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Chavismo (Spanish pronunciation:[tʃaˈβizmo]), also known in English asChavism orChavezism, is aleft-wing populist political ideology based on the ideas, programs, and government style associated withHugo Chávez and laterNicolás Maduro.[1] It combines elements ofsocialist patriotism,[2][3]Bolivarianism, andLatin American integration.[4] People who supported Hugo Chávez andChavismo are known asChavistas.
Severalpolitical parties in Venezuela supportChavismo. The main party, founded by Chávez, is theUnited Socialist Party of Venezuela (Spanish:Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela), usually referred to by the four letters PSUV).[citation needed] Other parties and movements supportingChavismo includeFatherland for All (Spanish:Patria Para Todos or PPT) andTupamaros.[citation needed]
Broadly,Chavismo policies includenationalization,social welfare programs andopposition to neoliberalism (particularly the policies of theInternational Monetary Fund and theWorld Bank). According to Chávez, Venezuelan socialism acceptsprivate property,[5] but seeks to promotesocial ownership as well.[6][7]
According to political scientist John Magdaleno, the proportion of Venezuelans who define themselves asChavistas declined from 44% to around 22% between October 2012 and December 2014, after thedeath of Hugo Chávez and the deterioration of theeconomy during Nicolás Maduro's tenure.[8] In February 2014, a poll conducted by International Consulting Services, an organization created by Juan Vicente Scorza, a sociologist and anthropologist for theNational Experimental University of the Armed Forces,[9] found that 62% of Venezuelans consider themselves supporters or followers of the ideals of Chávez.[10]
By 2016, manyChavistas became disenchanted with the Bolivarian government under Maduro and sought to emigrate from Venezuela to a more stable country.[11]
Despite its claim to socialist rhetoric,Chavismo has been frequently described as beingstate capitalist by critics.[12] In a 2017 interview, after being asked if he would take Venezuela's failing economy as an admission that socialism "wrecked people's lives", philosopherNoam Chomsky said: "I never described Chavez's state capitalist government as 'socialist' or even hinted at such an absurdity. It was quite remote from socialism. Private capitalism remained ... Capitalists were free to undermine the economy in all sorts of ways, like massive export of capital."[13] Critics also frequently point towards Venezuela's largeprivate sector. In 2009, roughly 70% of Venezuela'sgross domestic product was created by the private sector.[14]
According toEl Pitazo "normalization of Chavismo" is a political and sociological concept used by analysts, journalists, and theVenezuelan opposition to describe the processes and actors that contribute to the acceptance and legitimization of the Bolivarian Revolution, led by the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) andNicolás Maduro, despite criticisms regarding its authoritarian nature anddemocratic backsliding in the country.[15] Analysts say this involves the progressive adaptation of various internal and external sectors to the stabilization of Chavista political control. This process, they argue, occurs through the reduction of political confrontation, transforming what much of the international community has classified as a political and humanitarian crisis into a situation described by some as "authoritarian peace".[16]
According toInfobae, the use of the term intensified beginning in 2019, following the failure of the "maximum pressure" andinternational isolation strategy promoted and led byJuan Guaidó and his international allies (primarily the United States). Faced with the impossibility of an immediate democratic breakthrough or regime change, parts of the Venezuelan opposition and global actors began to incline toward negotiation and coexistence. This led, among other things, to the return of theUnitary Platform to the electoral arena in the2021 regional elections, and to theend of the "interim government" in late 2022 by the so-called "G4", composed at the time ofPrimero Justicia,Acción Democrática,Un Nuevo Tiempo, andVoluntad Popular, which were the majority opposition parties holding the absolute majority in theNational Assembly elected in2015.[17]
The concept regained relevance after the2024 presidential election, a process widely questioned by observers and parts of the opposition due to alleged irregularities and the disqualification of the unitary candidate,María Corina Machado. The National Electoral Council did not publish detailed voting results, while the opposition published over 80% of voting records verified by independent organizations, which declared the victory ofEdmundo González Urrutia.[18]
While the majority opposition bloc, represented by Machado and González, has promoted actions to disregard the official result by seeking international support and the designation of theCartel of the Suns as aninternational terrorist organization, with the ultimate goal of achieving a peaceful transition to democracy, the sectors referred to as "normalizers" have advocated for the tacit acceptance of the official 2024 result (which declared Nicolás Maduro as the winner) and the continuation of electoral participation under CNE-imposed conditions. This faction argues that the institutional path must be followed and that it is necessary to "preserve spaces" rather than promote abstention, which they claim has failed in past attempts.[19] Examples include the participation ofUn Nuevo Tiempo andUnión y Cambio [es] (a party created by former members of Primero Justicia) in theparliamentary and regional elections of 2025. This stance is criticized by the Unitary Platform, whose members believe that these actions consolidate the Chavista regime's power while using these actors as a "façade of political pluralism".[20][21]
Academic research produced aboutChavismo shows a considerable consensus when acknowledging its early shift to the left and its strong populist component. However, besides these two points there is significant disagreement in the literature. According to Kirk A. Hawkins, scholars are generally divided into two camps: aliberal democratic one that seesChavismo as an instance ofdemocratic backsliding and aradical democratic one that upholdsChavismo as the fulfillment of its aspirations for democracy. Hawkins argues that the most important division between these two groups is neither methodological nor theoretical, but ideological. It is a division over basic normative views of democracy:liberalism versusradicalism[22]
Scholars in this camp adhered to aclassical liberal ideology that valued procedural democracy (competitive elections,widespread participation defined primarily in terms of voting andcivil liberties) as the political means best suited to achieving human welfare. Many of these scholars had aliberal vision of economics, although some weremoderatesocial democrats who were critical ofneoliberalism. Together, they sawChavismo in a mostly negative light as a case of democratic backsliding or even competitiveauthoritarianism or electoral authoritarian regime. The most relevant aspects of the liberal critique ofChavismo are the following:
Scholars in this camp generally adhered to a classical socialist ideology that mistrusted market institutions in either the state or the economy. They saw procedural democracy as insufficient to ensure political inclusion (although they still accepted the importance of liberal democratic institutions) and emphasized participatory forms of democracy and collective worker ownership in the economy. They tended toward descriptions of the movement that celebrated its participatory features or analyzed its potential weaknesses for accomplishing its revolutionary goals. Most of these scholars supportedChavismo and helped constitute the civilian wing of the movement. Radical scholars argue that democracy can only become effective if it is deepened—and they feel thatChavismo is doing this deepening, which requires not only the greater inclusion of poor and excluded sectors in decision making but their remaking into a new "popular" identity that facilitates their autonomy and dignity. For some of these scholars, deepening also means the adoption of a socialist economy and some argue it requires taking power through charismatic leadership, which would have enough political support to conduct structural reforms.[22]: 313–319
In 2007, Hugo Chávez proclaimed support for theideas of MarxistLeon Trotsky, saying "When I called him (former Minister of Labour,José Ramón Rivero)" Chávez explained, "he said to me: 'President I want to tell you something before someone else tells you ... I am aTrotskyist', and I said, 'well, what is the problem? I am also a Trotskyist! I follow Trotsky's line, that ofpermanent revolution', and then citedMarx andLenin".[23][24][25][26]
InThe Weekly Standard in 2005,Thor Halvorssen Mendoza described the core ofChavismo as a "far-reaching foreign policy that aims to establish a loosely aligned federation of revolutionary republics as a resistance bloc in the Americas".[27]
In 2006,Noam Chomsky expressed a certain degree of support for Chávez and his policies, saying that he was "quite interested" by his policies and that he regarded "many of them" as "quite constructive", noting that most importantly Chávez seemed to enjoy overwhelming support from his people after "six closely supervised elections".[28]
According to an article inThe New York Sun,Chavismo was rejected in elections around 2006 in Peru, Colombia and Mexico.[29]El Universal reported thatBrazilian PresidentLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva kept distance fromChavismo, saying that Brazil is not Venezuela and has traditional institutions.[30] Still, Lula supported Chávez in theVenezuelan presidential election of 2012.[31]
The Nation noted on its editorial pages the following:
Chavismo is not an adequate description of the social movement that makes up Chávez's political base, since many organizations predate his rise to political power, and their leaders and cadre have a sophisticated understanding of their relationship with Chávez. Over the last couple of years, a number of social scientists have done field work in urbanbarrios, and their findings confirm that this synergy between the central government and participatory local organizations has expanded, not restricted, debate and that democracy is thriving in Venezuela.
Chavismo has ripped open the straitjacket of post–Cold War Latin American discourse, particularly the taboo against government regulation of the economy and economic redistribution. Public policy, including economic policy, is now open to discussion and, importantly, popular influence. This is in sharp contrast to Costa Rica, where a few months ago its Supreme Court, with the support of its executive branch, prohibited public universities from not just opposing but even debating theCentral American Free Trade Agreement, which soon won a national referendum by a razor-thin margin.[32]
In February 2014, about a year following Hugo Chávez's death,The Atlantic stated the following:
Hugo Chávez based his popularity on his extraordinary charisma, much discretionary money, and a key and well-tested political message: denouncing the past and promising a better future for all. The country's widespread student protests now symbolize the demise of this message. Venezuelans younger than 30 years of age (the majority of the population) have not known any government other than that of Chávez or Maduro. For them, "Chavismo" is the past. As for the promises of a better future: The results are in. The catastrophic consequences of Chávez's 21st-century socialism are impossible to mask any longer and the government has run out of excuses. Blaming the CIA, the "fascist opposition", or "dark international forces", as Maduro and his allies customarily do, has become fodder for parodies flooding YouTube. The concrete effects of 15 years ofChavismo are all too visible in empty shelves and overflowing morgues.[33]
In 2015, whenThe Economist was commenting about corruption in Latin America, it said the following:
The viceroys of the colonial era set the pattern. They centralised power and bought the loyalty of local interest groups. [...]Caudillos, dictators and elected presidents continued the tradition of personalising power. Venezuela'sChavismo and theKirchnerismo of Ms Fernández are among today's manifestations.[34]
