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TheDepartment of Propaganda in Enemy Countries was a wartimepropaganda,psychological warfare, andcommunications department of the BritishForeign Office and theMinistry of Information. It was active during both World Wars, being originally established in February 1918, during theFirst World War. During that war, the department was known more commonly asCrewe House,eponymously named after the building in which it was established. It was directed byViscount Northcliffe, and maintained as its leaders high persons of British society, such asH. G. Wells andHamilton Fyfe.[1]
During theSecond World War, the department became known asElectra House,Department Electra House,DepartmentEH, or simplyEH. The director of the department for the duration of the Second World War wasCampbell Stuart. As such, the department was sometimes referred to asCS. Electra House was the eponymously derived name from theElectra House buildings at No. 84Moorgate, and on theVictoria Embankment at No. 4Temple Place. The department's London headquarters were at the Moorgate building, but the building on the Victoria Embankment served as expanded offices and as an emergency site for relocation should the first building be bombed. Both of the Electra House buildings were bombed.[2] As a result of the bombings, the department's Country Headquarters (CHQ) were expanded toWoburn Abbey.
Regarding the nature of propaganda, Campbell Stuart wrote:
"What is propaganda? It is the presentation of a case in such a way that others may be influenced. In so far as its use against an enemy is concerned, the subject matter employed must not be self-evidently propagandist. Except in special circumstances, its origin should be completely concealed. As a general rule, too, it is desirable to hide the channels of communication."[1]
In 1940, Electra House was merged with theSection for Destruction of theSecret Intelligence Service, and another department in the War Office calledMilitary Intelligence (Research), to form theSpecial Operations Executive (SOE).[3][4][5]
In Britain, two key bodies were formed to manage information during theFirst World War. One was theNews Department created by theForeign Office to handle the growing demand for war updates fromjournalists from allied and neutral nations based inLondon. The other was theNeutral Press Committee (NPC), which operated under theHome Office and was linked to thePress Bureau, the main government office for wartimecensorship.[6]
At the outset of conflict inWorld War I, a covert propaganda agency was established called theWar Propaganda Bureau, led byCharles Masterman. More commonly, it was referred to as Wellington House. Wellington House's mission was to explain Britain's reasons for joining the war and to defend its wartime strategies to neutral countries and its alliedDominions, such asCanada,South Africa,Australia, andNew Zealand.[6] To sway public opinion in neutral nations, especially theUnited States, Masterman enlisted the help of many prominent authors of the era. This group included famous writers like J.M. Barrie,Arnold Bennett,G.K. Chesterton,Arthur Conan Doyle,John Galsworthy,Thomas Hardy,John Masefield,Gilbert Murray,G.M. Trevelyan,H.G. Wells, andRudyard Kipling. Through their efforts, the Bureau worked to gain international sympathy and support for the British cause by presenting its case through influential literary voices.[6]
In early 1917, the propaganda functions of Wellington House were integrated into a new, larger body known as theDepartment of Information (DOI), which was led by the MinisterSir Edward Carson and the authorJohn Buchan.[7] This department was given authority over both foreign propaganda and the majority of domestic information efforts. The following year, the organization was expanded once more to form theMinistry of Information (MOI), an independent department led byLord Beaverbrook, the newspaper magnate. This new ministry directed nearly all of Britain's official propaganda activities. The main exceptions were theNational War Aims Committee, a parliamentary body focused on local domestic propaganda, and the military intelligence section known asMI7.[6]
Wellington House was effectively shut down in 1918, when Charles Masterman was promoted to become the nascent Ministry's Director of Publications. At this point, the Ministry actively searched for someone who could effectively manage the war effort's propaganda productions and distributions.
In February 1918, at the express invitation of Prime MinisterDavid Lloyd George, theViscount Northcliffe became the firstDirector of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, a role for which his reputation made him a frequent target of theGerman press. He established his department at Crewe House, the mansion home ofLord Crewe located onCurzon Street inWestminster. Therefore, the department came to be known eponymously as Crewe House. Northcliffe structured this department with two separate branches; the first responsible for producing propaganda, and the second responsible for its distribution. To guide this specialized work, Northcliffe enlisted an Advisory Committee of distinguished journalists and publicists.[1]
The Advisory Committee comprised:
TheAustro-Hungarian section was led byH. Wickham Steed andDr. Seton-Watson, who worked directly with oppressed nationalities within the Empire to undermine its stability. The German section was initially headed by the authorH.G. Wells, who produced a key study on propaganda strategy before being succeeded byHamilton Fyfe for the final, intensive phase of the war. Delivering this material was a complex task; while military authorities distributed leaflets to enemy troops, a civilian unit built networks tosmuggle propaganda into enemy countries through neutral nations.[1]
Crewe House identifiedAustria-Hungary as the enemy most vulnerable to psychological warfare. The strategy, developed by Viscount Northcliffe with Wickham Steed and Seton-Watson, had two main goals: to support the independence aspirations of the Empire's oppressed nationalities (like theCzechs andSouthern Slavs) and to encourage their disinclination to fight for theCentral Powers.[1]
A major obstacle was the secretTreaty of London, which had promised Austrian territories inhabited by Southern Slavs to Italy, undermining Allied credibility. To counter this, a campaign was launched to foster a unified front among these nationalities. This culminated in theCongress of Oppressed Nationalities in Rome, which publicly aligned their cause with the Allies.[1]
AnInter-Allied Propaganda Commission was established on theItalian front, producing millions ofleaflets,newspapers, and even usinggramophone records to target Austro-Hungarian troops. Crewe House later presented their efforts as directly responsible for widespread desertion and unrest within the Austrian army, which significantly delayed a major offensive and contributed to its ultimate failure.[1]
British propaganda against Germany began slowly, initially viewed with skepticism by military leadership. Early efforts were limited, but a dedicated branch within the War Office's Military Intelligence Directorate was eventually established. This group began producing leaflets for German troops, aiming to counter enemy lies and reveal the truth about the war's progress and Germany's deteriorating home-front conditions.[1] For the German front, he enlisted writerH.G. Wells to define a clear propaganda policy. Wells's key memorandum argued that the Allied aim was not to crush Germany, but to establish a "League of Free Nations." The propaganda was to convince Germans that only by overthrowing their militarist government could they avoid ruin and eventually join this peaceful world order.Hamilton Fyfe later succeeded Wells and continued this work.[1]
A major challenge was distribution. After Germany threatened to punish captured airmen, Britain stopped using planes and instead developed paper balloons to carry leaflets. While innovative, this method was dependent on wind direction. Lord Northcliffe repeatedly lobbied to resume aerial distribution, a request that was only granted in the war's final weeks.[1]
The propaganda effort was intensified and centralized at Crewe House. A system was created to produce "priority" news leaflets that could be in German hands within 48 hours of being written. The volume was immense, with millions of leaflets dropped in the last months of the war. The content focused on Allied military successes, the overwhelming arrival of American forces, and the hopelessness of the German cause. The leaflets were designed to be truthful and verifiable, orwhite propaganda, which gave them credibility.[1] This "intensive" campaign in the final weeks directly attacked theHohenzollern government and urged German soldiers to consider why they were still fighting.[1]
Crewe House did not operate in isolation but relied on seamless coordination with other government departments. Through a system of liaison officers, it maintained vital links with theForeign Office,War Office,Admiralty, and theMinistry of Information, which provided crucial resources like itswireless service. This collaboration saw unwavering support and efficiency, with even theTreasury facilitating smooth and prompt funding for all necessary expenditures.[1] Contrary to enemy claims of vast spending, the entire intensive propaganda campaign over its final four months was conducted at a relatively modest cost. The total expenditure, including support from other departments, was £31,360, with only £7,946 spent directly by Crewe House, a figure kept low in part because many staff members worked without remuneration. This efficient and collaborative effort proved to be a remarkably successful and cost-effective component of the Allied war strategy.[1]
However, some historians challenge the extent of this department's influence. One prominent view is that the idea that Northcliffe's propaganda directly caused the collapse of German home-front morale – a notion later exploited by German propagandists as astab-in-the-back myth – is not supported by evidence. This perspective argues that the department actually produced very little original political content. Furthermore, even if it had, the significant logistical challenges of distribution meant that few Germans inside the country would have ever seen these leaflets.[8]
According to this analysis, the messages that truly eroded the German will to fight were not covert leaflets, but the public statements and policy positions openly declared by theAmerican President and theBritish Prime Minister. The department had little time to prove its effectiveness against Germany before the war ended. Northcliffe resigned immediately after the Armistice, and the organization was quickly disbanded, followed by a swift demobilization of Britain's psychological warfare capabilities.[8]
Following intelligence reports received ofGermany's rearmament, plans to reestablish the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries as a small section dedicated to studyingpropaganda techniques were developed by theForeign Office underLord Halifax. Since reliableintelligence onNazi operations could best be obtained fromrefugees, one early source wasDr. Klaus Spiecker, a formerWeimar civil servant who had fled toFrance and operated theanti-Naziradio stationDeutsche Freiheitsender nearParis. After being brought to Britain by theSecret Service, he resumed his broadcasts fromWoburn under the pseudonym “Mr. Turner.”[3]
AtPrime Minister Neville Chamberlain's direction,Sir Campbell Stuart was asked bySir Warren Fisher to form a similar department in preparation for the coming war.[3] Stuart had many experiences from the First World War with which to draw upon, having served at Crewe House and written its official history.[9] Stuart had also been well versed in printing, production, and paper manufacture from his earlier career atThe Times.
With the help of AdmiralSir Roger Backhouse, theFirst Sea Lord, Stuart secured the appointment ofReginald Alexander Dallas Brooks as his chief staff officer.[9] Brooks was an Australian, and a member of theRoyal Marines. During World War I, Brooks fought atZeebrugge. He had also previously served as an intelligence officer inSouth Africa.[9] Brooks managed liaison with intelligence agencies, while ColonelR. J. Shaw, a formerTimes staff member and friend of Stuart, headed the section itself.[3]
To provide for these services, the propaganda department was drawn up and established out of Stuart's offices atElectra House Moorgate.[8] In the lead-up to theMunich Agreement of 1938, a batch of leaflets was produced for an aerial distribution campaign over Germany. While the leaflets were never actually dropped, the planning stage highlighted a need for better coordination. This prompted Electra House to send a formal communication to theAir Ministry, stressing the importance of establishing a properly organized system for delivering information to enemy nations. The official at the Air Ministry who received this note wasSir Donald Banks, who would later be appointed as the head of thePetroleum Warfare Department (PWD).
The results ofMunich Agreement of 1938 led to the postponement of these preparations, a decision later seen as a major setback to internal German opposition against Hitler.[9] Chamberlain at this point was under the assumption that peace had been declared, and there would be no need for any more subversive sections. The plans for this department were mainly shelved at this point, and Campbell anticipated that the department would shut down.[9]
Only several months later, following theOccupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1989, war again appeared inevitable, and Stuart was instructed to revive his propaganda organisation. Officially titled the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, it operated under the newly mintedMinister of Information,Lord MacMillan, and was funded through theForeign Office's Secret Vote, though the department was required to operate entirely outside its premises. The office was re-located located toElectra House Victoria, the 2nd headquarters ofCable and Wireless, of which Campbell Stuart was also the chairman. The department operated out of Room 207 of this building, equipped with aReuters news tape and awireless set.[9][3]
In April 1939, Stuart established three guiding principles for British propaganda: it must betruthful, consistent, and aligned with clear policy.Anglo-French cooperation was pursued through theAnglo-French Propaganda Council in Paris.[9] Stuart, however, found his French counterparts “suspicious and superior,” and instead secured practical assistance through hisFrench-Canadian relatives, notably his cousins in the Beaulieu banking family ofMontreal, who maintained abanking house in Paris.[3]
Campbell Stuart recruited the authorValentine Williams, a former colleague from theDaily Mail, who in turn secured the involvement ofNoël Coward for the department's Paris office.[3] During thePhoney War, Stuart, accompanied by his private secretaryAnthony Gishford andReginald Dallas Brooks, made several official visits to Paris.[3]
TheForeign Office drafted six versions of leaflets, from whichSir Alexander Cadogan selected one fortranslation intoGerman andmass printing, ten million copies at the cost of sixpence per hundred, byH.M. Stationery Office.[3] Despite mutual reservations, the British and French collaborated in the production and distribution of the leaflets to be carried byballoon into enemy territory. The French were unimpressed by the British contributions, criticizing the leaflets forgrammatical errors and incorrectword usage.[3][9]
As the threat of war grew and London appeared a likely target, the department prepared to relocate its operations to safer quarters. On the suggestion of the Hon.Leo Russell, advertising director ofIllustrated Newspapers and a kinsman of theDuke of Bedford,Woburn Abbey was chosen as the new operations base. The Duke readily agreed, preferring to accommodate the propaganda unit rather than wartime evacuees.[3][9] Campbell Stuart had some prior familiarity with the Woburn area, having spent a summer there as a child in 1892. During that visit, a trip throughWoburn Park to see its collection of exotic animals was a memorable event for him.[3] However, Electra House still maintained staffs at both of theElectra Houses for the purposes of monitoring foreign governments through their telegraphy, and Electra House Moorgate was maintained as its headquarters.[8]
Parallel to these developments, the Foreign Office revived itsPolitical Intelligence Department, originally formed during the First World War. UnderReginald “Rex” Leeper, PID recruitedRobert Bruce Lockhart to oversee Central Europe and the Balkans. Among those later associated with the propaganda and intelligence coordination wasAnthony Eden, who after resigning as Foreign Secretary in 1938 remained closely involved in wartime intelligence, including liaison withBletchley Park.[9] By the outbreak of the Second World War, Bletchley Park was already active in decoding German communications. The propaganda staff of Electra House, by then based at Woburn Abbey, stood ready for mobilisation, while PID occupied nearby offices. Additional facilities had been prepared for foreign nationals involved in secret broadcasting, positioning the district as a key centre for Britain's early wartime intelligence and propaganda operations.[9]
Campbell Stuart, Anthony Gishford, and Dallas Brooks were in the department's offices in Paris on the dayGermany invaded Poland. Determined to return to England to oversee operations, Stuart arranged to conclude the department's affairs in France and reserved passage on the 4 p.m. train. When doubts arose that the train would run, he ordered his staff to find a car. They located a man in thePlace de la Concorde and, after confirming that the Woburn Abbey operation had been activated, set out forBoulogne. Apunctured tire delayed their journey, and they arrived after the final boat had departed. A hurried telephone call toDieppe revealed that there would be a night sailing, and the party raced to the port in time to board, reaching England safely and continuing on to Woburn.[3]
As the head of the organization, Campbell Stuart lived with a few key associates inParis House on the Woburn estate. This visually striking building was a 19th-century reproduction of a 16th-century style, originally built for theParis Exhibition of 1878, from which it got its name. The house had been purchased by an earlier Duke of Bedford and transported in its entirety to Woburn. Despite its architectural interest, Stuart reportedly found the house inconvenient, poorly lit, and uncomfortably cold in the winter. The rest of the staff were housed in about a dozen other smaller dwellings in or near Woburn.[3]
The British headquarters, always called "CHQ" or "Country Headquarters," was established at the estate. Personnel were discreetly directed to a hotel in nearbyDunstable, where they would receive a hand-drawn map or transport to the final, confidential location. Office spaces were created in the stable wing and a large riding school, where a long corridor was flanked by two dozen small partitioned cubicles. Living quarters were set up above the stables. Despite the functional accommodations, the presence of important works of art, left from the building's previous use as an overflow art gallery, lent an air of grandeur to the space.[3]
The Duke of Bedford visited early on to observe the new operations. The staff of sixty was initially catered by the firmJ. Lyons and Co., with the canteen bar reportedly accounting for nearly 10% of the department's salary expenditures. This catering contract was later taken over byA.B.C.[3]
From the very first night of the war, British bombers dropped leaflets over Germany, including one titled "A Warning to the German People." This aerial leafleting continued on subsequent nights. In addition to aircraft, balloons were also used as a delivery method, with launches beginning from the French countryside on September 30, 1939.[3]
The most notable was a two-page news sheet designed to mimic a Nazi newspaper, titledWolkiger Beobachter ("From the Clouds")—a deliberate pun on the authentic Nazi party newspaper,Völkischer Beobachter. It was first dropped on German cities in November 1939.[3]
The production of these leaflets was housed in a small green-and-white hangar on the Woburn estate, previously used to store aircraft. This facility, complete with an adjacentoffice andworkshop, was converted into acomposing room wheretypesetters hired from theOxford University Press worked. The early leaflets were manually typeset using traditional GermanFraktur typeface/font and then sent to the government'sprinting office formass production.[3]
Stuart desired that his department only publishwhite propaganda at Woburn, and disliked greatly the printing ofblack propaganda, which he thought was probably much more suited to other departments. That other department which printed black propaganda out of Woburn Abbey wasSection D of the SIS. Stuart eventually requested the members of Section D to transfer away, when they were stationed at a house inHertingfordbury, but some Section D members remained at Woburn Abbey to assist in the production of white propaganda.[9]
Following theGerman occupation of Western Europe andItaly's entry into the war, the demand for British propaganda surged. To meet this need, the Woburn printing unit was moved to a larger facility nearby atMarylands. There, with new typesetting equipment installed, the expanded staff worked around the clock, primarily on overtwhite propaganda.[3]
The recruitment of skilled typographers and graphic artists led to a major improvement in the quality of the propaganda materials. Printing was handled by specialist firms, including theSun Engraving Co. inWatford andWaterlows inDunstable, the latter being experts in photogravure. This partnership allowed for the effective use of color and the high-quality reproduction of photographs. Another key contributor from the start of the war wasHome Counties Newspapers, aLuton-based printing group that used its presses in Luton andLeagrave to produce a substantial volume of material.[3]
Production was a continuous process, andprint blocks were collected daily by car from Woburn Abbey. The demanding schedule yielded impressive results and soon led to a new project: a weekly "white" propaganda publication for distribution over France called theCourrier de L'Air (sharing the name of an earlier World War I newspaper printed by Crewe House). This French-language publication was printed elsewhere using gravure, while theLuton News, part of the Home Counties Group, was awarded the typesetting contract. The text was set at four times the normal size in the evenings, and the proofs were then photographically reduced. Eventually, the operation expanded to typesetting papers in five different languages, requiring two evening shifts to manage the workload.[3]
The printing unit also handled specialized, one-off projects. The defection ofRudolf Hess in May 1941 presented such an opportunity. Under conditions of extreme secrecy, the team at Luton News produced forged copies of the German newspaperVölkischer Beobachter with altered pages, which were then deliberately planted for Hess to read.[3]
Alongside printed propaganda, the British effort expanded into "black" radio propaganda, which was distinct from the official "white" broadcasts of the BBC. To lead this initiative, they enlisted the services of 48-year-old Colonel (later Brigadier) Richard Gambier-Parry. His mission was to establish and enhance radio communications for the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), which included providing the necessary transmitters for these clandestine broadcasts.[3]
The War Office requisitionedWhaddon Hall for its operations, and by the end of 1939,Gambier Parry had established his headquarters at there. He was soon joined byHarold Robin, who would be responsible for the technical side of all the department's secretbroadcasting operations throughout the war. Both men had previously worked for thePhilco company before the war. The estate's previous residents, theSelby Lowndes family, relocated to a nearby town.[3]
In early 1940, Robin was tasked with building a shortwave transmitter to broadcast propaganda. After surveying the area near Whaddon, he chose a site in a large field atGawcott, where two American-made 7.5KWtransmitters were installed. The broadcasts were first recorded in a specially adapted room at Whaddon Hall, with sound-dampening material on the walls to ensure quality. These recordings, made on 16-inch glass-based discs that held about twenty minutes of material, were then sent viaPost Office lines to the Gawcott transmitter for broadcast. Gambier Parry's personal secretary,Lisa Towse, who was fluent in French, wrote scripts for a clandestine station known asRadio Beaux Arts.[3]
To support the administrative needs of the Woburn operation, many typists were recruited, primarily from organizations like theImperial Communications Advisory Board andThomas Cook and Son.Telephone operators were supplied by various London establishments. All personnel were bound by strict secrecy; they were forbidden from discussing their work or their location, and all personal mail had to be sent to London for posting to maintain operational security.[3]
The military wing of the department remained in London, requiring its head, Campbell Stuart, to regularly travel between the two centers in hisRolls Royce, accompanied by his assistants and even afiling cabinet. This physical separation reduced the department's direct influence over theBBC German service, a situation exacerbated by the fact that liaison was handled by two officers provided by theBBC itself. To compensate for a general lack of firsthand knowledge of Nazi Germany among the staff,Ivone Kirkpatrick of the Foreign Office provided expert advice. His background was uniquely suited to the task; after being wounded in the First World War, he had joined a secret organization to develop propaganda methods, including successful early trials for dropping leaflets byballoon, making him a valuable advisor in the new conflict.[3]
The creation of effective propaganda required a deep understanding of the enemy's morale and mindset. To this end, they secured a steady supply of German daily newspapers through contacts in neutral countries. By the spring, their London facility was receiving a vast amount of material shortly after publication, including ninety different Germannewspapers,trade journals, andperiodicals, over a hundred Allied and neutral papers from sixteen countries, and numerous publications from refugee groups in Britain. A team of fivelinguists from the intelligence division would then analyze this content to identify useful information.[3]
British missions in European capitals telegraphed important news, and the BBC provided transcripts of its monitoring of significant enemy broadcasts. When the German advance cut off these conventional sources, the British Legation inStockholm was instructed to purchase every available newspaper and have theRAF fly them to Britain on a weekly basis.[3]
In June 1940, administrative control of the department returned to the Minister of Information,Duff Cooper. Around this time, Stuart began advocating for British propaganda to be broadcast from overseas locations. Ten days after theFall of France, he traveled secretly toNorth America to explore this possibility. His mission successfully secured theCanadian government's consent for the BBC to build ashortwave station there, and he also made plans for broadcasts to Germany from eitherNewfoundland orBermuda.[3]
However, upon his return, Campbell Stuart found the BBC to be unenthusiastic about these plans. Furthermore, a significant political change had occurred.Prime Minister Churchill had invitedHugh Dalton, the newMinister of Economic Warfare, to lead a new organization for sabotage and subversion. This new body, theSpecial Operations Executive (SOE), was formally established on July 22, 1940. The propaganda department, Electra House, was absorbed into this new structure as its propaganda branch. In anticipation of this change, Campbell Stuart resigned on August 17 and subsequently devoted his energies to chairing theImperial Communications Advisory Committee.[3]
His successor wasReginald Leeper, the head of PID, who took charge of the department's "country operations." However, the new minister, Hugh Dalton, soon began to view Leeper with increasing suspicion regarding his loyalties.[3]