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| Combat Skyspot | |
|---|---|
| Part of Second Indochina War (Vietnam •Laos •Cambodia);Arc Light | |
| Type | Ground-directed bombing operation |
| Location | |
| Commanded by | United States Air Force (USAF) United States Marine Corps (USMC) |
| Target | Cambodia,North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Thailand |
| Date | 1965–1973 |
| Executed by | 7th Air Force coordinator: Lt Col Robert C. Seitzberg[1]: 34 1CEVGDet. 15[2] LS-85: Lt Col Gerald Clayton USMC |
| Casualties | At least 21, additional remains identified killed |
Combat Skyspot was theground-directed bombing (GDB) operation of theVietnam War by theUnited States Air Force using Bomb Directing Centrals and by theUnited States Marine Corps using Course Directing Centrals ("MSQ-77 andTPQ-10 ground radars").[3] Combat Skyspot'scommand guidance of B-52s and tactical fighters and bombers[4]—"chiefly flown byF-100's"[3]—at night and poor weather was used for aerial bombing of strategic, close air support, interdiction, and other targets. Using a combination radar/computer/communications system ("Q" system) at operating location inSoutheast Asia, a typical bombing mission (e.g., duringOperation Arc Light with a "cell" of 3Boeing B-52 Stratofortresses) had an air command post turn over control of the mission to the radar station, and the station provided bomb run corrections and designated when to release bombs.[5]
Planning of Vietnam GDB missions included providing coordinates with 10 m (11 yd) accuracy[5] to the radar sites, handoff of the bomber from air controllers (e.g., aDASC) to the site, tracking the aircraft by radiating the bomber (e.g., activating the 400 WattMotorola SST-181 X Band Beacon Transponder),[6] and radioing of technical data from the aircrew to the radar site such as the airspeed/heading for the central to estimate wind speed on the bomb(s). With the bomber near a designated "Initial Point" the GDB site would begin a radar track (Bomb Directing Centrals would calculate a computer track and solve the "bomb problem" for the aircraft position.)
For B-52 missions the site personnel verbally transmitted guidance commands to the aircraft crew by radio (lead aircraft for multi-ship formations) to adjust the flight path toward an eventual release point for the actual bomb(s). Site personnel verbally directed release of the ordnance from the aircraft by voice countdown. This was a manual process requiring training, practice and adherence to procedure. Both the site and aircrew were authorized to "withhold" release at any point if doubt arose. All communications were tape recorded by the aircrew for post strike debriefing.
Similar toWorld War II GDB andKorean War GDB, Combat Skyspot was planned during 1965 development of theReeves AN/MSQ-77 Bomb Directing Central with a new integrating ballistic computer using vacuum tubes to continually compute the bomb release point during the bomb run (the USMC AN/TPQ-10 directed aircraft to a predetermined release point). Planning for the USAF vacuum-tube trajectory computer/radar system began in early 1965 and in October 1965,F-100s tested the AN/MSQ-77 atMatagorda Island General Bombing and Gunnery Range on theTexas Gulf Coast[1] (theMatagorda training unit was later moved toBergstrom Air Force Base). In 1967 a helicopter-transportable variant of the AN/MSQ-77 in rigid shelters (AN/TSQ-81) was developed forCommando Club bombing of northern North Vietnam targets (Red River Delta), and in 1969 training for an additional transportable variant with tower-mounted antenna and digital computer (AN/TSQ-96) was being conducted at theReeves Instrument Corporation in New York. "In March 1966 the first MSQ-77 arrived atBien Hoa" Air Base[3] ("activated" April 1[5] to use the "reverse MSQ method".)[3]
| Vietnam War ground-directed bombing sites | |||
| site | location | accuracy[7] | notes |
| OL-21 MACON | Bien Hoa Air Base | 238 ft (73 m) | |
| OL-22 BONGO | Pleiku | 256 ft (78 m) | |
| OL-23 LID | Nakhon Phanom RTAFB[7] laterUdorn RTAFB[8] | 322 ft (98 m) | AN/MSQ-77,c. 1969 AN/TSQ-96 |
| OL-24 MILKY | Đông Hà Combat Base,[9] Hue-Phu Bai, Monkey Mountain (Da Nang) | 291 ft (89 m) | overrun March 31, 1972 |
| OL-25 TEEPEE | Dalat, laterUbon RTAFB[10] | ||
| OL-26 | Binh Thuy Air Base,RVN[11] | 222 ft (68 m) | |
| OL-27 BROMO | Nakhon Phanom RTAFB | 1967 AN/TSQ-81 | |
| LS-85 WAGER CONTROL | mountaintop ofPhou Pha Thi | 1967-8 AN/TSQ-81(destroyed 10 March 1968) | |
| Lima Site 44 PAULA | Salavan, Laos | Channel 72 emplaced April 1966 | |
| Skyline Ridge JANE | Long Tieng, Laos | Channel 79 emplaced May 1966 | |
| Lima Site 61 NORA | Muang Phalane, Laos | Channel 77 emplaced 26 March 1967[1]: 34 | |
| [specify] | AN/TPQ-10 sites | ||
Combat Skyspot was first used "to support fighting ground troops" on July 2, 1966;[12] and the initial 15,000 Skyspot sorties from March 1966[13]-March 1967 included the respective 35%, 46%, and 54% "of the B-52D sorties flown" from July[12]-December 1966, in January 1967, and in March 1967.[14] Similar to the lead bomber for 3-ship B-52 missions, aNorth American F-100 Super Sabres could use Skyspot to act as a pathfinder forRepublic F-105 Thunderchiefs.[15] On July 3, 1966, "24-hour all-weather bombing [was] authorized against targets in Laos [using] MSQ-77 ground director bombing system (SKY SPOT)" and on July 5,[16] "Quick Run" began with Skyspot airstrikes where "MACV could request priority targeting resulting in B-52D missions diverted from their primary targets prior to take off or after takeoff".[14] In addition toArc Light B-52 airstrikes, Skyspot was used against Cambodia targets ofOperation Menu fromBien Hoa Air Base and byOperation Niagara.[17] The Combat Skyspot "Operations Order (OPORD) 439–67" was published March 10, 1967;[7] and notable battles using Skyspot include:
Skyspot also supportedLockheed AC-130 gunships,[23]BLU-82/B drops[24] fromMC-130 Commando Vault aircraft to clear landing zones, at least 1 helicopter evacuation of wounded on August 13, 1966,[25] and "since many maps of South Vietnam contained distance errors of up to 300 meters",[3] target surveying by tracking an observation aircraft flying circles around a target for plotting its coordinates.[7] As with "loran-controlled photography" for target geolocation,[3] Skyspot was also used for surveying during 'recce escort' missions, e.g., for Commando Club calibration with anRF-4C reconnaissance jet taking high speed target photos during a "Run for the Roses" ("almost guaranteed to produce copious SAM firings").[26] Interdiction occasionally used Skyspot to walk subsequent bombs onto a small target such as byCommando Nailforward air controller, e.g., to "hit a couple bull dozers … The Fac would say [you got him pause nope he's back on the dozer, move your coordinates to the adjusted location]… It took 4F-4 strikes to knock it out."[27] "On 22 December 1968, RF-4Cs from the12 and16 TRS began flying bomb damage assessment missions to evaluate" Skyspot accuracy.[28]
Commando Club was a Combat Skyspot operation for ground-directed bombing ofRed River Delta targets (Hanoi,Haiphong, etc.) out of range of the initial Combat Skyspot sites using a specialized radar emplaced byHeavy Green at one of theLaos Sites of the Vietnam War. The operation also bombed clandestine targets in the neutralKingdom of Laos (e.g., for self-defense during theBattle of Route 602) using Detachment 1 personnel of the 1043rd Radar Evaluation Squadron[29] performing AN/TSQ-81 operations as Lockheed civilians (volunteers discharged from the USAF for cover). Due to limited reliability of the AN/TSQ-81 radios, an intermediary aircraft (EC-121[30]: b or "usually aC-135…decoy ship")[31] provided a "radio relay [and] surveillance/control channel" (callsign: WAGER) between the radar and the bomber.[32]
| Commando Club/total missions by target area & period[33] | |||
| Period | North Vietnam [verification needed] | Barrel Roll "around" LS-85[34] | Both areas |
| November | 20/153 (13%) | 1/268 | 21/421 (5%) |
| December | 20/94 (21%) | 67/327 (20%) | 87/421 (21%) |
| January | 29/125 (55%) | 23/320 (10%) | 52/445 (12%) |
| February | 27/49 (55%) | 142/375 (38%) | 169/424 (40%) |
| March 1–10 | 3/6 (50%) | 165**/182 (91%) | 168/188 (89%) |
| Total | 99*/427 (20%) | 398/1472[34] (27%) | 497/1899 (26%) |
| *The 99 Commando Club missions on NVN used ~500sorties.[35] (The last was on theThai Nguyen RR yard.) **Only 153 of the March 1–10 Commando Club missions were on Laos targets.[1]: 62 | |||
The LS-85 radar withcallsign "Wager Control"[36] at 396.2 MHz[30]: a and day/night shift crews of 5 men each[37] became operational on November 1, 1967;[38] and trial missions[clarification needed] byRepublic F-105 Thunderchiefs were led[specify] by Col.John C. Giraudo[36] (355th Fighter Wing commander).[39] F-105 Commando Club missions included the November 15, 1967,357th Tactical Fighter Squadron bombing ofYên Bái Air Base inRoute Package 5 ("noBDA possible") and the defeated November 18 raid of 16 F-105s of the388th Tactical Fighter Wing—preceded by 4 F-105Wild Weasels—onPhúc Yên Air Base (JCS Target 6).[36] The latter mission's loss of 2 Wild Weasels toMiGs and then some of the bombers toSAM sites thattracked the USAF jamming resulted in temporary suspension of Commando Club untilelectronic countermeasures were improved. Through November 16, LS-85 had effected a direct hit (zero miss distance) as well as a 5 mi (8.0 km) miss: the Commando Club CEP for "14 runs was 867 feet"[40] while other Skyspot sites for 1967 missions averaged 300–350 ft (91–107 m) error at ranges ≤100 nmi (190 km; 120 mi).[13] LS-85 accuracy was improved during the suspension period, another UHF radio was added at the summit, and the radio relay's secondary task of surveilling for MiGs was eliminated.[41]
Commando Club was resumed by November 21 when F-105s attacked the Yên Bái airfield (also on December 1 & 23,[36] January 5, & February 11.)[30]: d LS-85 directing bombings of Laos'Ban Phougnong truck park on December 22, a target "25 miles west of [LS-85's TACAN] Channel 97" on December 28, and "a target 20 miles east of San Neua" December 31; and "Commando Club under Wager Control" bombed the Kim Lo Army Barracks northwest of Hanoi on February 7, 1968,[30]: c a Route Pack V target on February 11, and the "Phuc Yen (JCS 6) airfield" & "theBan Nakay truck park in Northern Laos" on February 19.[30]: d Arc Light B-52s and other aircraft also flew missions of Commando Club, which were 20% (less than 1 per day) of all bombing missions on North Vietnam targets during November 1 – March 10. Commando Club airstrikes against Laos targets included operations to interdict enemy advances on LS-85 such as theBattle of Route 602. "On 21 Februarythe [Laos] Ambassador authorized the Local Area Defense Commander (alternately the senior CIA officer or the FAC) to use the TSQ radar to direct any and all strikes within 12 kilometers of the summit" and "between the 20th and 29th, 342 sorties hit within 30 kilometers of Phou Phathi."[33] Commando Club operations during theBattle of Route 602 were part of the approximately 400 Commando Club missions out of the "1,472BARREL ROLL Strike missions" flown "around" LS-85 from November 1 – March 10.[34] Despite the bombing campaign, the enemy reached LS-85 and it was captured during theBattle of Lima Site 85 on March 10/11, 1968.
The AN/TSQ-96 atUbon RTAFB directed the "last Arc Light strike of the Indochinese conflicts…on August 15, 1973",[24] and the lastVietnam War Skyspot mission was also from OL-25[42] (in December 1975 the TSQ-81 that had been at OL-23 was moved nearOsan Air Base, Korea.)[43] TheAN/MSQ-77 averaged 300–350 ft (91–107 m) error for 1967 missions at ranges ≤100 nmi (190 km; 120 mi),[13] and theAN/TPQ-10 had aCEP of 150 ft (46 m).[how?]far?] ForRoute Package I sorties, the "major increase in high altitude MSQ-77 bombing was probably the most important reason for loss reduction" (fewer shoot downs),[44] Casualties associated with Combat Skyspot included a Detachment 15 NCO killed in an enemy rocket attack,[45] 6 of a site survey team killed in a 1966 ambush,[25] and the 13 KIA of theBattle of Lima Site 85. In 1989, remains of anF-4CWeapon System Officer shot down during a November 10, 1967, AN/MSQ-77 bomb run were recovered in Southeast Asia,[46] and US remains from the LS-85 battle were identified in 2005 & 2012. The Combat Skyspot Memorial onAndersen Air Force Base, Guam, identifies[when?] personnel killed in Southeast Asia (itsAN/MSQ-77 antenna was destroyed by a typhoonc. 2007).[47]
| External image | |
|---|---|
 1967 Dong Ha "SKY SPOT" entrance |
Skyspot's accuracy let heavy bombs be dropped on occasion within 250 meters of friendly positions. …many maps of South Vietnam contained distance errors of up to 300 meters. … Skyspot (S) MSQ-77 and TPQ-10 ground radars[dead link]
In SEA, the MSQ-77 system is utilized by tactical fighters, tactical bombers, and B-52 bomber aircraft for controlled release of ordnance on targets during periods of darkness and adverse weather. It was used by: F-100, F-4C, F-105, A-1E, A-26, B-52, and B-57, though most frequently used by F-100s and B-52s.
Preplanned radar-directed strikes were fragged by the TACC along with other missions. After takeoff, the strike aircraft were passed from the appropriate CRC/CRP to an MSQ-77 [or] TPQ-10 radar station that directed the strike.
In SEA, the MSQ-77 system is utilized by tactic~l fighters, tactical bombers, and 8–52 bomber aircr~ft for controlled release ti or~nance'on targets during periods of darkness and adverse weather. … The F-IOO and B-S2 aircraft use the system most frequently.(p. 7)
OL-23 (call sign LID)…ran many Arc Light strikes against targets in northern Laos.
OL-26 (call sign GAP) was deeply involved with the secret bombing in Cambodia
By December 1966, 35 percent of the B-52D sorties flown were MSQ directed, increasing to 46 percent in January and 54 percent in March.
Finally, a B-52 from U Tapao carrying 108 500-pound bombs ran a test mission on 26 February, guided by Skyspot. The delivery was precise and the equipment operated well. The following day, four missions were run close to the defenders at Khe Sanh. During March, 44 close-support sorties were run.
{{cite report}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link) (partial transcription at 1stCombatEvaluationGroup.com)Archived 2013-06-06 at theWayback MachineOne night we worked with a Nail Fac and hit a couple bull dozers. …the fac gave coordinates, we would run an F4 on the spot. The Fac would say you got him pause nope he's back on the dozer, move your coordinated to whatever the new coordinates were. It took 4 f 4s to finally nock it out.
34 TFS were diverted to a target in Laos as a result of the North Vietnamese attack on Lima Site 85. They took off at 0715 and returned after 2 hours 55 minutes. … We were diverted up to Lima 85 up by the North TACAN station. The bad guys were trying to storm the hill. The hill was sticking up through the clouds but we couldn't detect any enemy action. The A-1Es were working over the enemy but they wouldn't let us in on the action. Instead they put us in on an enemy gun emplacement about 10 miles away.
We already had a 600-foot STOL strip three-quarters of the way up the mountain for resupplying local Meo guerrilla … One wounded and extraordinarily unlucky technician was killed, shot through the backduring helicopter evacuation.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)From November 1967 to March 1968, controllers at Phou Pha Thi directed nearly a hundred "Commando Club" missions (about five hundred sorties) against the Red River Delta.
{{cite book}}:|journal= ignored (help)On 1 November 1967, another MSQ-77 became operational in Laos, but it was destroyed by the enemy in March 1968.
{{cite book}}:|journal= ignored (help){{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)