Back in the 1980s, the formerDefense Agency had several intelligence divisions with different duties. Among these intelligence divisions in the Defense Agency had included those from the Central Data Command Unit, the Joint Staff Council's Second Office and the three branches from the chiefs of staff in theJapan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).[4] Most of the DIH's establishment was based on the Annex Chamber (or Special Annex),[5] Second Intelligence Division, Ground Staff Office.[6] They collected signals from theSino–Soviet border conflictof 1969 and theSoviet Afghan warof 1979.[7]They were also involved in intercepting communications that led to and after the shooting ofKorean Air Lines Flight 007 through the Wakkanai Station.[8]
A supposed plan to integrate the intelligence divisions of the threeJSDF branches started in 1988 before lack of cooperation and subordination ended it.[4]
Plans to consolidate all the intelligence bureaus of the old Defense Administration into one agency had started in the 1990s[9] after theNational Diet had passed a law in May 1996, calling for the creation of a central military intelligence agency before the DIH was eventually established on January 20, 1997[8][10] after intelligence units from the JSDF, Japanese Defense Agency and the Joint Staff council are united[11] with the appointment ofLieutenant General Kunimi Masahiro as the agency's first commanding officer.[3]
Initially, DIH civilian and military staff members were numbered at 1,580[10] with a planned manpower of 2,000 personnel[12] before it reached its current manpower of 2,300 staff members.[13][14] In 2011, the manpower is 1,907 members[15]
Spy satellites had been planned for launch in 1998 as part of augmenting the DIH's intelligence gathering capabilities. Though two were able to launch into space, two more were destroyed in a botch attempt to send them to space.[16]
In 2005, the DIH has suffered its first internal leak of classified information when aColonel in the JASDF had been arrested for allegedly leaking information regarding the accident of aPeople's Liberation Army NavySubmarine that took place in the same year in theSouth China Sea.[17]
North Korean radio communications were intercepted by the SIGINT division's Kikaijima, Kagoshima radio monitoring station. The successful interception ofNorth Korean communications later led to anaval shootout between ships of theJapan Coast Guard and a suspectedNorth Korean spy boat in 2001 near the island ofAmami-Ōshima before the latter had been destroyed.[20]
Using asignals intelligence facility inTachiarai, the DIH reportedly monitor communications from transiting satellites, as part of a program codenamed MALLARD.[21] The program reportedly intercepts more than 12 million Internet communications per day.[21]
In May 2019, several Chinese JH7 fighter-bombers conducted a training exercise over the high seas of the East China Sea, using a JMSDF destroyer as a target for attack. The JSDF side is said to have intercepted radio transmissions emitted by the Chinese warplanes stating that they were training to attack the Maritime Self-Defense Force ships as targets.[22]
The DIH is under the jurisdiction of the Joint Staff and is controlled by the Defense Intelligence Committee, which is made up of the Chiefs of Staff of the JGSDF, JMSDF and JASDF along with the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, State Minister of Defense and theMinister of Defense.[23][24]
Command of the DIH was given directly to theJapanese Minister of Defense in March 2006.[13] The deputy officer is usually a civilian officially appointed by the MOD.[25] Four Defense Intelligence Officers (DIOs) are also appointed with three being colonels from the JGSDF or the JASDF with one a civilian official.[25]
The SIGINT facilities managed by the Chobetsu (Chosa Besshitsu) or the Annex Chamber, Second Section, Second Investigation Division in English, from 1958 to 1997, is currently managed by the DIH.[26] Command of the SIGINT division is usually filled by a senior officer appointed by the NPA from the Prefectural Police.[27][28]
A number of divisions were established under the DIH, including the following:[24][29][30]
Directorate
Mandate
Directorate for Administration
Provides administrative and logistics support
Directorate for Programs
Conducts and plans DIH's intelligence collection/analysis plans. Serves as the point of contact when coordinating work with intelligence agencies in and out of the MOD.
Directorate for Geospatial Intelligence
Analyzessatellite images from various satellites and geospatial-based information.
Directorate for Signal Intelligence
AnalyzesSIGINT intelligence. Is responsible for its electronics unit inIchigaya to monitorNorth Korea,china andrussia-based military communications. It also manages two CDAA 'elephant cages,' as well as six other communications offices. They are located in Kobunato, Niigata Prefecture, Oi, Saitama Prefecture, Tachiarai, Fukushima Prefecture and Kikaijima, Kagoshima Prefecture.
Directorate for Assessment
Summarizes/assesses open-source intelligence fromJapanesemilitary attachés serving abroad, intelligence from friendly nations and from DIH collaborators and agents
Directorate for Joint Intelligence
Collect and analyse intelligence which is needed to cope with immediately and support Chief of JSO and SDFs directly. This division is a part of DIH, but also is expected to be used as J-2 of JSO.
The main role of the DIH is to collect information and analyse for planning defense and operation policy. The agency collect information from open sources, signals and image intelligence as well as from otherJapanese government ministries,Japanese embassies and other affiliated ministries and organizations.[13][29] In addition, they also gather intelligence through surveillance activities.[31]
The analysis results are reported and shared with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, internal departments and other organizations of the Ministry of Defense,National Security Council (Japan) and other relevant ministries and agencies, and units of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces for use in policy decisions and unit operations.
In addition, in the National Defense Strategy approved by the Cabinet in December 2022, the Defense Intelligence Headquarters is to play a central role in information warfare in the defense of Japan, in addition to its existing role.[1]
It is not allowed to obtain non-military intelligence in Japan or information from cyberspace.[7]
Davies, Philip H.J.; Gustafson, Kristian, eds. (2013).Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere. Georgetown University Press.ISBN978-1589019560.
Dover, Robert; Goodman, Michael S.; Hillebrand, Claudia, eds. (2014).Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies. New York: Routledge.ISBN978-1589019560.
Samuels, Richard J. (2019).Special Duty: A History of the Japanese Intelligence Community. Cornell University Press.ISBN978-1501741586.
Williams, Brad (2021).Japanese Foreign Intelligence and Grand Strategy: From the Cold War to the Abe Era. Georgetown University Press.ISBN978-1647120634.