Carl Schmitt | |
|---|---|
 Schmitt in 1932 | |
| Born | (1888-07-11)11 July 1888 |
| Died | 7 April 1985(1985-04-07) (aged 96) Plettenberg,North Rhine-Westphalia,West Germany |
| Spouse(s) | Pavla Dorotić (1916–?) Duška Todorović (1926–1950, her death) |
| Children | 1 |
| Education | |
| Education | |
| Philosophical work | |
| Era | 20th-century philosophy |
| Region | Western philosophy |
| School | |
| Institutions |
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| Main interests | |
| Notable ideas | |
Carl Schmitt[a] (11 July 1888 – 7 April 1985) was a Germanjurist,author, andpolitical theorist. He held various positions on Nazi councils including serving on thePrussian State Council, theAcademy for German Law, and as the president of theNational Socialist Association of Legal Professionals.[4][5][6]
Schmitt wrote extensively about the effective wielding of political power. Anauthoritarian conservative theorist,[7] he was noted as a critic ofparliamentary democracy,liberalism, andcosmopolitanism.[8] His works covered political theory, legal theory, continental philosophy, andpolitical theology. However, they are controversial, mainly due to his intellectual support for, and active involvement with,Nazism.[9] In 1933, Schmitt joined the Nazi Party and utilized his legal and political theories to provide ideological justification for the regime. He later lost favour among senior Nazi officials and was ultimately removed from his official positions within the party.
TheStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy writes that "Schmitt was an acute observer and analyst of the weaknesses of liberalconstitutionalism and liberal cosmopolitanism. But there can be little doubt that his preferred cure turned out to be infinitely worse than the disease."[10] His ideas remain highly influential, with many scholars arguing he has influenced modern governance inChina andRussia, as well as the movements ofneoconservatism andTrumpism.
Schmitt was born inPlettenberg,Westphalia,German Empire. His parents wereRoman Catholics from the GermanEifel region, who had settled in Plettenberg. His father was a minor businessman. Schmitt had three siblings: Auguste Schmitt, Joseph Schmitt, and Anna Margarethe Schmitt. Schmitt studiedlaw at the universities ofBerlin,Munich, andStrasbourg between 1907 and 1910. He passed his first state law examination that same year.[11] His 1910doctoral thesis was titledÜber Schuld und Schuldarten (On Guilt and Types of Guilt).[12] In 1914, he earned hishabilitation at Strasbourg with a thesis entitledDer Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen (The Value of the State and the Significance of the Individual). He completed a legal clerkship at theDüsseldorf Higher Regional Court and, in February 1915, he passed theAssessor examination.[11]
Schmitt volunteered for service with theBavarian Army in February 1915 and served in theFirst World War. He was discharged from the military on 1 July 1919.[11] Returning to civilian life, he embarked on an academic career that would lead to teaching positions at various business schools and universities, namely theTechnical University of Munich (1920), theUniversity of Greifswald (1921), theUniversity of Bonn (1922), theTechnical University of Berlin (1928), theUniversity of Cologne (1933), and the University of Berlin (1933–1945).
While in Munich, Carl Schmitt attended Max Weber's lectures, "Politics as a Vocation", "Science as a Vocation", and theGeneral Economic History.[13][14] In 1923, he contributed to the second volume ofMelchior Palyi'sErinnerungsgabe für Max Weber[14]
In 1921, Schmitt became a professor at the University of Greifswald, where he published his essayDie Diktatur (On Dictatorship).[15]
In 1922, he publishedPolitische Theologie (Political Theology) while working as a professor at the University of Bonn. Schmitt changed universities in 1928, when he became professor of law at the Handelshochschule inBerlin, and again in 1933, when he accepted a position at the University of Cologne. His most famous paper,"Der Begriff des Politischen" ("The Concept of the Political"), was based on lectures at theDeutsche Hochschule für Politik in Berlin.[16]
In 1932, Schmitt was counsel for the Reich government in the casePreussen contra Reich (Prussia vs. Reich), in which theSPD-controlled government of the state ofPrussia disputed its dismissal by the right-wing Reich government ofFranz von Papen. Papen was motivated by the fact that Prussia, by far the largest state inGermany, served as a powerful base for the political left and provided it with institutional power, particularly in the form of the Prussian police. Schmitt, Carl Bilfinger, and Erwin Jacobi represented the Reich,[17] and one of the counsel for the Prussian government wasHermann Heller. In October 1932, the court ruled that the Prussian government had been suspended unlawfully but that the Reich had the right to install a commissar.[17] In German history, the struggle that resulted in the de facto destruction of federalism in the Weimar Republic is known as thePreußenschlag.[citation needed]
As a young man, Schmitt was "a devoted Catholic until his break with the church in the mid twenties".[18] From around the end of the First World War, he began to describe his Catholicism as "displaced" and "de-totalised".[19] N.S. Lyons claimed that something in Schmitt’s interior life seems to have begun to shift around 1914, when his diary entries started to hint at a crisis of faith. According to Lyons' claims, it was his troubled relationships with women that estranged him from the Faith.[20]
According to Political theoristReinhard Mehring, Schmitt's involvement with Catholicism was mostly political rather than being motivated by genuine belief in Catholic doctrine. However, he also praised the hierarchical structure and Roman law of the Catholic Church. He frequently quoted and was influenced by Protestant and Catholic thinkers such asSøren Kierkegaard,Juan Donoso Cortés, andThomas Hobbes.[21]
Schmitt's "state of exception" doctrine has enjoyed a revival in the 21st century. Formulated 10 years before the 1933 Nazi takeover of Germany, Schmitt claimed that urgency justified the following:[22]
Schmitt's doctrine helped clear the way forHitler's rise to power by providing the theoretical legal foundation of theNazi regime.[22]
On 31 January 1933, Schmitt remarked that withAdolf Hitler's appointment as Chancellor, "one can say that 'Hegel died.'"[23]Richard Wolin observes:[1]
[I]t is Hegel qua philosopher of the "bureaucratic class" orBeamtenstaat that has been definitely surpassed with Hitler's triumph ... this class of civil servants—which Hegel in theRechtsphilosophie deems the "universal class"—represents an impermissible drag on the sovereignty of executive authority. For Schmitt ... the very essence of the bureaucratic conduct of business is reverence for the norm, a standpoint that could not but exist in great tension with the doctrines of Carl Schmitt ... Hegel had set an ignominious precedent by according this putative universal class a position of preeminence in his political thought, insofar as the primacy of the bureaucracy tends to diminish or supplant the prerogative of sovereign authority.
The Nazis engineered the passage of theEnabling Act of 1933 in March, which changed theWeimar Constitution to allow the "present government" to rule by decree, bypassing both the President,Paul von Hindenburg, and theReichstag.[citation needed]
Alfred Hugenberg, the leader of theGerman National People's Party, one of the Nazis' partners in the coalition government that was being squeezed out of existence, hoped to slow theNazi takeover of the country by threatening to quit his cabinet position. Hugenberg reasoned that by doing so, the government would be changed, and the Enabling Act would no longer apply, as the "present government" would no longer exist. A legal opinion by Schmitt prevented this manoeuvre from succeeding. Well known at the time as a constitutional theorist, Schmitt declared that "present government" did not refer to the cabinet's makeup when the act was passed, but to the "completely different kind of government"—that is, different from the democracy of theWeimar Republic—that theHitler cabinet had brought into existence.[24]
Schmitt was the presiding legal expert at meetings during the early stages of theThird Reich that resulted in a formal decision to bypass the process of formulating a new constitution.[25][26] An approach that would nominally maintain the former constitution was adopted, even though theFührerprinzip (Leader Principle) was promoted to a transcendent supra-legal status.[25][26] Schmitt claimed that the adoption of the Leader Principle in place of a legal constitution was legitimized by the presumed "Volkisch" or racial composition of the German people, and their identification withAdolf Hitler.[25][26]
Schmitt joined theNazi Party on 1 May 1933.[27] Within days, he rejoiced in the burning of "un-German" and "anti-German" writings of Jewish authors, and called for a much more extensive purge, to include works by authors influenced by "Jewish" ideas.[28] From June 1933, he was in the leadership council ofHans Frank'sAcademy for German Law and served as chairman of the Committee for State and Administrative Law.[29] In July,Hermann Göring appointed him to thePrussian State Council, and in November he became the president of theAssociation of National Socialist German Jurists. He also replaced Heller as a professor at theUniversity of Berlin,[30] a position he held until the end ofWorld War II. He presented his theories as an ideological foundation of the Nazi dictatorship and a justification of theFührer state concerning legal philosophy, particularly through the concept ofauctoritas.
In June 1934, Schmitt was appointed editor-in-chief of the Nazi newspaper for lawyers, theDeutsche Juristen-Zeitung [de] ("German Jurists' Journal").[31] In July he published in it "The Leader Protects the Law (Der Führer schützt das Recht)", a justification of the political murders of theNight of the Long Knives with Hitler's authority as the "highest form of administrative justice (höchste Form administrativer Justiz)".[32] Schmitt presented himself as a radicalantisemite and was the chairman of an October 1936 law teachers' convention in Berlin[33] at which he demanded that German law be cleansed of the "Jewish spirit (jüdischem Geist)" and that all Jewish scientists' publications be marked with a small symbol.[34]
Nevertheless, in December 1936, theSchutzstaffel (SS) publicationDas Schwarze Korps accused Schmitt of being an opportunist, a Hegelian state thinker, and a Catholic, and called his antisemitism a mere pretense, citing earlier statements in which he criticized the Nazis' racial theories.[35][36][37] After this, Schmitt resigned asReichsfachgruppenleiter (Reich Professional Group Leader) but retained his professorship in Berlin and his title "Prussian State Councillor". Schmitt continued to be investigated in 1937, but Göring stopped further reprisals.[38][39]
During theGerman occupation of Paris, a "round-table" of French and German intellectuals met at theGeorges V Hotel, including Schmitt, the writersErnst Jünger,Paul Morand,Jean Cocteau, andHenry de Montherlant, and the publisherGaston Gallimard.[40]
In 1945, American forces captured Schmitt and, after spending more than a year in an internment camp, he returned to his hometown ofPlettenberg and, later, to the residence of his housekeeper Anni Stand in Plettenberg-Pasel. He remained unrepentant for his role in the creation of the Nazi state and, by refusing every attempt atdenazification, he was barred from academic jobs.[8] Despite being isolated from the mainstream of the scholarly and political community, from the 1950s on, he continued his studies, especially ofinternational law, and frequently received visitors, both colleagues and younger intellectuals, well into his old age. Among the visitors wereErnst Jünger,Jacob Taubes, andAlexandre Kojève.[citation needed]
In 1962, Schmitt gave lectures inFrancoist Spain, two of which resulted in the publication, the next year, ofTheory of the Partisan, in which he characterized theSpanish Civil War as a "war of national liberation" against "international Communism". Schmitt regarded thepartisan as a specific and significant phenomenon which, during the latter half of the 20th century, indicated the emergence of a new theory of warfare.[citation needed]
Schmitt contended that political representation in aliberal democracy was formulaic, and that the mystical nature andpersonalist ideal of the Catholic sovereign was essential.[41]: 516
In his essayDie Diktatur ("The Dictatorship"), he discussed the foundations of the newly establishedWeimar Republic, emphasising the office of thePresident of Germany. In this essay, Schmitt compared and contrasted what he saw as the effective and ineffective elements of the new constitution of his country. He saw the office of the president as a comparatively effective element, because of the power granted to the president to declare astate of exception (Ausnahmezustand). This power, which Schmitt discussed and implicitly praised as dictatorial,[32] was more in line with the underlying mentality of executive power than the comparatively slow and ineffective processes of legislative power reached through parliamentary discussion and compromise.[citation needed]
Schmitt was at pains to remove what he saw as a taboo surrounding the concept of "dictatorship" and to show that the concept is implicit whenever power is wielded by means other than the slow processes of parliamentary politics and the bureaucracy:[42]
If the constitution of a state is democratic, then every exceptional negation of democratic principles, every exercise of state power independent of the approval of the majority, can be called dictatorship.
For Schmitt, every government capable of decisive action must include a dictatorial element within its constitution. Although the German concept ofAusnahmezustand is best translated as "state of emergency", it literally means "state of exception" which, according to Schmitt, frees the executive from any legal restraints to its power that would normally apply. The use of the term "exceptional" has to be underlined here: Schmitt definessovereignty as the power todecide to initiate astate of exception, asGiorgio Agamben has noted. According to Agamben,[43] Schmitt's conceptualization of the "state of exception" as belonging to the core-concept of sovereignty was a response toWalter Benjamin's concept of a "pure" or "revolutionary" violence, which did not enter into any relationship whatsoever with right. Through the state of exception, Schmitt included all types of violence under right, in the case of the authority of Hitler, leading to the formulation "The leader defends the law" ("Der Führer schützt das Recht").[32]
Schmitt opposed what he termed "commissarial dictatorship", or the declaration of a state of emergency to save the legal order (a temporary suspension of law, defined itself by moral or legal right): the state of emergency is limited (even ifa posteriori, by law) to "sovereign dictatorship", in which law was suspended, as in the classical state of exception, not to "save theConstitution", but rather to create another constitution. This is how he theorizedAdolf Hitler's continual suspension of the legal constitutional order during theThird Reich (theWeimar Republic's Constitution was never abrogated, emphasized Giorgio Agamben;[44] rather, it was "suspended" for four years, first with the 28 February 1933Reichstag Fire Decree, with the suspension renewed every four years, implying a continual state of emergency).[citation needed]
On Dictatorship was followed by another essay in 1922, titledPolitische Theologie (political theology); in it, Schmitt gives further substance to his authoritarian theories with the now notorious definition: "The sovereign is he who decides on the exception." By "exception", Schmitt means stepping outside therule of law under thestate of exception (Ausnahmezustand) doctrine he first introduced inOn Dictatorship for the purpose of managing some crisis, which Schmitt defines loosely as "a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like." For this reason, the "exception" is understood as a "borderline concept" for Schmitt because it is not within the purview of the normal legal order. Schmitt opposes this definition ofsovereignty to those offered by contemporary theorists on the issue, particularlyHans Kelsen, whose work is criticized at several points in the essay. The state of exception is a critique of "normativism", apositivist concept of law developed by Kelsen of law as the expression of norms that are abstract and generally applicable, in all circumstances.[45]
A year later, Schmitt supported the emergence oftotalitarian power structures in his paper "Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus" (roughly: "The Intellectual-Historical Situation of Today's Parliamentarianism", translated asThe Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy by Ellen Kennedy). Schmitt criticized the institutional practices of liberal politics, arguing that they are justified by a faith in rational discussion and openness that is at odds with actual parliamentaryparty politics, in which outcomes are hammered out insmoke-filled rooms by party leaders. Schmitt also posits an essential division between the liberal doctrine ofseparation of powers and what he holds to be the nature ofdemocracy itself, the identity of the rulers and the ruled. Although many critics of Schmitt today, such asStephen Holmes in hisThe Anatomy of Anti-Liberalism, take exception to his fundamentallyauthoritarian outlook, the idea of incompatibility between liberalism and democracy is one reason for the continued interest in hispolitical philosophy.[46]
In chapter 4 of hisState of Exception (2005), Italian philosopherGiorgio Agamben argued that Schmitt'sPolitical Theology ought to be read as a response toWalter Benjamin's influential essayTowards the Critique of Violence.[47]
The book's title derives from Schmitt's assertion (in chapter 3) that "all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts"—in other words, thatpolitical theory addresses the state (and sovereignty) in much the same manner astheology does God.[48][49]
For Schmitt, "the political" is not equal to any other domain, such as the economic (which distinguishes between profitable and not profitable), but instead is the most essential to identity. While churches are predominant in religion or society is predominant in economics, and the state is usually predominant in politics. Yet, for Schmitt, the political was not autonomous or equivalent to the other domains, but rather the existential basis that would determine any other domain should it reach the point of politics (e.g. religion ceases to be merely theological when it makes a clear distinction between the "friend" and the "enemy").[citation needed]
He views political concepts and images as inherently contestable. Hegemonic powers seek to control and direct how political concepts are applied for a purpose and to effect an outcome such as making the enemy knowable and, in all cases, intended to manifest the inclusive and exclusive aspects of the social order represented by the political words and symbolism:[50]
All political concepts, images, and terms have a polemical meaning. They are focused on a specific conflict and are bound to a concrete situation; the result (which manifests itself in war or revolution) is a friend–enemy grouping, and they turn into empty and ghostlike abstractions when this situation disappears. Words such as state, republic, society, class, as well as sovereignty, constitutional state, absolutism, dictatorship, economic planning, neutral or total state, and so on, are incomprehensible if one does not know exactly who is to be affected, combated, refuted, or negated by such a term.
Schmitt, in perhaps his best-known formulation, bases his conceptual realm of state sovereignty and autonomy upon the distinction betweenfriend andenemy. Schmitt writes:[51]
The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly… But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger ...
This distinction is to be determined "existentially", which is to say that the enemy is whoever is "in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible".[52][53] Such an enemy need not even be based on nationality: so long as the conflict is potentially intense enough to become a violent one between political entities, the actual substance of enmity may be anything.[54] In this work, Schmitt makes the distinction between several different types of enemies one may make, stating that political enemies ought to be made out of a legitimate concern for the safety of the state rather than moral intuitions.[55]
The collectivization of friendship and enmity is, for Schmitt, the essence of politics. This theory of politics was influential in the Third Reich where the recognition and eradication of the enemy became a necessary component of the collective national identity. Similar views were shared by other Nazi legal theorists likeWerner Best.[56] Although there have been divergent interpretations concerning this work, there is broad agreement thatThe Concept of the Political is an attempt to achieve state unity by defining the content of politics as opposition to the "enemy". Additionally, the prominence of the state stands as an arbitrary force dominating potentially fractious civil society, whose various antagonisms must not be allowed to affect politics, lest civil war result.[citation needed]
According toHeinrich Meier, Schmitt provided a positive reference forLeo Strauss, and approved his work, which was instrumental in winning Strauss the scholarship funding that allowed him to leave Germany.[57] In turn, Strauss's critique and clarifications ofThe Concept of the Political led Schmitt to make significant emendations in its second edition. Writing to Schmitt during 1932, Strauss summarized Schmitt's political theology thus: "[B]ecause man is by nature evil, he therefore needsdominion. But dominion can be established, that is, men can be unified only in a unity against—against other men. Every association of men is necessarily a separation from other men… the political, thus understood, is not the constitutive principle of the state, of order, but a condition of the state."[58] However, Robert Howse has argued that this interpretation of Heinrich Meier is exaggerated and unfounded, and that there is no proper basis for the idea that Strauss's critique had a major influence on Schmitt.[59]
In his analysis of Schmitt's thought, philosopherKarl Löwith interprets the changes that occurred between the second and third editions ofThe Concept of the Political as unrelated to the influence of Leo Strauss. Rather, he sees these revisions as being made in response to the demands of the time, and as the result of Schmitt's opportunistic adjustment of his position to accommodate the Nazi regime.[60][59]
Schmitt'sPolitical Romanticism (1926) contains Schmitt's critique ofRomanticconservatism, which he considers unrealistic for the political arena of the modern era as it only seeks a restoration of theancien régime, which Schmitt considers unfeasible. Distancing himself from the tradition of legitimist "restorative conservatives" such asAdam Müller orJoseph de Maistre, Schmitt instead champions the thought of the 19th century Spanish reactionary thinkerJuan Donoso Cortés, who advocated for a dictatorship.[61]
According toGyörgy Lukács, this text is both the starting point of Schmitt's advocacy for apolitics of realism and his extreme anti-humanism. Lukács quotes Schmitt's comment that Cortes's 'great theoretical significance for the history of counter-revolutionary theory lies in [that] his contempt for human beings knew no bounds; their blind understanding, their feeble wills, the derisory elan of their carnal desires seem so pitiful to him that all the vocabulary of all human languages is not sufficient to express the full baseness of these creatures,' and Lukács writes:[62]
Here we clearly perceive Schmitt's association with all anti-human tendencies, past and present, along with the reason for it in socio-human terms: he is an enemy of the masses grown blind with hatred, a fanatic in the campaign againstVermassung or mass feeling.
The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, with the subtitle "Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol", is a 1938 work by Schmitt that revisits one of his most critical theoretical inspirations:Thomas Hobbes. Schmitt's work can be described as both a critique and an appraisal of the controversial political theorist. This work also contains some of Schmitt's more anti-Semitic language. As contemporary writers on Schmitt have noted, his anti-Semitism may be read as more a kind of "anti-Judaism" as, unlike his Nazi allies, he did not attribute the dangers of Judaism to "biological" reasons but strictly religious ones. This work by Schmitt is also one of the most intimately involved by him with the concept of myth in a political setting.[citation needed]
The text itself begins with an overview of the religious history of the mythical character "Leviathan". Schmitt traces this character as a unique subject of conflicting interpretations inAbrahamic doctrines, whereby the Leviathan, understood most pointedly as a "big fish," is occasionally interchangeable with that of a dragon or serpent, which Schmitt remarks have been "protective and benevolent deities"[63] in the history of non-Jewish peoples. But, as Schmitt makes clear, Hobbes' Leviathan is very different from these interpretations, being illustrated firstly in his workLeviathan as a "huge man". The Leviathan as a "huge man" is used throughout Hobbes' work as a symbol of the sovereign person. Although the Leviathan is not the only allegory made by Hobbes of the sovereign, which gravitates throughout his work as "a huge man, a huge leviathan, an artificial being, ananimal artificiale, anautomaton, or amachina".[64] Hobbes' concern was mainly to convey the sovereign person as a frightening creature that could instill fear into those chaotic elements of man that belong to his interpretation of thestate of nature.[citation needed]
Schmitt's critique of Hobbes begins with Hobbes' understanding of the state as a "machine" which is set into motion by the sovereign. That, according to Schmitt, is actually a continuation ofRené Descartes's concept ofmind–body dualism. For Hobbes to conceptualize the state as a machine whose soul is the sovereign renders it really as just a mechanic structure, carrying over the cartesian dualism into political theory: "As a totality, the state is body and soul, ahomo artificialis, and, as such, a machine. It is a manmade product... the soul thereby becomes a mere component of a machine artificially manufactured by man."[65] Schmitt adds that this technical conception of the state is essential in the modern interpretation of government as a widespread administrative organ.[b] Therefore, Schmitt attributes Hobbes' mechanistic and often also a legally positivist interpretation of the state (what is legitimate = what is legal) with the process of political neutralization. This is consistent with Schmitt's larger attitude toward attempts to apply technical principles to political matters.[citation needed]
Also, Schmitt critiques Hobbes' insistence that belief in miracles must only be outwardly consistent with the position of the state and can, privately, deviate into one's own opinion as to the validity of such "miracles".[67] The belief in miracles was a relevant point in Hobbes' century, for kings would regularly "bestow miracles" by touching the hands of those of ill health, supposedly healing them—obviously a consequence of the medieval belief that kings had a divine character. Hobbes' position was that "private reason" may disagree with what the state claims to be a miracle, but the "public reason" must, by necessity, agree to its position in order to avoid chaos. Schmitt's critique of Hobbes here is twofold. Firstly, Hobbes opens the crack toward a liberal understanding ofindividual rights (such as the right to "private reason") which Schmitt was a tireless critic of and, secondly, Hobbes guts the state of any "substantive truth" (such as the genuine belief of the individual, even in private, of the kingsdivine right) and renders the state into now simply a "justifiable external power".[67] This opens up the elementary basis of liberal society, which, for Schmitt, waspluralism. Such a pluralist society lacked ideological homogeneity and nationally bound group identity, both of which were fundamental premises of a democratic society to Schmitt.[68] Despite his critiques, Schmitt, nonetheless, finishes the book with a celebration of Hobbes as a truly magnificent thinker, ranking him along with other theorists he values greatly likeNiccolò Machiavelli andGiambattista Vico.[69]
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The Nomos of the Earth is Schmitt's most historical and geopolitical work. Published in 1950, it was also one of his final texts. It describes the origin of theEurocentric global order, which Schmitt dates from thediscovery of the New World, discusses its specific character and its contribution to civilization, analyses the reasons for its decline at the end of the 19th century, and concludes with prospects for a new world order. It defends European achievements, not only in creating the first truly global order ofinternational law, but also in limiting war to conflicts among sovereign states, which, in effect, civilized war. In Schmitt's view, the European sovereign state was the greatest achievement ofOccidental rationalism; in becoming the principal agency of secularization, the European state created the modern age.
Notable in Schmitt's discussion of the European epoch of world history is the role played by theNew World, which ultimately replaced theOld World as the centre of the Earth and became the arbiter in European and world politics. According to Schmitt, theUnited States' internal conflicts between economic presence and political absence, between isolationism and interventionism, are global problems, which today continue to hamper the creation of a new world order. However critical Schmitt is of American actions at the end of the 19th century and after World War I, he considered the United States to be the only political entity capable of resolving the crisis of global order. Since 1942, Schmitt envisaged thenomos of the New World installing itself “upon the ruins" of the Old.[70]
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Published in 1956,Hamlet or Hecuba: The Intrusion of the Time into the Play was Schmitt's most extended piece of literary criticism. In it, Schmitt focuses his attention onShakespeare'sHamlet and argues that the significance of the work hinges on its ability to integrate history in the form of the taboo of the queen and the deformation of the figure of the avenger. Schmitt uses this interpretation to develop a theory of myth and politics that serves as a cultural foundation for his concept of political representation. Beyond literary criticism or historical analysis, Schmitt's book also reveals a comprehensive theory of the relationship between aesthetics and politics that responds to alternative ideas developed byWalter Benjamin andTheodor W. Adorno.
Schmitt'sTheory of the Partisan originated in two lectures delivered during 1962,[71] and has been seen as a rethinking ofThe Concept of the Political.[72] It addressed the transformation of war in the post-European age, analysing a specific and significant phenomenon that ushered in a newtheory of war and enmity. It contains an implicit theory of the terrorist, which during the 21st century has resulted in yet another new theory of war and enmity. In the lectures, Schmitt directly tackles the issues surrounding "the problem of the Partisan" figure: the guerrilla or revolutionary who "fights irregularly" (p. 3).[73] Both because of its scope, with extended discussions on historical figures likeNapoleon,Vladimir Lenin, andMao Zedong, as well as the events marking the beginning of the 20th century, Schmitt's text has had a resurgence of popularity.Jacques Derrida, in hisPolitics of Friendship remarked:[74]
Despite certain signs of ironic distrust in the areas of metaphysics and ontology,The Concept of the Political was, as we have seen, a philosophical type of essay to 'frame' the topic of a concept unable to constitute itself on philosophical ground. But inTheory of the Partisan, it is in the same areas that the topic of this concept is both radicalized and properly uprooted, where Schmitt wished to regrasp in history the event or node of events that engaged this uprooting radicalization, and it is precisely there that the philosophical as such intervenes again.
Schmitt concludesTheory of the Partisan with the statement: "The theory of the partisan flows into the question of the concept of the political, into the question of the real enemy and of a newnomos of the earth."[75] Schmitt's work on the Partisan has since spurred comparisons with the post-9/11 'terrorist' in recent scholarship.[76] The Italian philosopherDomenico Losurdo comments:[77]
Thus, for Schmitt, the colonized peoples' struggle for national independence, although embracing ever larger sections of the population, becomes synonymous with terrorism, while the actions of the occupying army, foreign and hated by the citizens of the occupied country, are characterized as "counter-terrorist". Of course, the "retaliations" can be very harsh, but - Schmitt observes, referring toAlgeria andVietnam - we must take into account the "irresistible logic of the old rule according to which insurgents can only be dealt with by insurgent methods." As we see, the main difference between terrorism and counter-terrorism is not a specific behavior (ie. the impact on, or participation of, citizens). It coincides with the border between barbarism and civilization, between East and West. The power that determines who the barbarians are every time also determines who the terrorists are.
According to biographers such asReinhard Mehring,[78] Schmitt's private life was deeply troubled and distressed by extremeanti-semitism,self-destructive and compulsivesexuality, and a deep resentment towardbourgeois life. And this is said to have had a profound impact on his real-life activities.[79][80]
In 1916, Schmitt married his first wife, Pavla Dorotić,[81] a Croatian woman who pretended to be a countess. They divorced, but an annulment was not granted by aCatholic tribunal, so his 1926 marriage to Duška Todorović (1903–1950), a Serbian woman, was not deemed valid underCatholic law.[81] He reportedly had an affair with English teacher Kathleen Murray while his divorce from Dorotić was still pending.[82] Schmitt and his second wife Duška Todorović had a daughter, Anima, who, in 1957, married Alfonso Otero Varela (1925–2001), a Spanish law professor at theUniversity of Santiago de Compostela and a member of the rulingFET y de las JONS party inFrancoist Spain. She translated several of her father's works into Spanish. Letters from Schmitt to his son-in-law have been published.
Schmitt died on 7 April 1985 and is buried inPlettenberg.[83]
ThroughWalter Benjamin,Giorgio Agamben,Andrew Arato,Chantal Mouffe and other writers, Schmitt has become a common reference in recent writings of the intellectual left as well as the right.[84] These discussions concern not only the interpretation of Schmitt's own positions, but also matters relevant to contemporary politics: the idea that laws of the state cannot strictly limit actions of itssovereign, the problem of a "state of exception" (later expanded upon by Agamben).[85]
Schmitt's argument that political concepts aresecularized theological concepts has also recently been seen as consequential for those interested in contemporarypolitical theology. The German-Jewish philosopherJacob Taubes, for example, engaged Schmitt widely in his study ofSaint Paul,The Political Theology of Paul (Stanford Univ. Press, 2004). Taubes' understanding of political theology is, however, very different from Schmitt's, and emphasizes the political aspect of theological claims, rather than the religious derivation of political claims.[citation needed]
Schmitt is described as a "classic of political thought" byHerfried Münkler, while in the same article Münkler speaks of his post-war writings as reflecting an "embittered, jealous, occasionally malicious man" ("verbitterten, eifersüchtigen, gelegentlich bösartigen Mann"). Schmitt was termed the "Crown Jurist of theThird Reich" ("Kronjurist des Dritten Reiches") byWaldemar Gurian.[86]
According to historian Renato Cristi in the writing of the 1980Constitution of Chile,Pinochet collaboratorJaime Guzmán based his work on thepouvoir constituant concept used by Schmitt (as well as drawing inspiration in the ideas ofmarket society ofFriedrich Hayek). This way Guzmán would have enabled a framework for a dictatorial state combined with afree market economic system.[87]
Schmitt's anti-parliamentarian political theory received renewed attention as a historical reference with immediate contemporary relevance during the electoral cycles and administrations of the U.S. PresidentDonald Trump.[88][89][90][91]
Some have argued that Schmitt has become an important influence on Chinese political theory in the 21st century, particularly sinceXi Jinping becameGeneral Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012.[92][93][94] Leading Chinese Schmittians include the theologianLiu Xiaofeng, the public policy scholarWang Shaoguang,[95] and the legal theorist and government adviserJiang Shigong.[96] Schmitt's ideas have proved popular and useful instruments in justifying the legitimacy ofChinese Communist Party rule.[93][97]
The first important wave of Schmitt's reception in China started with Liu's writings at the end of the 1990s.[98] In the context of a transition period, Schmitt was used both by liberal, nationalist and conservative intellectuals to find answers to contemporary issues. In the 21st century, most of them are still concerned with state power and to what extent a strong state is required to tackle China's modernization. Some authors consider Schmitt's works as a weapon against liberalism.[99] Others think that his theories are helpful for China's development.[95]
A critical reception of his use in a Chinese context also exists.[100][101][99] These differences go together with different interpretations of Schmitt's relation with fascism. While some scholars regard him as a faithful follower of fascism, others, such as Liu Xiaofeng, consider his support for the Nazi regime only as instrumental and attempt to separate his works from their historical context.[98] According to them, his real goal is to pave a different and unique way for the modernization of Germany—precisely what makes him interesting for China. Generally speaking, the Chinese reception is ambivalent: quite diverse and dynamic, but also highly ideological.[95][102] Other scholars are cautious when it comes to Schmitt's arguments for state power, considering the danger of totalitarianism, they assume at the same time that state power is necessary for the current transition and that a "dogmatic faith" in liberalism is unsuitable for China.[101] By emphasizing the danger of social chaos, many of them agree with Schmitt—beyond their differences—on the necessity of a strong state.[95]
Among other things, his work is considered to have influencedneoconservatism in the United States.[103] Most notably the legal opinions offered byAlberto Gonzales,John Yoo et al. by invoking the unitary executive theory to justify theBush administration's legally controversial decisions during theWar on terror (such as introducing unlawful combatant status which purportedly would eliminate protection by theGeneva Conventions,[104] theAbu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse, theNational Security Agency'selectronic surveillance program and various excesses of thePatriot Act) mimic his writings.[103] Professor David Luban points out that the American legal database Lexis.com has five references to Schmitt in the period between 1980 and 1990, 114 between 1990 and 2000, and 420 between 2000 and 2010, with almost twice as many in the last five years of the 2000s decade as the first five.[105]
Several scholars have noted the influence of Carl Schmitt onVladimir Putin and Russia, specifically in defence of illiberal norms and exercising power, such as in disputes with Ukraine.[106][107][108][109][110]Timothy Snyder has asserted that Schmitt's work has greatly influencedEurasianist philosophy in Russia by revealing a counter to the liberal order.[111] Nomma Zarubina, who was accused[112] by theFBI of being a secret operative of Russia’sFederal Security Service (FSB), said in an interview that her father named her "Nomma" after Schmitt's workThe Nomos of the Earth.[113]
Some of Schmitt's major works are:
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