| China Burma India Theater | |||
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| Part of theAsia-Pacific theater ofWorld War II | |||
 Insignia of the CBI Theater | |||
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China Burma India Theater (CBI) was theUnited States military designation duringWorld War II for theChina andSoutheast Asian orIndia–Burma (IBT)theaters. Operational command ofAllied forces (including U.S. forces) in the CBI was officially the responsibility of theSupreme Commanders forSouth East Asia or China. In practice, U.S. forces were usually overseen by GeneralJoseph Stilwell, the Deputy Allied Commander in China; the term "CBI" was significant in logistical, material and personnel matters; it was and is commonly used within the US for these theaters.
U.S. and Chinese fighting forces in the CBI included theChinese Expeditionary Force, theFlying Tigers,[1] transport and bomber units flyingthe Hump, including theTenth Air Force, the1st Air Commando Group, the engineers who built theLedo Road, the5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), popularly known as "Merrill's Marauders", and the 5332d Brigade, Provisional or 'Mars Task Force', which assumed the Marauders' mission.
Japanese policy towards China had long been a source of international controversy. Western powers had exploited China through theopen door policy, advocated by United States diplomatWilliam Woodville Rockhill, while Japan intervened more directly, creating the puppet-state ofManchukuo. By 1937, Japan was engaged in afull-scale war of conquest in China. The infamousRape of Nanking galvanized Western opinion and led to direct financial aid for theKuomintang (Nationalists) and increasing economic sanctions against Japan.
In 1941, the U.S. made a series of decisions to support China in its war with Japan:Lend Lease supplies were provided after PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt announced the defense of China to be vital to the defense of the United States. Over the summer, as Japan moved south intoFrench Indo-China, the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands instituted an oil embargo on Japan, cutting off 90% of its supplies. The embargo threatened the operations of theKwantung Army, which had over a million soldiers deployed in China. Japan responded with a tightly co-ordinated offensive on 7/8 December, simultaneously attackingPearl Harbor,the Philippines,Malaya,Singapore,Hong Kong,Guam,Wake Island, andThailand.
Japan cut off Allied supplies to China that had been coming throughBurma. China could be supplied only by flying over theHimalaya mountains ("The Hump") from India,[2] or capturing territory in Burma and building a new road—theLedo Road.[3]
In 1941 and 1942, Japan was overextended. Its naval base could not defend its conquests, and its industrial base could not strengthen its navy. To cut off China from Allied aid, it went into Burma and capturedRangoon on 8 March 1942, cutting off theBurma Road. Moving north, the Japanese took Tounggoo and capturedLashio in northern Burma on 29 April. The British, primarily concerned with India, looked to Burma as the main theater of action against Japan and wanted Chinese troops to fight there.[4] The United States conjured up visions of millions of Chinese soldiers who would hold the Japanese then throw them back, while providing close-in airbases for a systematic firebombing of Japanese cities. Chinese Nationalist leaderChiang Kai-shek realized it was all fantasy. On the other hand, there were vast sums of American dollars available if he collaborated. He did so and managed to feed his starving soldiers, but they were so poorly equipped and led that offensive operations against the Japanese in China were impossible. However, Chiang did release theChinese Expeditionary Force of two Chinese armies for action in Burma underStilwell. Due to conflicts between Chiang, the British, Stilwell, and American GeneralClaire Chennault, as well as general ill-preparedness against the more proficient Japanese army, the Burma defense collapsed. Stilwell escaped to India, but the recovery of Burma and construction of the Ledo Road to supply China became a new obsession for him.[5][6]
"On April 14, 1942,William Donovan, as Coordinator of Information (forerunner of theOffice of Strategic Services), activatedDetachment 101 for action behind enemy lines inBurma. The first unit of its kind, the Detachment was charged with gathering intelligence, harassing the Japanese throughguerrilla actions, identifying targets for the Army Air Force to bomb, and rescuing downed Allied airmen. Because Detachment 101 was never larger than a few hundred Americans, it relied on support from various tribal groups in Burma. In particular, the vigorously anti-JapaneseKachin people were vital to the unit's success."[7]
Detachment 101's efforts opened the way for Stilwell's Chinese forces,Wingate's Raiders,Merrill's Marauders, and the counter-attack against the Japanese Imperial life-line.[8]
US forces in the CBI were administered by GeneralJoseph "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell. However, unlike other combat theaters, for example theEuropean Theater of Operations, the CBI was never a "theater of operations" and did not have an overall operational command structure. Initially U.S. land units were split. Those in China were technically commanded byGeneralissimoChiang Kai-shek,[9] as Stillwell was Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander in China. When the GALAHAD force (later to become the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional)) arrived in Bombay in October 1943, it came under the British-ledSouth East Asia Command (SEAC) and AdmiralLord Mountbatten.[10] However, Stilwell often broke thechain of command and communicated directly with the USJoint Chiefs of Staff on operational matters.
When joint allied command was agreed upon, it was decided that the senior position should be held by a British officer because the British had the greatest number of forces in India and Burma (in much the same way as the US did in thePacific War). Admiral Lord Mountbatten was appointed as the Supreme Allied Commander of South-East Asia forces in October 1943. Chiang however later objected to deferring to Mountbatten on matters related to operations in China.[11]
General Stilwell, who also had operational command of theNorthern Combat Area Command (NCAC), a US-Chinese formation, was to report in theory to Gen.George Giffard – commander ofEleventh Army Group – so that NCAC and theBritish Fourteenth Army, under the command of GeneralWilliam Slim, could be co-ordinated. However, in practice, Gen. Stilwell never agreed to this arrangement. Stilwell was able to do this because of his multiple positions within complex command structures, including especially his simultaneous positions of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, and Chief of Staff to Chinese leader GeneralissimoChiang Kai-shek. As SEAC's deputy leader, Stilwell was Giffard's superior, but as operational commander of NCAC, Giffard was Stilwell's superior. As the two men did not get on, this inevitably lead to conflict and confusion.
Stilwell, however, bitterly resisted [taking orders from Giffard] ... To watch Stilwell, when hard pressed, shift his opposition from one of the several strong-points he held by virtue of his numerous Allied, American and Chinese offices, to another was a lesson in mobile offensive-defence.
— William Slim[12]
Eventually at a SEAC meeting to sort out the chain of command for NCAC, Stilwell astonished everyone by saying "I am prepared to come under General Slim's operational control until I get toKamaing".[12] Although far from ideal, this compromise was accepted.[12]
Although Stilwell was the control and co-ordinating point for all command activity in the theater, his assumption of personal direction of the advance of the Chinese Ledo forces into north Burma in late 1943 meant that he was often out of touch with both his own headquarters and with the overall situation.[9]
Not until late 1944, after Stilwell was recalled to Washington, was the chain of command clarified. His overall role, and the CBI command, was then split among three people: Lt Gen.Raymond Wheeler became Deputy Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia; Major-GeneralAlbert Wedemeyer became Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek, and commander of US Forces, China Theater (USFCT). Lt Gen.Daniel Sultan was promoted, from deputy commander of CBI to commander of US Forces, India–Burma Theater (USFIBT) and commander of the NCAC. The 11th Army Group was redesignatedAllied Land Forces South East Asia (ALFSEA), and NCAC was decisively placed under this formation. However, by the time the last phase of theBurma Campaign began in earnest, NCAC had become irrelevant, and it was dissolved in early 1945.
Ramgarh Training Center, in Bihar Province, India, an American-staffed, American-operated organisation, was established on 30 June 1942 by General Stilwell, the Commanding General, USAF, CBI, for the training of Chinese troops in India. The Supreme Commander, China Theater, General Chiang Kai-Shek, had approvedRamgarh Cantonment, as the site for a training center to train, equip, and reinforce the Chinese troops that had retreated into India from Burma.[13]
The first Chinese troops arrived on 17 July 1942.
Headquarters RTC and Hq Camp Ramgarh combined and CG RTC assumed command on 1 February 1943. (These two organizations and HqChinese Army in India were the three original command organizations at Ramgarh.) Headquarters Ramgarh Training Center was responsible for the training of Chinese Army in India, and Headquarters Chinese Army in India was responsible for the activation, organization, administration, and command of Chinese units.[13]
After consultation among the Allied governments,Air Command South-East Asia was formed in November 1943 to control all Allied air forces in the theater, with Air Chief Marshal SirRichard Peirse as Commander-in-Chief.[14] Under Peirse's deputy,USAAF Major GeneralGeorge E. Stratemeyer,Eastern Air Command (EAC) was organized in 1943 to control Allied air operations in Burma, with headquarters inCalcutta.[15] Unlike the strained relations and confusion with Allied ground force commands, air force operations in the CBI were relatively smooth. Relations improved even further after new U.S. military aid began arriving, together with capable USAAF officers such as Brigadier GeneralWilliam D. Old of CBI Troop Carrier Command,[16] and ColonelsPhilip Cochran andJohn R. Alison of the1st Air Commando Group.[17] Within Eastern Air Command, Air Marshal SirJohn Baldwin commanded the Third Tactical Air Force, originally formed to provide close air support to the Fourteenth Army. Baldwin was later succeeded by Air Marshal SirAlec Coryton. U.S. Brigadier-GeneralHoward C. Davidson and later Air CommodoreF. J. W. Mellersh commanded the Strategic Air Force. In the new command, various units of the Royal Air Force and the U.S.Tenth Air Force worked side-by-side. In the autumn of 1943 SEAAC had 48 RAF and 17 USAAF squadrons; by the following May, the figures had risen to 64 and 28, respectively.[15]
At Eastern Air Command, Gen. Stratemeyer had a status comparable to that of Stilwell.[18] Coordinating the efforts of the various allied air components while maintaining relations with diverse command structures proved a daunting task. Part of Stratemeyer's command, the Tenth Air Force, had been integrated with theRAF Third Tactical Air Force in India in December 1943 and was tasked with a number of roles in support of a variety of allied forces. Another component, the USFourteenth Air Force in China, was under the jurisdiction of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as China theater commander. Although theIndia-China Division of the AAF'sAir Transport Command received its tonnage allocations from Stratemeyer as Stilwell's deputy, ICD reported directly to Headquarters ATC in Washington, D.C.
In the spring of 1944, the arrival ofBoeing B-29 Superfortresses in the theater, presaged a major offensive against Japan.XX Bomber Command of theTwentieth Air Force was tasked with the strategic bombing of Japan underOperation Matterhorn. It engaged in very-long-rangeBoeing B-29 Superfortress bombardment operations against Japan,Formosa, China,Indochina andBurma. It reported directly to theJoint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C., and had no command relationship with any authority in India. However, XX Bomber Command remained totally dependent on Eastern Air Command for supplies, bases, ground staff, and infrastructure support.
The B-29 force included the1st Photo Squadron, and the58th Bombardment Wing atChakulia,Kharagpur, with the40th (Chakulia Airport),444th,462nd, and468th Bombardment Groups.
While in India, XX BC was supported logistically byTenth Air Force and theIndia-China Division, Air Transport Command. The B-29 groups moved to West Field,Tinian, in early 1945.
After a period of reshuffling, Eastern Air Command's air operations began to show results. In August 1944, Admiral Mountbatten said to a press conference that EAC fighter missions had practically swept the Japanese air force from Burmese skies. Between the formation of ACSEA in November 1943, and the middle of August 1944, American and British forces operating in Burma destroyed or damaged more than 700 Japanese aircraft with a further 100 aircraft probably destroyed.[19] This achievement considerably reduced dangers to Air Transport Command cargo planes flying in support ofthe Hump airlift operation. By May 1944, EAC resupply missions in support of the Allied ground offensive had carried 70,000 tons of supplies and transported a total of 93,000 men, including 25,500 casualties evacuated from the battle areas. These figures did not include tonnage flown in the Hump airlift missions to China.[19]
Transferred in 1944 to Fourteenth Air Force:
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