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China–Uzbekistan relations

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Bilateral relations
China–Uzbekistan relations
Map indicating locations of China and Uzbekistan

China

Uzbekistan
Diplomatic mission
Chinese Embassy, TashkentUzbek Embassy, Beijing
Envoy
AmbassadorJiang YanAmbassadorFarhod Nuritdinovich Arziev

China–Uzbekistan relations[a] are thebilateral relationship between China andUzbekistan. Both countries are members of theShanghai Cooperation Organization.

History

[edit]

According to theMing Shilu, ambassadors from theUzbek Khanate andBukhara Khanate corresponded withMing China more than 20 times between 1488 and 1618.[1]

China recognized Uzbekistan's independence on 27 December 1991 and the two countries established relations on 2 January 1992.[2] Both countries signed the "China-Uzbek Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" in 2005, during Uzbek leaderIslam Karimov's meeting with Chinese leaderHu Jintao in Beijing.[3]

Uzbekistan has cooperated with China in extraditingUyghur activists from the country.[4] In July 2019, UN ambassadors of 37 countries, including Uzbekistan, signed a joint letter to theUnited Nations Human Rights Council defendingChina's persecution of Uyghurs.[5][6] Uzbekistan was one of 16 countries that defended China in 2019 but did not do so in 2020.[7]

Uzbek Prime MinisterAbdulla Aripov called China Uzbekistan's "closest partner" on a 26 August 2019 meeting.[8]

Economic relations

[edit]

China is the second-largest importer of raw materials from Uzbekistan.[9]: 152  As of 2024, significant Chinese investment in the country has resulted in approximately 600 Chinese-Uzbek joint enterprises.[9]: 152 

China has also increasing its development loans to Uzbekistan.[8] China regards Uzbekistan as a critical part of theBelt and Road Initiative.[citation needed]

As China reduces its reliance on imported natural gas, currently accounting for about 62% of its energy mix but projected to decline due to slowing economic growth and a national carbon neutrality target by 2060,Central Asian gas exporters, including Uzbekistan, are reevaluating their positions. A May 2025 report byEurasianet, drawing onBloombergNEF’sEnergy Transition Supply Chains 2025, underscores China's dominance in globalclean energy manufacturing, controlling over 70% of production in solar, wind, and battery technologies. With 76% of global investment in clean-tech facilities occurring in China in 2024 and renewables now supplying around 80% of its new electricity demand, China's softening gas appetite may reportedly limit future energy exports from the region.[10]

Political relations

[edit]

Uzbekistan follows theone China principle, and recognizesgovernment of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government representing the whole of China and Taiwan as "an inalienable part" of China. Uzbekistan also supports all efforts by the PRC to "achievenational reunification" and opposesTaiwan independence.[11]

Military relations

[edit]

ChineseUzbek military relations have grown in recent years as part of China's broader effort to expand its role as an arms supplier inCentral Asia. Traditionally reliant on Russian military equipment, Uzbekistan has begun diversifying its defense partnerships, partly due to a decline in Russian arms exports following its2022 invasion of Ukraine. In 2024, China sold anti-aircraft systems to Uzbekistan, and by April 2025, reports suggestedTashkent was considering purchasingJF-17 fighter jets; a joint China–Pakistan project known for its multi-role capabilities. If finalized, the deal would signal a shift in regional defense alignments and underscore Beijing's increasing influence in Central Asia's arms market.[12]

Cultural and educational relations

[edit]

In 2013, Uzbekistan and China signed a cultural exchange agreement to increase engagement in culture, education, science, and technology.[9]: 159  The first exchange per the agreement occurred in 2017, during which seminars, exhibitions, and performances were held.[9]: 159  These exchanges have been repeated since.[9]: 159 

China provides support for the preservation of and restoration ofcultural heritage sites in Uzbekistan.[9]: 159 

China Central Television (CCTV) and Uzbekistan's National Television and Radio Corporation (UzTRK) cooperate to produce joint programs and documentaries.[9]: 159 

Uzbekistan has twoConfucius Institutes.[9]: 156 

In June 2025, China and Uzbekistan expanded cooperation in vocational education with the signing of 13 agreements between Chinese colleges, enterprises, and Uzbek institutions at the China–Uzbekistan Vocational Education Cooperation Conference in Chongqing. The agreements covered fields such as telecommunications, new energy vehicles, construction, and manufacturing. As part of the partnership, the Chongqing Vocational Institute of Engineering andZTE announced plans to establish a Sino–Uzbek telecommunication college with the Tashkent Transport Technical College, while Anhui Water Conservancy Technical College andBYD’s Uzbekistan plant partnered with a local college to open a new energy vehicle industry college. Speaking at the event, Otabek Mahkamov, Uzbekistan's deputy minister of higher education, science and innovation, noted that Uzbekistan was pursuing large-scale reforms in vocational education and valued China's cooperation with major companies such asBYD,Huawei, andZTE.[13]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^

References

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  1. ^"The Tūqmāq (Golden Horde), the Qazaq Khanate, the Shībānid Dynasty, Rūm (Ottoman Empire), and Moghūlistan in the XIV-XVI Centuries: from Original Sources"(PDF). Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 2023-01-16. Retrieved2022-05-08.
  2. ^"Cooperation of the Republic of Uzbekistan with the countries of the Asia and the Pacific".Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Archived fromthe original on 2015-10-22. Retrieved2020-12-24.
  3. ^Buckley, Chris (2005-05-27)."China 'honors' Uzbekistan crackdown".The New York Times.ISSN 0362-4331.Archived from the original on 2020-01-31. Retrieved2020-01-31.
  4. ^Jardine, Bradley."China's Surveillance State Has Eyes on Central Asia".Foreign Policy.Archived from the original on 2019-11-15. Retrieved2020-01-31.
  5. ^"Which Countries Are For or Against China's Xinjiang Policies?".The Diplomat. 15 July 2019.Archived from the original on 16 July 2019. Retrieved13 May 2024.
  6. ^"Saudi Arabia and Russia among 37 states backing China's Xinjiang policy".Reuters. 12 July 2019.Archived from the original on 2019-12-10. Retrieved2019-07-13.
  7. ^Basu, Zachary (8 October 2020)."Mapped: More countries sign UN statement condemning China's mass detentions in Xinjiang".Axios.Archived from the original on 1 November 2020. Retrieved18 December 2020.
  8. ^ab"Uzbekistan Increasingly Turns to China for Development Loans".Jamestown Foundation.Archived from the original on 2019-09-09. Retrieved2020-01-31.
  9. ^abcdefghSun, Yi (2024). "Necessitated by Geopolitics: China's Economic and Cultural Initiatives in Central Asia". In Fang, Qiang; Li, Xiaobing (eds.).China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment.Leiden University Press.ISBN 9789087284411.JSTOR jj.15136086.
  10. ^"As China Cuts Gas Demand, Uzbekistan Eyes Renewables Opportunity - The Times Of Central Asia". 2025-05-09. Retrieved2025-05-13.
  11. ^"Five One-Chinas: The contest to define Taiwan".Lowy Institute. Retrieved2025-11-15.
  12. ^"China trying to expand role as arms supplier to Central Asia | Eurasianet".eurasianet.org. Retrieved2025-04-15.
  13. ^Tan, Yingzi (2025-06-18)."Vocational education cooperation boosted with Uzbekistan".China Daily. Retrieved2025-09-07.
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