| Erie v. Pap's A. M. | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued November 10, 1999 Decided March 29, 2000 | |
| Full case name | City of Erie, et al. v. Pap's A. M., tdba "Kandyland" |
| Citations | 529U.S.277 (more) 120 S. Ct. 1382; 146L. Ed. 2d 265 |
| Case history | |
| Prior | 553 Pa. 348, 719A.2d 273. The state supreme court determined that petitioner City's ordinance banning public nudity violated respondent operator of totally nude dancing establishment's right to freedom of expression under U.S. Const. amend. I. |
| Holding | |
| The ordinance was content-neutral because it regulated conduct alone, did not target nudity that contained an erotic message, and petitioner's interest in preventing harmful secondary effects associated with adult entertainment establishments was not related to the suppression of the exotic message conveyed by nude dancing. TheO'Brien test for evaluating restrictions onsymbolic speech therefore applied, and was successfully met. Reversed. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | O'Connor (Parts I and II), joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer |
| Plurality | O'Connor (Parts III and IV), joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy, Breyer |
| Concurrence | Scalia, joined by Thomas |
| Concur/dissent | Souter |
| Dissent | Stevens, joined by Ginsburg |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. Amend. I | |
Erie v. Pap's A. M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000), was alandmark decision by theSupreme Court of the United States regardingnude dancing asfree speech. The court held that an ordinance banningpublic nudity did not violate the free speech rights of a nude entertainment establishment's operator, employees, or customers.[1]
On September 28, 1994, the city council ofErie, Pennsylvania, enacted Ordinance 75–1994, apublic indecency ordinance that makes it asummary offense to knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a "state of nudity."[1][2] The respondent, Pap's, a Pennsylvania corporation, operated an establishment in Erie known as Kandyland that featured totally nude erotic dancing performed by women. To comply with the ordinance, these dancers would need to wear, at a minimum,pasties and aG-string.[1][2] On October 14, 1994, two days after the ordinance went into effect, Pap's filed a complaint against the city of Erie, mayor Joyce Savacchio, city solicitor Gregory A. Karle, and members of the city council, seekingdeclaratory relief and a permanentinjunction against the enforcement of the ordinance.[1]
The stateCourt of Common Pleas struck down the ordinance as unconstitutional, but the state appellateCommonwealth Court reversed the decision. ThePennsylvania Supreme Court in turn reversed the Commonwealth Court, finding that the ordinance's public nudity section was an unconstitutional violation of Pap'sFirst Amendment rights. The company appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and was grantedcertiorari.[1]
The U.S. Supreme Court proceeded to the merits of the case despite a possiblemootness issue. While the case was pending, Pap's A.M. went out of business, meaning that no concrete private rights were left to litigate. Despite going out of business, the Supreme Court still heard the case because 1) the City of Erie was suffering an "ongoing injury" and 2) Pap's was still incorporated and could potentially go back into business.
The court found the following rules of law to apply:
After determining that the ordinance was content neutral, the Court then applied theO'Brien test for evaluating restrictions on symbolic speech. The first factor of theO'Brien test is whether the government regulation is within the constitutional power of the government to enact. The second factor is whether the regulation furthers an important or substantial government interest. The third factor is that the government interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression. The fourth factor is that the restriction be no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the government interest.[1]
The court found that the ordinance met all four factors of theO'Brien test, and that a "least restrictive means" analysis was not necessary.[1] The Court reversed the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and found the ordinance to be constitutional.
JusticeScalia, joined by JusticeThomas, agreed that thePennsylvania Supreme Court's decision must be reversed, but disagreed with the mode of analysis that should be applied.[1]