This article includes a list ofgeneral references, butit lacks sufficient correspondinginline citations. Please help toimprove this article byintroducing more precise citations.(September 2009) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
TheColumbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was an internal commission convened byNASA to investigate thedestruction of theSpace ShuttleColumbia duringSTS-107 upon atmospheric re-entry on February 1, 2003.[1][2] The panel determined that the accident was caused by foam insulation breaking off from the external fuel tank, forming debris which damaged the orbiter's wing, and that the problem of "debris shedding" was well known but considered "acceptable" by management.[3] The panel also recommended changes that should be made to increase the safety of future shuttle flights. The CAIB released its final report on August 26, 2003.[4][5][6]
The board found both the immediate physical cause of the accident and also what it called organizational causes.

82 seconds after launch a large piece of foam insulating material, the "left bipod foam ramp", broke free from the external tank and struck the leading edge of the shuttle's left wing, damaging the protective carbon heat shielding panels.
During re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere, this damage allowed super-heated gases to enter and erode the inner wing structure which led to the destruction ofColumbia. It was the seventh instance of a piece of foam, from this particular area of the external tank, breaking free during launch, and the only instance of structural damage as a result of the breakage.[7]
The problem of debris shedding from the external tank was well known and had caused shuttle damage on every prior shuttle flight. The damage was usually, but not always, minor. Over time, management gained confidence that it was an acceptable risk. NASA decided that it did not warrant an extra EVA (extravehicular activity) for visual inspection, with one official Sean O'Keefe dismissing the event as "the functional equivalent...of a Styrofoam cooler blowing off a pickup truck ahead of you on the highway".[8]
The board made 29 specific recommendations to NASA to improve the safety of future shuttle flights. These recommendations include:
Only two further Space Shuttle missions were allowed to be flown before the implementation of these recommendations.
After the CAIB report came out, NASA implemented all recommended changes and flew itsfirst post-Columbia mission in 2005. As part of the CAIB recommendations, the Shuttle carried a 50-foot inspection boom attached to the robot arm, which was used within 24 hours of launch to check the orbiter for damage. As all but one of the post-Columbia missions were concentrated on theInternational Space Station, primarily to provide a "safe haven" in the event an orbiter was damaged beyond the normal repair methods, NASA implemented aSTS-3xx contingency mission program that could launch a rescue orbiter on short notice, similar to theSkylab Rescue that was planned during theSkylab program.
NASA retired theSpace Shuttle fleet on July 21, 2011, after completing the ISS and the final flight and subsequent landing ofAtlantis. The Shuttle's replacement,Orion, was to have consisted of anApollo-derived spacecraft launched on theAres I rocket, which would use aSpace Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster as its first stage. Orion would not face the dangers of either an O-ring failure (due to the presence of alaunch escape system[9]) or shedding foam (as the spacecraft would be launched in a stack configuration). In addition to ferrying crews to the ISS, the Orion spacecraft was (as part ofProject Constellation) to allow NASA to return to the Moon.[9] President Obama signed the NASA Authorization Act 2010 on October 11 which officially brought the Constellation program to an end, replacing it with theSpace Launch System (SLS) andMulti-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) programs to develop the launch vehicle and spacecraft to enable human exploration missions beyond low-Earth orbit.[10]
Chairman of the board
Board members
Source:[12]