| International opposition to apartheid in South Africa |
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 Anti-apartheid protest inAmsterdam, 1988 |
Instruments and legislation |
UN Security Council Resolutions |
Other aspects |
Constructive engagement was the name given to the conciliatoryforeign policy of theReaganadministration towards theapartheid regime in South Africa. Devised byChester Crocker, Reagan'sU.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, the policy was promoted as an alternative to theeconomic sanctions anddivestment from South Africa demanded by theUN General Assembly and the internationalanti-apartheid movement. Among other objectives, it sought to advance regional peace inSouthern Africa by linking the end ofSouth Africa's occupation of Namibia to the end of theCuban presence in Angola.
The policy was in place between roughly 1981 and 1986, when, amid mounting international criticism of the South African regime, theUnited States Congress overrode PresidentRonald Reagan'sveto to pass theComprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act.
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In 1981,Chester Crocker was appointedU.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and announced that the U.S. would pursue with South Africa "a more constructive relationship... based on shared interests, persuasion, and improved communication".[1] The constructive engagement policy originated in a piece published by Crocker inForeign Affairs the previous year, while he was an adviser toRonald Reagan's presidential campaign.[2] In the piece, Crocker criticised the South Africapolicy ofJimmy Carter'sadministration, which had involved overt and public pressure onPretoria to move away fromapartheid. He said this policy had had disappointing results. Instead, by building leverage with Pretoria and saving it "for genuine opportunities to exert influence", the U.S. could "steer between the twin dangers of abetting violence in the Republic [of South Africa] and aligning ourselves with the cause ofwhite rule", and thereby could "underpromise and overdeliver".[3]
Beyond this, however, constructive engagement was generally framed by its adherents as the policy governing the U.S.'s engagements with the entireSouthern African region.[4] The region had grown in its importance to the U.S. – and itsCold War programme ofcontainment – as a result of theCuban presence in Angola, where South Africa was pursuing putatively counter-communist objectives in both theAngolan Civil War and theBorder War. The South African government redoubled its appeals to its own importance as a Western military partner and anti-communist bulwark in the region, while U.S. policymakers feared that political instability inside South Africa would create a regional power vacuum, opening the door toSoviet influence.[5][6] At the same time, Crocker believed that a closer relationship with the South African government could create leverage to be expended on brokering peace across the region.[7]
The policy of this Administration has been to foment change away from apartheid:
- By unambiguous public statements condemning apartheid evils;
- By reinforcing these views with quiet diplomacy;
- By working with elements within South Africa that share a vision of peace and equality;
- By encouraging fair employment practices for U.S. companies; and
- By including ourselves as a government in financing programs... to give South African blacks better training and educational opportunities.
Constructive engagement entailed "encouraging change in theapartheid system through a quiet dialogue with [South Africa's] white minority leaders" – that is, through private inducements and positive incentives, rather than throughsanctions or public pressure.[9][10] In an early speech, Reagan declared his support for the South African government,[11] and his administration lifted prior restrictions on the export of military equipment to South Africa.[12] Between 1981 and 1985, bilateral trade and investment grew, as did bilateral cooperation in other arenas.[12][13] Indeed, Reagan's administration frequently used itsveto powers to block punitive measures tabled in theUnited Nations (UN)Security Council or in theU.S. Congress.[14] Instead, it welcomed and encouraged the limited domestic political reforms initiated by South African PresidentP. W. Botha, including the1983 Constitution.[15]
In the wider region – which on some accounts was Crocker's primary focus[16] – the practice of constructive engagement turned on the so-called "linkage" strategy. Crocker sought to attain both Namibian independence and a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, precisely by linking the two outcomes: the end of South Africa's highly unpopularoccupation of Namibia could be made conditional on Cuban withdrawal from Angola, which, in turn, could be framed as a reward to South Africa for its own withdrawal.[17] These regional objectives were also linked to the U.S.'s improved bilateral relationship with South Africa: the U.S.'s conciliatory posture would encourage South African compliance with a regional peace programme, and, moreover, once achieved, the regional peace programme might provide more conducive conditions for domestic political reforms inside South Africa.[18]
The policy of constructive engagement, though it was echoed by the British government ofMargaret Thatcher, came under criticism, as the South African government used increasingly repressive tactics against its black population andanti-apartheid activists.[19][20] When South Africa's ArchbishopDesmond Tutu visited the United States in 1984, in the aftermath of President Reagan'scomfortable re-election, he said in a speech onCapitol Hill that, "constructive engagement is an abomination, an unmitigated disaster... Apartheid is as evil, as immoral, as un-Christian, in my view, asNazism. And in my view, the Reagan administration's support and collaboration with it is equally immoral, evil, and totally un-Christian."[21] In April 1985 President Reagan came under attack from within theRepublican Party itself. The Republican majority in the Senate voted 89–4 on a resolution condemning apartheid.[22] The four "no" votes came from Republican senatorsJesse Helms,Barry Goldwater,Chic Hecht, andSteve Symms.[23]
In October 1986, theUnited States Congress overrode President Reagan's veto of theComprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (theSenate vote was 78 to 21, and theHouse vote was 313 to 83). During the lead-up to the override, Reagan appointedEdward Perkins, who is black,ambassador to South Africa. Conservative RepresentativeDick Cheney was opposed to the override, saying thatNelson Mandela was the head ofan organisation that theState Department had deemed "terrorist".[24][25] In the week leading up to the vote, President Reagan appealed to members of the Republican Party for support, but as SenatorLowell P. Weicker Jr. would state, "For this moment, at least, the President has become an irrelevancy to the ideals, heartfelt and spoken, of America."[26] The legislation, which banned all new U.S. trade and investment in South Africa, also denied landing permission at U.S. airports toSouth African Airways flights. This legislation was seen as a catalyst for similar sanctions in Europe and Japan, and signalled the end of the constructive engagement policy.
The policy is widely viewed as having failed to achieve its aim of inducing theNational Party to reform apartheid.[10][27][28] In the early 1980s, the apartheid state grew more, not less, repressive.[12] Furthermore, just as Carter'sNon-Proliferation Act failed to prevent South Africa from building a nuclear bomb, Constructive Engagement attempted, but failed, to prevent expansion of the weapons program.[29] According to one 1985 analysis by academicsPeter Vale andSanford J. Ungar:
Having been offered many carrots by the United States over a period of four-and-a-half years as incentives to institute meaningful reforms, the South African authorities had simply made a carrot stew and eaten it... Constructive engagement has not merely caused the United States to lose five valuable years when it might have influenced South Africa to begin negotiating a settlement of its unique and extraordinary racial problems. Many would argue that constructive engagement was a necessary step in the evolution of American attitudes toward South Africa, but the cost has been great. American policy has actually exacerbated the situation inside South Africa by encouraging and indulging the white regime'sdivide-and-rule tactics...[30]
At the same time, U.S. adherence to constructive engagement is viewed as having marginalised and alienated moderate black activists inside South Africa, who were neglected by U.S. diplomacy, and as having antagonised other states in the region.[31] Similarly, critics hold that U.S. concessions to Pretoria had little regional effect but to delay Namibian independence and regional peace. JournalistChristopher Hitchens, for example, blamed constructive engagement and "the fearlessly soft attitude displayed by Chester Crocker towards apartheid" for the ten-year delay in implementingUnited Nations Security Council Resolution 435:
Independence on these terms could have been won years ago if it were not for Crocker's procrastination and Reagan's attempt to change the subject to the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. Here again, the United States dogmatically extended diplomatic recognition to one side only – South Africa's. Here again, without 'neutral' mediators American policy would have deservedly become the victim of its own flagrant bias. An important participant wasBernt Carlsson,UN Commissioner for Namibia, who worked tirelessly for free elections in the colony and tried to isolate the racists diplomatically.[32]
The value of the regional dimensions of constructive engagement, and particularly the linkage principle, are defended by some commentators, who argue that previous U.S. administrations had not recognised – as Crocker did – the extent to which regional conflicts were inter-connected.[7] Crocker himself continued to defend the policy, and viewed it as instrumental in enabling the1988 Tripartite Accord and moves towardsnegotiations to end apartheid.[33]
