| Convoy HG 76 | |||||||
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 Map of the Bay of Biscay and the South-western Approaches | |||||||
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.svg) Germany |  United Kingdom | ||||||
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| Karl Dönitz |
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Convoy HG 76 (19 to 23 December 1941) was anAlliedconvoy of theHG (Homeward fromGibraltar) series, during theSecond World War. It was notable for the destruction of five GermanU-boats, although the true total was not known to the British until after the war.
TwoCondor long-range reconnaissance aircraft were shot down by BritishMartlet fighters from the escort carrierHMS Audacity, which was sunk later on the voyage, along with a destroyer and two merchant ships. Despite the loss ofAudacity, it was regarded as the first big convoy victory for the Allies in theBattle of the Atlantic.
The attack on Convoy HG 76 was the last in a series of U-boat pack attacks on Gibraltar convoys which had started in the summer of 1941. Before this theU-boat Arm (U-bootwaffe) had only enough boats operational to form one patrol line at a time and their focus was on the North Atlantic convoy route. Gibraltar convoys had suffered only occasional adventitious attacks by individual U-boats that had met them while crossing their route.[1] By the summer 1941 U-boat Command (BdU) had sufficient boats to form several patrol lines but this coincided with Hitler ordering U-boats into the Mediterranean to support Axis forces operating in North Africa and attack the Gibraltar traffic. This phase of the campaign had commenced with a pack attack onConvoy OG 69.[2]
For the Allies the introduction of specialist escort groups had created the conditions for better of convoy protection tactics, giving a measure of success in countering the wolf pack threat. It was recognised that air cover was needed to counter shadowing aircraft, to seek out approaching U-boats and for reinforcement of convoys under attack. Sufficient escorts were needed to hunt U-boats to destruction rather than driving them off, as so often happened.[3] The first requirement was met with the commissioning ofAudacity, the first merchant aircraft carrier, the second by reinforcing the escorts and by the formation of an anti-submarine Hunting Group at Gibraltar, which would sweep ahead of a homeward bound convoy, to attack and destroy patrolling U-boats. The new measures had been introduced by the time Convoy HG 76 sailed.[4]
Audacity participated in the escort ofConvoy OG 76 of twenty merchant ships, which sailed from Liverpool for Gibraltar on 31 October. The escort carrier embarked802 Naval Air Squadron (802 NAS),Fleet Air Arm (FAA) with eightMartlets and ten pilots.[5] The fighters were usually split into standing patrols of two aircraft, which flew over the convoy for about two hours, searching for U-boats and Condors, the danger mainly coming from deck landings.[5] The weather was atrocious and at times pitched the flight deck 65 ft (20 m) and rolled it through16° as spray swept over the deck. Two Martlets took off on patrol and one managed a safe landing but the other touched down when the stern was rising and was thrown overboard, the pilot being rescued just before the Martlet sank.[6]
On 8 November,Kampfgeschwader 40 (KG 40) sent sixCondor reconnaissance bombers to locateConvoy SL 91, bound for Liverpool fromFreetown,Sierra Leone. Near noon, the radar onAudacity detected two Condors and a Martlet patrol was sent to intercept. One Condor escaped into a cloud but two Martlets caught the second, which shot down one Martlet before being shot down by the other Martlet. About three hours later, another Condor was shot down by a Martlet making a head-on attack and a fourth Condor escaped. KG 40 had lost a third of its operational aircraft and failed to direct any U-boats onto either convoy, Convoy OG 76 making a safe arrival at Gibraltar late on 11 November. The presence ofAudacity was now known to KG 40 and to BdU.[6]
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Convoy HG 76 comprised 32 ships homeward bound fromGibraltar, some in ballast and some carrying cargo. TheConvoy Commodore was Vice-Admiral R. Fitzmaurice in the steamshipSpero. The convoy had a large escort force, consisting of the36th Escort Group (CommanderFrederick "Johnnie" Walker), usually composed of twoBittern-class sloops (HMS Stork andDeptford) and sevencorvettes (HMS Convolvulus,Gardenia,Marigold,Pentstemon,Rhodedendron,Samphire andVetch).[7] Walker, an experienced escort commander, had taken command of Escort Group 36 in October and brought the it down to Gibraltar in November with Convoy OG 76. He had exercised the group there in anti-submarine patrols that had resulted in the destruction ofU-433 byMarigold.[8] The close escort was augmented by a support group comprising the newescort carrierHMS Audacity and her escortingdestroyers,Blankney,Stanley andExmoor, plus the sloopsFowey,Black Swan and the corvettesHMS Carnation andLa Malouine, also at Gibraltar, 17 ships in all.[9] A U-boat hunter group of Force H destroyers from Gibraltar, comprisingHMS Croome,Gurkha,Foxhound andNestor sailed independently.[10]
Since August 1940, Dönitz had ended the practice of U-boats freelancing and sending only one report per day. U-boat commanders were ordered to signal whenever they found a convoy and shadow it rather than attack. The commander was to send short homing signals every thirty minutes, to guide other U-boats to the convoy. When the pack had assembled, Dönitz gave the order to attack, usually at night, so that the U-boats could fire their torpedoes on the surface. For the tactic to work, U-boats had to signal their positions to Dönitz at Kerneval (across the river from the submarine base atLorient inBrittany).[11][a] Closer to land, when Condors on tracking patrol (Fühlungshalter) sighted a convoy, the wireless operator reported its position and course to the BdU and relays of Condors remained over the convoy.[13] When the pack had rendezvoused near the convoy, surface attacks would be made on successive nights, the U-boats withdrawing during the day.[14]
In mid December, BdU was informed that a convoy was assembling at Gibraltar. German agents inAlgeciras, in neutral Spain, could see the harbour without hindrance from the Spanish authorities. BdU began to assemble a patrol line, code-namedSeeräuber (Pirate), preparatory to launching a pack attack.Seeräuber was anad hoc group, as the previousGruppe Steuben, had disbanded following a fruitless pursuit of southbound Convoy OS 12.Gruppe Seeräuber comprised seven U-boats;U-67 was already in position after a failed attack onConvoy OG 77;U-434 andU-574 fromGruppe Steuben had refuelled from a clandestine depot ship inVigo harbour,U-127 andU-131 had arrived from Germany andU-107 andU-108 from bases in France. Five of the seven wereType IX boats, which Dönitz considered unsuitable for pack attacks and five of the seven crews were inexperienced, being on their first patrols.[15] The pack had orders to sinkAudacity at all costs and was reinforced later by three more boats;U-108 sank a Portuguese freighter sailing independently on 14 December.[16]
Convoy HG 76 sailed from Gibraltar on 14 December 1941, in company with a small convoy bound for Cape Town. Agents across the bay, reported the composition, escort strength and departure time of the convoy. BdU was confused by an agent report that the convoy had returned to port. The first sightings of Convoy HG 76 were made byU-74 andU-77, bothen route to the Mediterranean and about to pass the Straits.[17]U-77 sank one ship from the Cape Town convoy, butU-74 was unable to attack Convoy HG 76;Swordfish aircraft ofRAF Gibraltar Command were escorting the convoy and on three occasions during the night of14/15 December, drove off the U-boats.[18] TheSeerauber boats formed a patrol line south ofCape St Vincent but Convoy HG 76 passed through the line without detection. At8:15 a.m.Hudson andCatalina aircraft took over from the Swordfish and for the next two days co-operated with the 802 NAS Martlets onAudacity, forcing U-boats to submerge.[19]U-127 was detected on a routineanti-submarine sweep by aShort Sunderland from Gibraltar late in the day; next morning it was detected onAsdic byNestor and sunk at11:00 a.m.[3]
At noon on 16 December, Convoy HG 76 was sighted and its position reported by a Focke-Wulf Condor of I/KG 40 patrolling fromBordeaux, which guidedU-108 to the convoy to begin reporting its position to other U-boats. During the night of16/17 December, the wolf pack closed in andU-574 was ordered to the area; by morning on 17 December, the convoy had passed beyond the range of Gibraltar-based aircraft and four U-boats made contact,U-67 andU-108 being forced away from the convoy. Just after9:00 a.m. a Martlet fromAudacity sighted a surfaced U-boat about 20 nmi (37 km; 23 mi) from the convoy and circled over the area for the escort ships to gain a good radar fix; a corvette made an Asdic attack to no apparent effect. At12:47 p.m. on 17 December,Stanley sightedU-131 on the surface and Walker ordered a Martlet to attack whileStork, withPentstemon and the three destroyers, made their best speed to the location.[9]
The Martlet pilot dived towards the U-boat and both opened fire at the same time, the Martlet being shot down and the pilot killed. The British ships opened fire at extreme range, thenU-131 was driven to the surface and sunk.[20][b] Observers saw the crew ofU-131 abandon the vessel before it sank at1:30 p.m. and took on survivors who said that they had been shadowing the convoy (claiming to have spent the previous night inside the convoy,homing other U-boats) and had been the U-boat attacked earlier. On the night of17/18 December, the U-boats attacked again but failed to torpedo any ships;U-107 was forced under water byPentstemon and after a failed torpedo attack,U-67 was forced to retire byConvolvulus.[21]
At9:06 a.m. on 18 December,Stanley gained an Asdic contact at 6 nmi (11 km; 6.9 mi) and fiftydepth charges were dropped by the escorts. After thirty minutesU-434 surfaced and the crew abandoned ship just before it rolled over and sank, north ofMadeira,42 members of the crew being rescued and taken prisoner. Before noon, the radar onAudacity indicated two aircraft and Martlets were scrambled to intercept but the guns on both aircraft jammed and the Condors escaped. The rest of the day was quiet but the Admiralty signalled that three more U-boats were en route.[22] In the early hours of18/19 December,Stanley sightedU-574 astern at4:00 a.m., sent a sighting report, was hit by a torpedo and blew up.Stork following behind, swung behind the stern ofStanley, gained an Asdic contact and dropped a pattern of depth charges, then turned after 0.5 nmi (0.93 km; 0.58 mi) to attack again.[23]
A U-boat shot to the surface 200 yd (180 m) ahead and a chase began; Walker tried to ram the U-boat but found that it could turn inside the turning circle ofStork, nearly as fast. The ship fired on the U-boat, illuminated it with snowflakeflares and managed to ram it just forward of the conning tower, scraping over the hull of the submarine. As the U-boat emerged from under the stern, depth charges set forshallow were dropped, blowing up the U-boat. The bows ofStork were crushed and bent sideways and the Asdic dome under the hull was smashed.[23] Soon afterwards,U-108 torpedoedRuckinge, which was abandoned and sunk later bySamphire. Condors arrived, one was shot down in another head-on attack and a second aircraft was damaged. When more Condors reached the convoy in the afternoon, a Martlet pilot made such a determined head-on attack that he collided with the Condor, destroying it and coming back with its aerial round his tail-wheel; the night of18/19 December was quiet.[23]
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At7:30 a.m., a Condor appeared to shadow the convoy and a Martlet chased it away before returning for lack of fuel. In the afternoon a Martlet spotted two U-boats and the convoy made an emergency turn. The U-boats were forced to submerge and Martlets patrolled overhead keeping them down for as long as their fuel lasted. It was so dark that the aircraft were guided to the flight deck with hand torches and again the night was quiet.[23]U-107 maintained contact and the wolf pack was joined byU-71,U-567 (commanded by the aceEngelbert Endrass) andU-751 from Bordeaux and the three original wolf pack boatsU-67,U-107 andU-108 re-joinedSeeräuber by 21 December.[10]
On 21 December, 802 NAS was down to three operational Martlets, take-off and landing was dangerous in the heavy swell and the pilots were very tired. After the last patrol, the commander ofAudacity ordered the ship out of the convoy 10 nmi (19 km; 12 mi) to the starboard as usual but no escorts could be spared.[24] At8:33 p.m. during the night of 21/22 December, a ship at the rear of the convoy was torpedoed byU-751 and nearby ships fired snowflakes, illuminating the area to both sides.U-567 saw the silhouette ofAudacity at close range torpedoed it at8:37 p.m.. As the carrier sank by the stern, two more torpedoes fromU-751 hit it, a big explosion blew off the bows and the ship began to sink at the head.[25] At10:10 p.m.,Audacity sank head first at 43°45'N, 19°54'W, about 500 nmi (930 km; 580 mi) west ofCape Finisterre.[26]
At12:40 a.m. on the night of21/22 December,U-567 was sunk by depth charges fromDeptford, two hours after gaining an Asdic contact;Deptford then collided withStork, damaging them both.U-67 fired torpedoes at aCAM ship but missed.[27] During 22 December,U-71 andU-751 remained in contact, to be joined byU-125 (en route to America), while Convoy HG 76 was reinforced by the destroyersHMS Vanquisher andWitch. At10:54 a.m. aLiberator of120 Squadron, 19 GroupCoastal Command based atRAF Nutts Corner in Ireland (750 nmi (1,390 km; 860 mi) away) arrived over the convoy and saw off a Condor. After two hours the Liberator attacked a U-boat and at4:20 p.m. was relieved by a second Liberator, which forced another three U-boats to submerge. The Liberator turned for home with minimal fuel but next day the convoy came into range of continuous air support.[19] On 23 December, Dönitz, shaken by the loss of five U-boats and the lack of success against the convoy, called off the attack,U-67,U-107,U-108 andU-751 returned to bases in France.[28]
Despite the loss ofAudacity and the three merchant ships, the safe arrival of thirty ships and the destruction of three U-boats (U-127 was not included andU-567 not confirmed until after the war) was judged by the Admiralty to be an outstanding victory.[29] It also confirmed Walker as the Royal Navy's foremost expert in anti-submarine warfare. The loss of five of the nine U-boats and Endrass, one of the most experienced U-boat commanders, was considered a grievous blow by Dönitz; his loss was concealed from the U-boat men for several weeks.[30]
| Name | Year | Flag | GRT | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjutant | 1922 |  Merchant Navy | 1,931 | |
| Algerian | 1924 | Merchant Navy | 2,315 | |
| Alresford | 1922 | Merchant Navy | 2,472 | |
| Annavore | 1921 |  Norway | 3,324 | Sunk, 21 December,U-567, 43°55'N 19°50'W, 34†, 4 surv[32] |
| Baron Newlands | 1928 | Merchant Navy | 3,386 | |
| Benwood | 1910 | Norway | 3,931 | |
| Blairatholl | 1925 | Merchant Navy | 3,319 | |
| Cisneros | 1926 | Merchant Navy | 1,886 | |
| Clan Macinnes | 1920 | Merchant Navy | 4,672 | |
| Cressado | 1913 | Merchant Navy | 1,228 | Convoy Commodore Rear-Admiral Oswald Dawson embarked |
| Disa | 1918 |  Sweden | 2,002 | |
| Empire Darwin | 1941 | Merchant Navy | 6,765 | CAM ship |
| Fagersten | 1921 | Norway | 2,342 | |
| Finland | 1939 | Merchant Navy | 1,375 | |
| Fylingdale | 1924 | Merchant Navy | 3,918 | |
| Lago | 1929 | Norway | 2,552 | |
| Lisbeth | 1922 | Norway | 2,732 | |
| Meta | 1930 | Merchant Navy | 1,575 | |
| Ocean Coast | 1935 | Merchant Navy | 1,173 | |
| Ogmore Castle | 1919 | Merchant Navy | 2,481 | |
| Ottinge | 1940 | Merchant Navy | 2,870 | |
| Ousel | 1922 | Merchant Navy | 1,533 | |
| Portsea | 1938 | Merchant Navy | 1,583 | |
| Ruckinge | 1939 | Merchant Navy | 2,869 | Damaged, 19 December,U-108, scuttled 38°20'N, 17°15'W, 2†[33] |
| San Gorg | 1919 | Merchant Navy | 615 | |
| Sheaf Crown | 1929 | Merchant Navy | 4,868 | |
| Shuna | 1937 | Merchant Navy | 1,575 | |
| Spero | 1922 | Merchant Navy | 1,589 | Convoy Commodore, Vice-Admiral Raymond Fitzmaurice |
| Switzerland | 1922 | Merchant Navy | 1,291 | |
| Thyra | 1925 | Sweden | 1,796 | |
| Tintern Abbey | 1939 | Merchant Navy | 2,471 | |
| Vanellus | 1921 | Merchant Navy | 1,886 |
| Name | Flag | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| HMS Croome |  Royal Navy | Hunt-class destroyer | |
| HMS Gurkha | Royal Navy | L-class destroyer | |
| HMS Foxhound | Royal Navy | F-class destroyer | |
| HMAS Nestor | Royal Navy | N-class destroyer | SankU-127, 14 December 1941 |
Gruppe Seerauber was assembled on 14 December 1941, comprising seven U-boats and reinforced on 21 December by three more. Four U-boats were sunk when attacking the convoy and another by the Gibraltar Strike Force.[10]
| Name | Flag | Class | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| U-67 |  Kriegsmarine | Type IXC submarine | |
| U-71 | Kriegsmarine | Type VIIC submarine | Reinforcement |
| U-107 | Kriegsmarine | Type IXB submarine | |
| U-108 | Kriegsmarine | Type IXB submarine | SankRuckinge[35] |
| U-127 | Kriegsmarine | Type IXC submarine | Destroyed 15 December,Nestor, Force H hunting group |
| U-131 | Kriegsmarine | Type IXB submarine | Destroyed 17 December,Stork,Penstemon,Martlet |
| U-434 | Kriegsmarine | Type VIIC submarine | Destroyed 18 December,Stanley |
| U-567 | Kriegsmarine | Type VIIC submarine | Reinforcement; sankAnnavore, destroyed 21/22 December,Deptford |
| U-574 | Kriegsmarine | Type VIIC submarine | SankStanley, destroyed 19 December,Stork |
| U-751 | Kriegsmarine | Type VIIC submarine | Reinforcement, sankAudacity |
