Initially, the Comintern operated with the expectation of imminentproletarian revolutions in Europe, particularly Germany, which were seen as crucial for the survival and success of theRussian Revolution. Its early years were characterized by attempts to foment and coordinate revolutionary uprisings and the establishment of disciplined communist parties across the globe, often demanding strict adherence to the "Twenty-one Conditions" for admission. As these revolutionary hopes faded by the early 1920s, the Comintern's policies shifted, notably with the adoption of the "united workers' front" tactic, aiming to win over the working masses fromreformist socialist parties. Throughout the 1920s, the Comintern underwent a process of "Bolshevisation", increasing the centralization of its structure and the dominance of the RCP within its ranks. This process intensified with the rise ofJoseph Stalin in theSoviet Union.
The "Third Period" (1928–1933) saw the Comintern adopt an ultra-sectarian line and denouncesocial democratic parties as "social fascism". From 1934, the Comintern shifted to thePopular Front policy, advocating broad alliances with socialist and even liberal parties against fascism. This was formally adopted at itsSeventh World Congress in 1935. The Comintern played a significant role in organizing support for the Republican side in theSpanish Civil War, including the formation of theInternational Brigades. However, this period also coincided with theGreat Purge in the Soviet Union, during which many Comintern officials and foreign communists residing in Moscow were arrested and executed.
With the signing of theNazi–Soviet Pact in August 1939, the Comintern again changed its line, denouncing the war betweenNazi Germany and the Western Allies as an "imperialist war" and abandoning itsanti-fascist stance until theGerman invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. As a gesture to its Western Allies inWorld War II, Stalin unilaterally dissolved the Comintern on 15 May 1943. While its formal structures were dismantled, mechanisms of Soviet control over the international communist movement persisted and were later partially revived through theCominform (1947–1956).
The Comintern, or Third International, was the direct descendant of theFirst International (1864–1876) and theSecond International (1889–1914).[2] The First International, of whichKarl Marx was a leading figure, aimed to coordinate theproletariat in its worldwide struggle againstcapitalism, based on the premise that "the working men have no country" and that horizontal class allegiance would supersede vertical national divisions.[2] By the late 19th century, however, the Western labour movement had largely abandoned the revolutionary zeal of the First International. Powerful trade unions and socialist parties emerged which, while often adhering to Marxist revolutionary theory, in practice pursued gradual, constitutional reforms, improving the workers' lot within the existing capitalist framework.[3] This created a manifest contradiction between revolutionary rhetoric and peaceful practice.[4]
The Second International, created in 1889, was a looser federation of autonomous socialist parties, comprising "left", "right", and "centrist" factions divided on issues such asbourgeois democracy, thenational question,general strikes, and, crucially, war.[5] It foundered in August 1914 on the rock ofnational chauvinism when most of its constituent parties chose to support their respective national governments inWorld War I by voting forwar credits.[6]Vladimir Lenin, a key figure in the RussianBolshevik Party (later the Russian Communist Party, RCP), viewed this as a "sheer betrayal of socialism" and declared the Second International dead, calling for a Third International by the autumn of 1914.[7]
During the war, anti-war socialists attempted to regroup at theZimmerwald Conference in 1915 and theKienthal Conference in 1916.[8] At Zimmerwald, a divide emerged between a pacifist majority, which sought an immediate peace without annexations or indemnities, and Lenin's left-wing minority, which advocated turning the imperialist war into a revolutionary civil war.[9] Lenin's position gained more support at Kienthal, and the Zimmerwald Left laid the ideological foundations for the future Third International.[10]
TheBolsheviks emerged from a distinct Russian revolutionary tradition. Unlike the mass-based, reformist parties of the West, Russian revolutionaries operated in a clandestine underground, organized in small, disciplined groups of "professional revolutionaries". Drawn largely from the intelligentsia, this movement possessed a quasi-religious devotion to the cause of revolution itself, an enthusiasm that contrasted sharply with the practical, matter-of-fact nature of Western labour movements.[11] TheOctober Revolution of 1917 in Russia, led by the Bolsheviks, was seen by Lenin as the first act of a global drama, with European workers expected to follow suit. To achieve this, a new International, purged of reformist "traitors", was deemed an absolute necessity.[12]
The Communist International was founded at a congress of revolutionaries inMoscow from 2–6 March 1919.[13] The impetus for its creation came from the Bolsheviks' belief in the imminence of worldproletarian revolution, spurred by the perceived collapse of capitalism after World War I andrevolutionary upheavals across Europe, particularly the German "November Revolution".[14] The mission of the Comintern was to build a "world party" ofcommunists dedicated to the armed overthrow of capitalist private property and its replacement by a system of collective ownership.[12]
On 24 January 1919, a "Letter of Invitation to theFirst Congress of the Communist International" was sent by wireless from Moscow, identifying thirty-nine communist parties and revolutionary groups eligible to attend; it was deliberately timed to pre-empt theBerne Conference, held in early February by reformist socialists attempting to revive the Second International.[15] The congress convened in theKremlin on 2 March 1919.[16] Of the fifty-one delegates, only nine arrived from abroad due to theAllied blockade of Russia; the rest resided in Soviet Russia, and many lacked authorized credentials.[17]Hugo Eberlein, the delegate of theCommunist Party of Germany (KPD), was mandated to oppose the immediate formation of a new International, reflectingRosa Luxemburg's earlier concerns that a premature founding would allow the Bolsheviks to dominate the new organization.[18] Despite Eberlein's abstention, the congress voted overwhelmingly to establish the Third International on 4 March 1919.[19]
The principal document of the congress wasLeon Trotsky's "Manifesto to the Proletariat of the Entire World", which emphasizedsoviets (workers' councils) as the instrument of working-class unity and action, deeming the Russian model universally applicable. It dismissed "bourgeois democracy" and reiterated Lenin's insistence on thedictatorship of the proletariat.[20] Unusually, the Manifesto made no explicit reference to the role of national Communist Parties, instead placing its emphasis on the soviets on one hand and, on the other, the "International Communist Party" whose task was to overthrow the capitalist order.[21] The improvised nature of the congress meant that no formal statutes or rules were adopted, but anExecutive Committee (ECCI) was elected, withGrigory Zinoviev as its first President.[22] While provision was made for foreign party representation on the ECCI, Bolsheviks predominated due to the prestige of the Russian Revolution and the weakness of foreign parties.[23]
The foundation of the Comintern institutionalized the split in the international labour movement between revolutionary communists and reformistsocial democrats. This schism was rooted in fundamentally different conceptions of the path to socialism.[24]Karl Kautsky, a leading theoretician of the Second International, condemned the Bolshevik coup inThe Dictatorship of the Proletariat (1918), arguing that socialism was inseparable from democracy and that a revolution in backward Russia could only result in a terroristic dictatorship.[25] Lenin, in his replyThe Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky (1918), excoriated Kautsky, asserting that parliamentary institutions were a sham concealing bourgeois class rule and that "proletarian democracy is a million times more democratic than any bourgeois democracy". He proclaimed thatBolshevism could "serve as a model of tactics for all".[26]Rosa Luxemburg, while a committed revolutionary, also criticized the Bolsheviks from a democratic standpoint, warning that their centralist organizational model would lead to a bureaucratic dictatorship over the proletariat, not of it.[27]
Delegates at the Second World Congress, 1920
TheSecond World Congress, held inPetrograd and Moscow from 19 July to 7 August 1920, is considered the true founding congress of the Comintern.[28] Many delegates undertook hazardous, illegal journeys through the Allied blockade and civil war to attend, with some travelling for weeks to reach Russia.[29] The congress itself took place amidst the privations ofWar Communism, but the Bolsheviks staged impressive cultural spectacles, such as a mass performance depicting the history ofclass struggle, to foster revolutionary enthusiasm among the delegates and the domestic population.[30]
The congress adopted the famous "Twenty-one Conditions" for admission, drafted primarily by Zinoviev under Lenin's guidance.[31] These conditions, a "much more stringent and deterrent set" than the initial platform, aimed to split the rank-and-file of European socialist parties from their "opportunist" leaders and enforce Bolshevik organizational principles.[32] Key conditions included: systematic removal of reformists and centrists from all responsible posts; combining legal and illegal activity; a complete break with figures like Kautsky andRamsay MacDonald; establishing communist cells in trade unions; adherence todemocratic centralism based on iron discipline and periodic purges; unconditional support for every Soviet republic; and changing party names to "Communist Party".[33] Point sixteen stated that all decisions of Comintern congresses and the ECCI were binding on all parties.[34] The congress also ratified the Statutes of the Comintern, which established the annual world congress as the supreme body and the ECCI as the directing body between congresses. Point 8 of the Statutes stipulated that the work of the ECCI was performed mainly by the party of the country where it was located (Soviet Russia), which had five representatives with full voting rights, while other major parties had only one.[35]
This "universalisation of Bolshevism" was further elaborated in Lenin's pamphlet"Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder (April 1920), which argued that "certain fundamental features of our revolution have a significance that is not local... but international".[36] TheThird (June–July 1921) andFourth (November–December 1922) Congresses reinforced the centralist Bolshevik model, creating ECCI bodies like the Presidium, Secretariat, Organisational Bureau (Orgburo), and International Control Commission (ICC) that paralleled Russian party structures.[37] The Comintern also began dispatching "agents" and "emissaries" to intervene in the affairs of national parties.[38] Funding for foreign communist parties and the Comintern's clandestine activities, managed by theInternational Liaison Department (OMS) from 1921, came from the Soviet state treasury, creating economic dependence.[39]
Despite the trend towards Russian dominance and centralisation, the Comintern in Lenin's era displayed a degree of pluralism and open debate not seen later. Figures likePaul Levi of the KPD and the ItalianAmadeo Bordiga were not docile, and some national parties resisted or reinterpreted Moscow's directives.[40]
Vladimir Lenin addressing the Third World Congress, 1921
By late 1920 and into 1921, with the failure of revolutionary upheavals in Europe (such as thefactory occupations in Italy and the "March Action" in Germany in 1921), Lenin reluctantly concluded that proletarian revolution was no longer on the immediate agenda.[41] This led to the adoption of the "united workers' front" policy, formally expounded in ECCI theses on 18 December 1921.[42] The policy aimed to win over the majority of the working class by engaging in joint defensive struggles with socialist rank-and-file against the capitalist offensive.[43] It allowed for temporary alliances with reformist leaders ("united front from above") but primarily focused on unity "from below".[44] The slogan of theThird Congress (1921) was "To the masses!".[45]
The United Front policy was closely intertwined with changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policy, particularly theNew Economic Policy (NEP) and the search for trade relations with capitalist nations.[46] TheRapallo Treaty of April 1922 between Germany and Soviet Russia epitomized the growing tension between the Comintern's revolutionary goals and Soviet state interests.[47] The United Front tactics faced intense opposition from left-wing elements in many communist parties (e.g., in France and Italy), who found it inconceivable to court the "social chauvinists".[48] The Comintern's trade union arm, theProfintern (Red International of Labour Unions), founded on Lenin's initiative at the Second Congress in 1920, played a crucial role in applying United Front tactics in the industrial field, though this often led to splits in national trade union movements, as in Czechoslovakia and France.[49]
Aconference of the three Internationals (Second, Comintern, and theVienna Union or "Two-and-a-half International") in Berlin in April 1922, aimed at creating common action, failed amidst mutual suspicion and recriminations.[50] The Communists, led byKarl Radek, denounced the "social patriots", who in turn condemned the persecution ofSocialist Revolutionaries andMensheviks in Russia and theSoviet invasion of theSocial Democratic republic of Georgia.[51] Despite the hostility, a temporary Committee of Nine (three from each International) was formed to explore further steps towards unity, but it met only once in May 1922 and achieved nothing, with the Comintern soon withdrawing.[52]
The "German October" of 1923, a failed Comintern-inspired uprising in Germany, revealed fundamental limitations in Comintern thinking, including inadequate military preparations and a misjudgment of the German workers' mood.[53] This debacle convinced many Bolsheviks, notablyJoseph Stalin, that European revolution was a distant prospect, reinforcing the priority of defending the Soviet state.[54]
The period from 1924 to 1928 was characterized by the "Bolshevisation" of the Comintern and its member sections. This entailed an increasing Russian dominance, the Russification of ideological and organizational structures, and the canonization ofLeninist principles of party unity, discipline, anddemocratic centralism, particularly the concentration of power in the hands of the Russian party delegation to the ECCI.[55]
The failure of the "German October" andLenin's death in January 1924 intensified inner-party struggles in the Soviet Union, which profoundly affected the Comintern.[56] The triumvirate of Zinoviev,Lev Kamenev, and Stalin moved against Trotsky and his supporters. At an ECCI Presidium session in January 1924, Zinoviev attributed the German failure to the "opportunism" of Radek,Heinrich Brandler, andAugust Thalheimer, implicating Trotsky by association.[57] "Trotskyism" was branded a "right deviation".[58]
The slogan of "Bolshevisation" was officially proclaimed at the Fifth Comintern Congress (June–July 1924).[58] In practice, it meant creating centralized, disciplined Leninist organizations fiercely loyal to the RCP majority in its struggle against the "Trotskyite opposition".[58] Zinoviev declared the need for "iron discipline" and the eradication of "social-democratism, federalism, 'autonomy'".[59] This led to a series of denunciations and expulsions: Brandler and Thalheimer were removed from the KPD leadership, replaced by leftistsArkadi Maslow andRuth Fischer;Boris Souvarine was expelled from the French party; and Polish leaders likeAdolf Warski were condemned.[59]
The Fifth Congress also marked a tactical shift to the left regarding the United Front. TheTheses on Tactics rejected united fronts "solely from above" and re-emphasized the united front "from below" under communist party leadership as a means to unmask reformist "bosses".[60] Radek was removed from the ECCI, and Trotsky was demoted to non-voting status, replaced by Stalin.[60]
However, the period 1925–1926 saw a tentative move back to the centre underNikolai Bukharin's growing influence in the Comintern, emphasizing a broader conception of the United Front.[61] This coincided with Stalin's doctrine of "socialism in one country", first propounded in December 1924.[62] This theory argued that the Soviet Union could build socialism without the need for immediate world revolution, and that the main task of communist parties was to defend the USSR.[63] This fundamentally altered the strategic orientation of the international communist movement, subordinating the goal of world revolution to the defence and construction of the USSR, which was now considered the essential factor in that revolution.[64] A key initiative of this period was theAnglo-Russian Trade Union Committee, formed in April 1925, which aimed to foster trade union unity but ended in failure after the1926 British General Strike.[65]
By 1926, Zinoviev and Trotsky formed theUnited Opposition against the Stalin-Bukharinduumvirate, criticizing "socialism in one country" and the Comintern's rightward turn.[66] The ensuing power struggle dominated the Comintern, leading to Zinoviev's removal as Comintern President in October 1926 (replaced by a "collective leadership" headed by Bukharin) and Trotsky's expulsion from the ECCI and eventually the Soviet Union.[67]
Foreign communist parties responded to Bolshevisation in various ways. Many leaders and members, out of sincere respect for the Bolsheviks' revolutionary success or a sense of disorientation, accepted Moscow's directives, sometimes lapsing into deference.[68] Loyalty to the USSR as the first "socialist bastion" and a commitment to "internationalism" as defined by Moscow were powerful motivating factors.[69] Figures likePalmiro Togliatti of the Italian party ultimately aligned with the RCP majority, recognizing the operational necessity of Moscow's support.[70]
Bureaucratisation within the Comintern and national parties also facilitated Russian control. As world congresses became less frequent, power devolved to the ECCI and its Presidium, which were disproportionately staffed by Bolsheviks and managed the day-to-day workings of the International.[71] However, there was also resistance. "Ultra-left" elements in parties like the KPD challenged the Russification of the Comintern and the perceived subordination of revolutionary goals to Soviet state interests.[72] There was also widespread reluctance to implement specific organizational prescriptions of Bolshevisation, such as the replacement of territorial branches with factory cells and the formation of communist fractions in reformist trade unions.[73] These measures often clashed with local traditions and practical difficulties, leading to slow implementation or outright disregard.[74]
The years 1928–1933 in Comintern history are known as the "Third Period", a phase of sectarian tactics which entailed increased opposition to the social democratic parties.[75] This period was characterized by the belief that capitalism was entering its final crisis, leading to a new revolutionary upsurge and impending imperialist wars.[75]
The concept of a "Third Period" was first introduced by Bukharin at the Seventh ECCI Plenum (November–December 1926). He posited it as a phase following the initial post-war revolutionary upheaval (First Period) and the relative capitalist stabilization (Second Period), where the internal contradictions of stabilization would lead to a new revolutionary wave.[76] This analysis remained Comintern orthodoxy through theSixth World Congress (July–September 1928).[77]
However, by 1928, the political landscape within the Soviet Union was shifting. Stalin began to move against Bukharin and his allies (the "Right Opposition"), who resisted his policies ofrapid industrialization andforced collectivization.[78] This struggle inevitably extended to the Comintern. The Sixth Congress, while formally still under Bukharin's influence, saw theStalinist faction begin to construct a "right-wing deviation" within the Comintern, linking it to social democracy.[79] Stalin's pivotal speech at an ECCI Presidium meeting in December 1928 concerning the KPD (the "German question") signalled a decisive move against any "Right faction" in the Comintern, demanding "iron inner-party discipline" and condemning "conciliators".[80] This led to purges of "rightists" and "conciliators" in various parties, such as in Germany, Sweden, and Czechoslovakia.[81] Bukharin himself was removed from his Comintern duties in July 1929.[82] Leading Comintern officials likeDmitri Manuilsky,Osip Piatnitsky,Otto Kuusinen, andKlement Gottwald aligned with Stalin.[83]
The central ideological tenet of the Third Period was the doctrine of "social fascism". This theory, formally expounded at the Tenth ECCI Plenum (July 1929), asserted that social democracy had transformed from a right-wing working-class party into a wing of thebourgeoisie, and in the context of capitalism's final crisis, had become the "moderate wing offascism".[84] "Left" social democrats (like theAustro-Marxists or the BritishIndependent Labour Party) were branded as the most dangerous enemies, as they allegedly deceived the workers with revolutionary phrases while supporting capitalism.[85]
This doctrine precluded any united front with social democratic leaders and mandated a strategy of "class against class", meaning communists should fight independently for the leadership of the working class.[86] In practice, this led to intense hostility towards social democratic parties and trade unions. The Comintern urged the creation of independent "Red" trade unions or revolutionary oppositions within existing unions, aiming to organize the unorganized and unemployed, who were seen as a key revolutionary force.[87] This policy proved largely counterproductive, isolating communists from the bulk of the organized working class and leading to a decline in membership and influence in many countries, such as Britain and Czechoslovakia.[88]
In Germany, the "social fascism" line had particularly tragic consequences. The KPD, underErnst Thälmann, directed its main fire against theSocial Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), even engaging in joint actions with theNazis against SPD-led governments (e.g., thePrussian referendum of 1931).[89] The Twelfth ECCI Plenum in August 1932 was dominated by the German question and a sense of growing crisis, but its resolutions were confused and contradictory, reflecting deep divisions in Moscow over how to respond to the Nazi threat. While some leaders like Manuilsky and Kuusinen urged a more flexible united front, hard-liners likeVilhelm Knorin insisted on the primacy of the struggle against the SPD, and no clear line emerged.[90] This division in the German labour movement fatally weakened its ability to resist the rise ofAdolf Hitler.[91] HistorianG. D. H. Cole described the policy as "disastrous" and argued it was "largely responsible for Hitler's victory in Germany".[92]
While some local-level collaboration between communists and social democrats occurred, the official Comintern line remained largely unchanged even after Hitler's accession to power in January 1933.[93] In response to the SPD executive-in-exile's "Prague Manifesto" of January 1934, which called for revolutionary unity against Nazism, the Comintern maintained its "implacable hostility" and, in an appeal in May, denounced Social Democracy as the "ally of Fascism".[94] The Thirteenth ECCI Plenum in December 1933, held in the aftermath of the German catastrophe, failed to reassess the policy, instead blaming the SPD for the Nazi victory and reasserting the "social fascism" line.[95] The policy was also influenced by Soviet foreign policy concerns, particularly Stalin's initial fear of an Anglo-French war of intervention and the need to combat social democratic support for such a war, as well as the desire to maintain stable relations with Weimar Germany and prevent its alignment with Western powers against the USSR.[96]
The disastrous consequences of the Third Period, epitomized by the Nazi seizure of power in Germany, led to a gradual and complex reorientation of Comintern policy towards thePopular Front. This era was simultaneously marked by the devastating impact of the StalinistGreat Purge on the Comintern itself.[97]
The catalyst for the shift away from "social fascism" came largely from events in France. In February 1934, joint actions by socialist and communist workers againsta common fascist threat created a powerful groundswell for unity from below.[98] This coincided with a growing recognition within parts of the Comintern leadership, notablyGeorgi Dimitrov (who became General Secretary in spring 1934 after hisLeipzig trial), that the old tactics had failed.[99] By mid-May 1934, Dimitrov began to advocate for broaderanti-fascist alliances, including with social democratic parties ("united front from above") and even middle-class "democratic" forces.[100] The transition was marked by intense and protracted internal debates in Moscow throughout 1934 between proponents of the new line, like Dimitrov, Manuilsky and Kuusinen, and "hard-line" opponents such as Knorin,Béla Kun andSolomon Lozovsky, who resisted any deviation from the established dogma. Stalin's role was initially indecisive, but he ultimately gave his cautious approval to the new course.[101] The enforcement of the line before Stalin was fully ready for a policy change led to the purging of leaders who dissented, such asHeinz Neumann andHermann Remmele in Germany andKarl Kilbom in Sweden.[92]
The process was driven by a "triple interaction": national factors (such as the anti-fascist unity in France), internal Comintern dynamics, and Soviet foreign policy (the USSR's search for collective security against Nazi Germany, leading to its entry into theLeague of Nations in September 1934, the efforts ofMaxim Litvinov for "united resistance to Fascist aggression", and theFranco-Soviet Pact in May 1935).[102] In July 1934, theFrench Communist Party (PCF) signed a "Pact of Unity of Action" with the FrenchSocialists.[103] The PCF, underMaurice Thorez, then pioneered the call for a broaderRassemblement Populaire in October 1934, extending appeals to theRadical Party.[104]
TheSeventh World Congress of the Comintern (July–August 1935) formally ratified the Popular Front policy.[105] Dimitrov's main report defined fascism as "the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital" and called for a "broad people's anti-fascist front" based on the proletarian united front but extending to the peasantry and urbanpetty-bourgeoisie.[106][107] Communists were to defend bourgeois democratic liberties against fascism and present themselves as tribunes of national independence.[106] The Congress resolution allowed for communist participation in Popular Front governments under certain pre-revolutionary conditions, viewing them as potential "transitional forms" to proletarian revolution.[108]
However, the break with the past was partial. The universal applicability of the Bolshevik model was not challenged, and conditions for "organic unity" with socialists remained prohibitively strict.[109] The Popular Front era was marked by an unresolved tension between inherited ideologies and new initiatives.[106] While parties were given more leeway for local adaptation, Moscow's ultimate control remained, especially concerning foreign policy.[110]
In France, thePopular Front led to anelectoral victory in May 1936 and the formation of a government underLéon Blum, which the PCF supported from outside.[111] This period saw massive growth in PCF membership and trade union influence, but was also characterized by a massive wave of strikes and factory occupations in June 1936 that alarmed the Radicals and complicated Soviet foreign policy aims of alliance with France.[112] The PCF leadership, under Thorez, acted to end the strikes, arguing that it was necessary to know when to stop and that "The People's Front is not the revolution", a line driven by the need to preserve the Franco-Soviet pact.[113]
The Comintern and the Soviet Union were initially hesitant to intervene directly, balancing support for the Republic with the diplomatic aim of not antagonizing Britain and France, whose policy ofnon-intervention the USSR initially joined.[117] However, as nationalist successes mounted and Italo-German aid continued, Moscow shifted its policy. In September 1936, the Comintern began organizing theInternational Brigades for the defence ofMadrid.[118] The USSR also began to supply arms and military advisers, with Soviet tanks and aircraft playing a crucial role insaving Madrid in November 1936.[119]
Soviet intervention was a "turning-point" in the war, but it also became the primary instrument for extending Comintern and Stalinist influence over the Republic's internal affairs.[120] The PCE, hitherto a marginal force, grew enormously in numbers and prestige, its authority buttressed by the arrival of Soviet aid.[121] The Comintern's strategy, directed from Moscow and implemented by figures likePalmiro Togliatti, was to subordinate all revolutionary objectives to the goal of military victory. This required building a broad "national front" and maintaining the appearance of a "democratic parliamentary republic" to avoid alienating the Western democracies, effectively "pushing the proletarian revolution back within the bourgeois-democratic bounds".[122] This made the communists, in the view of G. D. H. Cole, "definitely a right-wing influence in Spanish affairs".[123] This put the PCE in direct conflict with the powerful anarchistCNT and the revolutionary MarxistPOUM, and allied it with the socialist centre and right wing underIndalecio Prieto.[124]
Under Comintern guidance, the PCE and its Soviet advisers, includingNKVD representativeAlexander Orlov, established their own secret police and systematically persecuted their rivals on the Left.[125] Tensions culminated in theBarcelonaMay Days of 1937, an armed conflict between government forces (backed by the communists) and anarchists.[126] The defeat of the anarchists led to the fall of the socialist Prime MinisterFrancisco Largo Caballero, who had resisted communist pressure, and his replacement by the more compliantJuan Negrín. The POUM was subsequently outlawed, and its leader,Andreu Nin, was tortured and murdered by Soviet agents.[127] The Comintern's policy in Spain thus became a microcosm of Stalinism, prioritizing the elimination of "Trotskyist" and other revolutionary opponents over a genuine united front against Franco.[128] According to historianFernando Claudin, the entire episode was the "sacrifice of a revolution to the interests of Sovietraison d'état".[129] The internal divisions fatally weakened the Republican war effort, which ultimately collapsed in March 1939.[130]
The Popular Front era coincided with theGreat Purge in the USSR (1936–1938), which had a devastating impact on the Comintern.[131] Foreign communists and political émigrés in Moscow were heavily targeted.[131] The repression was driven by Stalin's paranoia, xenophobia, and desire to eliminate all potential opposition, real or imagined.[132] Leading Comintern figures like Piatnitsky, Kun, and Knorin were arrested and shot.[133] Entire national sections, most notably theCommunist Party of Poland (KPP), were accused of infiltration by enemy agents and dissolved by the Comintern in 1938.[134] Thousands of foreign communists perished in theGulag or were executed.[133] Of the approximately 320 Comintern employees mentioned by name in a study by Brigitte Studer, nearly a third died violently, with 58 perishing in the Stalinist purges before 1945.[135] Comintern officials like Dimitrov and Manuilsky were complicit in the purges, though Dimitrov also attempted to save some individuals.[136] The Purge effectively paralyzed the Comintern apparatus and shattered any remaining illusions about its independence.[137]
The Comintern's influence inEast Asia was shaped by the context of colonialism, anti-colonial nationalist movements, and the predominance of rural economies.[138] While initial interest focused on Japan, the only industrialized nation in the region, it was in China that the Comintern had its greatest impact.[138]
The First Comintern Congress (1919) devoted little attention to the "colonial question".[139] However, by the Second Congress (1920), as European revolution failed to materialize, the Bolsheviks began to see anti-imperialist struggles in the East as a way to stabilize the Soviet regime.[140] Lenin's theses on the national and colonial questions, debated with the Indian communistM. N. Roy, allowed for temporary alliances between communists and "bourgeois-democratic" nationalist forces in colonial regions, provided the proletarian movement maintained its independence.[141] TheBakuCongress of the Peoples of the East (September 1920) and the Congress of Toilers of the Far East (January 1922) further formalized this commitment, though they also highlighted the complexities of applying Bolshevik models in agrarian societies lacking a strong industrial proletariat.[142] In practice, however, Soviet state interests often led to the sacrifice of local communist movements in favour of alliances with nationalist leaders, such asKemal Atatürk in Turkey, whose government suppressed and murdered the leadership of theTurkish Communist Party in 1921 while receiving Soviet aid.[143]
In China, the Comintern engaged with both the nationalistKuomintang (KMT) and the fledglingChinese Communist Party (CCP), founded in 1921.[144] Under Comintern guidance, the KMT was reorganized along Soviet lines.[145] In August 1922, the ECCI directed the CCP to enter the KMT as individuals, forming a "bloc within" – theFirst United Front.[146] This policy, aimed at achieving national independence and unification under KMT leadership, was contested by CCP leaders likeChen Duxiu but ultimately enforced by Moscow, following direct negotiations between Soviet representatives andSun Yat-sen.[147] Comintern advisers likeMikhail Borodin played a significant role in both parties.[148]
The United Front initially benefited the CCP, which grew rapidly, particularly after theMay Thirtieth Movement of 1925.[149] However, tensions mounted. After Sun Yat-sen's death in March 1925,Chiang Kai-shek consolidated power within the KMT. In March 1926, Chiangmoved against the communists within the KMT, but the Comintern, under Stalin's direction, ignored this and continued to support the alliance and Chiang'sNorthern Expedition.[150] In April 1927, Chiang launched a brutalmassacre of communists in Shanghai, effectively ending the First United Front.[151] The Comintern, seeking to preserve Stalin's infallibility, blamed CCP "rightists" and "leftists" for the disaster.[152] Chen Duxiu was removed as General Secretary.[153]
The Sixth CCP Congress, held in Moscow in 1928 under Comintern supervision, confirmed Stalin's doctrinal "correctness" and initiated a deeper Bolshevisation of the CCP.[154] The Congress acknowledged the failure of the United Front but asserted that a new revolutionary wave was coming and that the CCP must prepare for it. Its resolutions attempted to steer a course between the "right-wing deviations" of Chen Duxiu and "left-wing 'putsch-ism'".[155] The new policy emphasized the need for a revolution against both the landlords and the bourgeoisie, and recognized the importance of the peasant movement and guerrilla warfare. However, it dogmatically insisted that the urban proletariat must lead the revolution, a view based on European Marxist theory rather than Chinese conditions.[156] This period saw the rise of Moscow-trained Chinese cadres, the "28 Bolsheviks" likeWang Ming, who ensured CCP subordination to Comintern directives.[157] The Comintern line emphasized urban proletarian leadership, despite the CCP's growing rural base under figures likeMao Zedong.[158]Li Lisan's attempts to implement Comintern directives toseize major urban centers in 1930 ended in failure, for which he was made a scapegoat.[159]
Wang Ming became CCP General Secretary in 1931, marking the zenith of direct Comintern intervention.[160] Following theJapanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, Comintern policy became increasingly confused, caught between the imperative to fight Japanese imperialism (which threatened Soviet interests) and the established dogma of opposing the Kuomintang as the primary enemy. A Comintern directive in December 1931 called for a "national revolutionary war" but simultaneously pronounced that overthrowing the Kuomintang was its "pre-requisite".[161] The CCP leadership, particularly those in theJiangxi Soviet like Mao, maintained a degree of autonomy, partly due to irregular communications with Moscow and Shanghai.[160] TheLong March (1934–1935), forced by KMT encirclement campaigns, saw Mao rise to pre-eminence at theZunyi Conference (January 1935), challenging the Moscow-backed leadership.[162] The Comintern's adoption of the Popular Front policy at its Seventh Congress (1935) and the growing threat of Japanese expansion led to the formation of aSecond United Front between the CCP and KMT in 1937, following theXi'an Incident.[163] By this time, however, direct Comintern influence over CCP policy had significantly diminished.[164]
The Comintern identifiedBritish-ruled India as a key target for its anti-colonial strategy, viewing it as the "citadel of the revolution in the East".[165] In 1920, it founded the Central Asian Bureau inTashkent to train Indian communists, withM. N. Roy as a central figure. At the Second Congress, Roy ran counter to Lenin's theses, arguing that a proletarian class struggle had already developed in India and that the new Communist party should lead the independence movement in struggle against, not in alliance with, the nationalist middle class.[165] An abortive attempt was made to prepare an armed expedition to India from Tashkent.[166] Early attempts to establish a party were hampered by British repression, culminating in theMeerut Conspiracy Case (1929–1933), in which thirty-one communist and trade union leaders were tried for a "revolutionary conspiracy to overthrow the existing order". The court found that theCommunist Party of India (CPI)'s aim was "to incite to violent revolution".[167]
Throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Comintern adhered to the "social fascism" line, condemning theIndian National Congress as a "class organization of capitalists" and denouncing its left-wing leaders,Jawaharlal Nehru andSubhas Chandra Bose, as a "dangerous hindrance to India's revolution".[168] After the Seventh Congress in 1935, this policy was reversed. The Comintern now instructed the CPI to form a united front with theCongress Socialist Party (CSP) and to enter the Indian National Congress itself, which was now described as a "major anti-imperialist people's organization".[169] The CPI's use of "conspiratorial techniques" to infiltrate and take over key positions within the CSP and its allied trade unions led to the collapse of the united front in 1940, when the socialists expelled the communists.[169]
The Comintern saw Japan as a "revolutionary key position in the Far East" due to its industrialisation.[170] TheJapanese Communist Party (JCP) was founded in 1922 as a direct creation of the Comintern, following a decision at the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East in Moscow.[171] From its inception, the party was illegal, composed largely of intellectuals, and subject to intense police persecution.[170] In June 1923, nearly all its leaders were arrested, and the party was dissolved by its own leadership in March 1924, a decision which met with "angry resistance from Moscow".[172] Under instructions from the Comintern's Shanghai Bureau, the party was reconstituted in late 1926. A wave of arrests in March 1928, however, again crippled the party, and it was effectively destroyed by further mass arrests in 1929 and 1932. By 1935, Japanese communism existed only as "a concealed thought in the memories of a few 'true believers', most of whom were in prison".[173]
The signing of theNazi–Soviet Pact in August 1939 led to a dramatic "about turn" in Comintern policy.[174] G. D. H. Cole characterized it as a "gross betrayal of the anti-fascist faith", though he also argued it was "not without excuse in face of the attitude of the Western 'appeasers'".[175] On 7 September 1939, following a personal interview with Stalin, Dimitrov received instructions to characterizethe unfolding war as an "imperialist" conflict between two groups of capitalist states, for which the bourgeoisie of all belligerent states bore equal responsibility.[176] The Comintern line was to denounce the war as a struggle between "rival imperialisms".[177] The division between "fascist" and "democratic" capitalist countries was declared to have lost its former sense, and the Popular Front slogan was to be renounced.[176] ECCI Secretariat theses issued on 9 September directed communist parties in belligerent states to actively oppose the "unjust war" and expose its imperialist nature.[178] During this period, the Comintern attacked social democrats as "agents in the service of British imperialism".[179] This marked a fundamental revision of the anti-fascist strategy pursued since 1934, and communist parties were required to drop the banner of anti-fascism at the very moment Hitler's armies began the conquest of Europe.[180]
The new line caused confusion and dissent in many communist parties. TheCommunist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), for instance, initially supported the war against Nazi Germany but was forced to reverse its position after intervention from Moscow, leading to the replacement ofHarry Pollitt as General Secretary byR. Palme Dutt.[181] The PCF was outlawed, and its leaders fled into exile or were arrested.[182] For many communists, particularly those in the prisons and concentration camps of fascist Europe, the pact was a devastating moral and political blow.[183] Throughout 1940 and early 1941, the Comintern maintained the "imperialist war" characterization, though the rapidcollapse of France in summer 1940 prompted some tentative rethinking regarding communist participation in anti-Nazi resistance in occupied territories.[184]
The German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 (Operation Barbarossa) led to another abruptvolte-face. The war was now redefined as a "Great Patriotic War" for the defense of the USSR and an anti-fascist struggle. Communist parties were instructed to give unstinting support to the Allied governments and build broad national fronts and resistance movements.[185]
The Comintern was officially dissolved on 15 May 1943, with the ECCI Presidium recommending its disbandment.[186] It had, however, effectively ceased to function after the last meeting of its Bureau in April 1940.[187] The stated reasons were that the centralized international organizational form had become a drag on the further strengthening of national working-class parties and that the diverse conditions in different countries required greater independence and maneuverability.[188] Stalin, in a rare interview, added that the dissolution would expose the "lie of the Hitlerites" that Moscow intended to intervene in other nations and "Bolshevise" them, and would facilitate the work of patriots in uniting freedom-loving peoples against Hitlerism.[189]
The dissolution is widely seen as a gesture by Stalin to appease his Western Allies (Britain and the United States), particularly to facilitate the opening of asecond front in Europe, and was the final step in subordinating the goal of world revolution to the Soviet strategy of dividing the post-war world into "spheres of influence".[190] It also reflected the reality that the Comintern had largely ceased to function effectively as a centralized directing body during the war due to disrupted communications.[191] After 1943, an organizational framework continued in Moscow under Dimitrov, attached to theCPSU Central Committee as theInternational Department, and through "special institutes" (numbered 99, 100, and 205) that carried on tasks like training cadres, maintaining radio links, and gathering intelligence.[192] This ensured continued Soviet influence over the international communist movement, which would re-emerge more formally with the creation of theCominform in 1947.[193]
The Comintern's organizational structure was designed to be a centralized "world party" or a "centralised controlling authority for the whole world-wide revolutionary movement".[194] Its supreme body was the World Congress, which was supposed to meet annually (later less frequently) to decide on program and policy.[195] Between congresses, the Comintern was directed by itsExecutive Committee (ECCI).[196] The ECCI, in turn, elected a Presidium to handle day-to-day affairs, and a Secretariat.[197] Other important bodies included the Organisational Bureau (Orgburo) and the International Control Commission (ICC), which was responsible for discipline and ideological purity.[38] TheInternational Liaison Department (Otdel mezhdunarodnoi sviazi, OMS), established in 1921, managed the Comintern's clandestine activities, including funding, communications, and forging documents.[198] The ECCI and its subsidiary bodies were based in Moscow.[199] The statutes stipulated that the Communist Party of the host country (the Soviet Union) would have a disproportionate influence, holding five seats on the ECCI, while other major parties held one.[200] National communist parties were considered "sections" of the Comintern, bound by its decisions.[34]
By the early 1930s, the parties' social composition had shifted significantly. Following the "Third Period" policy and theGreat Depression, many parties were transformed from organizations of employed industrial workers into parties of the unemployed. In Germany, the percentage of factory workers in the KPD dropped from over 62% in 1928 to around 20% in 1931.[201] The parties were also characterized by an extremely high membership turnover, or "fluctuation". The entire membership of most parties was almost completely renewed every few years, with only a small nucleus of about 5% remaining constant, preventing the formation of stable traditions and cadres independent of Moscow.[202] Between 1921 and 1931, the total membership of the Comintern's non-Soviet parties declined from 887,000 to 328,000.[203] For context, the rivalLabour and Socialist International claimed an affiliated membership of over 6.2 million in 1928, with a total electoral vote of 25.6 million.[204] The Comintern's finances, however, far exceeded those of its socialist rival; its income in 1927 was over twenty-six times greater, drawing on the resources of the Soviet state.[205]
Ninth Russian issue (1920) of theCommunist International, the official magazine of the Comintern published in various European languages from 1919 to 1943
Several international organizations (communist fronts) were sponsored by the Comintern:[209]
In addition to its central apparatus in Moscow, the Comintern established several regional bureaus to coordinate its activities. Among the most important was theBerlin-based West European Secretariat (WES), founded in October 1919 under the leadership ofYakov Reich ("Thomas").[210] It served as a critical hub for communications, finance, and propaganda, channeling funds (including cash and diamonds) and directives from Moscow to the emerging communist parties in Europe.[211] In the early 1920s, Weimar Berlin, with its large working-class movement and relatively loose controls, became the Comintern's most important outpost and a center for its transnational network of agents.[212] The WES was reorganized in 1927 as the West European Bureau (WEB), with a much clearer line of political control from Moscow.[213] Other bureaus included the Scandinavian Bureau, a Southern Bureau inKiev, the Vienna Bureau, the Balkan Bureau, theAmsterdam Bureau,[214] the Central Asian Bureau inTashkent, and theFar Eastern Bureau, based for much of its existence inShanghai.[215]
A crucial part of the Comintern's structure was its system of political schools, designed to train cadres from around the world in communist theory and practice. The immense importance of this schooling was a key feature of the organization, as it produced a worldwide cadre of loyal communists.[216] The four principal schools were:[217]
Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV, 1921–1937) provided political education for cadres from Soviet Eastern republics and later admitted candidates from colonial and independent countries in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean.[218]
Communist University of the National Minorities of the West (KUNMZ, 1921–1936) initially trained cadres from the western national minorities of Soviet Russia, but later expanded to include militants from the Balkans, Italy, Central Europe, and Scandinavia.[218]
Thehistoriography of the Comintern is diverse and has evolved significantly, particularly with the opening of Soviet archives in the late 1980s.[221] Early Western scholarship during theCold War often depicted the Comintern as a monolithic tool of Soviet foreign policy, emphasizing its subordination to Moscow.[222] "Dissident communist" critiques, such as those by former members likeFranz Borkenau orTrotskyist writers, often focused on the Comintern's degeneration under Stalin compared to an idealized Leninist phase.[222][223] Official communist historiography, particularly during the Soviet era, presented a sanitized and ideologically controlled narrative.[224]
More recent "scientific" scholarly studies, including those byE. H. Carr andFernando Claudin, have offered more nuanced interpretations.[225] Carr, while not completing a single-volume history, extensively analyzed the Comintern's relationship with Soviet foreign policy, allowing for a degree of autonomous action by Comintern leaders and national parties.[226] Claudin, in his Marxist analysis, argued that the Comintern was marked by a "crisis of theory" from its inception, as it failed to differentiate between Russian and Western European conditions, leading to flawed strategies.[227]
The opening of the Comintern archives in Moscow has spurred new research, often confirming the extent of Soviet control, particularly under Stalin, but also revealing complexities in the relationship between the center and national sections, and internal debates within the Comintern apparatus.[228] There is ongoing debate about the degree of autonomy retained by national parties and the interplay between Moscow's directives and indigenous factors in shaping communist policies.[229] More recent scholarship has also adopted a transnational and global history perspective, focusing on the Comintern as a network and on the lives and experiences of its "professional revolutionaries" who operated across borders, treating the organization as a unique "lifeworld" with its own practices and culture.[230]
The legacy of the Comintern is overwhelmingly viewed as one of failure in achieving its original aims of worldwide socialist revolution and the liberation of colonial peoples.[231] Instead of being a pluralistic body of enthusiastic revolutionaries, it was gradually transformed into a bureaucratized instrument of the Soviet state, particularly under Stalin.[232] Its history is marked by a series of failures and disappointments, from the "German October" in 1923 to theBritish General Strike in 1926 and theChinese Revolution in 1927.[233] According to historianFranz Borkenau, the Comintern's evolution can be divided into three periods: from 1919 to 1923 it was primarily an instrument for world revolution; from 1924 to 1928 it became an instrument in Russian factional struggles; and from 1929 onwards it was an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.[234] The concept ofproletarian internationalism became identified with devotion to the USSR and the duty to protect the "first socialist motherland".[235]
The Comintern's insistence on "iron discipline", intolerance of political rivals, and the ossification of Marxist thought under Stalinism hindered the development of strategies more applicable to diverse national conditions.[235] The processes ofBolshevisation and later Stalinisation led to the demotion, expulsion, and purging of those who resisted Moscow's line.[235] The Comintern's hostility towardssyndicalism and other currents of revolutionary socialism drove out figures likeAlfred Rosmer,Pierre Monatte,Ángel Pestaña, andMartin Tranmæl.[236] It legitimized the absurdities of "social fascism", justified theGreat Purge and the mass repression of loyal communists, and supported theNazi–Soviet Pact.[235] According toG. D. H. Cole, the Comintern deliberately set out to split the world's socialist movements, seeing reformists and centrists as "social traitors" who needed to be detached from their working-class base. This strategy, Cole argues, not only failed to achieve world revolution but, by dividing the working-class forces, helped bring about the triumph of fascism in Italy and Germany.[92] Similarly, socialist historianJulius Braunthal argued that Lenin's doctrine "wrecked the unity of the international workers movement... and, in Italy and Germany, paved the way for Fascism".[237][238]
However, the Comintern's legacy is also seen as ambiguous. In the 1920s, it nurtured a range of theoretical responses to contemporary problems, with figures like Trotsky, Bukharin, andAntonio Gramsci offering diverse solutions.[239] During thePopular Front era andWorld War II, communists were among the most active anti-fascists, notably organizing theInternational Brigades in theSpanish Civil War, though this support was also used to enforce Stalinist orthodoxy and suppress other left-wing groups.[240] The threat of communism may also have spurred capitalist governments to undertake social reforms.[241] After World War II, communism expanded significantly, with organized communists numbering fourteen million outside the Soviet Union by the end of 1945. This growth was partly due to the Soviet war effort and the groundwork laid by the Comintern in consolidating disciplined communist parties.[242]
Ultimately, the universalisation of a Bolshevik model specific to Russian conditions, later subjected to Stalinist hyper-centralisation, is seen as a core reason for the Comintern's failures and the eventual demise of the communist ideal.[243] The Leninist party structure and its associated dogmas proved to be an enduring constraint on communist parties adapting to changing post-war realities.[244] The uncritical and dogmatic mentality cultivated within the Comintern during the Stalinist period was transmitted to the new mass parties that emerged after 1945.[245] The Comintern nonetheless represented a unique historical experiment in creating a global and transnational network that supported movements of emancipation and gave a voice to oppressed groups such as the working class, women, and the peoples of the colonies.[246]
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