Conventionalism is thephilosophical attitude that fundamental principles of a certain kind are grounded on (explicit or implicit) agreements in society, rather than on external reality.Unspoken rules play a key role in the philosophy's structure. Although this attitude is commonly held with respect to the rules ofgrammar, its application to the propositions ofethics,law,science,biology,mathematics, andlogic is more controversial.
The debate on linguistic conventionalism dates back toPlato'sCratylus and the philosophy ofKumārila Bhaṭṭa.[citation needed] It has been the standard position of modernlinguistics sinceFerdinand de Saussure'sl'arbitraire du signe, but there have always been dissenting positions ofphonosemantics, recently defended byMargaret Magnus andVilayanur S. Ramachandran.[citation needed]
The FrenchmathematicianHenri Poincaré was among the first to articulate a conventionalist view. Poincaré's use ofnon-Euclidean geometries in his work ondifferential equations convinced him thatEuclidean geometry should not be regarded as ana priori truth. He held thataxioms in geometry should be chosen for the results they produce, not for their apparent coherence with – possibly flawed – human intuitions about the physical world.
Conventionalism was adopted bylogical positivists, chieflyA. J. Ayer andCarl Hempel, and extended to both mathematics and logic. To denyrationalism, Ayer sees two options forempiricism regarding the necessity of the truth of formal logic (and mathematics): 1) deny that they actually are necessary, and then account for why they only appear so, or 2) claim that the truths of logic and mathematics lack factual content – they are not "truths about the world" – and then explain how they are nevertheless true and informative.[1]John Stuart Mill adopted the former, which Ayer criticized, opting himself for the latter. Ayer's argument relies primarily on theanalytic/synthetic distinction.
The FrenchphilosopherPierre Duhem espoused a broader conventionalist view encompassing all of science.[2] Duhem was skeptical that human perceptions are sufficient to understand the "true," metaphysical nature of reality and argued that scientific laws should be valued mainly for their predictive power and correspondence with observations.
Karl Popper broadened the meaning of conventionalism still more. InThe Logic of Scientific Discovery, he defined a "conventionalist stratagem" as any technique that is used by a theorist to evade the consequences of a falsifying observation or experiment. Popper identified four such stratagems:
Popper argued that it was crucial to avoid conventionalist stratagems iffalsifiability of a theory was to be preserved. It has been argued that thestandard model of cosmology is built upon a set of conventionalist stratagems.[3]
In the 1930s, a Polish philosopherKazimierz Ajdukiewicz proposed a view that he called radical conventionalism – as opposed to moderate conventionalism developed byHenri Poincaré andPierre Duhem. Radical conventionalism was originally outlined inThe World-Picture and the Conceptual Apparatus, an article published in “Erkenntnis” in 1934. The theory can be characterized by the following theses: (1) there are languages or – as Ajdukiewicz used to say – conceptual apparatuses (schemes) which are not intertranslatable, (2) any knowledge must be articulate in one of those languages, (3) the choice of a language is arbitrary, and it is possible to change from one language to another.[4] Therefore, there is a conventional or decisional element in all knowledge (including perceptual). In his later writings – under the influence ofAlfred Tarski – Ajdukiewicz rejected radical conventionalism in favour of a semantic epistemology.
Conventionalism, as applied tolegal philosophy is one of the three rival conceptions of law constructed by American legal philosopherRonald Dworkin in his workLaw's Empire. The other two conceptions of law arelegal pragmatism andlaw as integrity.
According to conventionalism as defined by Dworkin, a community's legal institutions should contain clear socialconventions relied upon which rules are promulgated. Such rules will serve as the sole source of information for all the community members because they demarcate clearly all the circumstances in whichstate coercion will and will not be exercised.
Dworkin nonetheless has argued that this justification fails to fit with facts as there are many occasions wherein clear applicable legal rules are absent. It follows that, as he maintained, conventionalism can provide no valid ground forstate coercion. Dworkin himself favoredlaw as integrity as the best justification of state coercion.
One famous criticism of Dworkin's idea comes fromStanley Fish who argues that Dworkin, like theCritical Legal Studies movement,Marxists and adherents offeminist jurisprudence, was guilty of a false 'Theory Hope'. Fish claims that such mistake stems from their mistaken belief that there exists a general or higher 'theory' that explains or constrains all fields of activity like state coercion.
Another criticism is based on Dworkin's assertion that positivists' claims amount to conventionalism.H. L. A. Hart, as a soft positivist, denies such claim as he had pointed out that citizens cannot always discover the law as plain matter of fact. It is however unclear as to whetherJoseph Raz, an avowed hard positivist, can be classified as conventionalist as Raz has claimed that law is composed "exclusively" of social facts, which could be complex, and thus difficult to be discovered.
In particular, Dworkin has characterized law as having the main function of restraining state's coercion.[citation needed]Nigel Simmonds has rejected Dworkin's disapproval of conventionalism, claiming that his characterization of law is too narrow.
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