Carl Gustav Hempel | |
|---|---|
| Born | (1905-01-08)January 8, 1905 |
| Died | November 9, 1997(1997-11-09) (aged 92) Princeton, New Jersey, U.S. |
| Education | |
| Education | University of Göttingen University of Berlin (PhD, 1934) Heidelberg University |
| Thesis | Beiträge zur logischen Analyse des Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffs (Contributions to the Logical Analysis of the Concept of Probability) (1934) |
| Doctoral advisors | Hans Reichenbach,Wolfgang Köhler,Nicolai Hartmann |
| Other advisor | Rudolf Carnap[4] |
| Philosophical work | |
| Era | 20th-century philosophy |
| Region | Western philosophy |
| School | Analytic philosophy Berlin Circle Logical behaviorism[1] |
| Institutions | University of Chicago City College of New York Yale University Princeton University Hebrew University University of Pittsburgh |
| Doctoral students | |
| Notable students | |
| Main interests | |
| Notable ideas |
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Carl Gustav "Peter"Hempel (/ˈhɛmpəl/;[5]German:[ˈhɛmpl̩]; January 8, 1905 – November 9, 1997) was a Germanwriter,philosopher, logician, andepistemologist. He was a major figure inlogical empiricism, a 20th-century movement in thephilosophy of science. Hempel articulated thedeductive-nomological model ofscientificexplanation, which was considered the "standard model" of scientific explanation during the 1950s and 1960s. He is also known for theraven paradox ("Hempel's paradox")[6] andHempel's dilemma.
Hempel studiedmathematics,physics andphilosophy at theUniversity of Göttingen and subsequently at theUniversity of Berlin and theHeidelberg University. InGöttingen, he encounteredDavid Hilbert and was impressed byhis program attempting to base allmathematics on solidlogical foundations derived from a limited number ofaxioms.[7]
After moving toBerlin, Hempel participated in a congress on scientific philosophy in 1929 where he metRudolf Carnap and became involved in theBerlin Circle of philosophers associated with theVienna Circle. In 1934, he received hisdoctoral degree from theUniversity of Berlin with a dissertation onprobability theory, titledBeiträge zur logischen Analyse des Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffs (Contributions to the Logical Analysis of the Concept of Probability).Hans Reichenbach was Hempel's main doctoral supervisor, but after Reichenbach lost his philosophy chair in Berlin in 1933,Wolfgang Köhler andNicolai Hartmann became the official supervisors.[8]
Within a year of completing his doctorate, the increasingly repressive andanti-semiticNazi regime in Germany had prompted Hempel to emigrate to Belgium as his wife was ofJewish ancestry.[9] In this he was aided by the scientistPaul Oppenheim, with whom he co-authored the bookDer Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik ontypology and logic in 1936.[7] In 1937, Hempel emigrated to the United States, where he accepted a position as Carnap's assistant[10] at theUniversity of Chicago. He later held positions at theCity College of New York (1939–1948),Yale University (1948–1955) andPrinceton University, where he taught alongsideThomas Kuhn and remained until madeemeritus in 1973. Between 1974 and 1976, he was an emeritus at theHebrew University in Jerusalem before becoming University Professor of Philosophy at theUniversity of Pittsburgh in 1977 and teaching there until 1985. In 1989 the Department of Philosophy at Princeton University renamed its Three Lecture Series the 'Carl G. Hempel Lectures' in his honor.[11] He was an elected member of theAmerican Academy of Arts and Sciences[12] and of theAmerican Philosophical Society for which he served as president.[13]
Hempel died, aged 92, on November 9, 1997 at a nursing home near Princeton, New Jersey.[14][15]
Hempel never embraced the term "logical positivism" as an accurate description of the Vienna Circle and Berlin Group, preferring to describe those philosophers, including himself, as "logical empiricists." He believed that the term "positivism," with its roots in thematerialism ofAuguste Comte, implied ametaphysics that empiricists were not obliged to embrace. He regardedLudwig Wittgenstein as a philosopher with a genius for stating philosophical insights in striking and memorable language, but believed that he, or at least the Wittgenstein of theTractatus, made claims that could only be supported by recourse tometaphysics. To Hempel, metaphysics involved claims to know things which were not knowable; that is, metaphysical hypotheses were incapable of confirmation or disconfirmation by evidence.
In his exploration of thephilosophy of science, Hempel brought to light the significant contributions of 19th-centuryHungarianphysicianIgnaz Semmelweis. His examination of Semmelweis's systematic discovery in addressing a scientific problem provided a historical context for Hempel's own reflections. This account of Semmelweis's work notably influenced Hempel's thoughts on the role of 'induction' in scientific inquiry. He considered Semmelweis's approach as a pivotal example of howempirical evidence and inductive reasoning play a crucial role in the development of scientific knowledge, further enriching his perspective onlogical empiricism.[16]
Hempel is also credited with the revival of theDeductive-nomological model of explanation in the 1940s with the publication of "The function of general laws in history".[17]
In 2005, theCity of Oranienburg, Hempel's birthplace, renamed one of its streets "Carl-Gustav-Hempel-Straße" in his memory.