In thephilosophy of religion, acosmological argument is an argument for the existence ofGod based uponobservational andfactual statements concerning theuniverse (or some general category of itsnatural contents) typically in the context ofcausation, change, contingency or finitude.[1][2][3] In referring toreason and observation alone for itspremises, and precludingrevelation, this category of argument falls within the domain ofnatural theology. A cosmological argument can also sometimes be referred to as anargument from universal causation, anargument from first cause, thecausal argument or theprime mover argument.
The concept of causation is a principal underpinning idea in all cosmological arguments, particularly in affirming the necessity for aFirst Cause. The latter is typically determined inphilosophical analysis to beGod, as identified withinclassical conceptions of theism.
The origins of the argument date back to at leastAristotle, developed subsequently within the scholarly traditions ofNeoplatonism andearly Christianity, and later under medievalIslamicscholasticism through the 9th to 12th centuries. It would eventually be re-introduced to Christian theology in the 13th century byThomas Aquinas. In the 18th century, it would become associated with theprinciple of sufficient reason formulated byGottfried Leibniz andSamuel Clarke, itself an exposition of theParmenidean causal principle that "nothing comes from nothing".
Contemporary defenders of cosmological arguments includeWilliam Lane Craig,[4]Robert Koons,[5]John Lennox,Stephen Meyer, andAlexander Pruss.[6]
Plato (c. 427–347 BC) andAristotle (c. 384–322 BC) both posited first cause arguments, though each had certain notable caveats.[7] InThe Laws (Book X), Plato posited that all movement in the world and theCosmos was "imparted motion". This required a "self-originated motion" to set it in motion and to maintain it. InTimaeus, Plato posited a "demiurge" of supreme wisdom and intelligence as the creator of the Cosmos.
Aristotle arguedagainst the idea of a first cause, often confused with the idea of a "prime mover" or "unmoved mover" (πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον orprimus motor), in hisPhysics andMetaphysics.[8] Aristotle argued infavor of the idea of several unmoved movers, one powering eachcelestial sphere, which he believed lived beyond the sphere of the fixed stars, and explained why motion in the universe (which he believed was eternal) had continued for an infinite period of time. Aristotle argued that theatomists' assertion of a non-eternal universe would require an uncausedfirst cause—in his terminology, anefficient first cause—an idea he considered a nonsensical flaw in the atomists' reasoning.
Like Plato, Aristotle believed in an eternalcosmos with no beginning and no end (which in turn followsParmenides' famous statement that "nothing comes from nothing"). In what he called "first philosophy" or metaphysics, Aristotledid intend a theological correspondence between the prime mover and a deity; functionally, however, he provided an explanation for the apparent motion of the "fixed stars" (now understood as the daily rotation of the Earth). According to his theses, immaterial unmoved movers are eternal unchangeable beings that constantly think about thinking, but being immaterial, they are incapable of interacting with the cosmos and have no knowledge of what transpires therein. From an "aspiration or desire",[9] thecelestial spheres,imitate that purely intellectual activity as best they can, byuniform circular motion. The unmoved moversinspiring theplanetary spheres are no different in kind from the prime mover, they merely suffer a dependency of relation to the prime mover. Correspondingly, the motions of the planets are subordinate to the motion inspired by the prime mover in the sphere of fixed stars. Aristotle's natural theology admitted no creation or capriciousness from the immortalpantheon, but maintained a defense against dangerous charges of impiety.[10]
Plotinus, a third-centuryPlatonist, taught thatthe One transcendent absolute caused the universe to exist simply as a consequence of its existence (creatio ex deo).[11] His discipleProclus stated, "The One is God".[12] In the 6th century,Syriac Christianneo-PlatonistJohn Philoponus (c. 490 – c. 570) examined the contradiction between Greek pagan adherences to the concept of apast-eternal world and Aristotelian rejection of the existence ofactual infinities. Thereupon, he formulated arguments in defense oftemporal finitism, which underpinned his arguments for the existence of God. Philosopher Steven M. Duncan notes that Philoponus's ideas eventually received their fullest articulation "at the hands of Muslim and Jewish exponents ofkalam", or medieval Islamicscholasticism.[13]
In the 11th century, Islamic philosopherAvicenna (c. 980 – 1037) inquired into the question ofbeing, in which he distinguished betweenessence (māhiyya) andexistence (wuǧūd).[14] He argued that the fact of existence could not be inferred from or accounted for by the essence of existing things, and thatform and matter by themselves could not originate and interact with the movement of the universe or the progressive actualization of existing things. Thus, he reasoned that existence must be due to anagent cause that necessitates, imparts, gives, or adds existence to an essence. To do so, the cause must coexist with its effect and be an existing thing.[15]
Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225 – 1274) adapted and enhanced the argument he found in his reading of Aristotle, Avicenna (theProof of the Truthful) andMaimonides to formulate one of the most influential versions of the cosmological argument.[16][17] His conception of the first cause was the idea that the universe must be caused by something that is itself uncaused, which he claimed is 'that which we call God':[16]
The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
Importantly,Aquinas's Five Ways, given the second question of hisSumma Theologica, are not the entirety of Aquinas's demonstration that the Christian God exists. The Five Ways form only the beginning of Aquinas's Treatise on the Divine Nature.
Aregress is a series of related elements, arranged in some type of sequence of succession, examined in backwards succession (regression) from a fixed point of reference. Depending on the type of regress, this retrograde examination may take the form ofrecursive analysis, in which the elements in a series are studied as products of prior, often simpler, elements. If there is no 'last member' in a regress (i.e. no 'first member' in the series) it becomes aninfinite regress, continuing in perpetuity.[18] In the context of the cosmological argument the term 'regress' usually refers tocausal regress, in which the series is a chain ofcause and effect, with each element in the series arising from causal activity of the prior member.[19] Some variants of the argument may also refer totemporal regress, wherein the elements are past events (discrete units of time) arranged in atemporal sequence.[4]
Aninfinite regress argument attempts to establish the falsity of a proposition by showing that itentails an infinite regress that isvicious.[18][20] The cosmological argument is a type ofpositive infinite regress argument given that it defends a proposition (in this case, the existence of afirst cause) by arguing that its negation would lead to a vicious regress.[21] An infinite regress may be vicious due to various reasons:[22][1]
Aquinas refers to the distinction found in Aristotle'sPhysics (8.5) that a series of causes may either beaccidental or essential,[25][26] though the designation of this terminology would follow later underJohn Duns Scotus at the turn of the 14th century.[27]
In an accidentally ordered series of causes, earlier members need not continue exerting causal activity (having done so to propagate the chain) for the series to continue. For example, in a generational line, ancestors need no longer exist for their offspring to continue the sequence of descent. In an essential series, prior members must maintain causal interrelationship for the series to continue: If a hand grips a stick that moves a rock along the ground, the rock would stop motion once the hand or stick ceases to exist.[28]
Based upon this distinctionFrederick Copleston (1907–1994) characterises two types of causation: Causesin fieri, which cause an effect'sbecoming, or coming into existence, and causesin esse, which causally sustain an effect, inbeing, once it exists.[29]
Two specific properties of an essentially ordered series have significance in the context of the cosmological argument:[28]
Thomistic philosopher, R. P. Phillips comments on the characteristics of essential ordering:[30]
In thescholastic era,Aquinas formulated the "argument fromcontingency", followingAristotle, in claiming thatthere must be something to explain the existence of the universe. Since the universe could, under different circumstances, conceivablynot exist (i.e. it is contingent) its existence must have a cause. This cause cannot be embodied in another contingent thing, but something that exists bynecessity (i.e. thatmust exist in order for anything else to exist).[16] It is a form of argument fromuniversal causation, therefore compatible with the conception of a universe that has no beginning in time. In other words, according to Aquinas, even if the universe has always existed, it still owes its continuing existence to anuncaused cause,[31] he states: "... and this we understand to be God."[16]
Aquinas's argument from contingency is formulated as theThird Way (Q2, A3) in theSumma Theologica. It may be expressed as follows:[16]
He concludes thereupon that contingent beings are an insufficient explanation for the existence of other contingent beings. Furthermore, that there must exist anecessary being, whose non-existence is impossible, to explain the origination of all contingent beings.
In 1714, German philosopherGottfried Leibniz presented a variation of the cosmological argument based upon theprinciple of sufficient reason. He writes: "There can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most cases." Stating his argument succinctly:[32]
Alexander Pruss formulates the argument as follows:[33]
Premise 1 expresses theprinciple of sufficient reason. In premise 2, Leibniz proposes the existence of alogical conjunction of all contingent facts, referred to in later literature as theBig Conjunctive Contingent Fact (BCCF), representing the sum total of contingent reality.[34] Premise 3 applies the principle of sufficient reason to the BCCF, given that it too, as a contingency, has a sufficient explanation. It follows, in statement 4, that the explanation of the BCCF must be necessary, not contingent, given that the BCCF incorporates all contingent facts. Statement 5 proposes that the necessary being explaining the totality of contingent facts is God.
Philosophers Joshua Rasmussen and T. Ryan Byerly have argued in defence of the inference from statement 4 to statement 5.[35][36]
At the turn of the 14th century, medieval Christian theologianJohn Duns Scotus (1265/66–1308) formulated ametaphysical argument for the existence of God inspired by Aquinas'sargument of the unmoved mover.[37] Like other philosophers and theologians, Scotus believed that his statement for God's existence could be considered distinct to that of Aquinas. The form of the argument can be summarised as follows:[27]
Scotus affirms, in premise 5, that anaccidentally ordered series of causes is impossible without higher-order laws and processes that govern the basic principles of accidental causation, which he characterises as essentially ordered causes.[38]
Premise 6 continues, in accordance with Aquinas's discourses on theSecond Way andThird Way, that an essentially ordered series of causes cannot be an infinite regress.[39] On this, Scotus posits that, if it is merely possible that a first agent exists, then it isnecessarily true that a first agent exists, given that the non-existence of a first agent entails the impossibility of its own existence (by virtue of being a first cause in the chain).[27] He argues further that it isnot impossible for a being to exist that is causeless by virtue ofontological perfection.[40]
With the formulation of this argument, Scotus establishes the first component of his 'triple primacy': The characterisation of a being that is first inefficient causality,final causality and pre-eminence, or maximal excellence, which he ascribes to God.[27]
The Kalam cosmological argument's central thesis is the impossibility of an infinitetemporal regress of events (or past-infinite universe). Though a modern formulation that defends thefinitude of the past through philosophical and scientific arguments, many of the argument's ideas originate in the writings of early Christian theologianJohn Philoponus (490–570 AD),[41] developed within the proceedings of medievalIslamicscholasticism through the 9th to 12th centuries, eventually returning toChristian theological scholarship in the 13th century.[42]
These ideas were revitalised for modern discourse by philosopher and theologianWilliam Lane Craig through publications such asThe Kalām Cosmological Argument (1979) and theBlackwell Companion to Natural Theology (2009). The form of the argument popularised by Craig is expressed in two parts, as an initialdeductivesyllogism followed by further philosophical analysis.[4]
Craig argues that the cause of the universenecessarily embodies specific properties in creating the universeex nihilo and in effecting creation from a timeless state (implyingfree agency). Based upon this analysis, he appends a further premise and conclusion:[43]
For scientific evidence of the finitude of the past, Craig refers to theBorde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem, which posits a past boundary tocosmic inflation, and the general consensus on the standard model of cosmology, which refers to the origin of the universe in theBig Bang.[44][45]
For philosophical evidence, he citesHilbert's paradox of the grand hotel and theparadox of Tristram Shandy to prove (respectively) the impossibility of actual infinites existing in reality and of forming an actual infinite by successive addition. He concludes that past events, in comprising a series of events that are instantiated in reality and formed by successive addition, cannot extend to an infinite past.[46]
Craig remarks upon thetheological implications that follow from the conclusion of the argument:[47]
Objections to the cosmological argument may question why a first cause is unique in that it does not require any causes. Critics contend that the concept of a first cause qualifies asspecial pleading, or that arguing for the first cause's exemption raises the question of why there should be a first cause at all.[48] Defenders maintain that this question is addressed by various formulations of the cosmological argument, emphasizing that none of its major iterations rests on the premise that everything requires a cause.[49]
Andrew Loke refers to theKalam cosmological argument, in which the causal premise ("whatever begins to exist has a cause") stipulates that only things whichbegin to exist require a cause.[50]William Lane Craig asserts that—even if one posits a plurality of causes for the existence of the universe—a first uncaused cause is necessary, otherwise an infinite regress of causes would arise, which he argues is impossible.[4][1] Similarly,Edward Feser proposes, in accordance with Aquinas's discourses on theSecond Way, that an essentially ordered series of causes cannot regress to infinity, even if it may be theoretically possible for accidentally ordered causes to do so.[51]
Various arguments have been presented to demonstrate the metaphysical impossibility of an actually infinite regress occurring in thereal world, referring tothought experiments such asHilbert's Hotel, thetale of Tristram Shandy, and variations.[52][53]
Craig maintains that thecausal principle is predicated in themetaphysicalintuition thatnothing comes from nothing. If such intuitions are false, he argues it would be inexplicable why anything and everything does not randomly come into existence without a cause.[4] Yet, not all philosophers subscribe to the view of causality asa priori injustification.David Hume contends that the principle is rooted inexperience, therefore within the category ofa posteriori knowledge and subject to theproblem of induction.[54]
WhereasJ. L. Mackie argues that cause and effect cannot be extrapolated to the origins of the universe based upon our inductive experiences and intellectual preferences,[55] Craig proposes that causal laws are unrestricted metaphysical truths that are "not contingent upon the properties, causal powers, and dispositions of the natural kinds of substances which happen to exist".[56]
Secular philosophers such asMichael Martin argue that a cosmological argument may establish the existence of a first cause, but falls short of identifying that cause aspersonal, or as God as defined withinclassical or other specific conceptions oftheism.[57][1]
Defenders of the argument note that most formulations, such as by Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Craig, employ conceptual analysis to establish the identity of the cause. In Aquinas'sSumma Theologica, thePrima Pars (First Part) is devoted predominantly to establishing the attributes of the cause, such as uniqueness, perfection and intelligence.[58] In Scotus'sOrdinatio, his metaphysical argument is the first component of the 'triple primacy' through which he characterises the first cause as a being with the attributes of maximal excellence.[27]
In the topic ofcosmic origins and the standard model ofcosmology, theinitial singularity of theBig Bang is postulated to be the point at whichspace andtime, as well as allmatter andenergy, came into existence.[59]J. Richard Gott andJames E. Gunn assert that the question of "What was there before the Universe?" makes no sense and that the concept ofbefore becomes meaningless when considering a timeless state. They add that questioning what occurred before the Big Bang is akin to questioning what is north of theNorth Pole.[59]
Craig refers toKant's postulate that a cause can be simultaneous with its effect, denoting that this is true of the moment of creation when time itself came into being.[60] He affirms that the history of 20th century cosmology belies the proposition that researchers have no strong intuition to pursue a causal explanation of the origin of time and the universe.[56] Accordingly, physicists have sought to examine the causal origins of the Big Bang by conjecturing such scenarios as the collision ofmembranes.[61] Feser also notes that versions of the cosmological argument presented by classical philosophers do not require a commitment to the Big Bang, or even to a cosmic origin.[62]
William L. Rowe characterises the Hume-Edwards principle, referring to arguments presented byDavid Hume, and laterPaul Edwards, in their criticisms of the cosmological argument:[63]
"If the existence of every member of a set is explained, the existence of that set is thereby explained."
The principle stipulates that a causal series—even one that regresses to infinity—requires no explanatory causes beyond those that are members within that series. If every member of a series has a causal explanation within the sequence, the series in itself is explanatorily complete.[63] Thus, it rejects arguments, such as by Duns Scotus, for the existence of higher-order, efficient causes that govern the basic principles of material causation.[27] Notably, it contradicts Hume's ownDialogues Concerning Natural Religion, in which the character Demea reflects that, even if a succession of causes is infinite, the very existence of the chain still requires a cause.[64][65]
Some objections to the cosmological argument refer to the possibility of loops in the structure ofcause and effect that would avoid the need for a first cause. Gott and Li refer to the curvature ofspacetime andclosed timelike curves as possible mechanisms by which the universe may bring about its own existence.[66]Richard Hanley contends that causal loops are neither logically nor physically impossible, remarking: "[In timed systems] the only possibly objectionable feature that all causal loops share is that coincidence is required to explain them."[67]
Andrew Loke argues that there is insufficient evidence to postulate a causal loop of the type that would avoid a first cause. He proposes that such a mechanism would suffer from the problem ofvicious circularity, rendering itmetaphysically impossible.[68]
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