Denial and deception (D&D) is a Western theoretical framework[1] for conceiving and analyzingmilitary intelligence techniques pertaining tosecrecy anddeception.[2] Originating in the 1980s, it is roughly based on the more pragmatic Soviet practices ofmaskirovka (which preceded the D&D conceptualization by decades) but it has a more theoretical approach.[1]
In the D&D framework, denial and deception are seen as distinct but complementary endeavors.[2] Denial most often involvessecurity andconcealment to prevent foreign agents, photographicsurveillance,electronic monitoring, or even the media from revealing secretive diplomatic or military matters. Deception is the construction of afalse reality for the adversary through intentionally "leaked" false information, false stories implanted in the media, dummy or decoy structures or military formations, or numerous other measures.[3] For example, in the Japanese information warfare campaign that preceded the Japaneseattack on Pearl Harbor, the D&D approach identifies as a denial measure the twice-repeated change in navalcall signs effected by the Imperial Navy between 1 November and 1 December, but identifies as a deception measure the Japanese Foreign Office announcement that a large Japanese liner would sail to California on 2 December to evacuate Japanese citizens.[4]
A denial and deception campaign is most effective when numerous denial and deceptive efforts are coherently coordinated to advance a specific plan; however, the most effective such operations are very complex, involving numerous persons or organizations, and this can prove exceedingly difficult. A single failed denial measure or deception can easily jeopardize an entire operation.[3]
According to political scientistJohn J. Mearsheimer (Why Leaders Lie), during peaceful times, inter-state deceptions have little traction as the level of trust between states is usually already very low and therefore being caught in a lie would be ruinous. According to Mearsheimer, freely elected officials are often more likely to use such strategies than authoritarian dictators, who tend to rely more on intimidation and threats. Freely elected leaders who move up the ranks by employing political deception are not only familiar with deceiving the public for personal gain but also have considerablepolitical capital andpublic trust following their election. With this comparatively high level of trust, political leaders are the most likely to successfully target the public with deceptions, particularly withfearmongering. According to Mearsheimer, in the weeks leading up to the Iraq War, "the [George W.] Bush administration engaged in a deception campaign to inflate the threat posed bySaddam.” Following this successful deception, the administration was able to launch theIraq War with little opposition.[5]
According to Abram Shulsky,democracies, like theUnited States, had difficulty employing denial and deception campaigns. This is largely due to the open media of most such societies which frequently expose any major operations undertaken militarily or diplomatically. Also, legal restrictions tend to hamper governments and particularly intelligence services in democratic societies. The exception to these restrictions occurs in wartime, when some measure ofmartial law is imposed and legal impediments are relaxed.Authoritarian systems of government, however, frequently employ denial and deception campaigns both domestically and abroad to manipulate domestic opposition and foreign governments. These operations are unhampered by legal restrictions or an open media. Non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, frequently use denial and deception to influence governments and the public opinion of target societies.[6] Other authors illustrate the D&D topic withOperation Fortitude and consider it one of the most successful such examples in history.[7][8][9] According to Donald C.F. Daniel, democratic societies have more qualms with deception than they have with denial (in the technical sense used in this article); Daniel contrasts the little public controversy that surrounded the secretive way in whichNixon's rapprochement with China was negotiated (as example of secrecy/denial that did not cause a public outrage) with the uproar caused by the 2001 announcement of the creation of theOffice of Strategic Influence (an institution that had among its stated goals the planting of false stories in the foreign press).[2]
According toUnited States Department of Defense definitions,military deception includes both denial and deception (as defined in the D&D framework).[10] CanadianOPSEC officer John M. Roach notes that "Deception used as a broad, general term includes the elements of both denial and deception, each having distinct actions that are either active or passive."[11] D&D is not the only terminology used to make this distinction; according to Roach "passive deception" is another technical term for denial.[11] Western writers see the Soviet (and post-Soviet) maskirovka practices as not drawing a sharp or significant distinction between the two components of denial and deception.[1][11] The Islamic concepts ofkitman andtaqiyya, or at least thejihadist interpretations thereof, have been seen by Westerners as the equivalents of the two components of denial and (respectively) deception.[11][12] Since taqiyya is a word withShiite connotations,Sunni militants sometimes prefer to use the wordiham instead, roughly with the meaning "deception of unbelievers".[13] Although the Chinese deception theory literature is vast and uses rather different terminology (relative to Western works), some recent surveys have identified that "seduction"—understood as convincing the enemy to make fatal mistakes—is considered the highest form of deception while confusing or denying information to the enemy are considered lesser forms.[14]