Democracy (Hlas), Fico announced a shift to "the rural social democracy that perceives the specifics of Slovak reality",[48][49] and "a Slovak, not Brussels social democracy".[50] Post–2020 Smer holds stances that have been described asnationalist,populist andRussophilic.[58] The party is considered an example of a left-authoritarian party – a left-wing party with socially conservative stances.[59][60]
Originally namedDirection (Slovak:Smer), the party was founded on 8 November 1999, emerging as a breakaway from thepost-CommunistParty of the Democratic Left (SDĽ), the successor of the originalCommunist Party of Slovakia and the governing party from 1998 to 2002. UnderRobert Fico, at the time one of the most popular politicians in the country, it quickly became one of the most popular parties in Slovakia, while the SDĽ experienced a constant decrease within popularity. In the2002 Slovak parliamentary election, its first formal election period, it became the third-largest party in theNational Council of the Slovak Republic, with 25 of 150 seats. In 2003, it changed its formal name toDirection (Third Way) (Slovak:Smer (tretia cesta))[62] andParty of Civic Understanding merged into the party.
In 2005, the party absorbed the SDĽ and theSocial Democratic Alternative, a small social democratic party that split from the original SDĽ somewhat later than Direction did, in addition to theSocial Democratic Party of Slovakia. Founded in 1990, the party became known for the leadership ofAlexander Dubček, and Direction adopted the name Social Democracy. Following the party's victory in 2006, Smer entered into a coalition with the nationalistSlovak National Party (SNS) and was readmitted into theParty of European Socialists (PES) in 2008. It later formed another coalition with the SNS in 2016.
On 12 October 2006, the party was temporarily suspended from membership in the PES.[68] The resolution to suspend the party referred specifically to the PES Declaration "For a modern, pluralist and tolerant Europe", adopted in Berlin by the PES congress in 2001, which states that "all PES parties adhere to the following principles ... [and] to refrain from any form of political alliance or co-operation at all levels with any political party which incites or attempts to stir up racial or ethnic prejudices and racial hatred." InThe Slovak Spectator, the PES chairmanPoul Nyrup Rasmussen commented: "Most of our members stood solidly behind our values, according to which forming a coalition with the extreme right is unacceptable."[69] The party was readmitted on 14 February 2008 after its chairman Fico and SNS leaderJan Slota pledged in a letter to respect European values, human rights, and all ethnic minorities.[70]
Although the party won the most votes in the2010 Slovak parliamentary election, with a lead of 20% over the second-placeSlovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKÚ),[71] they had not been able to form a government because of losses sustained by their coalition partners. Their result, 34.8%, gave them 62 of 150 seats in the National Council, but the HZDS failed to cross the 5% threshold, losing all their seats, and the SNS was reduced to nine seats. The four opposition centre-right parties (theChristian Democratic Movement,Freedom and Solidarity,Bridge, and SDKÚ) were able to form a new government.[72]
In 2014, in cooperation with theChristian Democratic Movement (KDH), the party passed a constitutional amendment defining marriage exclusively as a union between a man and a woman. The amendment also states that marriage, parenthood, and family are under the protection of the law, and that children and young people are guaranteed special protection[75]
Despite suffering a significant loss in support as a result of strikes by teachers and nurses earlier in the year,[76] Smer won the5 March 2016 parliamentary election with 28.3% of the vote and 49 of 150 seats, and subsequently formedFico's Third Cabinet in a coalition government with Bridge,Network, and theSlovak National Party. Prime Minister Fico resigned in the wake of the political crisis following the murder of Ján Kuciak and was replaced byPeter Pellegrini, with the same majority. However, Fico remained leader of Smer.[citation needed]
The party managed to score 18.29% in the2020 Slovak parliamentary election, which was 2 to 3 percent more than the latest polls showed, but it was still a decrease of 10% compared to previous elections. The party occupied 38 seats in parliament. Pellegrini, the chairman of the Fico parliamentary group, became the vice-chairman of the National Council for the Opposition on the basis of post-election negotiations.[citation needed] In May 2020, two deputies for Smer (Ján Podmanický andMarián Kéry) founded a value policy platform with deputies from KDŽP, elected as a candidate of theKotlebists – People's Party Our Slovakia. Because of this, Pellegrini sharply criticized them, while Fico defended Podmanický. In May 2020, Podmanický also left the Smer parliamentary group after criticism from his own ranks.[citation needed]
As early as April 2020, party vice-chairman Pellegrini announced his ambition to run for party chairman as Smer's most popular politician, winning 170,000 more votes than the chairman. Fico reacted strongly, saying that he did not intend to resign and wanted to remain at the head of the party, while Pellegrini gradually began to tighten his criticism of Fico and the party's situation. Pellegrini criticized the fact that the party's presidency had not met since the election and the date of the parliament was unknown. Pellegrini demanded that the assembly be held as soon as possible, while Fico insisted that the nomination assembly take place only at a ceremonial assembly in December 2020.[citation needed]
At a June 2020 press conference in Banská Bystrica, Pellegrini announced that he would resign as vice-chairman of Smer and leave the party in the near future. He also outlined the establishment of a new party,Voice – Social Democracy (Hlas–SD), which he said should be social democratic, but refuse to be liberal. Around that time, Fico had already offered Pellegrini the position of party chairman, provided that he maintained his influence in the party, an offer which was rejected by Pellegrini. In the first FOCUS survey, 21.4% of respondents said they would vote for the new Pellegrini party, while those saying they would vote for the original Smer remained at 9.6%. At a press conference one week following the announcement of Pellegrini's departure, another 10 deputies announced they would leave the party, including Vice-presidentsPeter Žiga andRichard Raši, Bureau memberDenisa Saková and long-standing deputies and party members. At the same time, together with Pellegrini, they announced the creation of a new social-democratic party at the press conference, which they would join. Political scientist Grigory Mesezhnikov postulated that after the departure of the Pellegrini group, the Smer could move further to the left into the spectrum of the radical to communist left.[citation needed]
In 2025, in cooperation with KDH, the party passed a constitutional amendment introducing further provisions related to cultural, ethical, and family issues. The amendment legally recognizes only two sexes, defined by biological criteria, and states that a mother is a woman and a father is a man. It bans surrogacy and guarantees a child's right to know their parents. Adoption is restricted to married heterosexual couples. The amendment also strengthens parental rights, particularly in the area of education, and requires school curricula to align with the cultural and ethical values set out in the Slovak Constitution. It affirms Slovakia's sovereignty in matters such as the protection of life, human dignity, marriage, parenthood, family, culture, language, and related areas of healthcare, education, and upbringing. It further states that Slovak law in these domains takes precedence over European Union law.[78]
In 2025, the party's government passed a law amendment requiring NGOs to submit an annual "transparency report" starting in 2026. The report must include details of donors who contribute more than 5,000 euros, including their full names. NGOs will also be required to disclose information about their governing bodies or members of those bodies. Furthermore, NGOs will be classified as obligated entities under the Freedom of Information Act and must provide information upon request if they receive more than 3,300 euros from public sources in a single instance or a total of more than 10,000 euros. Initially, the party sought to pass a law labeling certain NGOs as foreign agents, organizations with foreign support or lobbyists. However, it withdrew the proposal due to the risk of conflict with European law and opposition from the junior coalition partner,Hlas.[79] Slovakia's Public Defender of Rights, Róbert Dobrovodský, challenged the law amendment at theConstitutional Court, arguing it violates constitutional and human rights by threatening donor anonymity, restricting foreign funding, increasing administrative burdens, and disproportionately affecting smaller NGOs.[80]
Fico has promised to cut all aid toUkraine as a result of theRussian Invasion of Ukraine, and has promised to block Ukrainian accession toNATO should the subject be broached under his tenure. Fico has also stated that the Ukrainian government is run by neo-Nazis.[81]
Meeting of the Slovak delegation with the European Commissioner for Justice Didier Reynders, 27 November 2023
In December 2023, theFourth Cabinet of Robert Fico introduced an amendment to the Criminal Code. The government proposed that the bill be debated in a fast-track legislative procedure, arguing that the status quo leads to human rights violations. The amendment included scrapping the Special Prosecutor's Office dealing with high-level corruption and lowering penalties for financial crimes. The fast-track legislative procedure faced widespread criticism from the parliamentary opposition,PresidentZuzana Čaputová, theEuropean Commission and non-governmental organizations, resulting in a weeks-long opposition parliamentary obstruction and a series of demonstrations.[82]
Critics have raised questions about potential conflicts of interest within the government coalition. They have noted that various individuals with perceived affiliations to the government, alongside accused members of the coalition parties, including the bill's rapporteur, MPTibor Gašpar of Smer, could be directly affected by the proposed lowering of penalties. Additionally, their cases are overseen by the Special Prosecutor's Office, which the amendment would abolish. The coalition government introduced the amendment, citing the need to shift towards a rehabilitative approach to justice, update the criminal code, and align with European Union standards. Proponent of the law, theMinistry of Justice led byBoris Susko of Smer published the brochure 'Overview of Violations of the Principles of the Rule of Law in the Years 2020–2023.'[83]
The amendment was finally approved by theNational Council on 8 February 2024. The final proposal also included a reduction of the statute of limitations in rape cases from 20 to 10 years, which again caused widespread criticism from the parliamentary opposition, President Zuzana Čaputová and non-governmental organizations. The government defended the reduction of the limitation period by motivating victims to report rape earlier, possibly allowing a return to the 20-year limitation period in the next amendment after the approval of the law.[84]
President Zuzana Čaputová signed the law on 16 February, verbally clearly expressing her opposition to its content. The President argued that by signing the law instead of vetoing it, she wants to create enough time for theConstitutional Court to decide on her submission challenging the constitutionality of the law. As of February 2024, the Constitutional Court is expected to make its decision following the publication of the law in the collection of laws by the Ministry of Justice.[85]
On 17 October 2025, Smer was expelled from theParty of European Socialists in a unanimous vote for violations of the group's values by party leader Robert Fico.[86]
Smer's ideological development compared to other social-democratic parties such as the GermanSPD, AustrianSPÖ, BulgarianBSP, CzechČSSD, HungarianMSZP, PolishSLD/NL, and RomanianPSD on the TAN/GAL (sociocultural) and left-right (economic) dimensions. By 2025, SMER has become the second most socially conservative party, and the most economically left-wing one amongst the compared parties.[87]
In their 2008 publication, Slovak political scientistsGrigorij Mesežnikov andOľga Gyárfášová argue that Smer is a social-democratic party (thus matching its self-identification), but one with very strong nationalist and populist elements that also include aspects of social conservatism.[99] Tim Haughton states that the party "conveys both a Slovak version of social democracy and a stronger national emphasis"; he also stressed that the party cannot be seen as right-wing or far-right, but rather as one that combines "leftist economics and nationalist appeal".[32] In 2025, Roman Hlatky and Oľga Gyárfášová wrote that Smer combines "left-wing economic orientation with conservative, if not radical, stances on sociocultural issues". They also argue that Smer "takes the strongest left-wing positions" amongst European social-democratic parties, but that it also "has shifted dramatically in a conservative direction on the sociocultural dimension", although theBulgarian Socialist Party and RomanianSocial Democratic Party had undergone similar conservative shift.[87]
The party is also considered by some to incorporatefar-right themes. While scholars avoid labeling it as a far-right party, they have described it as incorporating far-right themes,[100] expressing views that resonate with far-right voters,[101] or advancing an electoral program aligned with far-right agendas.[102] Natalia Hatarova described the party's ideological drift:
During the ‘90s and into the next century, Smer became increasingly Euro-optimistic, economically open, and culturally mainstream. After the killings of the Slovak investigative journalist Jan Kuciak and his fiancée in 2018, Fico’s resignation and his temporary exile from mainstream politics, Smer, along with other parties, became more culturally conservative, nationalistic, and Euro-skeptic.[103]
Hatarova also argues that Smer has become increasingly friendly towards some European far-right parties and figures, such asViktor Orbán of the HungarianFidesz party. However, she concludes that Smer's shift "appears to be caused by pure opportunism rather than continuous influence by Orbán [or other far-right figures]".[103]
Smer advocates economically left-wing policies.[32] The main economic proposals of the party focus on the establishment of a welfare state and supporting the poorest groups of Slovakia. Many of the party's socioeconomic policies, such as free travel for pensioners and pension increases are considered typically left-wing populist.[32] The party also promotes redistributive policies, such as corporate tax increases and income tax hikes for the highest earners.[104]
Smer also adheres toeconomic nationalism;Grigorij Mesežnikov noted that "Smer openly subscribes to etatism as the foundation of its political profile and advocates government's strong role in a number of areas" and called its economic policy "etatist paternalism", while also arguing that the party also represents "socio-economic policies based on social-democratic values". Robert Fico, the leader of the party, argued that the government should be "the father of all citizens" and stated that a strong state is necessary to improve the socioeconomic conditions of Slovak citizens.[99]
The party presents its economic policies as being "social" and "pro-ordinary people", and its proposals also included the introduction of differential VAT rates, replacement of flat income tax rate with a progressive one that would tax the lower-income groups much less and reduction of excise duty on fuel oils. In regards to the Slovak healthcare system, the party advocated a ban of manipulation feels as well as a halt to the privatization of public health system. Smer also made pledges to cancel payment of tuition fees for regular university sutudents and establishing a dynamic minimum wage that would be fixed to the 60% of average salary. The party is highly critical of other Slovak parties, accusing them of implementing "anti-social" policies that neglect the poor while benefitting the rich. Robert Fico argued that the neoliberal economic policy of theMikuláš Dzurinda threw Slovakia "back to the 1930s".[105]
In its economic rhetoric, Smer also frequently attacks monopolies, arguing that the increase in gas prices is caused by the "ruthless pricing policy of monopolies" that are "raking in exorbitant profits". The party is also critical of the banking industry, stating that Slovak banks tend to collect unfairly high service fees from their client; the party promoted itself as one willing to ban or limit the service fees of Slovak banks. In regards to Slovak banks, Robert Fico said: "The banks operating in Slovakia must realize that they operate on the territory of a sovereign state, which must use all available means to bring a pressure to bear on the banking sector." In response to criticism of his remarks, Fico also argued that the political opponents of Smer are "conveying the fears of international corporations and financial groups that literally govern this country and now they have understood that once our program is implemented, the gold rush in Slovakia will be over." This reveals a highly nationalist orientation of the party.[105]
Since regaining power in 2023, Smer–SD has focused on fiscal consolidation to reduce Slovakia's high deficit and stabilize public debt. The government introduced a €2.7 billion package combining tax increases—including higher health insurance contributions and minimum corporate taxes—and expenditure controls such as public administration reforms and cuts to operating costs. Social programs like the 13th pension remain protected.[106]
International institutions, notably the IMF, acknowledge these steps but consider them insufficient to fully address the structural deficit, estimating that fiscal adjustments of about 3.7% of GDP over 2024–28 are necessary.[107] The IMF and Slovakia's Council for Budget Responsibility highlight an overreliance on revenue measures and call for deeper expenditure reforms.[108] The Supreme Audit Office warns that growing pension obligations pose long-term fiscal risks.[109] The National Bank of Slovakia projects that the consolidation will slow short-term economic growth by around 0.6 percentage points,[108] and experts caution that tax-heavy consolidation may dampen private investment and growth prospects.[110]
Regarding theRusso-Ukrainian War, Smer advocates for ending military aid toUkraine and lifting sanctions againstRussia. The party has described the conflict as a proxy war between theUnited States and Russia, characterizing Russia's actions as a response to perceived threats to its national interests. In its statements, Smer has claimed that the war was provoked in 2014 by what it describes as the "extermination of citizens of Russian nationality by Ukrainian fascists." [114][115][116] However, since his return to power, Fico has taken a somewhat different line on Ukraine than during his election campaign. During a meeting with UkrainianPrime MinisterDenys Shmyhal in January 2024, Fico promised not to block private Slovak arms companies from selling to Ukraine, not to block EU financial support for Ukraine, and to support theaccession of Ukraine to the European Union. He described Slovakia's political differences with Ukraine as "minor" and claimed to support Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[117][118]
In its foreign policy manifesto, Smer calls for understanding with countries that have forms of government different fromparliamentary democracy, specifically mentioningChina andVietnam.[119] During his premiership, party leader Robert Fico repeatedly praised the political systems of both countries, describing Slovakia's system as clumsy and uncompetitive by comparison. He has called for aspects of these systems to be adopted in Slovakia.[120][121]
In the 2000s, the party opposed theIraq War and theWar in Afghanistan, and organized the withdrawal of 110 Slovak soldiers that were deployed in Iraq.[122] In 2007, Fico made an official state visit toLibya, where he met with then-leaderMuammar Gaddafi. During the visit, Fico spoke of "the fight against world imperialism" as a topic of mutual interest. [123]
After the2024 European Parliament election, Smer unsuccessfully sought to rejoin the S&D group.[127][128] Smer subsequently declined to join the newly-formedPatriots for Europe group, led by the Hungarian national-conservativeFidesz party, stating that it would not join a non-leftist group.[129][130] Nevertheless, Smer maintains close ties with Fidesz;Viktor Orbán, Fidesz's longtime leader andprime minister of Hungary, delivered a video address to the Smer party conference in November 2024.[131]
In September 2024, Smer began negotiations with two other parties in theNon-Inscrits, the GermanBündnis Sahra Wagenknecht and the CzechStačilo!, on establishing cooperation between left-wing conservative parties.[132][133]
One year later, in September 2025, it was reported that PES had voted to expel Smer from the party. The decision was ratified at a PES party conference held in mid-October 2025.[134] After the formal expulsion of Smer from the PES, Fico instructed Smer MEPs to seek a new European Parliament group, withMonika Beňová expressing preference for accepting an offer from thePatriots for Europe,[135] though Beňová noted that her colleagues were still negotiating the formation of an entirely new political group.[136] Smer MEPsKatarína Roth Neveďalová andĽuboš Blaha subsequently expressed opposition to joining Patriots for Europe.[137][138] Smer leaderRobert Fico is reportedly in "ongoing consultations" with Fidesz leaderViktor Orbán about joining the group, though Fico remains undecided.[139] According to Beňová, the party ultimately decided to postpone its decision until September 2026.[140]
During the tenure ofJuraj Blanár, the vice-chairman of Smer, asMinister of Foreign and European Affairs, the ministry saw significant personnel changes that sparked controversy. Several diplomats perceived as pro-Western, including openly gay employees and those with disabilities, were dismissed amid allegations of discrimination related to sexual orientation, age, and political views.[141] Nine former diplomats filed a lawsuit claiming unjust dismissals.[142]
Concurrently, the ministry recruited around 146 new staff members, many of whom graduated from Russian institutions such asMGIMO andSt. Petersburg University, reflecting a shift towards closer ties with Russia.[143][144]
Leading figures of the Smer party, including thePM and party's leaderRobert Fico and the deputy leader andMEPĽuboš Blaha, have maintained a presence on media platforms in Slovakia known for promoting Russian-aligned narratives. Among these outlets areHlavné Správy (Main News) andInfovojna (Infowar), both widely recognized as prominent sources of disinformation and Russian propaganda in Slovakia.[145][146][147] Despite Hlavné Správy and Infovojna having been temporarily suspended by theNational Security Authority in accordance with the Cyber Security Act following the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 due to identified harmful activity,[148] the leaders continue to utilize these platforms for communication after the suspension was lifted.[149][150] In December 2023, Robert Fico appeared on Infovojna, where he expressed appreciation towards "alternative media" for "correcting the distortions we have in the media market."[151]
Additionally, in October 2024, Fico appeared on Russia's state-owned television network,Rossiya 1, during the program 60 Minutes, hosted byOlga Skabeyeva. Fico criticized Western support for Ukraine, questioned the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia, and accused the West of "prolonging the war" in Ukraine. His appearance marked the first by a political leader from anEU andNATO country on Russian television since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, drawing significant criticism both domestically and internationally.[152]
In October 2025,Richard Glück, Smer MP and chair of the parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security, attended a gala in Moscow celebrating the 20th anniversary of the Russian state television networkRT, wherePresidentVladimir Putin also spoke. During an interview with RT, Glück criticized Slovak and Western media for alleged bias over thewar in Ukraine and praised pro-Russian “alternative media.” He said he travelled privately, and the visit was not an official parliamentary trip.[153]
During its time in power, the party, in cooperation with the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), passed constitutional amendments defining marriage exclusively as a union between a man and a woman, legally recognizing only two biological sexes, banning surrogacy, restricting adoption to married heterosexual couples, strengthening parental control over education, and asserting Slovak sovereignty over EU law in cultural and ethical matters.
It also introduced a law requiring NGOs to submit annual transparency reports disclosing donors contributing over €5,000, as well as information about their leadership and funding sources; the Public Defender of Rights challenged the measure at the Constitutional Court, arguing it violated constitutional and human rights by threatening donor privacy and disproportionately burdening smaller organizations.
During the2015 European migrant crisis, party's leaderRobert Fico stated that the government monitors every singleMuslim who is on the territory of the Slovak Republic.[166] In 2016, Fico declared thatIslam has no place in Slovakia, challengedmulticulturalism and called for the preservation of the country's traditions and identity.[167] In 2016, party's government passed a law amendment raising the minimum membership requirement for churches and religious organizations seeking registration in Slovakia from 20,000 to 50,000 adult members with permanent residence.[168]
In 2016, Fico described Romani people as "welfare abusers" and supported increased police interventions in Romani settlements, calling for a tougher approach and rejecting political correctness.[169] In 2019, Fico also endorsed anti-Romani remarks made by former far-right MPMilan Mazurek, who was convicted for disparaging comments targeting the community; this endorsement led to criminal charges against Fico for defamation and incitement to racial hatred, which were eventually dismissed.[170]
Several prominent figures from Smer have appeared in interviews, livestreams, or videos hosted by Daniel Bombic — also known as Danny Kollár — a Slovak far-right commentator based in London who is the subject of three international arrest warrants for alleged offences related toextremism,cyberbullying, anddoxing.[174][175][176] Bombic has been reported to promote conspiracy theories including those involvingCOVID-19 misinformation, theGreat Replacement, theNew World Order, and an alleged international Jewish conspiracy.[177][178] During the COVID-19 pandemic, he was accused of inciting attacks and spreading hate speech against doctors, public health officials, and other public figures.[177]
Bombic's return to Slovakia in early 2025 was reported to have been facilitated using a government aircraft, and he received legal and housing assistance from a law firm co-owned by Robert Kaliňák.[183]
In August 2025, the party's deputy leader, MEP, and Chairman of the Prime Minister's Advisory Council,Erik Kaliňák, along with MP and Chairman of the Parliamentary Defense and Security Committee,Richard Glück, met with American manosphere media personalityAndrew Tate and his brother, Tristan Tate. After publishing a photograph from the meeting on Facebook, Glück commented: “I respect everyone; people can think whatever they want. I agree with many things Andrew Tate and his brother say, but of course, I do not agree with the exaggerated misogyny.” Kaliňák described the discussions as “well-founded,” covering not only Slovak and Romanian politics but also the future of Europe in the context of current European leadership. He added that the conversation also touched on the United States, where “these personalities are relatively highly regarded.”[184]
The party politicians utilize slogans reminiscent of the communist era, such as "Loiterers from cafes, to fields and factories"[185] and the greeting "Greetings, comrades! Honor work!"[186]
In November 2023, Blaha replaced a portrait ofPresidentZuzana Čaputová in his parliamentary office with a portrait of Argentine Marxist revolutionaryChe Guevara.[188]
In his speech at the Smer-organized commemoration of the anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising in August 2023, Blaha addressed the crowd as "comrades" and stated, "The basic historical truth is that war andfascism have always come from the West and freedom and peace from the East."[189]
In December 2019, Blaha shared a photograph on Facebook depicting himself alongside Fico, with the former holding ared star bearing ahammer and sickle motif. The star was a birthday gift presented to Blaha by Fico.[190]
Since the2020 parliamentary election – Smer's return to the opposition, Slovak authorities have been investigating a number of corruption-related crimes. By August 2023, a total of 42 individuals reportedly linked to the party, including policemen, prosecutors, judges, members of theSlovak intelligence agency, politicians, officials, and businessmen were convicted.[3] The party strongly rejects all charges, calling itcriminalization of politics.[4] Numerous criticisms of the investigation process and the Special Prosecutor's Office were outlined in the brochure 'Overview of Violations of the Principles of the Rule of Law in the Years 2020–2023' published by theMinistry of Justice led byBoris Susko of Smer in December 2023.[5]
In March 2023, Deputy Prime Minister andMinister of Defense,Robert Kaliňák, who previously served asMinister of Interior, and businessman Jozef Brhel were formally indicted with bribery. Kaliňák was identified as the intermediary in a bribery scheme involving an annual sum of €200,000, purportedly arranged by Brhel for František Imrecze, who served as the President of the Financial Administration at the time. In return for the alleged bribery, Imrecze facilitated the passing of information regarding entities scheduled for corporate income tax audits and ensured the fulfillment of requirements for filling positions within the Financial Administration with specific individuals recommended by Brhel. In one instance, the Financial Administration then awarded substantial IT contracts to Michal Suchoba's company, Allexis, while Suchoba himself is now a cooperating defendant. Imrecze, also a cooperating defendant, stated that the total amount of bribes involved was €1,100,000. The indictment was also based on the statements of other high-ranking officials, now cooperating defendants: the former director of the Criminal Office of the Financial Administration, Ľudovít Makó, and the former director general of the tax and customs administration section, Daniel Čech.[6] In June 2023, the indictment was quashed by theSupreme Court citing "serious procedural errors that infringed upon the defendants' right to a fair defense".[7] In August 2023, Deputy Prosecutor General Jozef Sedlák canceled the charges for Kaliňák, while Brhel remained charged.[8]
In November 2020,Tibor Gašpar of Smer, a member of theNational Council and formerPolice President, was formally charged with organizing a criminal group. According to the charge, the criminal group composed predominantly of members of the police force was founded by Gašpar in collaboration with businessman Norbert Bödör in 2012. The alleged activities of the group involved serving the interests of Bödör while engaging in illegal activities such as obstructing investigations into tax evasion, extortion, bribery, and utilizing police resources and technology for their operations. Gašpar and Bödör were purportedly at the top of the three tiers hierarchical criminal group. In one instance, allegations suggested that a private company, Interstore Group, sought to evade a criminal investigation. It was alleged that their request was to be fulfilled through a €400,000 bribe distributed among the members of the group, with Gašpar receiving €90,000 through an intermediary. In November 2022, Prosecutor General Maroš Žilinka canceled the charges in compliance with the proposal ofPrime Minister and party chairmanRobert Fico and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Robert Kaliňák. Žilinka described the charges as vague and imprecise, stating that they violated the basic principles of criminal proceedings.[9]
In December 2023, Gašpar was accused of breaching the confidentiality of oral expression and other expression of a personal nature by complicity.[10]
In April 2022, Robert Fico, Robert Kaliňák, Tibor Gašpar and Norbert Bödör were officially charged with endangering commercial, banking, postal, telecommunications and tax secrets, with Fico and Kaliňák additionally charged with organizing a criminal group and abuse of authority. Fico and Kaliňák allegedly misused state authorities and collaborated with other members of the group to illegally acquire information aimed at discrediting political adversaries, namely the then opposition leadersIgor Matovič andAndrej Kiska. In November 2022, Prosecutor General Maroš Žilinka canceled the charges in compliance with the proposal of Fico and Kaliňák.[11]
In April 2023,Peter Kažimír, former Minister of Finance and former vice-chairman of the party, was convicted by the Specialized Criminal Court for bribery. According to the indictment supported by the testimony of cooperating defendant František Imrecze, Kažimír allegedly gave a bribe of €48,000 to Imrecze, who was then the President of the Financial Administration. The alleged purpose of the bribe was to expedite and ensure a favorable outcome in tax appeal proceedings concerning two private companies.[12] Kažimír denied all the charges and appealed against the verdict. As of 2024, the trial is still ongoing.[13]
In 2021, Bernard Slobodník, a cooperating defendant who formerly served as the director of the National Financial Police Unit, testified that State Secretary of Justice Pavol Gašpar of Smer, son of Tibor Gašpar, was supposed to hand over a bribe of €60,000 in exchange for information from the investigation. An investigation into the allegation was not initiated because it was already time-barred.[14]
Monika Jankovská of Smer, former State Secretary of Justice and former member of the National Council, testified about the alleged involvement in corrupt practices within the judiciary, admitting her own criminal activity.[15]
Nordsieck, Wolfram (2020)."Slovakia".Parties and Elections in Europe. Retrieved4 March 2020.
Keating, Michael; McCrone, Davic (2013).The Crisis of Social Democracy in Europe. Edinburgh University Press. p. 63.ISBN978-0-7486-6583-9.Following in the path of the social democratic party Smer in Slovakia, the social democrats in the Czech Republic and Romania are well positioned to benefit from this.
Myant, Martin; Drahokoupil, Jan; Lesay, Ivan (2013). "The Political Economy of Crisis Management in East–Central European Countries".Europe-Asia Studies.65 (3): 401.doi:10.1080/09668136.2013.779460.hdl:10.1080/09668136.2013.779460.That did not imply electoral punishment for the social-democratic Smer party. The party won more votes than in the previous elections in 2006, but failure by its previous coalition allies meant that the right succeeded thanks to its ability to lead a viable coalition.
De Sio, Lorenzo; Emanuele, Vincenzo; Maggini, Nicola (2014).The European Parliament Elections of 2014. CISE – Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali. p. 245.ISBN978-88-98012-16-9.The election was won by the ruling social democratic Smer-SD, which got 4 of 13 seats.
Taggart, Paul; Szczerbiak, Aleks (2018). "Putting Brexit into perspective: the effect of the Eurozone and migration crises and Brexit on Euroscepticism in European states".Journal of European Public Policy.25 (8). Taylor & Francis: 120.doi:10.1080/13501763.2018.1467955.This brought (Soft) Euroscepticism into the core of the party system involving not just right-wing conservative parties such as Law and Justice in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary, but centre-left governing parties such as the Czech Social Democrats and the social democratic Smer (Direction) party in Slovakia.
^Saxonberg, Steven; Sirovátka, Tomáš; Csudai, Eduard (2024)."Crisis? What crisis? Social policy when crises are and are not crises in Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia".Social Policy & Administration.58 (2): 238.doi:10.1111/spol.13004.Ideology mattered somewhat, but not party politics, as the left-wing populist Smer party continued with incremental changesas it made similar types of cutbacks as the previous centre-right government, which shows that both the left-leaning and right-leaning parties shared some ideological views as to how to deal with the country's economic division, but this also shows that party politics did not matter much.
Ramet, Sabrina P. (2024). "The Functions of Pluralism, the Dysfunctions of Populism: An Introduction". In Lavinia Stan (ed.).East Central Europe since 1989 (1st ed.). London: Routledge. p. 22.doi:10.4324/9781003312031.ISBN9781003312031.In 1999, he set up the Smer-SD party, still described as center-left in spite of Fico's hostility to all sexual minorities.
Henley, Jon (15 May 2024)."Who is Robert Fico?".The Guardian.He was Slovakia's representative to the European court of human rights from 1994 to 2000 and set up his centre-left Smer-SD party in 1999 after being turned down for a ministerial post by the Democratic Left, the Communists' political heirs.
Gyárfášová, Oľga[in Slovak] (11 February 2020)."Explaining the popularity of the extreme right in Slovakia".Friends of Europe.Slovakia is approaching critical parliamentary elections. On 29 February voters will decide whether the main centre-left coalition party Smer-SD – which has led governments almost uninterrupted since 2006 – will stay in power, or whether the predominantly liberal opposition will force a change in government.
Jakupec, Viktor (2025).Dynamics of the Ukraine War: Diplomatic Challenges and Geopolitical Uncertainties. Contributions to International Relations. Springer. p. 51.doi:10.1007/978-3-031-52444-8.ISBN978-3-031-52444-8.ISSN2731-507X.In the Slovakian parliamentary elections on first October 2023, the left-wing Russia friendly Smer-SSD party led by Robert Fico won the most votes and, together with the pro-European Hlas party, could form the new government.
Bundzíková, Veronika; Janšta, Denis (2025). "The Framing of the Conflict in Ukraine by Three Slovak Far-Right Parties".Europe-Asia Studies.77 (1). Routledge: 12.doi:10.1080/09668136.2024.2434089.ISSN1465-3427.The election was won by the left-wing party SMER–SD, led by Robert Fico. He capitalised on voters' dissatisfaction with the previous government's neoliberal agenda, which had resulted in strict social and economic reforms, and based his campaign primarily on socio-economic themes and a call for a 'strong social state'.
Hatarova, Natalia (2025).Ideological Worlds Colliding: Questioning Smer's Alliance with the Political Radical Right(PDF) (Master of Political Science thesis). Vienna: Central European University. p. 8.With the exclusion of leftist parties like Smer from academic analysis, it seems that left-wing parties that are illiberal and populist almost ceased to exist on a mainstream level after the end of the Cold War.
Vangeli, Anastas (2025)."Populism and the China question: implications for EU foreign policymaking".Asia Europe Journal. Springer: 7.doi:10.1007/s10308-025-00763-y.The two largest non-attached parties represented in the EP, the Direction – Social Democracy (SMER), joined by their coalition partner Voice – Social Democracy (Hlas) from Slovakia, and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) from Germany, are among the most notable and influential left-wing populist parties in Europe.
Saxonberg, Steven; Sirovátka, Tomáš; Csudai, Eduard (2024)."Crisis? What crisis? Social policy when crises are and are not crises in Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia".Social Policy & Administration.58 (2): 238.doi:10.1111/spol.13004.Ideology mattered somewhat, but not party politics, as the left-wing populist Smer party continued with incremental changesas it made similar types of cutbacks as the previous centre-right government, which shows that both the left-leaning and right-leaning parties shared some ideological views as to how to deal with the country's economic division, but this also shows that party politics did not matter much.
Bessonova, Maryna; Domaradzki, Spasimir (2024). "Anti-Americanism and Anti-Western Sentiments in Europe and Post-Soviet States".Ideology and Politics Journal.26 (2). Foundation for Good Politics: 184.ISSN2227-6068.In the 2023 parliamentary elections, the left-wing nationalist and populist political party "Smer," known for its anti-American and pro-Russian stance, secured a decisive victory.
Zanko, Yustyna (2024).Three essays in political economy on: populism, political survival, and informal economy.Economics and Finance (Thesis). Paris: HAL Open Science. p. 4.In 2023, Robert Fico's populist left-wing SmerSD party won the parliamentary elections in Slovakia and formed a coalition government with the far-right SNS party and Hlas-SD, a breakaway party from Smer.
Hovet, Jason (16 October 2023)."Slovakia's populist ex-PM Fico seals coalition deal for new government".Reuters. Prague.Fico's leftist, populist SMER-SSD (Direction-Slovak Social Democracy) struck a deal last week with the centre-left HLAS (Voice) and nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) to form a coalition that will have 79 out of 150 seats in parliament.
Nicholson, Tom; Hülsemann, Laura (11 October 2023)."New government emerges in Slovakia, with Robert Fico as prime minister".Politico.Following Tuesday's announcement by the social democratic Hlas (Voice) party, which finished third in the September 30 election with 14.7 percent, that it would focus on coalition talks with leftist-populist Smer (Direction), the victor of the ballot with 23 percent, the two parties on Wednesday announced agreement on forming a ruling coalition.
^Kriesi, Hanspeter; Altiparmakis, Argyrios; Bojár, Ábel; Oană, Ioana-Elena (2024).Coming to Terms with the European Refugee Crisis. Cambridge University Press. p. 35.doi:10.1017/9781009456555.ISBN9781009456555.[...] or the nationalist-conservative left (such as the Slovak Smer government).
^abCooper, Luke (June 2021). "Authoritarian protectionism in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe: diversity, commonality and resistance".LSE Ideas: 8.
^Keating, Michael; McCrone, Davic (2013).The Crisis of Social Democracy in Europe. Edinburgh University Press. p. 65.ISBN978-0-7486-6583-9.As Deegan-Krause argues, Smer's coalition with the HZDS and the SNP before 2010 was 'anti-market left' and 'Slovak national' (2010).
^Tamara Popic (2021)."Slovakia". In Ellen M. Immergut; Karen M. Anderson; Camilla Devitt; Tamara Popic (eds.).Health Politics in Europe: A Handbook. Oxford University Press. p. 774.ISBN978-0-198-86052-5.
Henley, Jon (15 May 2024)."Who is Robert Fico?".The Guardian.He was Slovakia's representative to the European court of human rights from 1994 to 2000 and set up his centre-left Smer-SD party in 1999 after being turned down for a ministerial post by the Democratic Left, the Communists' political heirs.
Gyárfášová, Oľga[in Slovak] (11 February 2020)."Explaining the popularity of the extreme right in Slovakia".Friends of Europe.Slovakia is approaching critical parliamentary elections. On 29 February voters will decide whether the main centre-left coalition party Smer-SD – which has led governments almost uninterrupted since 2006 – will stay in power, or whether the predominantly liberal opposition will force a change in government.
Hovet, Jason (16 October 2023)."Slovakia's populist ex-PM Fico seals coalition deal for new government".Reuters. Prague.Fico's leftist, populist SMER-SSD (Direction-Slovak Social Democracy) struck a deal last week with the centre-left HLAS (Voice) and nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) to form a coalition that will have 79 out of 150 seats in parliament.
Nicholson, Tom; Hülsemann, Laura (11 October 2023)."New government emerges in Slovakia, with Robert Fico as prime minister".Politico.Following Tuesday's announcement by the social democratic Hlas (Voice) party, which finished third in the September 30 election with 14.7 percent, that it would focus on coalition talks with leftist-populist Smer (Direction), the victor of the ballot with 23 percent, the two parties on Wednesday announced agreement on forming a ruling coalition.
^Ol̕ga Gyarfášová; Anders Ravin Jupskås (2012)."The appeal of populism". In Harald Baldersheim; Josef Bátora (eds.).The Governance of Small States in Turbulent Times: The Exemplary Cases of Norway and Slovakia. Verlag Barbara Budrich. p. 162.ISBN978-3-847-40484-2.
^abHatarova, Natalia (2025).Ideological Worlds Colliding: Questioning Smer's Alliance with the Political Radical Right(PDF) (Master of Political Science thesis). Vienna: Central European University. pp. 7–51.With the exclusion of leftist parties like Smer from academic analysis, it seems that left-wing parties that are illiberal and populist almost ceased to exist on a mainstream level after the end of the Cold War.
^"Smer zatiaľ do Orbánovej frakcie nepôjde, zastavil to Fico aj ľavicoví europoslanci".Dennik N. 13 November 2025.„Dohodli sme sa, že si dáme čas do budúceho roka. Budúci rok v decembri máme polovicu legislatívneho obdobia. To znamená, že niekedy po lete, v septembri; na budúci rok sa rozhodneme, či ideme jednou cestou, druhou cestou alebo ostaneme nezaradení," vysvetlila Beňová.