Civilian control of the military incommunist states have differed from country to country. There are typically three models ofcivilian control of the military: party-run, state-run, and hybrid. In all three models, thecommunist party has an internal organisation in the military.
In the party-run model, the military is entirely run through the organ on military affairs of thecentral committee of thecommunist party. This was the case inChina from 1975 to 1983, when there existed no state counterpart to theCentral Military Commission of theCentral Committee of theChinese Communist Party (CCP).[1] Since 1982, under the principle of "one institution with two names", a state counterpart with an identical name, personnel and organisation has existed alongside its party counterpart.[2] The party's authority is stated in law, Article 19 of the "Law of the People's Republic of China on National Defence" states, "The armed forces of the People’s Republic of China is subject to the leadership of the Communist Party of China."[3]
In the state-run model, the highest organ on military affairs is an organ of thehighest organ of state power, with no party counterpart. This model was practised by theSoviet Union, in which theCouncil of Defence, appointed by thePresidium of theSupreme Soviet, led theSoviet armed forces. However, party leadership was ensured by the Soviet party leader, thegeneral secretary of theCentral Committee of theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union, servingex officio as chairman of the Council of Defence.[4]
In the hybrid model, both the state and the party have organs on military affairs. This model is practised in Vietnam, in which theCommunist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has aninternal organ on military affairs led by theparty leader and the highest organ of state power, theNational Assembly of Vietnam, having astate counterpart led by thePresident of Vietnam. Despite this, the Vietnamese political system stresses that theVietnamese armed forces are under the absolute leadership of the CPV.[5]
