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 China |  Taiwan |
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| Cross-strait relations | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Traditional Chinese | 兩岸關係 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 两岸关系 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Alternative Chinese name | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 海峽兩岸關係 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 海峡两岸关系 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Second alternative Chinese name | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 臺海關係 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 台海关系 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Literal meaning | Taiwan Strait relations | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Third alternative Chinese name | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 陸臺關係 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 陆台关系 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Literal meaning | Mainland–Taiwan relations | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Fourth alternative Chinese name | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 中臺關係 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 中台关系 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Literal meaning | China–Taiwan relations | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Cross-strait relations (sometimes calledMainland–Taiwan relations,[1]China–Taiwan relations,[2] orPRC–ROC relations) are the political and economic relations betweenChina (officially the People's Republic of China or PRC) andTaiwan (officially the Republic of China or ROC) across theTaiwan Strait. Due to the existing controversy over the status of Taiwan and theChinese legitimacy question, they are also not defined asdiplomatic relations by either side.
The relationship has been complex and controversial due to the dispute regarding thepolitical status of Taiwan after the island's administration was transferred fromJapan to theRepublic of China in 1945, and the split between the PRC and ROC in 1949 as a result of theROC's retreat to the island after losing theChinese Civil War. The essential questions are whether the two governments are still in a state of civil war overOne China, each holding one of two "regions" or parts of the same country (i.e. "one nation, two states"); whether they can beunified under a "one country, two systems" framework; or whether they are now separate countries (either asTwo Chinas, or as "one China, one Taiwan"). The English expression "cross-strait relations" is considered to be a neutral term that avoids reference to the political status of either side.
After theJapanese surrender at the end of theSecond World War in 1945, the administration of Taiwan was transferred from theEmpire of Japan (who hadannexed Taiwan as a spoil of war through theFirst Sino-Japanese War) to the Republic of China, who was one of the "Big Four" ofAllied Nations, although questions remain regarding the legal language used in theTreaty of San Francisco. In 1949, with the Chinese Civil War turning decisively in favor of theChinese Communist Party (CCP), theRepublic of China Government led by theNationalist Party of China (Kuomintang, or KMT) evacuated to Taiwan and established a provisional capital inTaipei, while still claiming to be the legitimate government of all of China. CCP chairmanMao Zedongproclaimed the establishment of theCentral People's Government withBeijing as the capital, and thePeople's Liberation Army (PLA) subsequently conquered and quelled all of mainland China, although thedisastrous landing attempt at Kinmen, the unexpected outbreak of theKorean War and the subsequentAmerican involvement halted any further plans to invade Taiwan. The two sides then entered decades of stalemate andde factoceasefire with sporadic episodes of naval skirmishes and islandshellings, but noarmistice orpeace treaty has ever been signed, and debate continues as to whether the civil war has legally ended.[3]
Since then, the relations between the governments in Beijing and Taipei have been characterized by limited contact, tensions, and instability. In the early years, military conflicts continued, while diplomatically both governments competed to be the "legitimate government of China". Since the democratization of Taiwan, the question regarding thepolitical and legal status of Taiwan has shifted focus to the choice betweenpolitical unification with the mainland orde jureTaiwanese independence. The PRC remains hostile to any formal declaration of independence and maintains its claim over Taiwan, citing its status as the only internationally recognized government of all of China since theUnited Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 in 1971.
The administration of cross-strait relations of both sides are independent from the official diplomatic system. The Taiwanese government established theMainland Affairs Council led by theExecutive Yuan, and China established theTaiwan Affairs Office in both theState Council and theCCP Central Committee, while the top decision-making body isCentral Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs of the CCP. The communication between both sides are through two semi-official institutions:Straits Exchange Foundation by the ROC side, and theAssociation for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits by the PRC side.
Leaders of the two governments
The early history of cross-strait relations involved the exchange of cultures, people, and technology.[4][5][6] However, no Chinese dynasty formally incorporated Taiwan in ancient times.[7] In the 16th and 17th centuries, Taiwan first caught the attention ofPortuguese, thenDutch andSpanish explorers. After establishing their first settlement in Taiwan in 1624, the Dutch were defeated in 1662 byKoxinga (Zheng Chenggong), asouthern Ming dynasty loyalist, who expelled the Dutch and established the firstHan Chinese regime in Taiwan. Koxinga's heirs used Taiwan as a base for launching raids intomainland China against theManchu-ledQing dynasty, before his descendants being defeated in 1683 by Qing forces. Taiwan was incorporated intoFujian Province in 1684.
With other powers increasingly eyeing Taiwan for its strategic location and resources in the 19th century, the administration began to implement a modernization drive.[8] In 1887, Fujian-Taiwan Province was declared by Imperial decree. However, the fall of the Qing outpaced the development of Taiwan, and in 1895, following its defeat in theFirst Sino-Japanese War, the Imperial government ceded Taiwan toJapan in perpetuity. Qing loyalists briefly resisted Japanese rule under the banner of the "Republic of Formosa" but were quickly put down by Japanese authorities.[9]
Japan ruled Taiwan until 1945. As part of theEmpire of Japan, Taiwan was a foreign jurisdiction in relation to the Qing dynasty until 1912, and then to theRepublic of China for the remainder of Japanese rule. From 1928 to 1942, theChinese Communist Party (CCP) maintained that Taiwan was a separate nation.[10] In a 1937 interview withEdgar Snow,Mao Zedong stated, "we will extend them (the Koreans) our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Taiwan."[11]
In 1945, Japan was defeated inWorld War II and surrendered its forces in Taiwan to the Allies; the ROC, then ruled by theKuomintang (KMT), took custody of the island. The period of post-war KMT rule over China (1945–1949) was marked by conflict in Taiwan between local residents and the new KMT authority. The Taiwaneserebelled on 28 February 1947, but the uprising was violently suppressed by the KMT. The seeds of the Taiwan independence movement were sown during this period.
China was soon engulfed infull-scale civil war. In 1949, the conflict turned decisively against the KMT in favor of the CCP. On 1 October 1949,CCP ChairmanMao Zedong proclaimed thefounding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) inBeijing. The ROC governmentretreated to Taiwan, eventually declaringTaipei its temporary capital in December 1949.[12]
In October 1949, the PRC's attempt to capture the ROC-controlled island ofKinmen was thwarted in theBattle of Guningtou, halting thePLA’s advance towards Taiwan.[13] In November 1949, ROC forces repulsed the PRC at theBattle of Dengbu Island but were later forced to retreat after the PRC established air superiority.[14] Other PRC amphibious operations in 1950 were more successful, leading to thecapture of Hainan Island, theWanshan Islands off theGuangdong coast, andZhoushan Island offZhejiang.[15] Additional PRC successes included theBattle of Dongshan Island and theBattle of Nanpeng Island.
While in the process of losing mainland China, the ROC declared a "closure" of Chinese ports, and its navy attempted to intercept all foreign ships.[16] This also blocked direct traffic between northern and southern China.[17] On the mainland, the ROC government launched severalair bombing raids on Shanghai.[18] Meanwhile, approximately 12,000KMT soldiers retreated to Burma, where they continued launching guerrilla attacks into southern China during the early 1950s.[19]
_underway_in_heavy_seas_on_20_August_1953_(80-G-628675).jpg)
Most observers expected Chiang's government to eventually fall in response to a Communist invasion of Taiwan, and the U.S. initially showed no interest in supporting Chiang's government in its final stand. Things changed radically with the onset of theKorean War in June 1950. At this point, it became politically impossible in the U.S. to allow a total Communist victory over Chiang, so PresidentHarry S. Truman ordered theU.S. Seventh Fleet into theTaiwan Strait.[20] The U.S. fleet hindered the Communist invasion of Taiwan, and the PRC decided to send troops to Korea in October 1950.[21] The ROC proposed participation in the Korean War but was rejected.[22] The battles on the coastal islands of the mainland continued. In 1952, the ROC won theBattle of Nanri Island with U.S. support. In 1953, the Communists secured victories in theBattle of Nanpeng Archipelago, theBattle of Dalushan Islands and theDongshan Island Campaign. At the end of the Korean War, approximately two-thirds of captured Communist Chinese soldiers, many of whom were originally KMT soldiers, were repatriated to Taiwan rather than China.[23][24][25]
Though viewed as a military liability by the United States, the ROC viewed its remaining islands inFujian as vital for any future campaign to defeat the PRC and retake China. On 3 September 1954, theFirst Taiwan Strait Crisis began when thePLA started shelling Kinmen and threatened to take theDachen Islands.[16] On 19 January 1955, the PLA took nearbyYijiangshan Islands, with the entire ROC garrison of 720 troops killed or wounded in the defense. TheU.S. Congress then passed theFormosa Resolution, authorizing the President to defend the ROC's offshore islands.[16] The First Taiwan Strait Crisis ended in March 1955 when the PLA ceased its bombardment. The crisis was brought to a close during theBandung Conference.[16] At the conference, the PRC articulated itsFive Principles of Peaceful Coexistence with PremierZhou Enlai publicly stating, "[T]he Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States. The Chinese government is willing to sit down to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East, and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area."[26] Two years of negotiations with the U.S. followed, although no agreement was reached on the Taiwan issue.[26]
TheSecond Taiwan Strait Crisis began on 23 August 1958 with air and naval engagements between the PRC and the ROC military forces, leading to intense artillery bombardment of Kinmen (by the PRC) andXiamen (by the ROC), and ended in November of the same year.[16] PLA patrol boats blockaded the islands from ROC supply ships. Though the U.S. rejectedChiang Kai-shek's proposal to bomb Chinese artillery batteries, it quickly moved to supply fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles to the ROC. It also providedamphibious assault ships to land supply, as a sunken ROC naval vessel was blocking the harbor. On 7 September, the U.S. escorted a convoy of ROC supply ships, and the PRC refrained from firing. On 25 October, the PRC announced an "even-day ceasefire"—the PLA would only shell Kinmen on odd-numbered days.
After the 1950s, the "war" became more symbolic than real, represented by on again, off again artillery bombardment towards and from Kinmen. In later years, live shells were replaced with propaganda sheets.[27] The ROC once initiatedProject National Glory, a plan to retake mainland China.[28] The project failed in the 1960s,[29] and the bombardment finally ceased after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States.[27] The PRC and the ROC have never signed any agreement or treaty to officially end the war.[30] There were occasional defectors from both sides.[31][32]
Until the 1970s, the ROC had international recognition from most countries.[33]: 228 The PRC government was recognized bySoviet Bloc countries, members of theNon-Aligned Movement, and someWestern nations, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Both governments claimed to be the legitimate government of China,[34] and each side referred to the other as "bandits".[35][36] Civil war propaganda permeated educational curricula on both sides.[37][38] Additionally, the ROC suppressed expressions of support for Taiwanese identity or Taiwan independence.[39]
The ROC representedChina at the United Nations until 1971, when the PRC replaced the ROC in the UN seat.[33]: 228
After the United States formally recognized the PRC and broke its official relations with the ROC in 1979, the PRC under the leadership ofDeng Xiaoping shifted its strategy from liberating Taiwan to peaceful unification.[40][41] The PRC moderated its rhetoric, referring to the "Taiwan authorities" instead of "Chiang's clique" and "peaceful reunification" instead of "liberating Taiwan."[33]: 228 In the 1 January 1979 "New Year's Day Message to Taiwan Compatriots," theStanding Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) stated that the PRC would "take present realities into account in accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland and respect the status quo on Taiwan and the opinions of people in all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures in settling the question of reunification so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses."[33]: 228
Deng proposed a model for the incorporation of Taiwan into the PRC which involved a high degree of autonomy within the Chinese state, similar to the model proposed toHong Kong which would eventually becomeone country, two systems. Consistent with Deng's one country, two systems approach, NPC Standing Committee ChairYe Jianying elaborated on peaceful unification under per his 30 September 1981 "Nine Points Proposal" in which Taiwan would have a high degree of autonomy following unification.[33]: 228 The Nine Points Proposal also talked of trade, transportation, and postal services as "Three Links" across the strait and "four exchanges" in the areas of culture, academics, economics, and sports.[33]: 228
The ROC government underChiang Ching-kuo maintained aThree Noes policy of no contact, no negotiation and no compromise to deal with the PRC government.[42]: 11 However, Chiang was forced to break from this policy during the May 1986hijacking of a China Airlines cargo plane,[42]: 11 in which the Taiwanese pilot subdued other members of the crew and flew the plane toGuangzhou. In response, Chiang sent delegates to Hong Kong to discuss with PRC officials the return of the plane and crew, which was seen as a turning point in cross-strait relations.[43][44]
In 1987, Chiang became willing to open up cross-strait economic and cultural contacts.[33]: 229 That year, the ROC government began allowing visits to China. This benefited many, especially old KMT soldiers, who had been separated from their families in China for decades.[45][46] This catalyzed a thawing of relations between the two sides, but problems arising from increased contact necessitated a mechanism for regular negotiations. From the end of 1987 to June 1995, the two sides frequently exchanged envoys to develop formal and informal institutions and agencies for cross-strait relations.[33]: 229
In 1988,a guideline was approved by PRC to encourage ROC investments in the PRC.[47][48] It guaranteed that ROC establishments would not be nationalized, exports would be free from tariffs, and ROC businessmen would be granted multiple visas for easy movement.
In 1990, under the presidency ofLee Teng-hui, theNational Unification Council was established in Taiwan.[41] The following year, theGuidelines for National Unification were adopted, and theperiod of mobilization for the suppression of Communist rebellion was terminated. Seeking to negotiate with China on operational issues without affirming the other side's legitimacy, the ROC government created theStraits Exchange Foundation (SEF),[33]: 229 a nominally non-governmental institution directly led by theMainland Affairs Council (MAC), an instrument of theExecutive Yuan in 1991. The PRC established theAssociation for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS),[33]: 229 directly led by theTaiwan Affairs Office of theState Council. This system, described as "white gloves", allowed the two governments to engage with each other on a semi-official basis without compromising their respective sovereignty policies.[49]
On 1 August 1992, the ROC'sNational Unification Council passed the "Definition of One China Resolution," stating: "The two sides of the Taiwan Strait uphold the One China principle, but the interpretations of the two sides are different ... Our side believes that one China should mean the Republic of China, established in 1912 and existing today, and its sovereignty extends throughout China, but its current governing authority is only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu. Admittedly, Taiwan is part of China, but the mainland is also a part of China."[33]: 229
This resolution became the basis for quasi-governmental negotiations between SEF and ARATS from October to November 1992.[33]: 229 Led byKoo Chen-fu andWang Daohan, these talks culminated in the 1993Wang–Koo summit. Both sides agreed to confer ambiguity on questions of sovereignty in order to engage on operational questions affecting both sides.[50] The ambiguity of the1992 Consensus allowed the PRC to emphasize that both sides of the strait upheld the position of one China and allowed the ROC to emphasize that it was the one China to which both the mainland and Taiwan belonged.[33]: 230 This facilitated the improvement of cross-strait relations in the early 1990s.[33]: 230
Nonetheless, the rhetoric of ROC President Lee Teng-hui increasingly leaned towards advocating Taiwan independence.[51] Prior to the 1990s, the ROC had been a one-party authoritarian state committed to eventual unification with China. However, democratic reforms reshaped attitudes of the general public, which in turn began influencing policy in Taiwan. As a result, the ROC government shifted away from its commitment toOne China and towards a separate political identity for Taiwan. In 1993, Taiwan applied to rejoin the United Nations, while China responded by issuing its firstwhite paper on the Taiwan issue, reaffirming its sovereignty over the island.[52]
In January 1995,CCP General SecretaryJiang Zemin announced the PRC's "Eight-Point Proposal" discussing a gradual process of cross-strait rapprochement and negotiation leading to eventual unification.[33]: 231 The Eight-Point Proposal emphasized maintaining the status quo, facilitating economic exchanges and the Three Links, and seeking to deter Taiwan from separating from the mainland.[33]: 231 As long as Taiwan was committed to the One China principle, than the PRC stated that it would consider Taiwan concerns like renouncing the use of force or treating the Taipei government as an equal political entity.[33]: 231
_underway_at_sea_on_10_March_1996.jpeg)
In June 1995, Lee visited the United States and delivered a speech to an invited audience atCornell University.[53] In response to Taiwan's diplomatic moves, the PRC postponed the second Wang–Koo summit indefinitely.[54] The PLA attempted to influence the1996 Taiwanese presidential election by conducting a missile exercise, leading to theThird Taiwan Strait Crisis.[55][56] Following the crisis and the growing influence of a pro-independence element in Taiwan politics, the PRC increased its focus on modernizing its military to deter Taiwan independence and deter U.S.-involvement.[33]: 231
In May 1998, theCentral Committee of the Chinese Communist Party convened a Work Conference on Taiwan Affairs which stated that the whole party and the whole nation should work together for peaceful unification.[42]: 11 The next month, the ARATS and the SEF resumed contact and the second Wang–Koo summit was held inShanghai, China.[57] Jiang also received the Taiwanese representatives inBeijing.
While Wang Daohan's return visit to Taiwan was scheduled, Lee Teng-hui described cross-strait relations as "state-to-state or at least special state-to-state relations" in July 1999.[58] PRC leadership interpreted Lee's statement as a sign that Taiwan would take steps toward independence.[59]: 98 Lee'stwo-states theory postponed Wang's visit indefinitely and the PRC issued a white paper entitled "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue" in February 2000, before the2000 Taiwanese presidential election.[60] In the white paper, the PRC warned against conduct it would view as separatism and stated that the PRC would consider the use of force if Taiwan sought to indefinitely avoid meaningful talks with the PRC.[33]: 231
Chen Shui-bian of the pro-independenceDemocratic Progressive Party (DPP) was electedPresident of the ROC in 2000. Before the KMT handed over power to the DPP, chairman of theMainland Affairs CouncilSu Chi suggested a new term 1992 Consensus as a common point that was acceptable to both sides so that Taiwan and China could keep up cross-strait exchanges.[61] Chen expressed some willingness to accept the 1992 Consensus, but backed down after backlash within his own party.[62] In his inaugural speech, Chen Shui-bian pledged to theFour Noes and One Without, in particular, promising to seek neither independence nor unification as well as rejecting the concept of special state-to-state relations expressed by his predecessor, Lee Teng-hui, as well as establishing theMini-three Links. Furthermore, he pursued a policy of normalizing economic relations with the PRC.[63] The PRC did not engage Chen's administration, but meanwhile in 2001 Chen lifted the 50-year ban on direct trade and investment with the PRC.[64][65] In November 2001, Chen repudiated "One China" and called for talks without preconditions.[66] On 3 August 2002, Chen defined the cross-strait relations asOne Country on Each Side (namely, that China and Taiwan are two different countries). The PRC subsequently cut off official contact with the ROC government.[67]
Hu Jintao becameGeneral Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in late 2002, succeeding Jiang astop leader of the PRC.[33]: 233 Hu urged Taiwan's DPP administration to resume cross-strait dialogue on the basis of the 1992 Consensus.[33]: 233 China continued its military build-up against Taiwan and pursued a vigorous policy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically.[68] After the re-election of Chen Shui-bian in 2004, China issued astatement before Chen's inaugural speech, indicating that preventing Taiwan'sde jure independence was the top priority of Beijing's Taiwan policy.[69] In March 2005, the10th National People's Congress passed theAnti-Secession Law, which authorized military action if Taiwan were to declare formal independence.[70]
Meanwhile, the PRC administration sought to engage with apolitical or politically non-independence-leaning groups in Taiwan. The CCP increased contacts on a party-to-party basis with the KMT,[71]: 138 then the opposition party in Taiwan, due to their support for the 1992 Consensus. The increased contacts culminated in the2005 Pan-Blue visits to China, including a meeting between Hu and then-KMT chairmanLien Chan in April 2005.[72][73] It was the first meeting between the leaders of the two parties since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949.[74][75][76]
In 2008, the KMT won a large majority in thelegislative election and its candidateMa Ying-jeou won the followingTaiwanese presidential election on 22 March.[77] Ma advocated that cross-strait relations should shift from "mutual non-recognition" to "mutual non-denial".[78] He stated that the relations are neither between two Chinas nor two states. It is a special relationship.[79] Cross-strait cooperation increased during Ma's tenure.[80] During Ma's administration, the two sides signed 23 agreements and held elevenhigh-level talks.[81]: 125
Both Hu Jintao and his new counterpart, Ma Ying-jeou, considered the 1992 Consensus to be the basis for negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. On 26 March 2008, Hu Jintao held a telephone talk with the U.S. PresidentGeorge W. Bush, in which he explained that the "1992 Consensus" shows that "both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition".[82][83][84] There followed a series of meetings between the two sides. On 12 April 2008, Hu Jintao held a meeting with ROC's then vice-president electVincent Siew as chairman of theCross-Straits Common Market Foundation during theBoao Forum for Asia.[85] On 28 May 2008, Hu met with the KMT chairmanWu Po-hsiung, the first meeting between the heads of the CCP and the KMT as ruling parties.[86] During this meeting, Hu and Wu agreed that both sides should recommence semi-official dialogue under the 1992 Consensus.[87][88]
Cross-strait high-level talks between theARATS and theSEF reopened in June 2008, with thefirst meeting held in Beijing. On 13 June,Chen Yunlin, President of the ARATS, andChiang Pin-kung, President of the SEF, signed agreements stating that direct charter flights between the two sides would begin,[89] and that Taiwan would allow the entry of up to 3,000 visitors from China daily.[90] AfterChen and Chiang's second meeting, the first direct flights and shipments began on 15 December 2008.[91][92] On 31 December 2008, Hu Jintao made six proposals on cross-strait relations, stating that both sides of the strait should "make pragmatic explorations in their political relations under the special circumstances where the country has not yet been unified."[33]: 334 [93]
The financial relationship between the two areas improved in 2009 when the ROC's financial regulator, theFinancial Supervisory Commission, announced that Chinese investors would be permitted to invest in Taiwan's money markets for the first time since 1949. Investors could apply to purchase Taiwan shares, provided that their holdings did not exceed one-tenth of the value of the firm's total shares.[94] In 2010, theEconomic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) removed tariffs on hundreds of products. While the deal favored Taiwan, Beijing hoped to gain political advantages in its long-standing unification campaign.[95]
As Taiwan's risk factor as a flashpoint has significantly decreased in relation to China,[94] a 2010 report from Taiwan'sMinistry of National Defense stated that China's charm offensive is only accommodating on issues that do not undermine its claim to Taiwan. The report also warned that the PRC would invade if Taiwan declared independence, developed weapons of mass destruction, or suffered from civil chaos.[96] President Ma has repeatedly called for the PRC to dismantle the missile batteries targeting Taiwan's cities.[97][98] Additionally, Ma has urged the PRC to embraceSun Yat-sen's call for freedom and democracy.[99]
In 2012, Ma Ying-jeou won hissecond presidential election, and the KMT maintained its majority inTaiwan's legislature.[100] In the same year,Xi Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao asGeneral Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as thePRC top leader.[101] Xi continued Hu's Taiwan policy, and offered 31 new measures to improve Taiwan's economic integration with the mainland in June 2013.[102] TheCross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) was signed in Shanghai during the ninth cross-strait high-level talks, opening the service sectors on both sides to further exchanges.[103] Xi further expressed his intention regarding Taiwan when he met Taiwan's former vice president, Vincent Siew, at the2013 APEC summit, stating that these issues cannot be passed on from generation to generation.[104]
While Xi met with Siew at the summit,Wang Yu-chi, Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, spoke withZhang Zhijun, Minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office, with each addressing the other by his official title. Both called for the establishment of a regular dialogue mechanism between their two agencies.[105]The two ministers met inNanjing on 11 February 2014, making the first official, high-level, government-to-government contact between the two sides since 1949.[106][107][108] Zhang visited Taiwan from 25 to 28 June 2014, becoming the first ministerial-level PRC official to do so.[109]
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At the same time that official talks between the two sides began, the CSSTA, awaiting review by theLegislative Yuan, faced internal opposition in Taiwan, which ultimately led to the outbreak of theSunflower Student Movement.[110] Citizens occupied the Legislative Yuan for 23 days, protesting against the ruling KMT's attempt to push the CSSTA through.[111] The protesters felt that the trade pact with China would leave Taiwan vulnerable to political pressure from Beijing.[112] In the end, the agreement was not ratified by the legislature.[113] Subsequent talks on other cross-strait trade agreements were suspended.[114] In September 2014, Xi Jinping adopted a more uncompromising stance than his predecessors, calling for the "one country, two systems" model to be applied to Taiwan.[115] It was noted that the model had not been mentioned by the PRC for quite some time.[69] Taiwan's ruling KMT later suffered a historic defeat in the2014 Taiwanese local elections.[116]
With the prospect of Taiwan's DPP taking control of the presidency and legislature in the upcoming2016 elections,[117]Ma and Xi met on 7 November 2015 inSingapore, marking the first meeting between leaders of the two sides since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949.[118][119] They met within their capacity as "Leader of Mainland China" and "Leader of Taiwan" respectively and addressed each other as "mister".[33]: 236 No major agreements were reached on the occasion, however, ahotline connecting the head of the Mainland Affairs Council and the head of the Taiwan Affairs Office was established at the end of 2015.[120][121]
In the2016 Taiwanese general elections,Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP captured landslide victories.[122] Tsai initially pursued a similar strategy as Chen Shui-bian, but after winning the election she received a similarly frosty reception from the PRC.[123][124][125] On 12 March 2016, Xi stated that the 1992 Consensus was "the greatest common denominator and political bottom line for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations".[42]: 13
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In her inauguration speech, President Tsai acknowledged that the talks surrounding the 1992 Consensus took place without agreeing that a consensus was reached. She credited the talks with spurring 20 years of dialogue and exchange between the two sides. She hoped that exchanges would continue on the basis of these historical facts, as well as the existence of the Republic of China's constitutional system and the democratic will of the Taiwanese people.[126] In response, Beijing called Tsai's answer an "incomplete test paper" because Tsai did not agree to the content of the 1992 Consensus.[124] On 25 June 2016, Beijing suspended official cross-strait communications,[127] with any remaining cross-strait exchanges thereafter taking place through unofficial channels.[128]
The Tsai administration blocked former President Ma Ying-jeou from visiting Hong Kong,[129][130][131] but eight non-DPP magistrates and mayors from Taiwan visited Beijing in 2016.[132][133][134] Their visit aimed to reset and restart cross-strait relations after Tsai took office. The eight local leaders reiterated their support forOne China under the 1992 Consensus. In response, Tsai presented the "New Four Noes" in her firstNational Day speech, stating that "our pledges will not change, and our goodwill will not change; but we will not bow to pressure, and we will of course not revert to the old path of confrontation".[135]: 66
In October 2017, Tsai Ing-wen expressed hopes that both sides would restart their cross-strait relations after the19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, and argued that new practices and guidelines governing mutual interaction should be examined.[136][137] However, Xi Jinping emphasized the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan in his opening speech at the 19th National Congress.[138] At the same time, he offered the chance for open talks and "unobstructed exchanges" with Taiwan as long as the government moved to accept the 1992 Consensus.[138][139] Xi stated that people from Taiwan could receive national treatment in pursuing careers on the mainland and in February 2018 the PRC government announced 31 preferential policies for Taiwan people on matters of industry, finance, taxation, land use, employment, education, and health care.[42]: 13 Among other measures, beginning 1 September 2018 Taiwan people who live on the mainland for six months and have stable jobs are eligible to obtain residence permits.[42]: 13–14 By the end of February 2018, 24 provinces and 72 cities had introduced preferential policies for people from Taiwan.[135]: 72
Beginning in the mid-to-late 2010s, Beijing has significantly restricted the number of Chinese tour groups allowed to visit Taiwan in order to place pressure upon President Tsai Ing-wen.[140] During Tsai's first presidential term, seven countries shifted their diplomatic recognition to the PRC.[141] ThePeople's Liberation Army Air Force conducted circumnavigations around Taiwan, strengthening the PLA's conventional strategic deterrence.[135]: 67 [142] China was also accused of conductinghybrid warfare against Taiwan.[143][144] ROC political leaders, including President Tsai and PremierLai Ching-te, as well as international media outlets, have repeatedly accused the PRC of spreadingfake news via social media to create divisions in Taiwanese society andinfluence voters.[145][146][147][148]
In a January 2019 speech commemorating the 40th anniversary of the "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," Xi Jinping called for "peaceful reunification with Taiwan" in accordance with the "One China principle" and the 1992 Consensus.[33]: 240 In Xi's view, the Taiwan issue emerged from China's weakness dating back to the Opium Wars and after World War II, the "two sides of the Taiwan straits fell into a special state of protracted political confrontation due to the civil war in China and the interferences of foreign forces."[33]: 240–241
In response, Tsai emphasized that she has never accepted the 1992 Consensus.[149] Tsai made a shift from not publicly accepting the 1992 Consensus to directly rejecting it, stating that there's no need to talk about the 1992 Consensus anymore, because this term has already been defined by Beijing as "one country, two systems."[150] Tsai, who supported the2019–2020 Hong Kong protests, pledged that as long as she is Taiwan's president, she will never accept the "one country, two systems."[151] In January 2020, re-elected Tsai Ing-wen argued that Taiwan already was an independent country called the "Republic of China (Taiwan)", further arguing that the mainland Chinese authorities had to recognize that situation.[152]
The Taiwanese public turned further against mainland China, due to fallout from the Hong Kong protests and also due to the PRC's continued determination to keep the ROC out of theWorld Health Organization during theCOVID-19 pandemic.[153]The opposition KMT also appeared to distance itself from the Chinese mainland in 2020, stating it would review its unpopular advocacy of closer ties with the PRC. In March 2021, KMT chairmanJohnny Chiang rejected "one country, two systems" as a feasible model for Taiwan, citing Beijing's response to protests in Hong Kong as well as the value that Taiwanese place in political freedoms.[154]
TheHong Kong Economic, Trade and Cultural Office in Taiwan suspended its operation indefinitely in 2021, followed by theMacau Economic and Cultural Office.[155] In October 2021, Tsai stated her "four commitments" in a National Day speech, including that the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China should not be subordinate to each other.[156] The PRC denounced Tsai's speech as "incited confrontation and distorted facts", and added that seeking Taiwanese independence was closing doors to dialogue.[157] Following aban on the importation of pineapples from Taiwan and wax apples in 2021, the Chinese government banned the import ofgrouper fish in June 2022, claiming they had found banned chemicals and excessive levels of other substances.[158][159]
On 2 August 2022, U.S. House SpeakerNancy Pelosivisited Taiwan, which China viewed as a violation of its sovereignty.[160] In response, the PLA conductedunprecedented live-fire drills from 4 to 7 August in six zones around Taiwan, involving live ammunition, air assets, naval forces, and ballistic missiles.[161][162][163] Taiwan deployed ships and aircraft, but no military conflict occurred, though tensions escalated. China ended the exercises on 10 August but stated that regular "patrols" would be launched in the Taiwan Strait.[164][165] China also released its firstwhite paper on Taiwan's status since 2000, once again urging Taiwan to unify under the "one country, two systems" framework, but omitted a previous statement that no troops would be sent to Taiwan after unification. In response, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council called the white paper "wishful thinking and disregarding facts."[166]
Another set of Chinese military exercises around Taiwan called "Joint Sword" began on 8 April 2023, after president Tsai visited U.S. SpeakerKevin McCarthy in California.[167][168] In June 2023,Wang Huning, thechairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, unveiled a plan to transform Fujian province into ademonstration zone for "Taiwan’s economic integration into China".[169] Under the plan, the Chinese government would boost economic and transportation cooperation with Taiwan and make it easier for Taiwanese people to live, buy property, access social services and study in Fujian.[170]
Before the2024 Taiwanese election, China began ending preferential import tariffs under theECFA.[171] AfterLai Ching-te's election, China declared that the DPP could not represent mainstream Taiwanese opinion.[172] Tensions rose following thecapsizing of a Chinese motorboat in Kinmen waters, which resulted in two deaths.[173] Upon taking office, Lai affirmed that Taiwan and China are not subordinate to each other, prompting China to conductmilitary exercises.[174][175] Subsequently, China suspended preferential tariff arrangements on 134 items under the ECFA.[176] In addition, China threatened the death penalty for independence advocates and, in September 2024, sentenced a Taiwanese individual to nine years for "separatism."[177][178]
In 2025, Taiwan charged the captain of a Chinese-crewed cargo ship suspected of deliberately damaging a subsea communications cable near thePenghu Islands, marking the first such prosecution amid concerns over grey zone maritime activities.[179] In response to risingespionage activity, Lai announced his intention to reinstate military trials for active-duty personnel and labeled China a "foreign hostile force" under theAnti-Infiltration Act.[180][181]
In September 2025, four former staffers of Taiwan’s rulingDemocratic Progressive Party (DPP) were convicted of spying for China and sentenced to prison terms ranging from over six to ten years.Huang Chu-jung, a former assistant to a New Taipei city councillor, received the longest sentence for espionage and money laundering and faced additional charges. He had passed information to Chinese intelligence via encrypted apps and directed others to gather intelligence. One of them, Chiu Shih-yuan, former deputy head of the DPP’s Taiwan Institute of Democracy, was sentenced to over six years. The group also included a former aide to PresidentLai Ching-te and a senior staffer to former foreign ministerJoseph Wu. The convictions followed a broader crackdown on Chinese influence under Lai’s administration.[182] In October 2025, the Xiamenpublic security bureau offered monetary rewards for information about 18 members of Taiwan's military for allegedly spreading "separatist" messages.[183] In November 2025, theQuanzhou public security bureau announced bounties on Taiwaneserappers andYouTubers for posting content that was allegedly "inciting secession."[184][185]
In October 2025, Taiwan's National Security Bureau reported a 17% increase in Chinese cyberattacks on government systems, averaging 2.8 million daily incidents. These efforts, reportedly involving AI-generated media and state media amplification, aim to undermine public trust and influence Taiwan’s internal affairs. China has denied involvement and accused Taiwan of conducting its own cyber operations.[186]
Semi-governmental contact is maintained through theStraits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and theAssociation for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). Although formally privately constituted bodies, the SEF and the ARATS are both directly led by the executive governments of each side: the SEF by the Mainland Affairs Council of the ROC's Executive Yuan, and the ARATS by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC's State Council. The heads of the two bodies are both full-time appointees and do not hold other government positions.
Semi-official representative offices between the two sides are the PRC'sCross-Strait Tourism Exchange Association (CSTEA) in Taiwan, and the ROC'sTaiwan Strait Tourism Association (TSTA) in China.[187][188] Both were established in May 2010.[189] However, the duties of these offices are limited only to tourism-related affairs.
The Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party maintained regular dialogue via theKMT–CCP Forum from 2006 to 2016.[190][191] This was called a "second rail" in Taiwan and helped to maintain political understanding between the two parties.[192]
TheShanghai–Taipei City Forum is an annual forum between the cities of Shanghai and Taipei. Launched in 2010 by then-Taipei mayorHau Lung-pin to promote city-to-city exchanges, it led to Shanghai's participation in theTaipei International Flora Exposition end of that year.[193] Both Taipei and Shanghai are the first two cities across the Taiwan Strait that carries out exchanges. The forum proceeded even thoughKo Wen-je was the non-KMT mayor of Taipei from 2014 to 2022.[194][195]
Another mode of contact is through private bodies accredited by the respective governments to negotiate technical and operational aspects of issues between the two sides. Called the "Macau mode", this avenue of contact was maintained even through the years of the Chen Shui-bian administration.[196]
The PRC proposedThree Links to open up postal, transportation and trade links between mainland China and Taiwan. Before 2003, travelers had to make a time-consuming stopover at a third destination, usually Hong Kong or Macau.[197]Cross-strait charter flights duringChinese New Year took off in 2003. However, the charter flights still had to land in Hong Kong. The transportation model was improved in 2005 as the flights had to fly over Hong Kong'sflight information region without landing. It was not until 2008 that direct flights and cargo shipments began.[92] As of 2015, 61 mainland Chinese cities are connected with eight airports in Taiwan. The flights operate every day, totaling 890 round-trip flights across the Taiwan Strait per week.[198]
Taiwan residents cannot use theRepublic of China passport to travel to mainland China, and mainland China residents cannot use thePeople's Republic of China passport to travel to Taiwan, as neither the ROC nor the PRC considers this international travel. The PRC government requires Taiwan residents to hold aMainland Travel Permit for Taiwan Residents when entering mainland China, whereas the ROC government requires mainland Chinese residents to hold theExit and Entry Permit for the Taiwan Area of the Republic of China to enter the Taiwan Area.
China is one of Taiwan's most important target for outwardforeign direct investment (FDI).[199] From 1991 to 2022, more than US$200 billion has been invested in China by Taiwanese companies, comprising over half of Taiwan's outward FDI annually before 2016.[200][201] Much of Taiwanese-owned manufacturing, particularly in the electronics sector and the apparel sector, takes place in the PRC, with major companies likeTSMC,Foxconn, andUMC establishing subsidiaries there.[202]: 11 [135]: 74 The investments helped the Taiwanese economy but also propelled China's economic rise.[203]
China is also Taiwan's largest trading partner, accounting for over 20 percent of total trade.[204] China and Hong Kong together account for over 30 percent of Taiwan's exports. In 2022, Taiwan's trade surplus with mainland China and Hong Kong amounted to $100.4 billion.[205] Electronic components, including semiconductor chips, lead in Taiwan's total exports to China.[206]
Neither China nor Taiwan is comfortable with mutual economic dependence, and each government has been driven to seek alternatives.[207] China issued a "Made in China 2025" plan in 2015 to promote manufacturing.[208] On the other hand, Taiwan has tried to reduce its economic reliance on mainland China through its "New Southbound Policy" since 2016. In 2022, Taiwan's total investments in the countries targeted by the policy outstripped investments in China for the first time.[209] The number of Taiwanese working in China, including Hong Kong and Macau, also fell from over 400,000 before theCOVID-19 pandemic to 217,000 in 2023.[210][211] The proportion of Taiwanese overseas workers in China has dropped from a peak of 62% in 2011 to 35% in 2023.
Since the governments on both sides of the strait do not recognize the other side's legitimacy, there is a lack of legal protection for cross-strait economic exchanges. TheEconomic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) was viewed as providing legal protection for investments.[212] In 2014, theSunflower Student Movement effectively halted theCross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA).
TheNational Palace Museum in Taipei and thePalace Museum in Beijing have collaborated on exhibitions.[213] Scholars and academics frequently visit institutions across the Taiwan Strait.[214] Books published on each side are regularly re-published in the other side. However, restrictions on direct imports,different writing systems, andcensorship somewhat impede the exchange of books and ideas.[215][216] Some cultural exchanges are even accused of being associated with China'sunited front work.[217][218]
Taiwanese students can apply to universities in the mainland China without taking China's nationwide unified examination, calledGaokao.[219] There are regular programs for school students from each side to visit the other.[220][221] In 2019, there were 30,000 mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students studying in Taiwan.[222] There were also more than 7,000 Taiwanese students studying in Hong Kong that same year.[223]
Religious exchange has become frequent. Frequent interactions occur between worshipers ofMatsu, and also betweenBuddhists.[224][225] Taiwan Buddhist organizationTzu Chi is the first overseas non-governmental organization allowed to operate in China.[226]
Both sides have provided humanitarian aid to one another on several occasions. Following the2008 Sichuan earthquake, an expert search and rescue team was sent from Taiwan to help rescue survivors inSichuan. Shipments of aid materials were also provided under the coordination of theRed Cross Society of the Republic of China and charities such asTzu Chi.[227] One year later, China donatedprefabricated homes to Taiwan for use by the victims ofTyphoon Morakot in 2009.[228]
Political disputes sometimes arose during humanitarian relief efforts. Taiwan declined China's offer of rescue teams and emergency supplies, accusing China of attempting to gain political advantage from the1999 Jiji earthquake.[229] On another occasion, China accused Taiwan of using theCOVID-19 pandemic as a means to pursue independence.[230]
 | It has been suggested that this section besplit out into another article titledChinese invasion of Taiwan. (Discuss)(May 2025) |
The People's Republic of China's persistent opposition to Taiwan'sde facto autonomy has edged many times on the possibility andthreat of amilitary invasion of the latter territories with the aim of achieving its vision ofChinese unification. Such a threat has become increasingly tangible in the course of the 2020s, driven by the expressed willingness of mainland political leadership to pursue a military intervention, its parallel build-up of forces and recurrent exercises around Taiwan; as a consequence, Taiwan has also pursued forms of military preparation and international political alignment to discourage and possibly resist such intervention.[231][232]
Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te has emphasized the need for stronger measures to counter China's increased efforts to infiltrate and weaken Taiwan's defenses, particularly through espionage and psychological warfare. In response, Taiwan has proposed stricter laws, including reinstating military trials for espionage and restricting access to Taiwanese identification for Chinese nationals. China's frequent military exercises near Taiwan's airspace and waters, including recent incursions and information leaks by retired Taiwanese military personnel, have heightened concerns. Taiwan has bolstered its defense with new weapons and extended mandatory military service to one year. China continues to assert territorial claims over Taiwan, and in 2025, the island marked the 20th anniversary of China's Anti-Secession Act, which outlines conditions under which China might use force to reclaim Taiwan.[233][234]
US officials have warned that China’s military could be prepared for potential military action against Taiwan by 2027. Beijing’s large-scale exercises, including a simulated siege of the island, are viewed as indicators of this readiness.[235]
Speculation about the odds of war between China and Taiwan is rife. The Deputy Director-General of Taiwan'sNational Security Bureau, Chen Wen-fan, stated in 2020 that Xi Jinping intends to solve the "Taiwan Problem" by 2049.[236] In 2022, U.S. Pacific Command described the situation of cross-strait relations as being dire, as China was amassing the largest build-up of military personnel and assets seen since World War II.[237]Admiral Mike Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations of the U.S. Navy, warned that the American military must be prepared for the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before 2024.[238] A poll conducted by theCenter for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) summarized that China is determined to unify with Taiwan and the potential for a military crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait is very real.[239] The poll also showed that China is willing to wait to unify with Taiwan peacefully, but would immediately invade if Taiwan declared independence.
ThePeople's Liberation Army's current capacity of carrying out and winning such a war is a matter of debate, ranging mostly on the analysis whether it has the power to take the self-governing island despite the heavy costs foreseen. The perceived failure of the Russian army in rapidly occupyingUkraine, turning into a protracted conflict with destabilizing repercussions insideRussia itself, is believed to weigh on PRC decision making.[240][241][242]
The consolidation of Chinese hegemony in theIndo-Pacific and the immediate economic repercussions of the disruption to commodities logistics and electronic technology production are its main concerns in relation to Taiwan's security.[243]
The United States of America officially follows the "One-China policy", encouraging China and Taiwan to resolve their differences through dialogue, while also supporting Taiwan's efforts to enhance its self-defense under theTaiwan Relations Act.[244] The U.S. has conducted military exchanges with Taiwan,[245][246] and U.S. military vessels have occasionally transited the Taiwan Strait.[247] Chinese leaderXi Jinping requested that U.S. PresidentBiden change the U.S. position to explicitly oppose Taiwan's independence, but the U.S. maintained that it "does not support" Taiwan independence.[248] After PresidentTrump returned to the White House in 2025, theU.S. State Department removed the phrase "we do not support Taiwan independence" from the fact sheet on its website.[249]
Aside from the United States, Australia,[250] Canada,[251] France,[252] Germany,[253] Japan,[254] New Zealand,[255] and the United Kingdom[256] all had naval vessels transit the Taiwan Strait in the 2020s. Some analysts see India as an approximation to the United States as a visible positioning as well as a growing liability, amounting to the possibility of the country being dragged into the war.[243]
In response to Chinese military threats and recent drills near its coast in February 2025, Taiwan's defense ministry warned that history, includingWorld War II, showed that aggression leads to failure. Marking 80 years since the war's end, Taiwan compared China's actions to past invaders, accusingBeijing of destabilizing the region. Taiwan, once aJapanese colony, has a complex wartime history, with some Taiwanese fighting for Japan. Meanwhile,Xi Jinping plans to attendRussia's World War Two commemorations.[257]
A 2019 phone survey conducted in nine major cities found that 53.1% of respondents supported using military force for unification with Taiwan while 39.1% stated that they would oppose military force under any circumstance.[258]: 37 A survey conducted between 2020 and 2021 showed that 55 percent of the respondents accepted launching a war to unify with Taiwan entirely while 33 percent of them opposed.[259] 22 percent of the respondents accepted the two sides of the Taiwan Strait keeping separate political systems, with unification not necessarily being the end game.[259]
Another survey conducted in 2022 showed Chinese respondents were split between those favoring tough policies on Taiwan and those favoring friendly ones.[260]
A September 2024 poll by theCarter Center andEmory University found that 55 percent of mainland Chinese respondents agreed with the statement that "the Taiwan problem should not be resolved using force under any circumstances".[261]
According to a 2025 poll by theChicago Council on Global Affairs and the Carter Center, 91% of Chinese people consider "our Taiwan compatriots" to be a friend of China, while 9% do not. The poll also found that 44% of Chinese people consider the "current government of Taiwan, China" to be a friend of China, while 55% do not.[262]
YoungjingoisticChinese nationalists on the internet, also calledLittle Pink, occasionallybypassed theGreat Firewall to flood websites with messages andstickers in protest against Taiwan independence.[263][264][265]
An annual poll conducted by the Election Study Center ofNational Chengchi University (NCCU) showed that the Taiwanese public preferred maintaining some form of the status quo, rather than choosing immediate Taiwan independence or unification with China.[267][268] A regular survey released by theMainland Affairs Council (MAC) yielded similar results.[269] Another regular survey conducted by theTaiwanese Public Opinion Foundation [zh] (TPOF) indicated that the public preferred independence over unification.[270]
On people's national identity of being either "Taiwanese" or "Chinese," a majority of respondents identify as Taiwanese in either poll of the NCCU[266] or the TPOF.[271] MAC polls have consistently shown support for the future of Taiwan to be decided by the people in Taiwan.[272][273][274]
In 2020, an annual poll conducted byAcademia Sinica showed 73 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that "the Chinese government is a friend of Taiwan's," an increase of 15 percent from the previous year.[275][276] In 2024, an annual survey by Academia Sinica found that 80.6 percent of Taiwan residents believe Taiwan and China do not belong to the same country.[277][278]
According to a US account of the talks, Mr Hu said: It is China's consistent stand that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan should restore consultation and talks on the basis of 'the 1992 consensus', which sees both sides recognise there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition.
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