| 国家互联网信息办公室 | |
Logo of the Cyberspace Administration of China | |
Logo of the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission | |
| Abbreviation | CAC |
|---|---|
| Formation | 5 May 2011; 14 years ago (2011-05-05) |
| Type | Governmental |
| Headquarters | 11 Chegongzhuang Street,Xicheng, Beijing |
Director | Zhuang Rongwen |
Parent organization | Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission |
| Subsidiaries | China Internet Investment Fund China Internet Illegal Information Reporting Center |
| Website | www |
| Cyberspace Administration of China | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Simplified Chinese | 国家互联网信息办公室 | ||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 國家互聯網信息辦公室 | ||||||
| Literal meaning | State Internet Information Office | ||||||
| |||||||
TheCyberspace Administration of China (CAC) is the nationalinternet content regulator andcensor of thePeople's Republic of China.
The agency was initially established in 2011 by theState Council as the State Internet Information Office (SIIO), a subgroup of theState Council Information Office. In 2014, the SIIO was renamed in English as the Cyberspace Administration of China, and transformed into the executive arm of the newly establishedCentral Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization of theChinese Communist Party (CCP), which was promoted to the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission in 2018. The CAC and the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission areone institution with two names.
The CAC plays a key role in the CCP's control over the Chinese Internet. Its functions include issuing and enforcing rules about online content and regulating cybersecurity, data security, and privacy through rulemaking, administrative licensing and punishment activities. The CAC's current director isZhuang Rongwen, who concurrently serves as a Deputy Head of the CCP'sPublicity Department of the CCP Central Committee.
On 5 May 2011, theState Council approved the establishment of the State Internet Information Office (SIIO). The SIIO was initially a subgroup of theState Council Information Office (SCIO), which was anexternal name of the External Propaganda Office (EOP) of theChinese Communist Party (CCP). The first SIIO director wasWang Chen, who was also the director of the SCIO.[1] Though initially a nameplate of the SCIO, SIIO soon gained full-time staff.[2]
Reforms in February 2014 led to the creation of theCentral Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Information.[3]: 66 The SIIO was transformed to become the external name of the Central Leading Group's general office.[2] It additionally changed its name in English to the Cyberspace Administration of China, while its Chinese name stayed the same.[1]
Further reforms in February 2018 upgraded the Central Leading Group to the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CACC) as part of thedeepening the reform of the Party and state institutions, with the CAC staying as the executive arm of the commission.[1] The reforms also put theNational Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team/Coordination Center of China under the CAC.[4]
The Cyberspace Administration of China and the Office of theCentral Cyberspace Affairs Commission of the CCP, its executive arm, areone institution with two names.[5][6][7] The CAC is involved in the formulation and implementation of policy on a variety of issues related to the internet in China. It is under direct jurisdiction of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, a party institution subordinate to theCCP Central Committee.[8] The Director of both the state and party institutions isZhuang Rongwen,[9] who serves concurrently as a Deputy Head of the CCP'sCentral Committee Publicity Department.[10]
As of 2015[update], the CAC includes the following departments: an Internet Security Emergency Command Center, an Agency Service Center, and anChina Internet Illegal Information Reporting Center.[11][needs update] TheChina Cyberspace Research Institute sits under the CAC.[12] Unlike most other Chinese administrative agencies, the CAC does not regularly publish information about its organizational structure, structure, budget, duties as well as its personnel arrangements, except for brief biographies of its director and deputy directors.[1] Many of the CAC's regulatory functions are delegated to the China Electronic Technology Standardization Institute.[13]: 143 The institute tests cybersecurity compliance and data protection.[13]: 143
The CAC has authority over theChina Internet Investment Fund,[14]: 118 which hasgolden share ownership stakes in technology firms such asByteDance,Weibo Corporation,SenseTime, andKuaishou.[15][16] The CAC additionally organizes theWorld Internet Conference.[17]
| Name | Chinese name | Took office | Left office |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wang Chen | 王晨 | May 2011 | April 2013 |
| Lu Wei | 鲁炜 | 26 April 2013 | 29 June 2016 |
| Xu Lin | 徐麟 | 29 June 2016 | 31 July 2018 |
| Zhuang Rongwen | 庄荣文 | 31 July 2018 | Incumbent |
The CAC is the national internet regulation agency in China.[18][19] It is responsible for the content management and law enforcement of theInternet in China. Its functions include rulemaking, administrative licensing and punishment activities.[1] It issues and enforces rules about online content and regulates cybersecurity, data security, and privacy.[20]
The CAC implements information-dissemination guidelines and policies, regulates internet information content and management, supervises network news businesses, and investigates illegal or non-regulatory compliant websites.[13]: 40 The CAC maintains censorship functions, including issuing directives to media companies in China. After a campaign to arrest almost 200 lawyers and activists in China, the CAC published a directive saying that "All websites must, without exception, use as the standard official and authoritative media reports with regards to the detention of trouble-making lawyers by the relevant departments."[21] The CAC has also been given the responsibility for reviewing the security of devices made by foreign countries.[22][23]
Since its founding in 2011, CAC had the authority to issue punitive orders, including imposing fines, license revocations, and business closures. The initial powers and legal basis of the CAC came from a 2014 authorization by the State Council.[1] According to theCybersecurity Law passed in 2016, "state cybersecurity and information departments", generally regarded to refer to the CAC, have the authority to plan and coordinate cybersecurity and related regulation with other regulatory agencies with overlapping or complementary jurisdiction.[24] Since 2017, the CAC has also been publishing legally-binding departmental rules (部门规章), issued by State Council administrative agencies.[1] TheData Security Law passed in 2021 tasked CAC with online data security and export of important data, while thePersonal Information Protection Law passed in 2021 granted CAC with powers for planning, coordinating and supervising personal information protection work, retaliating its authority over control of personal information overseas.[1]
Due to the CAC's political and regulatory roles, Rogier Creemers atLeiden University argues that it is the world's most powerful digital institution.[25] It serves as the executive arm of the CCP CCAC, has regulatory power over online content, is responsible for protecting personal information and data, and has direct authority overChina's DNS registry, theNational Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team/Coordination Center of China, the cybersecurity standardization body TC260, and the Cybersecurity Association of China.[25]
In 2017, the CAC issued a rule stating that nonpublic capital should not be allowed to invest in internet-based newsgathering.[3]: 73 In 2022, the CAC issued measures and guidelines on security assessments for cross-border data transfers as part of an effort to institutionalize data transfer review mechanisms.[13]: 251
In 2015, the CAC was also responsible for chasing down Internet users and web sites that published "rumors" following anexplosion in theport city of Tianjin. Such rumors included claims that blasts killed 1,000 people, or that there was looting, or leadership ructions as a result of the blast.[26] The same year, the CAC debuted a song that Paul Mozur ofThe New York Times called "a throwback to revolutionary songs glorifying the state." The song included the lines: “Unified with the strength of all living things, Devoted to turning the global village into the most beautiful scene” and “An Internet power: Tell the world that the Chinese Dream is uplifting China.”[27] The efforts of the CAC have been linked with a broader push by theXi Jinping administration, characterized byXiao Qiang, head ofChina Digital Times, as a "ferocious assault on civil society."[21]
In 2020, the CAC issued theProvisions on the Governance of the Online Information Content Ecosystem, requiring "online information content service platforms" to create mechanisms that allow them to conduct "real-time inspections, emergency response, and the handling of online rumors". It also says platforms "must not transmit" information deemed "illegal", and "shall prevent and resist the transmission" of "negative" information.[20]
In May 2020, the CAC announced a campaign to "clean up" online political and religious content deemed "illegal."[28] In July 2020, the CAC commenced a three-month censorship action on We-Media in China.[29] In December 2020, the CAC removed 105 apps, including that ofTripadvisor, from China'sapp stores that were deemed "illegal" in a move to "clean up China's internet".[30] A 2020 investigation byProPublica andThe New York Times found that CAC systematically placed censorship restrictions on Chinese media outlets and social media to avoid mentions of the COVID-19 outbreak, mentions ofLi Wenliang, and "activated legions of fake online commenters to flood social sites with distracting chatter".[31]
In 2021, CAC launched a hotline to report online comments against the Chinese Communist Party, including comments which it deemedhistorical nihilism.[32][33] In 2022, CAC published rules that mandate that all online comments must be pre-reviewed before being published.[34][35] During the2022 COVID-19 protests in China, the CAC directed companies such asTencent and ByteDance to intensify their censorship efforts.[36][37] In January 2023, CAC ordered any content displaying "gloomy emotions" to be censored duringLunar New Year celebrations as part of its "Spring Festival internet environment rectification" campaign.[38] In December 2023, CAC launched a crackdown on content "spreading wrong views on marriage".[39] In September 2025, CAC launched a campaign to curb content about "negative outlooks on life" such as "lying flat."[40][41][42]
In March 2024, CAC stated that the country's media outlets must create "positive propaganda" (Chinese:正面宣传) about Chinese achievements.[43]
In April 2023,[44] the Cyberspace Administration of China issued draft measures stating that tech companies will be obligated to ensure AI-generated content upholds theideology of the CCP such asCore Socialist Values, avoids discrimination, respectsintellectual property rights, and safeguards user data.[45][13]: 278 Under these draft measures, companies bear legal responsibility for training data and content generated through their platforms.[13]: 278 In July 2023, CAC announced a licensing requirement forgenerative artificial intelligence systems.[46] Before releasing alarge language model to the public, companies must seek approval from the CAC to certify that the model refuses to answer certain questions relating to political ideology and criticism of the CCP.[47][48] In May 2024, CAC announced that it rolled out a large language model trained onXi Jinping Thought.[49]
Since at least 2017, CAC has cooperated withRoskomnadzor, Russia's principal internet regulator and censor.[50]
The CAC has been accused of assisting in cyber attacks against visitors to Chinese websites. The anti-censorship groupGreatFire.org provided data and reports showingman-in-the-middle attacks against major foreign web services, includingiCloud,Yahoo,Microsoft, andGoogle. The attack would have required the ability to "tap into the backbone of the Chinese Internet".[51]
Gibson Research Corporation attributed some of theattacks against GitHub to the CAC's operations. In the attack, ads hosted on Baidu were able to leverage computers visiting from outside China, redirecting their traffic to overload the servers of GitHub. "The tampering takes places someplace between when the traffic enters China and when it hits Baidu's servers," Gibson wrote. "This is consistent with previous malicious actions and points to the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) being directly involved..."[52]
In November 2019, CAC imposed a curfew on online gaming for minors. The restrictions included banning children under 18 from gaming between 10 p.m and 8 a.m. In addition to that, these children were restricted to only 90 minutes of online gaming on weekdays and 3 hours on weekends and holidays.[53] Extra restrictions were imposed on spending where 8 to 16 year old gamers were allowed to spend 200 yuan (£22, $29) per month while 16 to 18 year olds were allowed only 400 yuan per month.[53]
In August 2023, CAC proposed regulations to curb perceived internet addiction on minors. These regulations would limit minors between the ages of 16 and 18 to only 2 hours of mobile usage per day although they can be bypassed with permission from parents.[54] Children under the age of 18 will be restricted from accessing the internet between 10 p.m and 6 a.m[55] whereas children under age 8 will be allowed only 8 minutes a day.[55] CAC says that online platforms will be responsible for the execution of the law if passed, although the specific penalties were not disclosed in the event of failure to comply.[54]
In 2025, the Cyberspace Administration of China issued draft rules for categorizing online information that might affect minors. Under Article 10 of the draft, online goods and service providers must comply with standards for content that may harm minors’ physical or mental health. Providers must avoid placing such information in prominent promotional positions and must label or manage it according to the rules.[56]
In 2020, theXiao Zhan/227 incident, a conflict among online fan communities arising from aslash fiction novel posted on thefan fiction websiteArchive of Our Own, resulted in public attention and scrutiny from policymakers on the issue of hostile online communication.[57]: 163 Beginning in June 2021,CAC initiated a series of policies and campaigns against "resentment and abuse, upvoting/downvoting and trolling, disinformation and name-calling, doxing, and privacy violations of online fandom communities."[57]: 163 Major Chinese social media platforms revised their policies accordingly.[57]: 163–164