Movatterモバイル変換


[0]ホーム

URL:


Jump to content
WikipediaThe Free Encyclopedia
Search

China–Israel relations

Extended-protected article
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article is about relations between thePeople's Republic of China and theState of Israel. For relations between Israel and theRepublic of China, seeIsrael–Taiwan relations.
Bilateral relations
China–Israel relations
Map indicating locations of China and Israel

China

Israel
Diplomatic mission
Embassy of China, Tel AvivEmbassy of Israel, Beijing
Envoy
AmbassadorCai RunAmbassadorIrit Ben-Abba

ThePeople's Republic of China (PRC) and theState of Israel formally established diplomatic relations in 1992.[1][2] While theRepublic of China hadde jurerecognized Israeli sovereignty in 1949, it eventually lost theChinese Civil War, bringing theChinese Communist Party (CCP) to power across mainland China. In 1950, Israel became the first country in theMiddle East to recognize the PRC as the sole government inmainland China,[3] but the CCP did not reciprocate by establishing diplomatic ties due to Israel's alignment with theWestern Bloc during theCold War. This discontent persisted until the Cold War came to a close with thedissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

China has become[as of?] Israel's second largest trading partner globally and its largest trading partner inEast Asia.[4][5][6] Bilateral trade volume increased from $50 million in 1992 to over $10 billion in 2013.[7][needs update] Israel has traded significantly with China in technology and arms.[8][9][10]

The relations between the two countries have been complicated by China's support for thePalestinians andIran, both involved inongoing conflicts with Israel, and thegeopolitical rivalry between China and theUnited States, Israel's primary security guarantor.[11] In theUnited Nations, China has long voted in support of theState of Palestine and against Israel.[12][13]

Israel maintains an embassy inBeijing and consulates-general inGuangzhou,Chengdu,Hong Kong, andShanghai, while China maintains an embassy inTel Aviv.

History

Embassy of China in Tel Aviv
Embassy in Beijing
Embassy of Israel in Beijing

In the 1930s,David Ben-Gurion, then leader of theYishuv in Palestine, proclaimed that China would be one of the great world powers of the future.[14]

During the 1930s and 1940s, Shanghai was an importanthaven for Jewish refugees.[15]: 128  Along with the legacies of individuals such asHo Feng-Shan who protected Jews, this history continues to be a shared positive point of reference for contemporary relations between China and Israel.[15]: 128  Major Israeli officials including Prime MinisterBenjamin Netanyahu have emphasized this history during visits to theShanghai Jewish Refugees Museum.[15]: 128 

For some time after theChinese Communist Revolution in 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was diplomatically isolated, because theUnited States and its allies, including Israel, recognized theRepublic of China (ROC, commonly known asTaiwan after 1949) as the sole legitimate government of China. TheNationalist government of the ROC had been historically sympathetic to theZionist cause, while ROC founderSun Yat-sen affirmed his support for the creation of aJewish state.[16][17]

Before 1955, the People's Republic of China (PRC) did not have a stance on theArab-Israeli conflict.[18]: xxxiv-xxxv  This was largely because the PRC had few diplomatic contacts with Israel and the independent Arab states recognized the ROC at the time and not the PRC.[18]: xxxiv–xxxv 

During the 1955Bandung Conference, the PRC expressed support for thePalestinian right of return, but refrained from denying Israel'sright to exist and secretly pursued trade ties with the Israelis.[19] In January 1950, Israel formally recognized the PRC, becoming the first Middle Eastern state to do so.[15]: 126 

During theSuez Crisis in 1956, China made strong statements insupport of Egypt but did not make references to Israel when it condemnedFrance andBritain.[18]: xxxvii 

In 1975, the PRC supportedUnited Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 that stated that Zionism was a form of racism.[12] Until the 1980s, China refused to grantvisas to Israelis unless they helddual citizenship and carried a passport of a country other than Israel.[20] However, following theSino-Soviet split and China's 1979 establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States, China began to develop a series of secret, non-official ties with Israel.[21]

Developing ties

China and Israel secretly began building military ties in the 1980s during theSoviet–Afghan War, which both Israel and China opposed. They both supplied weapons to the Afghanmujahideen (Israel sending capturedPalestine Liberation Organization weapons via the United States andPakistan), and military cooperation between the two began in order to assist the Islamic resistance against the Soviets. China and Israel subsequently started exchanging visits of delegations of academics, experts, businessmen and industrialists.[20] Reportedly, a large number of theheavy tanks used in China's 1984National Day parades were retrofitted by Israel from capturedSix-Day War equipment.[21]

China eased travel restrictions, while Israel reopened itsconsulate inHong Kong (then underBritish administration), which would serve as the main point for diplomatic and economic contact between the two nations. In 1987 Israel's Prime Minister,Shimon Peres, appointedAmos Yudan to set up the first official Government owned company (Copeco Ltd[22]) to establish and foster commercial activities between companies in China and Israel. The company was active until 1992, when official diplomatic relationships were announced between Israel and China.[20] In the early 1990s, China joined a number of nations who established ties with Israel after the initiation of apeace process between Israel and the PLO in the early 1990s; it also desired to play a role in the peace process.

The two countries established full diplomatic relations in 1992.[15]: 127  Previously, Israel and China's representative offices inBeijing andTel Aviv functioned asde facto embassies. The Israeli office was formally known as the Liaison Office of theIsrael Academy of Sciences and Humanities.[23] This was opened in June 1990.[24] China was similarly represented by a branch of the China International Travel Service, which also opened in 1990.[25]

Zev Sufott, who had served in the liaison office of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities in Beijing beginning in 1991, was appointed as Israel's first Ambassador to China upon the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992.[26][27]

Early bilateral cooperation including establishing the Sino-Israeli Agricultural Training Center atChina Agricultural University.[15]: 127 

Relations in the 21st century

In 2009,China Radio International (CRI) began broadcasting in Hebrew.[28] In addition, the Chinese established Chinese institutes in Israel, to public and media activities of Israel-based Chinese diplomats.[29]

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited China in May 2013 and five agreements were signed during his visit. A government-to-government mechanism was established and five task forces were set up in high tech, environmental protection, energy, agriculture and financing.[7] Netanyahu visited China again in 2017 amid celebrations taking place to commemorate 25 years of ties between the two countries.[30]

During the2014 Israel–Gaza conflict, it was reported that Israel was winning the public opinion battle in China with most Chinese social media users siding with Israel.[31][32]

Starting in 2019,Chinese state-sponsored cyberespionage group UNC215 targeted Israeli government institutions, IT providers, and telecommunication firms in a series of attacks that attempted to disguise themselves as Iranian hackers.[33][34]

In May 2020, the Chinese ambassador to Israel,Du Wei, was found dead at his home inHerzliya. While the exact cause of his death is unknown, it is believed he died of natural causes.[35][36]

In November 2021, Israeli PresidentIsaac Herzog andChinese leader,CCP general secretaryXi Jinping held the first-ever phone call between heads of state of Israel and China. According to the read-out from theIsraeli President's Office, Herzog and Xi discussed opportunities to enhance Israeli-Chinese bilateral ties ahead of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, in honor of which Herzog and Xi invited each other to visit their respective countries.[37]

Multiple commentators have noted a worsening in relations between the two countries since theOctober 7 attacks.[38][39][40]

In 2025,Boaz Toporovsky led aKnesset delegation to Taiwan, the Chinese embassy in Israel objected strongly to the trip labeling Toporovsky a 'trouble-maker' and saying that such trips endanger the foundations of Israel-China relations.[41] The statement also accused Toporovsky of violating theOne China principle and said that "If he is not restrained, he will fall and shatter into pieces on the edge of the abyss."[42] The statement also threatened Toporovsky, saying that he should “not delude himself that he can harm China’s core interests... without paying a price.”[43] Ambassador Xiao Junzheng amplified the message by sharing it on social media.[44] The Embassy later denied that it had threated Toporovsky claiming that it had instead used a “popular Chinese saying.” In October 2025 the Chinese embassy in Israel held a public presentation about the “Taiwan Question” for the first time, reiterating their strong anti-Taiwan position.[43]

Military relations

Haifa base commander Brig. Gen.Eli Sharvit welcomes RADM Yang Junfei to Israel
Chinese navy docks in Israel

Israel and China began military-to-military relations as early as the 1980s, even though no formal diplomatic relations existed.[45][20][46] Before diplomatic relations were established in 1992 Israel had been selling arms to China. The use of military sales as a means of achieving foreign-policy goals was neither new nor unprecedented in Israeli foreign policy to promote its interests. Israel sold technology to upgrade Chinese tanks and planes in the 1980s.IAI Lavi andunmanned aerial vehicle technology seems to have been sold to China. Expertise in fitting western equipment in Soviet made hardware helped in modernization of Chinese army and air force, this way Chinese defense modernization complemented Israel's need of cash to fund its domestic made high-tech weapons programs.[47]

The arms embargo imposed by Western countries on China after the1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre offered an additional incentive for military relations and bilateral cooperation as a whole.[15]: 128  Sanctions imposed by Western countries almost froze Chinese access to advanced military and dual-use technologies. Israel then sought to benefit from the situation and became China's backdoor for acquiring Western technology.[48]

Israel was ready to sell China theEL/M-2075 Phalcon, an Israeli airborne early-warning radar system (AWACS), until the United States forced it to cancel the deal.[49] Some estimate that Israel sold arms worth US$4 billion to China in this period.[45][20]

China had looked to Israel for the arms and military technology it could not acquire from the United States, Europe and Russia.[50] China is a vital market for Israel's aerospace and defense industry.[45]

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency compiled evidence that Israel had transferred missile, laser and aircraft technology to China in the 1990s. On 19 October 1999, the Defense Minister of China,Chi Haotian, flew to Israel and met withEhud Barak, then-Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Israel. They reached several high-level agreements, including a $1 billion Israeli-Russian sale of military aircraft to China.[51] On 25 May 2011, the Commander of thePeople's Liberation Army Navy, AdmiralWu Shengli, made an official visit to Israel, meeting with Barak and Rear AdmiralEliezer Marom.[52]

On 14 August 2011, GeneralChen Bingde, Chief of thePeople's Liberation Army General Staff Department, made an official visit to Israel.[53] He came a guest of theIsraeli Chief of StaffBenny Gantz, who received him with an honor guard at theKirya military headquarters in Tel Aviv.[54] The visit came after Defense Minister Ehud Barak's visit to China in June,[53] the first visit of a defense minister to the country in a decade. Bingde's visit was part of a tour that included stops in Russia andUkraine.[54]

On 13 August 2012, vessels from the People's Liberation Army Navy's 11th escort fleet, led by Rear Admiral Yang Jun-fei, anchored at Israel'sHaifa naval base for a four-day goodwill visit to mark 20 years of cooperation between theIsrael Defense Forces and the PLA.[55][56] The vessels and crewmen were welcomed by the Haifa base commander, Brigadier General Eli Sharvit,[56] and Chinese embassy officials.[55] In July 2018, 180 acres of the Northern port in Haifa were transferred to the state-ownedShanghai International Port Group (SIPG) for a 25-year period of management. This sparked a heated discussion in the Israeli press and the academy, as well as a special discussion by the Israeli cabinet. It also came up in discussions between US National Security AdvisorJohn Bolton and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu when they met on January 7, 2019.[57]

In 2025, theMinistry of Defense prohibited the use of certainBYD electric cars due to cyber-espionage concerns of unauthorized transmission of data to China.[58]

Economic ties

China is Israel's largest East Asian trading partner and has sought Israel's expertise in solar energy, manufacturing robotics, irrigation, construction, agricultural and water management anddesalination technologies to combat drought and water shortages.[59][20][60]

Since the 2010s, China and Israel enhanced bilateral economic ties with China connecting both Chinese and Israeli businessmen and investors to invest in each other's economies respectively. Chinese economic cooperation with Israel has seen substantial Chinese investment of more than US$15 billion in the Israeli economy, spawning seed capital in Israeli startup companies, as well as the acquisition of Israeli companies by major Chinese corporations that incorporate Israel's know how to help invigorate the development of the modern Chinese economy more efficiently. China ranked second in 2015 after the United States on collaboration with Israeli high-tech firms that are backed by Israel's Office of the Chief Scientist.[61] Major Chinese firms such as Fosun,ChemChina, Brightfood, Horizons Ventures and China Everbright have invested significant amounts of financial capital and resources across numerous Israeli industries.[62]

Investment from China in Israeli technology reached an aggregate of $15 billion from 2011 to 2017 with the surplus of Chinese investment capital finding its way through Israel's high technology sector, including agriculture, pharmaceutical, medical devices, artificial intelligence and autonomous driving.[63][better source needed]

On 3 July 2011, Israel and the People's Republic of China signed an economic cooperation agreement to boost trade between the two countries. According to Eliran Elimelech, Israel's commercial attaché in Beijing, the agreement was expected to deepen ties between Israeli and Chinese businessmen in the short term, and in the medium to long term to improve trade conditions between the countries. In January 2011, theIsraeli Central Bureau of Statistics stated that Israeli exports to China had grown by an annual 95 percent in 2010 to $2 billion.[64] In September 2011, the Israeli Minister of Transport,Israel Katz, stated that China and Israel were discussing the construction of ahigh-speed rail link joining theMediterranean Sea with theRed Sea. This joint project would permit the mass overland transport of Chinese goods to Israel andEastern Europe, and would involve both Chinese and Israeli railway developers.[65] The following month, the Chinese and Israeli governments signed amemorandum of understanding regarding the joint construction of a 180-km (112-mile) railway linking the Israeli city ofEilat with theNegev Desert's Zin Valley,Beersheba, and Tel Aviv.[66]

In August 2012, with Chinese-Israeli trade growing, theBeijing University of International Business and Economics in Beijing set up a department dedicated to studying Israeli economics andJudaism, while some Chinese universities began offeringHebrew courses.[67] The group SIGNAL has established an exchange network of Chinese and Israeli scholars and academics to help them collaborate with each other on various academic projects.[68]

In 2013, China and Israel began to boost the economic relations with respect to agriculture.[69] The two countries decided to set up an agriculture technology incubator in Anhui Province, China enabling joint development of agriculture technologies and solutions in keeping with requirements on the ground. Israeli agriculture trade fairs such as Agrivest and AgriTech have witnessed large Chinese delegations and greater participation from Chinese state-owned enterprises and private companies as Chinese's growing middle class and increasing consumer demand as well as increased pressure on agricultural land has prompted the East Asian giant to increasingly look at Israeli agriculture technology to boost crop yields and dairy production.[69][70]Horizons Ventures, a venture capital firm established by Hong Kong business magnateLi Ka-shing, led a US$10.8 million strategic investment in Windward, an Israeli maritime data and analytics company. MarInt, Windward's satellite maritime analytics system, is widely used by many security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies across the world.[71] In 2013, Li donated US$130 million to Technion. A large part of the money came from the profits he made from the IPO ofWaze, an Israeli GPS-based map software company, in which he held an 11 percent stake that eventually acquired byGoogle.[72] His was the largest donation ever made to Technion and one of the biggest to any Israeli academic institution. Li has been the pioneer of Chinese investment in Israel.[71][72]

Bilateral trade between the two nations increased from $50 million to $10 billion in 2013.[5] Since 2013, Chinese investors have begun to show a growing interest in Israeli firms.[73] Recent high end deals include Beijing winning a $2 billion tender to build the "Med-Red" railway linking Ashdod port with Eilat as well as a $1 billion Israeli port tender, a $300 million joint research center between Tel Aviv University and Tsinghua University, HK billionaire Li Ka-shing donating $130 million toTechnion in return for building a technology school in Guangdong,[74] and Chinese acquisition of a controlling stake in Israel'sTnuva dairy company for more than US$1 billion.[75] The acquisition of Tnuva was the biggest Chinese buyout of an Israeli company since 2011 when state-owned ChemChina boughtAdama, the pesticides and crop protection company then known as Makhteshim Agan, for US$2.4 billion.[76] In 2014, Chinese-Israeli tech deals totaled $300 million, up from $50 million in 2013, according to Israel's National Economic Council.[77]

Bilateral between the two countries reached in excess of $10 billion in trade since the start of 2015.[78] In January 2015, a number of Chinese information technology companies began to make investments in Israel, Chinese e-commerce giantAlibaba invested an undisclosed sum in Visualead, an Israeli company specializing in QR code technology. Alibaba has also invested in Israel-based venture fundJerusalem Venture Partners, becoming a limited partner joiningQihoo 360, another Chinese web company to have invested in the Jerusalem-based fund.[77]Baidu, China's largest search engine, has put US$3 million intoPixellot, an Israeli video capture start-up and provided funds to Carmel Ventures, an Israeli venture capital firm as well as lead a $5 million investment round in the Israeli music education firmTonara.[76] In addition, leading Chinese technology firms such asHuawei,Legend andXiaomi have set up R&D centers in Israel.[79] In March 2015, Israel joined China's newly constitutedAsian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).[80][81]

Israel and China began negotiating afree trade agreement in 2019.[82]: 176  The discussions coincided with China's beginning of free trade agreement negotiations with Palestine.[82] According to academic Dawn C. Murphy, China likely proceeded concurrently with both countries in order to avoid perceptions of favoritism.[82]

Al Jazeera reported in 2025 that China including Hong Kong is the second largest importer of Israeli goods ($4.8 billion) and the largest exporter ($19 billion) country to Israel.[6]

Bilateral issues

Following theOctober 7 attacks, commentators generally note a worsening in relations between the two countries.[38][39] In 2024, public opinion polling showed a majority of Israelis consider China to be unfriendly or hostile toward Israel,[83] although data from thePew Research Center found a sharp difference between Jewish andArab Israelis in how they saw the East Asian country.[84]

Security concerns

Israel's increasing defense cooperation with China has caused concern in Western nations, particularly the United States, which is the largest foreign supplier of military equipment to Israel. Owing to strategic Chinese rivalry with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, India and Vietnam, as well as concerns over the security of Taiwan, the United States has pressured Israel against selling sophisticated equipment and technology to China.[46] In 1992,The Washington Times alleged that exported AmericanPatriot missiles and Israel's indigenousLavi jet aircraft technology had been shared with China, although official U.S. investigations did not substantiate these charges.[85] In 2000, Israel cancelled the sale to China of the Israeli-builtPhalcon Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) in the wake of pressure from the U.S., which threatened to cut off US$2.8 billion in yearly aid if the deal went through.[86] Israel's decision drew condemnation from China, which stated that the cancellation would hurt bilateral ties.[86] China's record of proliferating arms and weapons systems has also concerned U.S. planners, as the U.S. worries that China may repackage advanced Israeli defense technologies for resale to America's rivals and nations hostile to it throughout the world.[87]

Chinese involvement in the Israeli technology sector has also generated security concerns. The former head ofMossad,Efraim Halevy, is one of the major critics in Israel who believes that the country should examine thegeopolitical considerations with China and has consistently warned the Israeli government against involving the Chinese in a proposedhigh-speed railway to Eilat, arguing that it could lead to a crisis in strategic relations with the United States.[88] Other critics argue that growing Chinese involvement will endanger Israeli security and lead to theft of Israeli technology to be utilized inChinese espionage further arguing that Israel should balance its burgeoning relations with China with maintaining a balance of relations with the United States at the same time.[89][90]

Taiwan

Further information:Israel–Taiwan relations

Since 1992, Israel has followed theone China principle, and recognizesgovernment of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government representing the whole of China and Taiwan as "an inalienable part" of China.[91]

Uyghurs

In August 2022,Liu Jianchao warned the Israeli ambassador to China,Irit Ben-Abba, against taking the U.S. position on thepersecution of Uyghurs in China.[92]

Iran

In 2010, theUnited Nations Security Council passedResolution 1929, imposing a fourth round ofinternational sanctions against Iran for itsnuclear enrichment program. China ultimately supported this resolution, although initially, due to the strong bilateral relations and nuclear cooperation between theChina and Iran, China opposed the sanctions. According toThe New York Times, Israel lobbied for the sanctions by explaining to China the impact of any pre-emptive strike on Iran would have on the world oil supply, and hence on the Chinese economy.[93]

In June 2025, China's ambassador to the UN,Fu Cong, condemnedIsraeli strikes on Iran[94] whileWang Yi referred to Israel's strikes as "unacceptable".[95] On 2 July 2025, Israel urged China to pressure Iran to restrain itsnuclear ambitions.[96]

Israel–Palestine conflict

Publishing in 2025, academic Chuchu Zhang writes that China seeks to balance its approaches with Israel and Palestine, providing rhetorical support for Palestine and some criticism of Israel, but avoiding committing resources to Palestine that could jeopardize China's economic relationship with Israel.[15]: 47 

China's then Foreign MinisterLi Zhaoxing called the Israeli West Bank barrier wall an obstacle to peace in a September 2006 statement during a UN Security Council meeting on the Middle East. In November 2008, then China Ambassador to the United StatesYesui Zhang stated that the "continued construction ofsettlements on the West Bank is not only in violation of Israel's obligations under international law, but is also detrimental to guaranteeing Israel's own security." According to analysis from theJamestown Foundation, China's policy on Israel and Palestine is based on soft power diplomacy, and maintain a balancing act between its Israeli and Arab world ties.[87] On June 8, 2015, China demanded Israel to refrain from utilizing Chinese migrant construction workers in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. China sought this ban out of concern for the Chinese workers' safety in areas beyond the Green Line, which marks Israel's pre-1967 borders. The government of Israel has been eager to negotiate a deal with China completed in the hope that an influx of foreign workers will increase the rate of housing construction in Israel and reduce the costs of new homes.[97]

After the victory of Hamas in the 2006 elections in Gaza, China acknowledged Hamas as the legitimately elected political entity in the Gaza Strip despite Israeli and U.S. opposition. The Chinese government met with senior Hamas representativeMahmoud al-Zahar, who previously served as Palestinian foreign minister, during the June 2006China-Arab States Cooperation Forum in Beijing which held direct bilateral talks despite protests from Israel and the United States. A spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that "the Palestinian government is legally elected by the people there and it should be respected."[87] Besides the Chinese recognition of Hamas, China also does not designateHezbollah as a terrorist organization.[98]

After the May 31,2010 Gaza flotilla raid the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesmanMa Zhaoxu condemned Israel.[99] On April 28, 2011, after the rival Palestinian factionsFatah and Hamas formed a national unity government, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said that China welcomed the internal reconciliation.[100] During the November 2012Operation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip, theMinistry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China urged all sides to display restraint.[101]

In 2012, the families of eight Israeli terror victims of the 2008Mercaz HaRav massacre in Jerusalem filed a$1 billion lawsuit against theBank of China. The suit asserted that in 2003 the bank's New York branch wired millions of dollars to Hamas from its leadership inSyria andIran. The Bank of China subsequently denied providing banking services to terrorist groups: "The Bank of China has always strictly followed the UN's anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing requirements and regulations in China and other judicial areas where we operate."[102][103] The case was dismissed in 2015.[104]

On July 23, 2014, China was among the 29 nations who voted in favor of the investigation by the United Nations Human Rights Council of war crimes committed by Israel duringOperation Protective Edge, with the United States being the only nation in dissent.[105] In addition, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei earlier on 9 July 2014 issued a statement in response to the violence during the military operation, stating: "We believe that to resort to force and to counter violence with violence will not help resolve problems other than pile up more hatred. We urge relevant parties to bear in mind the broader picture of peace and the lives of the people, immediately realize a ceasefire, stick to the strategic choice of peace talks and strive for an early resumption of talks."[106] In July 2017, Chinese leader Xi Jinping delivered a formalization of China's positions in his "Four Points" on the "issue of Israel-Palestine conflict", the first of which was that China supported the establishment of an independent, sovereign Palestine within the framework of thetwo-state solution based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.[107]

In May 2021, Israel's embassy in Beijing accused Chinesestate media outletChina Global Television Network of "blatantantisemitism" when host Zheng Junfeng broadcast a segment accusing US policy on Israel of being influenced by wealthy Jews, during the2021 Israel–Palestine crisis.[108][109]

Gaza war

Following the 2023Hamas-led attack on Israel, an Israeli embassy official said Israel expected to see a "stronger condemnation" ofHamas and that it was "not the time to call for a two-state solution" when people were "being murdered, slaughtered in the streets."[110][111] The IsraeliMinistry of Foreign Affairs later expressed "deep disappointment" over China not condemning Hamas.[112] Commentary in Chinese state media and social media blamed the U.S. for the conflict and spreadantisemitic tropes against Israel.[113][114][115][116] Some people equated Israel's actions to Nazism by accusing them of committinggenocide on Palestinians, prompting a rebuke from the German embassy in Beijing.[117] Chinese foreign ministerWang Yi stated that in Gaza, "Israel’s actions have gone beyond self-defense."[118] In January 2024, Israel reported that it discovered a "massive" stockpile of Chinese weaponry used by Hamas.[119]

Chinese suppliers as of December 2023 have created bureaucratic obstacles for Israeli tech factories, delaying shipments of electronic components to Israel for civilian and military use.[120] The Chinese government, according to Israeli officials, has refused to send workers to Israel during the war.[121] Chinese shipping companiesCOSCO andOOCL have suspended trade with Israel as early as 18 December 2023,[122] sparking concerns by Israeli analysts that the Bayport terminal run by the state-owned Shanghai International Port Group in thePort of Haifa is a security risk.[123]

On the first anniversary of the 7 October Hamas-led attack on Israel,Xinhua News Agency criticized U.S. diplomatic and military support for Israel.[124] The Chinese government'sSpamouflage influence operation has also criticized U.S. support for Israel and spread antisemitic tropes online.[125][126][124][127]

In September 2025, Benjamin Netanyahu accused the PRC, along withQatar of orchestrating and leading a propaganda campaign to politically "besiege" Israel by undermining its global support, particularly in Western media and among allies.[128][129]

See also

References

  1. ^"China marks 17 years with Israel"Archived 2009-10-12 at theWayback Machine.Haaretz. 27 September 2009. Retrieved 11 March 2013.
  2. ^Kessler, Oren (March 13, 2012)."Shalom, Beijing".Foreign Policy.Archived from the original on January 13, 2022. RetrievedJanuary 14, 2022.
  3. ^Han, Xiaoxing (1993). "Sino-Israeli Relations".Journal of Palestine Studies.22 (2):62–77.doi:10.2307/2537269.ISSN 0377-919X.JSTOR 2537269.
  4. ^Benmeleh, Yaacov (May 19, 2014)."Israel's Tech Industry Is Becoming All About 'China, China, China".Bloomberg News.Archived from the original on 2021-03-08. Retrieved2017-08-23.
  5. ^abGregory Noddin Poulin, The Diplomat (1 December 2014)."Sino-Israeli Economic Ties Blossoming".The Diplomat.Archived from the original on 6 May 2021. Retrieved12 February 2021.
  6. ^abStaff, Al Jazeera."Which countries trade the most with Israel and what do they buy and sell?".Al Jazeera. Retrieved2025-09-18.
  7. ^ab"China-Israel relations are bound to blossom H.E. GAO YANPING".The Jerusalem Post. 3 April 2014.Archived from the original on 2022-04-22. Retrieved2014-06-10.
  8. ^Chester, Sam (June 28, 2013)."As Chinese-Israeli Relations Enjoy a Second Honeymoon, America Frets".Tablet.Archived from the original on December 16, 2021. RetrievedAugust 11, 2017.
  9. ^"Israel, China in Talks to Become Major Financial Allies".Israel National News. July 7, 2015.Archived from the original on October 24, 2021. RetrievedAugust 11, 2017.
  10. ^Tepper, Aryeh (September 2015)."China's Deepening Interest in Israel".The Tower Magazine.Archived from the original on 2022-09-01. Retrieved2017-07-30.
  11. ^Hadar, Leon (2025-08-30)."China-Israel relations in subtle but certain drift".Asia Times. Retrieved2025-09-18.
  12. ^ab"Will China's ties with Israel survive the Gaza war?".The Economist. April 10, 2024.ISSN 0013-0613.Archived from the original on 2024-04-12. Retrieved2024-04-12.
  13. ^"A UN vote on Palestine underlines America's weakening clout".The Economist. September 18, 2024.ISSN 0013-0613.Archived from the original on 2024-09-19. Retrieved2024-09-19.
  14. ^Smith, Daniel S. (January 10, 2018)."China and Israel".The Jerusalem Post.Archived from the original on March 18, 2018. RetrievedMarch 17, 2018.
  15. ^abcdefghZhang, Chuchu (2025).China's Changing Role in the Middle East: Filling a Power Vacuum?. Changing Dynamics in Asia-Middle East Relations series. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY:Routledge.doi:10.4324/9781003495741.ISBN 978-1-032-76275-3.
  16. ^Karsh, Efraim, ed. (2004-03-25), "The Republic of China and Israel, 1911– 2003",Israel: The First Hundred Years (0 ed.), Routledge, pp. 223–255,doi:10.4324/9780203504093-11,ISBN 978-0-203-50409-3
  17. ^Steinberg, Jessica (10 February 2021)."China's century-old support for Zionism surfaces in letter".The Times of Israel.Archived from the original on 22 January 2022. Retrieved22 January 2022.
  18. ^abcHar-El, Shai (2024).China and the Palestinian Organizations: 1964–1971.Palgrave Macmillan.doi:10.1007/978-3-031-57828-1.ISBN 978-3-031-57827-4.
  19. ^Cooley, John (Winter 1972). "China and the Palestinians".Journal of Palestine Studies.1 (2):19–34.doi:10.1525/jps.1972.1.2.00p00037 (inactive 1 July 2025).{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of July 2025 (link)
  20. ^abcdefFriedman, Thomas L. (1985-07-22)."Israel and China quietly form trade bonds".The New York Times.Archived from the original on 2014-07-15. Retrieved2008-06-11.
  21. ^abBerton, Peter (January 2010). "The Evolution of Sino-Israeli Relations".Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs.4 (3):69–80.doi:10.1080/23739770.2010.11446615.ISSN 2373-9770.S2CID 142431538.
  22. ^"Archived copy"(PDF). Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 2013-07-01. Retrieved2013-10-26.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  23. ^A China Diary: Towards the Establishment of China-Israel Diplomatic RelationsArchived 2023-04-11 at theWayback Machine, E. Zev Sufott, Frank Cass, 1997, page ix
  24. ^Israel Strengthening Representation in ChinaArchived 2021-09-17 at theWayback Machine,Associated Press, January 9, 1991
  25. ^IDSA News Review on East AsiaArchived 2023-04-11 at theWayback Machine, Volume 5, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1991, page 375
  26. ^Twersky, Mordechai I. (2014-04-21)."Zev Sufott, Israel's first ambassador to China, dies aged 86".Haaretz.Archived from the original on 2014-04-27. Retrieved2014-05-16.
  27. ^"Israel's first-ever ambassador to China dies at 86".The Jerusalem Post. 2014-04-22.Archived from the original on 2014-05-14. Retrieved2014-05-16.
  28. ^Yellinek, Roie (2020-02-21)."The Chinese Penetration of Israeli Media".Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.Archived from the original on 2020-04-05. Retrieved2020-05-09.
  29. ^Yellinek, Roie (2022-02-16). "China's media strategy towards Israel".Israel Affairs.28 (2):184–198.doi:10.1080/13537121.2022.2041308.ISSN 1353-7121.S2CID 246938342.
  30. ^Lazaroff, Tovah (March 20, 2017)."Netanyahu: Israel and China must cooperate on security and trade".Jerusalem Post.Archived from the original on July 16, 2021. RetrievedMarch 26, 2017.
  31. ^Chunshan, Mu (July 19, 2014)."Why China Must Pay Attention to the Israel-Palestine Conflict".The Diplomat.Archived from the original on April 2, 2018. RetrievedApril 2, 2018.
  32. ^"How Israel is winning the social media war in China".The Australian. September 2, 2014.
  33. ^"Chinese hackers disguised themselves as Iran to target Israel".MIT Technology Review. August 10, 2021.Archived from the original on 2025-03-07. Retrieved2025-07-20.
  34. ^Tress, Luke (10 August 2021)."Chinese group carried out widespread cyber espionage campaign in Israel – report".The Times of Israel.Archived from the original on 2022-11-20. Retrieved2025-07-20.
  35. ^"Chinese ambassador to Israel found dead at home".BBC News. 2020-05-17.Archived from the original on 2021-01-11. Retrieved2020-05-17.
  36. ^Liebermann, Oren (17 May 2020)."Chinese ambassador to Israel is found dead in his home".CNN.Archived from the original on 2020-05-17. Retrieved2020-05-17.
  37. ^"Israeli, Chinese Presidents Call for Increased Cooperation Despite U.S. Warnings".Haaretz.Archived from the original on 2022-08-17. Retrieved2022-08-17.
  38. ^abMalhotra, Divya (2025-03-03)."How China's stance on Hamas is shifting its Israel relations".The Jerusalem Post.Archived from the original on 2025-06-12. Retrieved2025-06-10.
  39. ^abLipkind, Simone (2024-06-19)."How China Soured on Israel".Time. Retrieved2025-06-10.
  40. ^Grossman, Derek (2024-05-15).China Is Burning All Its Bridges with Israel (Report).RAND Corporation.Archived from the original on 2025-06-15. RetrievedJune 10, 2025.
  41. ^Rai, Arpan (24 September 2025)."China calls Israeli politician who visited Taiwan a 'troublemaker'".The Independent. Retrieved10 October 2025.
  42. ^Eichner, Itamar (22 September 2025)."China issues threat to Israeli lawmaker over Taiwan visit: 'Will fall and shatter into pieces'".Ynetnews. Retrieved10 October 2025.
  43. ^abHELLER, MATHILDA."'Israel should respect One China,' Chinese embassy tells 'Post'".jpost.com. Jerusalem Post. Retrieved24 October 2025.
  44. ^Rai, Arpan (24 September 2025)."China calls Israeli politician who visited Taiwan a 'troublemaker'".the-independent.com. The Independent. Retrieved24 October 2025.
  45. ^abc"U.S. up in arms over Sino-Israeli ties".Asia Times. 2004-12-21. Archived fromthe original on 2008-05-16. Retrieved2008-06-11.
  46. ^ab"China's weapon chase".BBC News. 2000-07-12.Archived from the original on 2014-07-14. Retrieved2008-06-11.
  47. ^"Israel-China Relations And The Phalcon Controversy".Middle East Policy Council. March 21, 1990.Archived from the original on January 1, 2018. RetrievedApril 2, 2018.
  48. ^Gordon, Michael R. (1993-10-12)."Israel Selling China Military Technology, C.I.A. Chief Asserts".The New York Times.ISSN 0362-4331.Archived from the original on 2018-04-03. Retrieved2023-10-16.
  49. ^Isenberg, David (4 December 2002)."Israel's role in China's new warplane".Asia Times. Archived from the original on 3 December 2002.
  50. ^"The Evolving Relationship Between China and Israel".Innovated in China. 24 May 2017.Archived from the original on 24 August 2022. Retrieved24 August 2022.
  51. ^"China defense minister visits Israel".Archived 2012-05-30 at theWayback MachineWorld Tribune. 21 October 1999. Retrieved 11 March 2013.
  52. ^Barbara Opall-Rome (25 May 2011)."PLA Navy Commander Meets Israeli Defense Leaders".DefenseNews. Archived fromthe original on 21 January 2013. Retrieved10 June 2011.
  53. ^abWilliams, Dan (14 August 2011)."Chinese military chief makes first visit to Israel".Reuters.Archived from the original on 8 March 2016. Retrieved15 August 2011.
  54. ^abKatz, Yaakov (15 August 2011)."Chinese army chief here to talk defense cooperation".The Jerusalem Post.Archived from the original on 15 August 2011. Retrieved15 August 2011.
  55. ^ab"Chinese navy ships visit Israel's Haifa Port".People's Daily.Xinhua. 14 August 2012.Archived from the original on 24 May 2013. Retrieved15 August 2012.
  56. ^ab"Cooperation strengthens: Chinese fleet vessels arrive in Israel". IDF website. 13 August 2012.Archived from the original on 21 March 2016. Retrieved15 August 2012.
  57. ^Yellinek, Roie (2019-01-23)."US-Chinese Competition over the Haifa Port".Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.Archived from the original on 2021-03-08. Retrieved2020-05-09.
  58. ^Wullman, Israel (2025-07-05)."China's big brother is watching: How Chinese smart devices are spying inside Israel".Ynetnews.Archived from the original on 2025-07-14. Retrieved2025-07-12.
  59. ^"China No 1 in Israeli Asian Trade".China Daily. 2000-11-09.Archived from the original on 2008-06-26. Retrieved2008-06-11.
  60. ^"Israel-China "water-trade" to rise significantly".The Jerusalem Post. 2000-11-01. Retrieved2008-06-11.[permanent dead link]
  61. ^Miller, Yvette (May 9, 2015)."Jewish-Chinese Connections".aishcom.Archived from the original on August 19, 2017. RetrievedAugust 19, 2017.
  62. ^Cukierman, Edouard (2016-10-11)."China and Israel's tale of love and high-tech".Asia Times.Archived from the original on 2023-10-13. Retrieved2017-07-18.
  63. ^Fang, Li (February 2, 2018)."Feature: Israeli startups look east for vast funding, market potential".Xinhua. Archived fromthe original on February 2, 2018.
  64. ^Ackerman, Gwen (3 July 2011)."Israel Signs Cooperation Agreement With China".Bloomberg News.Archived from the original on 7 March 2012. Retrieved4 July 2011.Israel and China today signed a cooperation agreement that aims to boost trade between the two countries.
  65. ^"Israel to Co-op with China in Railway Project". Cri.cn. 20 September 2011. Retrieved 2011-09-21.
  66. ^Petersburg, Ofer (23 October 2011)."Chinese to build railway to Eilat".YnetNews.Archived from the original on 24 March 2023. Retrieved31 July 2023.
  67. ^Eichner, Itamar (8 August 2012)."Chinese 'very impressed' with Israeli economy".YnetNews.Archived from the original on 14 October 2013. Retrieved22 April 2013.
  68. ^Horovitz, David (11 December 2012)."Israel's China challenge".The Times of Israel.Archived from the original on 8 July 2023. Retrieved31 July 2023.
  69. ^ab"China learns Israeli agri-tech".Consulate of Israel in Hong Kong and Macau. May 3, 2012.Archived from the original on April 11, 2022. RetrievedAugust 23, 2017.
  70. ^Uniyal, Vijeta (18 May 2015)."China-Israel Ties On The Rise".Jewish Business News.Archived from the original on 22 May 2015. Retrieved21 May 2015.
  71. ^ab"Li Ka-shing fund leads US$10.8 mln Israel investment".EJ Insight.Archived from the original on 2015-05-03. Retrieved2015-05-15.
  72. ^abO'Neill, Mark (February 1, 2018)."China to overtake US as biggest investor in Israel".EJ Insight.Archived from the original on February 4, 2018. RetrievedFebruary 4, 2018.
  73. ^Orpaz, Inbal (26 February 2014)."Could China supplant U.S. as top source of Israeli tech capital?".Haaretz.Archived from the original on 6 October 2015. Retrieved1 August 2023.
  74. ^Neuman, Efrat (2013-10-05)."The story behind a HK billionaire's $130 million donation to the Technion".Haaretz.Archived from the original on 2022-08-12. Retrieved2024-06-14.
  75. ^Lin, Christina (July 26, 2014)."Will the Middle Kingdom Join the Middle East Peace Quartet?".The Times of Israel.Archived from the original on 27 July 2014. Retrieved29 July 2014.
  76. ^ab"It's kosher: Israel embraces Chinese investment". Ejisight. May 15, 2015.Archived from the original on 20 July 2015. Retrieved14 May 2015.
  77. ^abHirschauge, Orr (23 March 2015)."Alibaba Invests in Israeli Cyber-Focused Venture Fund".The Wall Street Journal.Archived from the original on 22 May 2015. Retrieved21 May 2015.
  78. ^Maya Yarowsky (May 3, 2015)."With Strong Tech Ties, Is Israel China's New Best Friend?".NoCamels. No Camels.Archived from the original on 22 May 2015. Retrieved21 May 2015.
  79. ^Bo, Xiang (September 8, 2017)."China-Israel economic, tech cooperation to enter new stage: Israeli minister".Xinhua News Agency. Archived fromthe original on September 8, 2017.
  80. ^Shamah, David (8 April 2015)."Peace move, or just business? Israel, Iran join China's fund".The Times of Israel.Archived from the original on 9 October 2022. Retrieved14 June 2024.
  81. ^"Israel joins the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank".embassies.gov.il. 31 March 2015.Archived from the original on 11 July 2024. Retrieved14 June 2024.
  82. ^abcMurphy, Dawn C. (2022).China's Rise in the Global South: the Middle East, Africa, and Beijing's Alternative World Order. Stanford, California:Stanford University Press.ISBN 978-1-5036-3060-4.OCLC 1249712936.
  83. ^Kaufman, Arthur (2024-10-21)."Israel Scrutinizes China's Position Amid Regional War".China Digital Times.Archived from the original on 2024-10-22. Retrieved2024-10-27.
  84. ^Prozorovsky, Laura Silver, Christine Huang, Laura Clancy and Andrew (2024-07-09)."Views of China and Xi Jinping in 35 countries".Pew Research Center. Retrieved2025-10-26.Jewish Israelis (25%) have much less favorable views of China than Arab Israelis do (61%).{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  85. ^"Return of the Red Card: Israel-China-U.S. Triangle". Power and Interest News Report. 2005-05-23.Archived from the original on 2012-01-03. Retrieved2008-06-11.
  86. ^ab"Israel scraps China radar deal".BBC News. 2000-07-12.Archived from the original on 2004-06-08. Retrieved2008-06-11.
  87. ^abcChris Zambelis."China's Palestine Policy".The Jamestown Foundation.Archived from the original on 2016-03-29. Retrieved2014-03-31.
  88. ^"China – Israel, Why China is interested fostering economic relationships with Israel ? | Eyes on Europe & Middle East". Middleeastnewsservice.com. 2015-01-07. Archived fromthe original on 2017-07-28. Retrieved2017-07-18.
  89. ^"The uncertain future of China-Israel relations".Al Arabiya. 4 April 2014. Archived fromthe original on 23 May 2014. Retrieved22 May 2014.
  90. ^Vick, Karl (7 May 2013)."China Can Posture, but It Can't Bring Peace to the Middle East".Time.Archived from the original on 13 May 2014. Retrieved23 May 2014.
  91. ^"Five One-Chinas: The contest to define Taiwan".Lowy Institute. Retrieved2025-11-15.
  92. ^Ravid, Barak (2022-08-17)."China warns Israel not to let U.S. pressure hurt relations".Axios.Archived from the original on 2022-08-18. Retrieved2022-08-18.
  93. ^Jacobs, Andrew (2010-06-08)."Israel Makes Case to China for Iran Sanctions".The New York Times.Archived from the original on 2015-12-06. Retrieved2017-02-06.
  94. ^"China's UN envoy condemns Israeli strikes on Iran - state media".Reuters. June 13, 2025.Archived from the original on June 20, 2025. RetrievedJune 14, 2025.
  95. ^"China's Wang Yi decries 'unacceptable' Israeli attack on Iran, urges diplomacy".South China Morning Post. 2025-06-15.Archived from the original on 2025-06-17. Retrieved2025-06-17.
  96. ^"Israel Urges China to Pressure Iran to Rein In Nuclear Ambitions".Bloomberg News. July 2, 2025.
  97. ^Stuart Winer (June 7, 2015)."China seeks ban on its citizens working in West Bank".Times of Israel.Archived from the original on 18 June 2015. Retrieved18 June 2015.
  98. ^Lons, Camille (2023-11-03)."How the Israel-Hamas war is testing China's diplomatic ambitions in the Middle East".European Council on Foreign Relations.Archived from the original on 2023-12-27. Retrieved2024-06-14.Despite having built a solid relationship with Israel since the 1990s, China's history as a leader of the non-aligned world has always made it a strong supporter of the Palestinian cause. China does not officially designate Hezbollah or Hamas as terrorist organisations.
  99. ^"China Condemns Israel's Attack on Gaza Aid Flotilla".cri.cn. Archived fromthe original on March 16, 2012.
  100. ^"Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China".mfa.gov.cn.Archived from the original on 2012-03-23. Retrieved2014-03-31.
  101. ^"外交部:中方严重关切以色列对加沙发动军事行动".China Daily (in Chinese). China. 16 November 2012.Archived from the original on 13 December 2019. Retrieved16 November 2012.
  102. ^Zhu, Grace (25 October 2012)."Bank of China Says It Hasn't Helped Hamas".The Wall Street Journal.Archived from the original on 2 May 2019. RetrievedFebruary 23, 2013.
  103. ^Davidovich, Joshua (December 18, 2013)."The China bank is not the issue here, dude".The Times of Israel. Times of Israel.Archived from the original on 13 July 2018. Retrieved30 March 2014.
  104. ^Jeremy Bob, Yonah (November 8, 2015)."Historic case against Bank of China for millions in terror financing dismissed".The Jerusalem Post.Archived from the original on July 18, 2023. RetrievedJuly 18, 2023.
  105. ^Alex Kane (July 24, 2014)."U.S. casts lonely vote against establishing war crimes inquiry in Gaza".Mondoweiss.Archived from the original on 28 July 2014. Retrieved29 July 2014.
  106. ^"Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Regular Press Conference on July 9, 2014".fmprc.gov.cn.Archived from the original on July 19, 2014. RetrievedJuly 30, 2014.
  107. ^"China pushes four-point Israeli-Palestinian peace plan".The Times of Israel. 1 August 2017.Archived from the original on 29 May 2023. Retrieved31 July 2023.
  108. ^"Israel accuses Chinese state TV of 'blatant antisemitism'".Associated Press. May 19, 2021.Archived from the original on May 22, 2021. RetrievedMay 22, 2021.
  109. ^"Israel accuses China state TV of 'blatant anti-Semitism'".France 24.Agence France-Presse. May 19, 2021.Archived from the original on May 23, 2021. RetrievedMay 22, 2021.
  110. ^"Israel expected 'stronger condemnation' of Hamas from China, Beijing embassy official says".Reuters. 2023-10-08.Archived from the original on 2023-10-08. Retrieved2023-10-08.
  111. ^Kaufman, Arthur (2023-10-12)."China Sidesteps Israel-Hamas Conflict".China Digital Times.Archived from the original on 2023-10-13. Retrieved2023-10-13.
  112. ^"Israel says 'deeply disappointed' over lack of China condemnation of Hamas attack".Reuters. 2023-10-13.Archived from the original on 2023-10-14. Retrieved2023-10-15.
  113. ^Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany (October 11, 2023)."Chinese media blames U.S. for Israel-Hamas war".Axios. RetrievedOctober 11, 2023.
  114. ^Lee, Christy (2023-10-13)."China Exploits Israel-Hamas Conflict to Diminish US Global Influence, Analysts Say".Voice of America.Archived from the original on 2023-10-15. Retrieved2023-10-15.
  115. ^Haime, Jordyn (2023-11-09)."Antisemitism explodes online in China since October 7 massacre".The Jerusalem Post.Archived from the original on 2024-04-25. Retrieved2024-04-25.
  116. ^McCartney, Micah (2023-10-11)."China's state media accused of spreading anti-Israel disinformation".Newsweek.Archived from the original on 2023-10-11. Retrieved2023-10-11.Anti-Israel and antisemitic rhetoric has become prevalent on China's insular social media in recent years, in part because of Israel's close association with the U.S. and the West.
  117. ^Tessa Wong (2023-11-01)."What China wants from Israel-Hamas war".BBC.Archived from the original on 2023-12-06. Retrieved2023-12-08.One side effect is an uptick in antisemitism online, fanned by nationalist bloggers. Some on Chinese social media have equated Israel's actions to Nazism by accusing them of carrying out a genocide on Palestinians, prompting a rebuke from the German embassy in Beijing.
  118. ^Tan, Clement (2023-10-15)."China says Israel's actions in Gaza are 'beyond self defense' as U.S. races to avert wider conflict".CNBC.Archived from the original on 2023-10-16. Retrieved2023-10-16.
  119. ^Swan, Melanie (2024-01-05)."Hamas 'using massive stockpile of Chinese weaponry' in Gaza".The Daily Telegraph.ISSN 0307-1235.Archived from the original on 2024-01-05. Retrieved2024-01-12.
  120. ^Zomer, Navit (2023-12-24)."Israeli high-tech factories have difficulties importing components from China".Ynetnews.Archived from the original on 2024-01-18. Retrieved2024-06-14.
  121. ^"Hebrew Newspaper: China imposes sanctions on "Israel" against the backdrop of the war in Gaza".Al-Quds.Archived from the original on 2024-02-11. Retrieved2024-06-14.
  122. ^"Gaza genocide: Chinese shipping company halts Israel shipments amid escalating Red Sea threat".Free Press Kashmir. December 18, 2023.
  123. ^Rabinovitch, Ari; Saul, Jonathan (January 26, 2024)."Israel's Ashdod port sees strategic risk from China during Gaza war".Reuters.Archived from the original on 2024-03-22. Retrieved2024-06-14.
  124. ^abMa, Wenhao (2024-10-15)."Chinese spamouflage campaign highlights US support for Israel".Voice of America.Archived from the original on 2024-11-01. Retrieved2024-10-18.
  125. ^Bond, Shannon (September 3, 2024)."China is pushing divisive political messages online using fake U.S. voters".NPR. RetrievedJanuary 2, 2025.
  126. ^Merrill, Jeremy B.; Schaffer, Aaron; and Nix, Naomi (10 October 2024)."A firehose of antisemitic disinformation from China is pointing at two Republican legislators".The Washington Post. Retrieved11 October 2024.
  127. ^Ma, Wenhao (2024-10-04)."China-connected spamouflage networks spread antisemitic disinformation".Voice of America. Archived fromthe original on 2024-10-05. Retrieved2024-10-05.
  128. ^Freiberg, Nava; Berman, Lazar (15 September 2025)."Netanyahu admits Israel economically isolated, says will need to become 'super-Sparta'".The Times of Israel. Retrieved11 October 2025.
  129. ^Freiberg, Nava (15 September 2025)."PM says Qatar, China attempting to 'blockade' Israel politically, but 'the US is with us'".The Times of Israel. Retrieved11 October 2025.

Sources

Bilateral relations
Africa
Americas
Asia
Europe
Oceania
Relations within China
Former states
Multilateral relations
Diplomacy
Bilateral relations
Africa
Central
East
North
South
West
Americas
North
Central
South
Asia
Central
East
South
Southeast
Western
Europe
EU members
Non EU members
Oceania
Former states
Multilateral relations
Membership in international organizations
Multilateral relations
Diplomacy and Related topics
Diplomacy
Institutions and ministers
Diplomatic missions
Peace and normalization agreements
Agreements
Doctrine and policies
International
Visa
Related topics
Lists
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=China–Israel_relations&oldid=1322545853"
Categories:
Hidden categories:

[8]ページ先頭

©2009-2025 Movatter.jp