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Buddhist philosophy is theancient Indianphilosophical system that developed within the religio-philosophical tradition ofBuddhism.[2][3] It comprises all thephilosophical investigations andsystems of rational inquiry that developed among variousschools of Buddhism inancient India following theparinirvāṇa ofGautama Buddha (c. 5th century BCE), as well as the further developments which followed thespread of Buddhism throughout Asia.[3][4][5]
Buddhism combines both philosophical reasoning and thepractice of meditation.[6] The Buddhist religion presents a multitude ofBuddhist paths to liberation; and with the expansion of early Buddhism from ancient India toSri Lanka and subsequently toEast Asia andSoutheast Asia,[4][5] Buddhist thinkers have covered topics as varied ascosmology,ethics,epistemology,logic,metaphysics,ontology,phenomenology, thephilosophy of mind, thephilosophy of time, andsoteriology in their analysis of these paths.[3]
Pre-sectarian Buddhism was based onempirical evidence gained by thesense organs (including themind), and the Buddha seems to have retained askeptical distance fromcertain metaphysical questions, refusing to answer them because they were not conducive to liberation but led instead to further speculation.[3][7] However, he was also claimed to have affirmed theories with metaphysical implications, such asdependent arising,karma, andrebirth.[2]
Particular points of Buddhist philosophy have often been the subject of disputes between different schools of Buddhism,[2] as well as between representative thinkers of Buddhist schools andHindu orJain philosophers.[3] These elaborations and disputes gave rise to variousearly Buddhist schools ofAbhidharma, theMahāyāna movement, and scholastic traditions such asPrajñāpāramitā,Sarvāstivāda,Mādhyamaka,Sautrāntika,Vaibhāṣika,Buddha-nature,Yogācāra, and more.[2][3][5] One recurrent theme in Buddhist philosophy has been the desire to find aMiddle Way between philosophical views seen as extreme.[8][9]
Edward Conze splits the development of Indian Buddhist philosophy into three phases:[10]
Various elements of these three phases are incorporated and/or further developed in the philosophy and worldview of the various sects of Buddhism that then emerged.
Buddhism is anIndian religion[11] anddhārma that encompasses a variety oftraditions,beliefs, andspiritual practices based onteachings attributed toGautama Buddha (5th century BCE), but diversified since then in awide variety of schools and traditions.[11] Buddhism originated inancient India,[11] from wheretheBuddhadhārma spread from thenortheastern region of theIndian subcontinent throughoutCentral Asia,East Asia,Mainland Southeast Asia, andMaritime Southeast Asia.[4]Philosophy in ancient India was aimed primarily atspiritual liberation and hadsoteriological goals.[11] In his study of theMādhyamaka andSautrāntika schools of Buddhist philosophy in ancient India, Peter Deller Santina writes:[12]
Attention must first of all be drawn to the fact thatphilosophical systems in India were seldom, if ever, purely speculative or descriptive. Virtually all the great philosophical systems of India:Sāṃkhya,Advaita Vedānta,Mādhyamaka and so forth, were preeminently concerned with providing a means to liberation or salvation. It was a tacit assumption with these systems that if their philosophy were correctly understood and assimilated, anunconditioned state free of suffering and limitation could be achieved. [...] If this fact is overlooked, as often happens as a result of the propensity engendered by formalOccidental philosophy to consider the philosophical enterprise as a purely descriptive one, the real significance of Indian and Buddhist philosophy will be missed.
For the Indian Buddhist philosophers, the teachings ofGautama Buddha were not meant to be taken on faith alone, but to be confirmed bylogical analysis and inquiry (pramāṇa) of the world.[6] The early Buddhist texts mention that a person becomes a follower of the Buddha's teachings after having pondered them over withwisdom (jñana) and the gradual training also requires that a disciple "investigate" (upaparikkhati) and "scrutinize" (tuleti) the teachings.[13] The Buddha also expected his disciples to approach him as a teacher in a critical fashion and scrutinize his actions and words, as shown in theVīmaṃsaka Sutta.[3]
Some Buddhist thinkers even argued thatsystems of rational reflection and philosophical analysis were a central practice which was necessary for the attainment of insight duringmeditation. Thus,Mahāyāna philosophers likePrajñakaragupta argue that one is not ayogi "merely because of meditation"; rather, one must meditate, listen to the teachings, and understand them by "reflecting through rational inquiry" (yukti-cintāmaya). Only through this method, which combinedrational reflection and the practice of meditation, will thewisdom that leads toenlightenment arise.[14]
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*This list is a simplification. It is likely that the development of Buddhist schools was not linear. |
Buddhism is devoted primarily toawakening or enlightenment (bodhi),Nirvāṇa ("blowing out"), andliberation (vimokṣa) fromall causes of suffering (duḥkha) due to the existence ofsentient beings insaṃsāra (the cycle of compulsorybirth, death, and rebirth) through thethreefold trainings (ethical conduct,meditative absorption, andwisdom).Classical Indian Buddhism emphasized the importance of the individual'sself-cultivation (through numerous spiritual practices like keepingethical precepts,Buddhist meditation, andworship) in the process of liberation from thedefilements which keep us bound to the cycle of rebirth. According to thestandard Buddhist scholastic understanding, liberation arises when the properelements (dhārmata) are cultivated and when the mind has been purified of itsattachment tofetters andhindrances that produce unwholesome mental factors (various calleddefilements,poisons, orfluxes).[15]
Scholarly opinion varies as to whetherGautama Buddha himself was engaged in philosophical inquiry.[16] Siddartha Gautama (c. 5th century BCE) was a north IndianŚramaṇa (wandering ascetic), whose teachings are preserved in thePāliNikayas and in theĀgamas as well as in other surviving fragmentary textual collections, collectively known as theearly Buddhist texts. Dating these texts is difficult, and there is disagreement on how much of this material goes back to a single religious founder. While the focus of the Buddha's teachings is about attaining the highest good ofnirvāṇa, they also contain an analysis of thesource of human suffering (duḥkha), the nature ofpersonal identity (ātman), and the process of acquiringknowledge (prajña) about the world.[3]
The Buddha defined his teaching as "the Middle Way" (Pāli:majjhimāpaṭipadā). In theDharmacakrapravartana Sūtra, this is used to refer to the fact that his teachings steer a middle course between the extremes ofasceticism and bodily denial (as practiced by theJains and other Indian ascetic groups) and sensualhedonism or indulgence. ManyŚramaṇa ascetics of the Buddha's time placed much emphasis on a denial of the body, using practices such asfasting, to liberate the mind from the body.Gautama Buddha, however, realized that the mind was embodied and causally dependent on the body, and therefore that a malnourished body did not allow the mind to be trained and developed.[17] Thus, Buddhism's main concern is not with luxury or poverty, but instead with the human response to circumstances.[18]
Another related teaching of the historical Buddha is "the teaching through the middle" (majjhena dhammaṃ desana), which claims to be a metaphysical middle path between the extremes ofeternalism andannihilationism, as well as the extremes of existence and non-existence.[19][20] This idea would become central to later Buddhist metaphysics, as all Buddhist philosophies would claim to steer a metaphysical middle course.
Apart from the middle way, certain basic teachings appear in many places throughout theseearly Buddhist texts, so older studies by various scholars conclude that the Buddha must at least have taught some of these key teachings:[21]
According to N. Ross Reat, all of these doctrines are shared by thePāli Canon ofTheravāda Buddhism and theŚālistamba Sūtra belonging to theMahāsāṃghika school.[22] A recent study by Bhikkhu Analayo concludes that the TheravādinMajjhima Nikāya and the SarvāstivādinMadhyama Āgama contain mostly the same major Buddhist doctrines.[23]Richard G. Salomon, in his study of theGandhāran Buddhist texts (which are the earliest manuscripts containing discourses attributed to Gautama Buddha), has confirmed that their teachings are "consistent with non-Mahayana Buddhism, which survives today in the Theravada school of Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, but which in ancient times was represented by eighteen separate schools."[24]
However, some scholars such asSchmithausen,Vetter, andBronkhorst argue that critical analysis reveals discrepancies among these various doctrines. They present alternative possibilities for what was taught inearliest Buddhism and question the authenticity of certain teachings and doctrines. For example, some scholars think that the doctrine ofkarma was not central to the teachings of the historical Buddha, while others disagree with this position.[25] Likewise, there is scholarly disagreement on whetherinsight into the true nature of reality (prajña) was seen as liberating in earliest Buddhism or whether it was a later addition. according to Vetter and Bronkhorst,dhyāna constituted the original "liberating practice", while discriminating insight into transiency as a separate path toliberation was a later development.[26][27] Scholars such as Bronkhorst and Carol Anderson also think that theFour Noble Truths may not have been formulated in earliest Buddhism but as Anderson writes "emerged as a central teaching in a slightly later period that still preceded the final redactions of the various Buddhist canons."[28][29]
According to some scholars, the philosophical outlook of earliest Buddhism was primarily negative, in the sense that it focused on what doctrines toreject and let go of more than on what doctrines toaccept.[a]Only knowledge that is useful in attaining liberation is valued. According to this theory, the cycle of philosophical upheavals that in part drove the diversification of Buddhism into its many schools and sects only began once Buddhists began attempting to make explicit the implicit philosophy of the Buddha and the early texts.
TheFour Noble Truths or "Truths of the Noble One" are a central feature to the teachings of the historical Buddha and are put forth in theDharmacakrapravartana Sūtra. The first truth ofduḥkha, often translated as "suffering", is the inherent and eternal unsatisfactoriness of life. This unpleasantness is said to be not just physical pain and psychological distress, but also a kind of existential unease caused by the inevitable facts of our mortality and ultimately by theimpermanence of all beings and phenomena.[30]
Suffering also arises because of contact with unpleasant events, and due to not getting what one desires. The second truth is that this unease arises out of conditions, mainlycraving (taṇhā) andignorance (avidyā). The third truth is then the fact that wheneversentient beings let go of craving and remove ignorance through insight and knowledge,suffering ceases (nirodhā). The fourth truth is theNoble Eightfold Path, which consists of eight practices that end suffering. They are: right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, rightmindfulness, and rightsamādhi (concentration, mental unification, meditation). The highest good and ultimate goal taught by the historical Buddha, which is the attainment ofnirvāṇa, literally means "extinguishing" and signified "the complete extinguishing of greed, hatred, and delusion (i.e.ignorance), the forces which powersaṃsāra".[31]
Nirvāṇa also means that after anenlightened being's death, there is no further rebirth. Inearliest Buddhism, the concept ofdependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda) was most likely limited to processes of mental conditioning and not to all physical phenomena.[32] Gautama Buddha understood the world in procedural terms, not in terms of things or substances.[33] His theory posits a flux of events arising under certain conditions which are interconnected and dependent, such that the processes in question at no time are considered to be static or independent.Craving (taṇhā), for example, is always dependent on, and caused by sensations gained by thesense organs (āyatana). Sensations are always dependent on contact with our surroundings. Buddha's causal theory is simply descriptive: "This existing, that exists; this arising, that arises; this not existing, that does not exist; this ceasing, that ceases." This understanding of causation as "impersonal lawlike causal ordering" is important because it shows how the processes that give rise to suffering work, and also how they can be reversed.[31]
The removal of suffering that stemmed fromignorance (avidyā), then, requires adeep understanding of the nature of reality (prajña). While philosophical analysis of arguments and concepts is clearly necessary to develop this understanding, it is not enough to remove our unskillful mental habits and deeply ingrained prejudices, which requiremeditation, paired with understanding.[34] According to the Buddha's teachings as recorded in theGandhāran Buddhist texts, we need to train the mind in meditation to be able to truly comprehend the nature of reality, which is said to have theThree marks of existence: suffering, impermanence, andnon-self (anātman). Understanding and meditation are said to work together toclearly see (vipassanā) the nature of human experience and this is said to lead to liberation.
| TheFive Aggregates (pañcakkhandha) according to thePali Canon. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Source: MN 109 (Thanissaro, 2001) | diagram details | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Gautama Buddha argued thatcompounded entities andsentient beings lacked essence, correspondinglythe self is without essence (anātman).[35] This means there is no part of a person which is unchanging and essential for continuity, and it means that there is no individual "part of the person that accounts for the identity of that person over time".[36] This is in opposition to theUpanishadic concept of an unchangingultimate self (ātman) and any view of an eternalsoul. The Buddha held that attachment to the appearance of a permanent self in this world of change isthe cause of suffering (duḥkha), and the main obstacle to the attainment ofspiritual liberation (mokṣa).
The most widely used argument that the Buddha employed against the idea of an unchanging ego is anempiricist one, based on the observation of thefive aggregates of existence (skandhā) that constitute a sentient being, and the fact that these are always changing.[35] This argument can be put in this way:[35]
This argument requires the implied premise that the five aggregates are an exhaustive account of what makes up a person, or else the self could exist outside of these aggregates.[36] This premise is affirmed in otherBuddhist texts, such asSaṃyutta Nikāya 22.47, which states: "whatever ascetics and brahmins regard various kinds of things as self, all regard the five grasping aggregates, or one of them."[37]
This argument is famously expounded in theAnātmalakṣaṇa Sūtra. According to this text, the apparently fixed self is merely the result of identification with thetemporary aggregates of existence (skandhā), the changing processes making up an individual human being. In this view, a 'person' is only a convenient nominal designation on a certain grouping of processes and characteristics, and an 'individual' is a conceptual construction overlaid upon a stream of experiences, just like achariot is merely a conventional designation for the parts of a chariot and how they are put together. The foundation of this argument is purelyempiricist, for it is based on the fact that all we observe is subject to change, especially everything observed when looking inwardly in meditation.[38]
Another argument supporting the doctrine ofnon-self, the "argument from lack of control",[39] is based on the fact that we often seek to change certain parts of ourselves, that the "executive function" of the mind is that which finds certain things unsatisfactory and attempts to alter them. Furthermore, it is also based on the "anti-reflexivity principle" ofIndian philosophy, which states an entity cannot operate on or control itself (a knife can cut other things but not itself, a finger can point at other things but not at itself, etc.). This means then, that the self could never desire to change itself and could not do so; another reason for this is that, besides Buddhism, in theorthodox schools ofHindu philosophy the unchangingultimate self (ātman) is perfectly blissful and does not suffer.[40][41] The historical Buddha used this idea to attack the concept of self. This argument could be structured thus:[35]
This argument then denies that there is one permanent "controller" in the person. Instead, it views the person as a set ofconstantly changing processes which include volitional events seeking change and an awareness of that desire for change. According to Mark Siderits:
What the Buddhist has in mind is that on one occasion one part of the person might perform the executive function, on another occasion another part might do so. This would make it possible for every part to be subject to control without there being any part that always fills the role of the controller (and so is the self). On some occasions, a given part might fall on the controller side, while on other occasions it might fall on the side of the controlled. This would explain how it's possible for us to seek to change any of the skandhas while there is nothing more to us than just those skandhas.[42]
As noted by K.R. Norman and Richard Gombrich, the Buddha extended hisnon-self critique to the Brahmanical belief expounded in theBrihadaranyaka Upanishad that the unchangingultimate self (ātman) was indeed the whole world, or identical withBrahman.[40][41][43][44] This concept is illustrated in theAlagaddupama Sūtra, where the Buddha argues that an individual cannot experience the suffering of the entire world. He used the example of someone carrying off and burning grass and sticks from the Jeta grove and how a monk would not sense or consider themselves harmed by that action. In this example, the Buddha is arguing that we do not have direct experience of the entire world, and hence the self cannot be the whole world.[b] In this Buddhist text, as well as in theSoattā Sūtra, the Buddha outlinessix wrong views about self:
There are six wrong views: An unwise, untrained person may think of the body, 'This is mine, this is me, this is my self'; he may think that of feelings; of perceptions; of volitions; or of what has been seen, heard, thought, cognized, reached, sought or considered by the mind. The sixth is to identify the world and self, to believe: 'At death, I shall become permanent, eternal, unchanging, and so remain forever the same; and that is mine, that is me, that is my self.' A wise and well-trained person sees that all these positions are wrong, and so he is not worried about something that does not exist.[43]
Furthermore, Gautama Buddha argued that the world can be observed to be a cause of suffering (Brahman was held to be ultimately blissful in theorthodox schools ofHindu philosophy) and that since we cannot control the world as we wish, the world cannot be the self. The idea that "this cosmos is the self" is one of thesix wrong views rejected by the historical Buddha,[45] along with the relatedmonisticHindu theology which held that "everything is a Oneness" (SN 12.48Lokayatika Sutta).[40][41][46] The historical Buddha also held that understanding and seeing the truth of non-self led to un-attachment, and hence to the cessation of suffering, whileignorance (avidyā) about thetrue nature of personality (prajña) led to further suffering and attachment.
All schools ofIndian philosophy recognizevarious sets of valid justifications for knowledge (pramāṇa) and many see theVedas as providing access to truth. The historical Buddhadenied the authority of the Vedas, though, like his contemporaries, he affirmed the soteriological importance of holding theright view; that is, having a proper understanding of reality.[47] However, this understanding was not conceived primarily as metaphysical and cosmological knowledge, but as a piece of knowledge into the arising and cessation of suffering in human experience.[48] Therefore, the Buddha's epistemic project is different from that ofmodern philosophy; it is primarily a solution to the fundamental human spiritual/existential problem.
Gautama Buddha'slogico-epistemology has been compared toempiricism, in the sense that it was based on the experience of the world throughthe senses.[49][50] The Buddha taught thatempirical observation through the six sense fields (āyatanā) was the proper way of verifying any knowledge claims. SomeBuddhist texts go further, stating that "the All", or everything that exists (sabbam), are these six sense spheres (SN 35.23,Sabba Sutta)[51] and that anyone who attempts to describe another "All" will be unable to do so because "it lies beyond range".[52] This text seems to indicate that for the Buddha, things in themselves ornoumena are beyond our epistemological reach (avisaya).[53][opinion]
Furthermore, in theKālāma Sutta the Buddha tells a group of confused villagers that the only proper reason for one's beliefs is verification in one's own personal experience (and the experience of the wise) and denies any verification which stems from a personal authority, sacred tradition (anussava), or any kind ofrationalism which constructs metaphysical theories (takka).[54] In theTevijja Sutta (DN 13), the Buddha rejects the personal authority ofBrahmins because none of them can prove they have had personal experience ofBrahman, nor could any of them prove its existence.[35] The Buddha also stressed that experience is the only criterion for verification of the truth in this passage from theMajjhima Nikāya (MN.I.265):
Furthermore, the Buddha's standard for personal verification was apragmatic andsalvific one, for the Buddha a belief counts as truth only if it leads to successful Buddhist practice (and hence, to the destruction of craving). In the "Discourse to Prince Abhaya" (MN.I.392–4) the Buddha states this pragmatic maxim by saying that a belief should only be accepted if it leads to wholesome consequences.[55] This tendency of the Buddha to see what is true as what was useful or "what works" has been called by Western scholars such asMrs Rhys Davids andVallée-Poussin a form ofpragmatism.[56][57] However,K. N. Jayatilleke argues the Buddha's epistemology can also be taken to be a form ofcorrespondence theory (as per theApannaka Sutta) with elements ofcoherentism,[58] and that for the Buddha it is causally impossible for something which is false to lead to cessation of suffering and evil.
Gautama Buddha discouragedhis disciples and early followers of Buddhism from indulging in intellectual disputation for its own sake, which is fruitless, and distracts one from the ultimate goals ofawakening (bodhi) andliberation (mokṣa). Only philosophy and discussion which has pragmatic value for liberation from suffering is seen as important. According to thePāli Canon, during his lifetime the Buddha remained silent when asked severalmetaphysicalquestions which he regarded as the basis for "unwise reflection". These "unanswered questions" (avyākṛta) regarded issues such aswhether the universe is eternal or non-eternal (or whether it is finite or infinite), the unity or separation of the body andthe self (ātman), the complete inexistence of a person after death andnirvāṇa, and others. In theAggi-Vacchagotta Sutta, the historical Buddha stated that thinking about these imponderable issues led to "a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views".
One explanation for this pragmatic suspension of judgment or epistemicEpoché is that such questions contribute nothing to the practical methods of realizingawakeness during one's lifetime[59] and bring about the danger of substituting the experience of liberation by a conceptual understanding of the doctrine or by religious faith. According to the Buddha, theDharma is not an ultimate end in itself or an explanation of all metaphysical reality, but a pragmatic set of teachings. The Buddha used two parables to clarify this point, the 'Parable of the raft' and theParable of the Poisoned Arrow.[60] TheDharma is like a raft in the sense that it is only a pragmatic tool for attaining nirvana ("for the purpose of crossing over, not for the purpose of holding onto", MN 22); once one has done this, one can discard the raft. It is also like medicine, in that the particulars of how one wasinjured by a poisoned arrow (i.e. metaphysics, etc.) do not matter in the act of removing and curing the arrow wound itself (removing suffering). In this sense, the Buddha was often called "the great physician" because his goal was to cure the human condition of suffering first and foremost, not to speculate about metaphysics.[61]
Having said this, it is still clear that resisting and even refuting a false or slanted doctrine can be useful to extricate the interlocutor, or oneself, from error; hence, to advance in the way of liberation. Witness the Buddha's confutation of several doctrines by Nigantha Nataputta and other purported sages which sometimes had large followings (e.g., Kula Sutta, Sankha Sutta, Brahmana Sutta). This shows that a virtuous and appropriate use of dialectics can take place. By implication, reasoning and argument shouldn't be disparaged by Buddhists.
After the Buddha's death, some Buddhists such asDharmakirti went on to use the sayings of the Buddha as sound evidence equal to perception and inference.[c]
Another possible reason why the Buddha refused to engage inmetaphysics is that he saw ultimate reality and nirvana as devoid of sensory mediation and conception and therefore language itself isa priori inadequate to explain it.[62] Thus, the Buddha's silence does not indicatemisology or disdain for philosophy. Rather, it indicates that he viewed the answers to these questions as not understandable by the unenlightened.[62]Dependent arising provides a framework for analysis of reality that is not based on metaphysical assumptions regarding existence or non-existence, but instead on direct cognition of phenomena as they are presented to the mind in meditation.
The Buddha of the earliest Buddhists texts describes Dharma (in the sense of "truth") as "beyond reasoning" or "transcending logic", in the sense that reasoning is a subjectively introduced aspect of the way unenlightened humans perceive things, and the conceptual framework which underpins their cognitive process, rather than a feature of things as they really are. Going "beyond reasoning" means in this context penetrating the nature of reasoning from the inside, and removing the causes for experiencing any future stress as a result of it, rather than functioning outside the system as a whole.[63]
The Buddha's ethics are based on thesoteriological need to eliminate suffering and on the premise of the law ofkarma. Buddhist ethics have been termed eudaimonic (with their goal being well-being) and also compared tovirtue ethics (this approach began with Damien Keown).[64] Keown writes that BuddhistNirvana is analogous to the AristotelianEudaimonia, and that Buddhist moral acts and virtues derive their value from how they lead us to or act as an aspect of the nirvanic life.
The Buddha outlinedfive precepts (no killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, or drinking alcohol) which were to be followed by his disciples, lay and monastic. There are various reasons the Buddha gave as to why someone should be ethical.
First, the universe is structured in such a way that if someone intentionally commits a misdeed, a bad karmic fruit will be the result. Hence, from a pragmatic point of view, it is best to abstain from these negative actions which bring forth negative results. However, the important word here isintentionally: for the Buddha, karma is nothing else but intention/volition, and hence unintentionally harming someone does not create bad karmic results. Unlike theJains who believed that karma was a quasi-physical element, for the Buddha karma was a volitional mental event, what Richard Gombrich calls "an ethicised consciousness".[65]
This idea leads into the second moral justification of the Buddha: intentionally performing negative actions reinforces and propagates mental defilements which keep persons bound to the cycle of rebirth and interfere with the process of liberation, and hence intentionally performing good karmic actions is participating in mental purification which leads tonirvana, the highest happiness. This perspective sees immoral acts as unskillful (akusala) in our quest for happiness, and hence it is pragmatic to do good.[66]
The third meta-ethical consideration takes the view of not-self and our natural desire to end our suffering to its logical conclusion. Since there is no self, there is no reason to prefer our own welfare over that of others because there is no ultimate grounding for the differentiation of "my" suffering and someone else's. Instead, an enlightened person would just work to end sufferingtout court, without thinking of the conventional concept of persons.[67] According to this argument, anyone who is selfish does so out of ignorance of the true nature of personal identity and irrationality.
The main Indian Buddhist philosophical schools practiced a form of analysis termedAbhidharma which sought to systematize the teachings of the early Buddhist discourses (sutras). Abhidharma analysis broke down human experience into momentary phenomenal events or occurrences called "dharmas". Dharmas are impermanent and dependent on other causal factors, they arise and pass as part of a web of other interconnected dharmas, and are never found alone. The Abhidharma schools held that the teachings of the Buddha in the sutras were merely conventional, while the Abhidharma analysis was ultimate truth (paramattha sacca), the way things really are when seen by an enlightened being. The Abhidharmic project has been likened as a form ofphenomenology orprocess philosophy.[68][69]
Abhidharma philosophers not only outlined what they believed to be an exhaustive listing ofdharmas (Pali: dhammas), which are the ultimate phenomena, events or processes (and include physical and mental phenomena), but also the causal relations between them. In the Abhidharmic analysis, the only thing which is ultimately real is the interplay of dharmas in a causal stream; everything else is merely conceptual (paññatti) and nominal.[70]
This view has been termed "mereological reductionism" by Mark Siderits because it holds that only impartite entities are real, not wholes.[71] Abhidharmikas such as Vasubandhu argued that conventional things (tables, persons, etc.) "disappear under analysis" and that this analysis reveals only a causal stream of phenomenal events and their relations. The mainstream Abhidharmikas defended this view against their main Hindu rivals, theNyaya school, who weresubstance theorists and posited the existence ofuniversals.[70] Some Abhidharmikas such as thePrajñaptivāda were also strictnominalists, and held that all things - even dharmas - were merely conceptual.
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An important Abhidhamma work from theTheravāda school is theKathāvatthu ("Points of controversy"), attributed to the Indian scholar-monkMoggaliputta-Tissa (c. 327–247 BCE). This text is important because it attempts to refute several philosophical views which had developed after the death of the Buddha, especially the theory that 'all exists' (sarvāstivāda), the theory of momentariness (khāṇavāda) and the personalist view (pudgalavada).[72] These were the major philosophical theories that divided the Buddhist Abhidharma schools in India.
After being brought toSri Lanka in the first century BCE, thePali languageTheravada Abhidhamma tradition was heavily influenced by the works ofBuddhaghosa (4-5th century AD), the most important philosopher and commentator of theTheravada school. The Theravada philosophical enterprise was mostly carried out in the genre ofAtthakatha (commentaries) as well assub-commentaries (tikas) on the classic Pali Abhidhamma texts. Abhidhamma study also included smaller doctrinal summaries and compendiums, like theAbhidhammattha-saṅgaha (The Compendium of Things contained in the Abhidhamma).
TheSarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika (sometimes just "Vaibhāṣika") was one of the major Buddhist philosophical schools in India, and they were so named because of their belief that dharmas exist in all three times: past, present and future. Though the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma system began as a mere categorization of mental events, their philosophers and exegetes such asDharmatrata and Katyāyāniputra, the compiler of theMahāvibhāṣa ("Great Commentary"), eventually refined this system into a robustrealism, which also included a type ofessentialism orsubstance theory. This realism was based on the nature of dharmas, which was calledsvabhava ("self-nature" or "intrinsic existence").[72] Svabhava is a sort ofessence, though it is not a completely independent essence, since all dharmas were said to be causally dependent. The Sarvāstivāda system extended this realism across time, effectively positing a type ofeternalism with regards to time; hence, the name of their school means "the view that everything exists".[72] Vaibhāṣika remained an influential school in North India during the medieval period. Perhaps the most influential figure in this tradition was the great scholarSaṃghabhadra.[73] Another key figure wasŚubhagupta (720–780), who was a Vaibhāṣika thinker within the epistemological (pramana) tradition.[74]
Other Buddhist schools such as thePrajñaptivāda ("the nominalists"), as well as theCaitika Mahāsāṃghikas refused to accept the concept ofsvabhava.[75] Thus, not all Abhidharma sources defend svabhava. For example, the main topic of theTattvasiddhi Śāstra by Harivarman (3-4th century CE), an influential Abhidharma text, is the emptiness (shunyata) of dharmas.[76] Indeed, this anti-essentialist nominalism was widespread among theMahāsāṃghika sects. Another important feature of the Mahāsāṃghika tradition was its unique theory of consciousness. Many of the Mahāsāṃghika sub-schools defended a theory of self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) which held that consciousness can be simultaneously aware of itself as well as its intentional object.[77] Some of these schools also held that the mind's nature (cittasvabhāva) is fundamentally pure (mulavisuddha), but it can be contaminated by adventitious defilements.[78]
The Theravādins and other schools, such as theSautrāntikas ("those who follow thesutras"), often attacked the theories of the Sarvāstivādins, especially their theory of time. A major figure in this argument was the scholarVasubandhu, a Sarvāstivādin monk himself (who was also influenced by the critiques of theSautrantika school), who critiqued the theory of all exists and argued forphilosophical presentism in his comprehensive treatise, theAbhidharmakośa. This work is the major Abhidharma text used in Tibetan and East Asian Buddhism today. The Theravāda also holds that dharmas only exist in the present, and are thus alsopresentists.[79]
The Theravāda presentation of Abhidharma is also not as concerned withontology as the Sarvāstivāda view, but is more of a phenomenological schema.[68] Hence the concept of svabhava (Pali: sabhava) for the Theravādins is more of a certain characteristic or dependent feature of a dharma, than any sort of essence or metaphysical grounding. As the Sinhalese scholarY. Karunadasa writes, the Pali tradition only postulates sabhava "for the sake of definition and description." However, ultimately each dhamma (particular phenomenon) is not a singular independent existence. Thus, Karunadasa rejects the view that Theravada Abhidhamma defends anontological pluralism (but it is also notmonism either, since there is no single underlying ground of all things or metaphysical substratum). Instead they are merely processes that happen "due to the interplay of a multitude of conditions."[80] Karunadasa also describes the Theravada system as a "critical realism" which sees the ultimate existents as the myriad irreducible dhammas, and which also accepts the existence of an external world with entities that truly exist independently of cognition (as opposed to Mahayana forms of idealism).[81][82]
Another important theory held by some Sarvāstivādins, Theravādins and Sautrāntikas was the theory of "momentariness" (Skt., kṣāṇavāda, Pali, khāṇavāda). This theory held that dhammas only last for a minute moment (ksana) after they arise. The Sarvāstivādins saw these 'moments' in an atomistic way, as the smallest length of time possible (they also developed a material atomism). Reconciling this theory with their eternalism regarding time was a major philosophical project of theSarvāstivāda.[83] The Theravādins initially rejected this theory, as evidenced by the Khaṇikakathā of theKathavatthu which attempts to refute the doctrine that "all phenomena (dhamma) are as momentary as a single mental entity."[84] However, momentariness with regards to mental dhammas (but not physical orrūpa dhammas) was later adopted by the Sri Lankan Theravādins, and it is possible that it was first introduced by the scholarBuddhagosa.[85]
All Abhidharma schools also developed complex theories of causation and conditionality to explain how dharmas interacted with each other. Another major philosophical project of the Abhidharma schools was the explanation ofperception. Some schools such as the Sarvastivadins explained perception as a type of phenomenalist realism while others such as the Sautrantikas preferredrepresentationalism and held that we only perceive objects indirectly.[86] The major argument used for this view by the Sautrāntikas was the "time-lag argument." According to Mark Siderits: "The basic idea behind the argument is that since there is always a tiny gap between when the sense comes in contact with the external object and when there is sensory awareness, what we are aware of can't be the external object that the senses were in contact with, since it no longer exists."[87] This is related to the theory of extreme momentariness.
One major philosophical view which was rejected by all the schools mentioned above was the view held by thePudgalavadin or 'personalist' schools. They seemed to have held that there was a sort of 'personhood' in some ultimately real sense which was not reducible to the five aggregates.[79] This controversial claim was in contrast to the other Buddhists of the time who held that a personality was a mere conceptual construction (prajñapti) and only conventionally real.
From about the 1st century BCE, a new textual tradition began to arise in Indian Buddhist thought calledMahāyāna (Great Vehicle), which would slowly come to dominate Indian Buddhist philosophy. During themedieval period of Indian history, Buddhist philosophy thrived in large monastery complexes such asNalanda,Vikramasila, andVallabhi. These institutions became major centers of philosophical learning in North India (where both Buddhist and also non-Buddhist thought was studied and debated). Mahāyāna philosophers continued the philosophical projects of Abhidharma, while at the same time critiquing them and introducing many new concepts and ideas. Since the Mahāyāna held to thepragmatic concept of truth, which states that doctrines are regarded as conditionally "true" in the sense of being spiritually beneficial, these new theories and practices were seen as "skillful means" (upāya)conductive to enlightenment.[88]
The Mahāyāna also promoted theBodhisattva ideal, which includedan attitude of benevolence, wisdom, compassion, generosity, and loving-kindness for allsentient beings. The Bodhisattva is someone who chooses to remain in thecycle of birth, death, and rebirth in order to help and benefit all other beings who are suffering, until their final attainment ofBuddhahood.[89][90]
Major Mahayana philosophical schools and traditions include thePrajñaparamita,Mādhyamaka,Yogācāra,Tathagatagarbha, the epistemological school of Dignaga, and in China theHuayan,Tiantai, andZen schools.
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The earliestPrajñāpāramitā Sūtras ("Perfection of Wisdom",c. 1st century BCE) emphasize theemptiness (śūnyatā) of allconditioned andunconditionedphenomena (dharma). It is thus a radical globalnominalism andanti-essentialism, which sees all things as illusions and all of reality as a dreamlike appearance without any fundamental essence.[91]Prajñāpāramitā is said to be atranscendent spiritual knowledge of the nature ofultimate reality, which is empty of anyessence or foundation, like a universalmirage.
Thus, theDiamond Sutra (Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra) states:
All conditioned phenomena
Are like a dream, an illusion, a bubble, a shadow,
Like dew or a flash of lightning;Thus we shall perceive them.[92]
TheHeart Sutra famously affirms the emptiness of all phenomena:
Oh, Sariputra, form does not differ from emptiness, and emptiness does not differ from form.
Form is emptiness and emptiness is form; the same is true for feelings, perceptions, volitions, and consciousness.
The Prajñāpāramitā sources also note that this applies to every single phenomenon, evenBuddhahood.[93] The goal of the Buddhist aspirant in the Prajñāpāramitā texts is to awaken to the perfection of wisdom ("prajñāpāramitā"), a non-conceptual transcendent wisdom that knows the emptiness of all things while not being attached to anything (including the very idea of emptiness itself or perfect wisdom).[94][91]
ThePrajñāpāramitā teachings are associated with the work of the Buddhist philosopherNāgārjuna (c. 150 –c. 250 CE) and theMādhyamaka ("Middle Way") school. Nāgārjuna was one of the most influential Indian Mahāyāna thinkers. He gave the classical arguments for the empty nature of all dharmas and attacked theessentialism found in various Abhidharma schools (and also inHindu philosophy) in his magnum opus,The Root Verses on the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā).[95] In theMūlamadhyamakakārikā, Nagarjuna relies onreductio ad absurdum arguments to refute various theories which assumesvabhāva (an inherentessence or substantial being),dravya (substances or entity), or any theory of existence (bhāva). In this work, he covers topics such ascausation, motion, and the sense faculties.[96]
Nāgārjuna asserted a direct connection between, even identity of,dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda),emptiness (śūnyatā), andnon-self (anattā). He pointed out that implicit in the early Buddhist concept of dependent origination is the lack of a permanent, unchanging self underlying the participants in origination, so that they have no independent existence, a state identified as being empty (svabhāvaśūnyam: i.e., emptiness of a nature or essence).
Later philosophers of the Mādhyamaka school built upon Nāgārjuna's analysis and defended the Mādhyamaka view against their opponents. These includedĀryadeva (3rd century CE), Nāgārjuna's pupil;Candrakīrti (600–c. 650), who wrote an important commentary on theMūlamadhyamakakārikā; andShantideva (8th century), who is regarded as the key Mahāyāna ethicist.
The commentatorBuddhapālita (c. 470–550) has been understood as the originator of the Prasaṅgika approach which is based on critiquing essentialismonly through reductio arguments. He was criticized byBhāvaviveka (c. 500 –c. 578), who argued for the use of properly logicalsyllogisms to positively argue for emptiness (instead of just refuting the theories of others). These two approaches were later termed thePrasaṅgika and Svatantrika approaches to Mādhyamaka philosophy byTibetan Buddhist philosophers and commentators.
Influenced by the work ofDignaga, Bhāvaviveka's Mādhyamaka philosophy makes use of Buddhist epistemology. Candrakīrti, on the other hand, critiqued Bhāvaviveka's adoption of the epistemological (pramana) tradition on the grounds that it contained subtle essentialism. He quotes Nagarjuna's famous statement in theVigrahavyavartani which says "I have no thesis" for his rejection of positive epistemic Madhyamaka statements.[97] Candrakīrti held that a true Madhyamika could only use "consequence" (prasanga), in which one points out the inconsistencies of their opponent's position without asserting an "autonomous inference" (svatantra), for no such inference can be ultimately true from the point of view of Madhyamaka.
In China, the Madhyamaka school (known asSānlùn)[98] was founded byKumārajīva (344–413 CE), who translated the works of Nagarjuna to Chinese. Other Chinese Madhymakas includeKumārajīva's pupilSengzhao,Jizang (549–623), who wrote over 50 works on Madhyamaka, andHyegwan, a Korean monk who brought Madhyamaka teachings to Japan.[99][100]
TheYogācāra school (Yoga practice) was a Buddhist philosophical tradition which arose in between the 2nd century CE and the 4th century CE and is associated with the philosophers and brothersAsanga andVasubandhu and with various sutras such as theSandhinirmocana Sutra and theLankavatara Sutra.[101] The central feature of Yogācāra thought is the concept ofvijñapti-mātra, often translated as "impressions only" or "appearance only". This has been interpreted as a form ofIdealism or as a form ofPhenomenology. Other names for the Yogācāra school are 'vijñanavada' (the doctrine of consciousness) and 'cittamatra' (mind-only).[101]
Yogācāra thinkers like Vasubandhu argued against the existence of external objects by pointing out that we only ever have access to our own mental impressions, and hence our inference of the existence of external objects is based on faulty logic. Vasubandhu'sTriṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā (The Proof that There Are Only Impressions in Thirty Verses), begins thus:
I. This [world] is nothing but impressions, since it manifests itself as an unreal object, Just like the case of those with cataracts seeing unreal hairs in the moon and the like.[102]
According toVasubandhu then, all our experiences are like seeing hairs on the moon when we have cataracts, that is, we project our mental images into something "out there" when there are no such things. Vasubandhu then goes on to use thedream argument to argue that mental impressions do not require external objects to (1) seem to be spatio-temporally located, (2) to seem to have an inter-subjective quality, and (3) to seem to operate by causal laws.[102] The fact that purely mental events can have causal efficacy and beintersubjective is proved by the event of awet dream and by the mass or sharedhallucinations created by the karma of certain types of beings.[103] After having argued that impressions-only is a theory that can explain our everyday experience, Vasubandhu then appeals toparsimony - since we do not need the concept of external objects to explain reality, then we can do away with those superfluous concepts altogether as they are most likely just mentally superimposed on our concepts of reality by the mind.[104] Yogācārins like Vasubandhu also attacked the realist theories ofBuddhist atomism and the Abhidharma theory ofsvabhava. He argued that atoms, as conceived by the atomists (un-divisible entities), would not be able to come together to form larger aggregate entities, and hence that they were illogical concepts.[104]
Inter-subjective reality for Vasubandhu is then the causal interaction between variousmental streams and theirkarma, and does not include any external physical objects. The soteriological importance of this theory is that, by removing the concept of an external world, it also weakens the 'internal' sense of self as an observer which is supposed to be separate from the external world. To dissolve the dualism of inner and outer is also to dissolve the sense of self and other. The later Yogacara commentatorSthiramati explains this thus:
There is a grasper if there is something to be grasped, but not in the absence of what is to be grasped. Where there is nothing to be grasped, the absence of a grasper also follows, there is not just the absence of the thing to be grasped. Thus there arises the extra-mundane non-conceptual cognition that is alike without object and without cognizer.[105]
Apart from its defense of an idealistic metaphysics and its attacks on realism, Yogācāra sources also developed a new theory of mind, based on theEight Consciousnesses, which includes the innovative doctrine of the subliminal storehouse consciousness (Skt: ālayavijñāna).[106]
Yogācāra thinkers also developed a positive account of ultimate reality based on three basic modes or "natures" (svabhāva). This metaphysical doctrine is central to their view of the ultimate and to their understanding of the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā).[107]
Dignāga (c. 480–540) andDharmakīrti (c. 6-7th century) were Buddhist philosophers who developed a system of epistemology (pramana) andlogic in their debates with the Brahminical philosophers in order to defend Buddhist doctrine. This tradition is called "those who follow reasoning" (Tibetan:rigs pa rjes su 'brang ba); in modern literature, it is sometimes known by the Sanskrit "pramāṇavāda", or "the Epistemological School."[108] They were associated with theYogacara andSautrantika schools, and defended theories held by both of these schools.[109]
Dignāga's influence was profound and led to an "epistemological turn" among all Buddhists and also all Sanskrit language philosophers in India after his death. In the centuries following Dignāga's work, Sanskrit philosophers became much more focused on defending all of their propositions with fully developedtheories of knowledge.[110]
The "School of Dignāga" includes later philosophers and commentators like Santabhadra,Dharmottara (8th century),Prajñakaragupta (740–800 C.E.),Jñanasrimitra (975–1025),Ratnakīrti (11th century) andŚaṅkaranandana (fl. c. 9th or 10th century).[111][74] Theepistemology they developed defends the view that there are only two 'instruments of knowledge' or 'valid cognitions' (pramana): "perception" (pratyaksa) and "inference" (anumāṇa). Perception is a non-conceptual awareness of particulars which is bound by causality, while inference is reasonable, linguistic and conceptual.[112]
These Buddhist philosophers argued in favor of the theory of momentariness, the Yogācāra "awareness only" view, the reality of particulars (svalakṣaṇa),atomism,nominalism and the self-reflexive nature of consciousness (svasaṃvedana). They attackedHindu theories of God (Isvara),universals, the authority of theVedas, and the existence of a permanent soul (atman).
After the time of Asanga and Vasubandhu, the Yogācāra school developed in different directions. One branch focused on epistemology (this would become the school of Dignaga). Another branch focused on expanding the Yogācāra's metaphysics and philosophy.[113] This latter tradition includes figures likeDharmapala of Nalanda,Sthiramati,Chandragomin (who was known to have debated the Madhyamaka thinker Candrakirti), andŚīlabhadra (a top scholar atNalanda). Yogācārins such asParamartha andGuṇabhadra brought the school to China and translated Yogacara works there, where it is known asWéishí-zōng or Fǎxiàng-zōng. An important contribution to East Asian Yogācāra isXuanzang'sCheng Weishi Lun, or "Discourse on the Establishment of Consciousness Only".
A later development is the rise of asyncretic tradition of Yogācāra-tathāgatagarbha thought. This group adopted the doctrine oftathāgatagarbha (the buddha-womb, buddha-source, or "buddha-within") found in varioustathāgatagarbha sutras.[114] This hybrid school eventually went on to equate thetathāgatagarbha with the pure aspect of the storehouse consciousness. Some key sources of this school are theLaṅkāvatāra Sūtra,Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra), and in China, the influentialMahayana Awakening of Faith treatise.[113] One key figure of this tradition wasParamārtha, an Indian monk who was an important translator in China. He promoted a new theory that said there was a "stainless consciousness" (amala-vijñāna, a pure wisdom within all beings), which he equated with theBuddha-nature (tathāgatagārbha).[115] This synthetic tradition also became important in later Indian Buddhism, where theRatnagotravibhāga became the key text.[116]
Another later development was the synthesis of Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka philosophies.Jñānagarbha (8th century) and his studentŚāntarakṣita (725–788) brought together Yogācāra, Mādhyamaka, and the Dignaga school of epistemology into a philosophical synthesis known as theYogācāra-Svatantrika-Mādhyamika. Śāntarakṣita was also instrumental in the introduction of Buddhism and the Sarvastivadin monastic ordination lineage to Tibet, which was conducted at Samye.Śāntarakṣita's disciples includedHaribhadra andKamalaśīla. This philosophical tradition is influential in Tibetan Buddhist thought.
Perhaps the most important debate among late Yogācāra philosophers was the debate between alikākāravāda (Tib.rnam rdzun pa, False Aspectarians, also known as Nirākāravāda) and Satyākāravāda (rnam bden pa, True Aspectarians, also known as sākāravāda). The crux of the debate was the question of whether mental appearances, images or “aspects” (ākāra) are true (satya) or false (alika).[117] The Satyākāravāda camp, defended by scholars likePrajñakaragupta (ca. 8th–9th century), andJñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980–1040), held that images in consciousness have a real existence, since they arise from a real consciousness. Meanwhile, Alikākāravāda defenders likeSthiramati andRatnākaraśānti (ca. 970–1045) argued that mental appearances do not really exist, and are false (alīka) or illusory. For these thinkers, the only thing which is real is a pure self-aware consciousness which is contentless (nirākāra, “without images”).[118][119]
Thetathāgathagarbha sutras, in a departure from mainstream Buddhist language, insist that there is a real potential for awakening is inherent to every sentient being. They marked a shift from a largelyapophatic (negative) method within Buddhism to a decidedly morecataphatic (positive) mode. The main topic of this genre of literature is thetathāgata-garbha, which can mean the womb or embryo of aTathāgata (i.e. a Buddha) and is what allows someone to become a Buddha.[120] Another similar term used for this idea isbuddhadhātu (buddha-nature or source of the Buddhas).
Prior to the period of these scriptures, Mahāyānametaphysics had been dominated by teachings onemptiness. The language used by this approach is primarily negative, and the buddha-nature literature can be seen as an attempt to state orthodox Buddhist teachings ofdependent origination using positive language instead, to prevent people from being turned away from Buddhism by a false impression of nihilism. In these sutras, the perfection of the wisdom of not-self is stated to be the true self (atman). The word "self" (atman) is used in a way idiosyncratic to these sutras; the "true self" is described as the perfection of the wisdom ofnot-self in theBuddha-Nature Treatise (Fóxìng lùn, 佛性論, T. 1610) ofParamārtha, for example.[121] The ultimate goal of the path is then characterized using a range of positive language that had been used previously in Indian philosophy by essentialist philosophers, but which was now adapted to describe the positive realities of Buddhahood.[121]
Perhaps the most influential source in the Indian tradition for this teaching is theRatnagotravibhāga (5th century CE). Thisśāstra brought together all the major themes of the tathāgatagārbha theory into a single treatise. TheRatnagotravibhāga sees the tathāgatagarbha as being an inherent nature in all things which is omnipresent, all-pervasive, non-conceptual, free of suffering and inherently blissful.[122] It also describes buddha nature as “the intrinsically stainless nature of the mind” (cittaprakṛtivaimalya).[123] Indeed, in many later Indian sources, thetathāgathagarbha teachings also come to be identified with the similar doctrine of theluminous mind (prabhasvara-citta). This ancient idea holds that the mind is inherently pure, and that defilements are only adventitious. In theRatnagotravibhāga, this originally pure (prakṛtipariśuddha) nature (i.e. the fully purified buddha-nature) is further described through numerous terms such as: unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), unborn (ajāta), unarisen (anutpanna), eternal (nitya), changeless (dhruva), and permanent (śāśvata).[124]
According to some scholars,tathāgatagarbha does not represent a substantial self; rather, it is a positive language expression ofemptiness and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices. In this interpretation, the intention of the teaching oftathāgatagarbha issoteriological rather than metaphysical.[121][125]
Vajrayāna (also Mantrayāna, Secret Mantra, Tantrayāna, and Esoteric Buddhism) is a Mahayana Buddhist tradition associated with a group of texts known as theBuddhist Tantras which had developed into a major force in India by the eighth century. By this time IndianTantric scholars were developing philosophical defenses,hermeneutics and explanations of the Buddhist tantric systems, especially through commentaries on key tantras such as theGuhyasamāja Tantra,Mahavairocana sutra, and theGuhyagarbha Tantra.
While the view of the Vajrayāna was based on the earlierMadhyamaka,Yogacara andBuddha-nature theories, it saw itself as being a faster vehicle to liberation containing many skillful methods (upaya) of tantric ritual. The need for an explication and defense of the Tantras arose out of the unusual nature of the rituals associated with them, which included the use of secretmantras,alcohol,sexual yoga, complex visualizations ofmandalas filled withwrathful deities and other practices which were discordant with or at least novel in comparison to traditional Buddhist practice.[127][128]
TheGuhyasamāja Tantra, for example, states: "you should kill living beings, speak lying words, take things that are not given and have sex with many women".[129] Other features of tantra included a focus on the physical body as the means to liberation, and a reaffirmation offeminine elements, feminine deities and a positive view ofsexuality.[130]
The defense of these tantric practices is based on the theory of transformation which states that negative mental factors and physical actions can be cultivated and transformed in a ritual setting. TheHevajra tantra states:
Those things by which evil men are bound, others turn into means and gain thereby release from the bonds of existence. By passion the world is bound, by passion too it is released, but by heretical Buddhists, this practice of reversals is not known.[131]
Another hermeneutic of Buddhist Tantric commentaries such as theVimalaprabha (Stainless Light) of Pundarika (a commentary on theKalacakra Tantra) is one of interpretingtaboo or unethical statements in the Tantras asmetaphorical statements about tantric practice and physiology. For example, in theVimalaprabha, "killing living beings" refers to stopping theprana at the top of the head. In the Tantric Candrakirti'sPradipoddyotana, a commentary to theGuhyasamaja Tantra, killing living beings is glossed as "making them void" by means of a "specialsamadhi" which according toBus-ton is associated withcompletion stage tantric practice.[132]
Douglas Duckworth notes that Vajrayāna philosophical outlook is one of embodiment, which sees the physical and cosmological body as already containing wisdom and divinity. Liberation (nirvana) andBuddhahood are not seen as something outside the body, or an event in the future, but as imminently present and accessible right now through unique tantric practices likedeity yoga. Hence, Vajrayāna is also called the "resultant vehicle", that is to say, it is the spiritual vehicle that relies on the immanent nature of the result of practice (liberation), which is already present in all beings.[133] Duckworth names the philosophical view of Vajrayāna as a form ofpantheism, by which he means the belief that every existing entity is in some sense divine and that all things express some form of unity.[134]
Major Indian Tantric Buddhist philosophers such asBuddhaguhya, Padmavajra (author of theGuhyasiddhi commentary), Nagarjuna (the 7th-century disciple ofSaraha),Indrabhuti (author of theJñānasiddhi), Anangavajra, Dombiheruka, Durjayacandra,Ratnākaraśānti andAbhayakaragupta wrote tantric texts and commentaries systematizing the tradition.[135][136]
Others such asVajrabodhi andŚubhakarasiṃha brought tantra toTang China (716 to 720), and tantric philosophy continued to be developed in Chinese and Japanese by thinkers such asYi Xing (683–727) andKūkai (774– 835).
InTibet, philosophers such asSakya Pandita (1182-28–1251),Longchenpa (1308–1364) andTsongkhapa (1357–1419) continued the tradition of Buddhist Tantric philosophy inClassical Tibetan.
Tibetan Buddhist philosophy is mainly a continuation and refinement of the Indian Mahayana philosophical traditions.[137] The initial efforts ofŚāntarakṣita andKamalaśīla brought their eclectic scholarly tradition to Tibet.
The initial work of early Tibetan Buddhist philosophers was in the translation of classical Indian philosophical treatises and the writing of commentaries. This initial period is from the 8th to the 10th century. Early Tibetan commentator-philosophers were heavily influenced by the work ofDharmakirti and these includeNgok Loden Sherab (1059–1109) and Chaba Chökyi Senge (1182–1251). Their works are now lost.[138]
The 12th and 13th centuries saw the translation of the works ofChandrakirti, the promulgation of his views in Tibet by scholars such asPatsab Nyima Drakpa, Kanakavarman and Jayananda (12th century) and the development of the Tibetan debate between theprasangika andsvatantrika views which continues to this day among Tibetan Buddhist schools.[139][140] The main disagreement between these views is the use of reasoned argument. For Śāntarakṣita's school,reason is useful in establishing arguments that lead one to a correct understanding of emptiness. Then, through the use of meditation, one can reach non-conceptualgnosis that does not rely on reason. However, Chandrakirti rejects this idea, because meditation on emptiness cannot possibly involve any object. Reason's role for him is purely negative. Reason is used to negate any essentialist view, and then eventually reason must also negate itself, along with anyconceptual proliferation (prapañca).[141]
Another very influential figure from this early period isMabja Jangchub Tsöndrü (d. 1185), who wrote an important commentary on Nagarjuna'sMūlamadhyamakakārikā. Mabja was studied under the Dharmakirtian Chaba and also the Candrakirti scholar Patsab. His work shows an attempt to steer a middle course between their views, he affirms the conventional usefulness of pramāṇa epistemology, but also accepts Candrakirti's prasangika views.[142] Mabja's Madhyamaka scholarship was very influential on later Tibetan Madhyamikas such asLongchenpa,Tsongkhapa,Gorampa, andMikyö Dorje.[142]
There are various Tibetan Buddhist schools or monastic orders. According toGeorges B.J. Dreyfus, within Tibetan thought, theSakya school holds a mostlyanti-realist philosophical position (which seessaṁvṛtisatya /conventional truth as an illusion), while theGelug school tends to defend a form ofrealism (which accepts that conventional truth is in some sense real and true, yet dependently originated). TheKagyu andNyingma schools also tend to follow Sakya anti-realism (with some differences).[143]
The 14th century saw increasing interest in the Buddha nature texts and doctrines. This can be seen in the work of the third Kagyu KarmapaRangjung Dorje (1284–1339), especially his treatise"Profound Inner Meaning".[144] This treatise describes ultimate nature orsuchness as Buddha nature which is the basis for nirvana and samsara, radiant in nature and empty in essence, surpassing thought.[144]
One of the most important theoriests of buddha-nature in Tibet was the scholar-yogiDölpopa Shérap Gyeltsen (c. 1292–1361). A figure of theJonang school, Dölpopa developed a view calledshentong (Wylie: gzhan stong, 'other emptiness'), based on earlierYogacara and Buddha-nature ideas present in Indian sources (including the buddha-nature literature, theKālacakratantra and the works ofRatnākaraśānti). The shentong view holds thatBuddhahood is already immanent in all living beings as an eternal and all-pervaside non-dual wisdom he termed "all-basis wisdom" or "gnosis of the ground of all" (Tib.kun gzhi ye shes, Skt. ālaya-jñāna).[145] This view holds that all relative phenomena are empty of inherent existence, but that the ultimate reality, the buddha-wisdom (buddhajñana) isnot empty of its own inherent existence.[146]
According to Dölpopa, all beings are said to have the Buddha nature, the non-dual wisdom which is real, unchanging, permanent, non-conditioned, eternal, blissful and compassionate. This ultimate buddha wisdom is "uncreated and indestructible, unconditioned and beyond the chain ofdependent origination" and is the basis for bothsamsara and nirvana.[147] Dolpopa's shentong view also taught that ultimate reality was truly a "Great Self" or "Supreme Self" referring to works such as theMahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, theAṅgulimālīya Sūtra and theŚrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra.[148]
The shentong view had an influence on philosophers of other schools, such asNyingma andKagyu thinkers, and was also widely criticized in some circles as being similar to the Hindu notions ofAtman.[149] The Shentong philosophy was also expounded in Tibet and Mongolia by the later Jonang scholarTāranātha (1575–1634) and numerous later figures of the Jonang tradition. In the late 17th century, the Jonang order and its teachings came under attack by the5th Dalai Lama, who converted the majority of their monasteries inTibet to theGelug order, although several survived in secret.[150]
Je Tsongkhapa (Dzong-ka-ba) (1357–1419) founded theGelug school of Tibetan Buddhism, which came to dominate the country through the office of theDalai Lama and is the major defender of thePrasaṅgika Madhyamaka view. His work is influenced by the philosophy ofCandrakirti andDharmakirti. Tsongkhapa's magnum opus isThe Ocean of Reasoning, a Commentary on Nagarjuna'sMulamadhyamakakarika. Gelug philosophy is based upon the study of Madhyamaka texts and Tsongkhapa's works as well as formal debate (rtsod pa).[151]
Tsongkhapa defended PrasangikaMadhyamaka as the highest view and critiqued thesvatantrika position. Tsongkhapa argued that, because svatantrika conventionally establishes things by their own characteristics, they fail to completely understand theemptiness of phenomena and hence do not achieve the same realization.[152] Drawing on Chandrakirti, Tsongkhapa rejected the Yogacara teachings, even as a provisional stepping point to the Madhyamaka view.[141] Tsongkhapa was also critical of the Shengtong view of Dolpopa, which he saw as dangerously absolutist and hence outside the middle way. Tsongkhapa identified two major flaws in interpretations of Madhyamika, under-negation (ofsvabhava or own essence), which could lead to Absolutism, and over-negation, which could lead to Nihilism. Tsongkhapa's solution to this dilemma was the promotion of the use of inferential reasoning only within the conventional realm of thetwo truths framework, allowing for the use of reason for ethics, conventional monastic rules and promoting a conventional epistemic realism,[153] while holding that, from the view of ultimate truth (paramarthika satya), all things (includingBuddha nature andNirvana) are empty of inherent existence (svabhava), and that true liberation is this realization of emptiness.
Sakya scholars such as Rongtön andGorampa disagreed with Tsongkhapa, and argued that the prasangika svatantrika distinction was merely pedagogical. Gorampa also critiqued Tsongkhapa's realism, arguing that the structures which allow an empty object to be presented as conventionally real eventually dissolve under analysis and are thus unstructured and non-conceptual (spros bral). Tsongkhapa's students Gyel-tsap, Kay-drup, and Ge-dun-drup set forth an epistemological realism against the Sakya scholars' anti-realism.
Sakya Pandita (1182–1251) was a 13th-century head of theSakya school and ruler of Tibet. He was also one of the most important Buddhist philosophers in the Tibetan tradition, writing works on logic and epistemology and promotingDharmakirti'sPramanavarttika (Commentary on Valid Cognition) as central to the scholastic study. Sakya Pandita's 'Treasury of Logic on Valid Cognition' (Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter) set forth the classic Sakya epistemic anti-realist position, arguing that concepts such asuniversals are not known through valid cognition and hence are not real objects of knowledge.[143] Sakya Pandita was also critical of theories of sudden awakening, which were held by some teachers of the "Chinese Great Perfection" in Tibet.
Later Sakyas such asGorampa (1429–1489) andSakya Chokden (1428–1507) would develop and defend Sakya anti-realism, and they are seen as the major interpreters and critics of Sakya Pandita's philosophy.Sakya Chokden also critiqued Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Madhyamaka and Dolpopa's Shentong. In hisDefinite ascertainment of the middle way, Chokden criticized Tsongkhapa's view as being too logo-centric and still caught up in conceptualization about the ultimate reality which is beyond language.[154] Sakya Chokden's philosophy attempted to reconcile the views of the Yogacara and Madhyamaka, seeing them both as valid and complementary perspectives on ultimate truth. Madhyamaka is seen by Chokden as removing the fault of taking the unreal as being real, and Yogacara removes the fault of the denial of Reality.[155] Likewise, the Shentong and Rangtong views are seen as complementary by Sakya Chokden; Rangtong negation is effective in cutting through all clinging to wrong views and conceptual rectification, while Shentong is more amenable for describing and enhancing meditative experience and realization.[156] Therefore, for Sakya Chokden, the same realization of ultimate reality can be accessed and described in two different but compatible ways.
The Nyingma school is strongly influenced by the view ofDzogchen (Great Perfection) and the Dzogchen Tantric literature.Longchenpa (1308–1364) was a major philosopher of theNyingma school and wrote an extensive number of works on the Tibetan practice ofDzogchen and on BuddhistTantra. These include theSeven Treasures, theTrilogy of Natural Ease, and hisTrilogy of Dispelling Darkness. Longchenpa's works provide a philosophical understanding of Dzogchen, a defense of Dzogchen in light of the sutras, as well as practical instructions.[157] For Longchenpa, the ground of reality is luminous emptiness,rigpa ("knowledge"), or buddha nature, and this ground is also the bridge between sutra andtantra.[158] Longchenpa's philosophy sought to establish the positive aspects of Buddha nature thought against the totally negative theology of Madhyamika without straying into the absolutism of Dolpopa. For Longchenpa, the basis for Dzogchen and Tantric practice in Vajrayana is the"Ground" or "Basis" (gzhi), the immanent Buddha nature, "the primordially luminous reality that is unconditioned and spontaneously present" which is "free from all elaborated extremes".[159]
The 19th century saw the rise of theRimé movement (non-sectarian, unbiased) which sought to push back against the politically dominant Gelug school's criticisms of the Sakya, Kagyu, Nyingma, andBon philosophical views, and develop a more eclectic or universal system of textual study.Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo (1820–1892) andJamgön Kongtrül (1813–1899) were the founders of Rimé. The Rimé movement came to prominence at a point in Tibetan history when the religious climate had become partisan.[160] The aim of the movement was "a push towards a middle ground where the various views and styles of the different traditions were appreciated for their individual contributions rather than being refuted, marginalized, or banned."[160]
Philosophically,Jamgön Kongtrül defendedShentong as being compatible with Madhyamaka while another Rimé scholarJamgon Ju Mipham Gyatso (1846–1912) criticized Tsongkhapa from aNyingma perspective. Mipham argued that the view of the middle way is Unity (zung 'jug), meaning that from the ultimate perspective the duality of sentient beings and Buddhas is also dissolved. Mipham also affirmed the view ofrangtong (self emptiness).[161]
The later Nyingma scholar Botrul (1894–1959) classified the major Tibetan Madhyamaka positions as shentong (other emptiness), Nyingma rangtong (self emptiness) and Gelug bdentong (emptiness of true existence). The main difference between them is their "object of negation"; shengtong states that inauthentic experience is empty, rangtong negates any conceptual reference and bdentong negates any true existence.[162]
The14th Dalai Lama was also influenced by this non-sectarian approach. Having studied under teachers from all major Tibetan Buddhist schools, his philosophical position tends to be that the different perspectives on emptiness are complementary:
There is a tradition of making a distinction between two different perspectives on the nature of emptiness: one is when emptiness is presented within a philosophical analysis of the ultimate reality of things, in which case it ought to be understood in terms of a non-affirming negative phenomena. On the other hand, when it is discussed from the point of view of experience, it should be understood more in terms of an affirming negation – 14th Dalai Lama[163]
The schools of Buddhism that had existed in China prior to the emergence of the Tiantai are generally believed to represent direct transplantations from India, with little modification to their basic doctrines and methods. The Tiantai school, founded byZhiyi (538–597), was the first truly unique Chinese Buddhist philosophical school.[164] Tiantai doctrine sought to bring together all Buddhist teachings into a comprehensive system based on theekayana ("one vehicle") doctrine taught in theLotus Sutra.
Tiantai's metaphysics is an immanentholism, which sees every phenomenon (dharma) as conditioned and manifested by the whole of reality (the totality of all other dharmas). Every instant of experience is a reflection of every other, and hence, suffering and nirvana, good and bad, Buddhahood and evildoing, are all "inherently entailed" within each other.[165]
Tiantai metaphysics is entailed in their teaching of the "three truths", which is an extension of the Mādhyamakatwo truths doctrine. The three truths are: the conventional truth of appearance, the truth of emptiness and the third truth of 'the exclusive Center' (但中danzhong) or middle way, which is beyond conventional truth and emptiness. This third truth is theAbsolute and expressed by the claim that nothing is "Neither-Same-Nor-Different" than anything else, but rather each 'thing' is the absolute totality of all things manifesting as a particular, everything is mutually contained within each thing. Everything is a reflection of "The Ultimate Reality of All Appearances" (諸法實相zhufashixiang) and each thought "contains three thousand worlds". This perspective allows the Tiantai school to state such seemingly paradoxical things as "evil is ineradicable from the highest good,Buddhahood."[165] Moreover, in Tiantai, nirvana and samsara are ultimately the same; as Zhiyi writes, "a single, unalloyed reality is all there is – no entities whatever exist outside of it."[164]
While Zhiyi did write "one thought contains three thousand worlds", this does not entail idealism. According to Zhiyi, "the objects of the [true] aspects of reality are not something produced by Buddhas, gods, or men. They exist inherently on their own and have no beginning" (The Esoteric Meaning, 210). This is then a form of realism, which sees the mind as real as the world, interconnected with and inseparable from it.[164] In Tiantai thought, ultimate reality is simply the very phenomenal world of interconnected events or dharmas.
Other key figures of Tiantai thought areZhanran (711–782) andSiming Zhili (960–1028). Zhanran developed the idea that non-sentient beings havebuddha nature, since they are also a reflection of the Absolute. In Japan, this school was known asTendai and was first brought to the island bySaicho. Tendai thought is more syncretic and draws on Huayan andEast Asian Esoteric Buddhism.
TheHuayan school is the other native Chinese doctrinal system. Huayan is known for the doctrine of "interpenetration" (Sanskrit:yuganaddha),[166][167] based on theAvataṃsaka Sūtra (Flower Garland Sutra). Huayan holds that all phenomena (Sanskrit:dharmas) are deeply interconnected, mutually arising and that every phenomenon contains all other phenomena. Various metaphors and images are used to illustrate this idea. The first is known asIndra's net. The net is set with jewels which have the extraordinary property that they reflect all of the other jewels, while the reflections also contain every other reflection, ad infinitum. The second image is that of the world text. This image portrays the world as consisting of an enormous text which is as large as the universe itself. The words of the text are composed of the phenomena that make up the world. However, every atom of the world contains the whole text within it. It is the work of a Buddha to let out the text so that beings can be liberated from suffering.
Fazang (Fa-tsang, 643–712), one of the most important Huayan thinkers, wrote 'Essay on the Golden Lion' and 'Treatise on the Five Teachings', which contain other metaphors for the interpenetration of reality. He also used the metaphor of ahouse of mirrors. Fazang introduced the distinction of "the Realm of Principle" and "the Realm of Things". This theory was further developed byCheng-guan (738–839) into the major Huayan thesis of "the fourfoldDharmadhatu" (dharma realm): the Realm of Principle, the Realm of Things, the Realm of the Noninterference between Principle and Things, and the Realm of the Noninterference of All Things.[164] The first two are the universal and the particular, the third is the interpenetration of universal and particular, and the fourth is the interpenetration of all particulars. The third truth was explained by the metaphor of a golden lion: the gold is the universal and the particular is the shape and features of the lion.[168]
While both Tiantai and Huayan hold to the interpenetration and interconnection of all things, their metaphysics have some differences. Huayan metaphysics is influenced by Yogacara thought and is closer toidealism. The Avatamsaka sutra compares the phenomenal world to a dream, an illusion, and a magician's conjuring. The sutra states nothing has true reality, location, beginning and end, or substantial nature. The Avatamsaka also states that "The triple world is illusory – it is only made by one mind", and Fazang echoes this by writing, "outside of mind there is not a single thing that can be apprehended."[164] Furthermore, according to Huayan thought, each mind creates its own world "according to their mental patterns", and "these worlds are infinite in kind" and constantly arising and passing away.[164] However, in Huayan, the mind is not real either, but also empty. The true reality in Huayan, the noumenon, or "Principle", is likened to a mirror, while phenomena are compared to reflections in the mirror. It is also compared to the ocean, and phenomena to waves.[164]
InKorea, this school was known asHwaeom and is represented in the work ofWonhyo (617–686), who also wrote about the idea ofessence-function, a central theme in Korean Buddhist thought. InJapan, Huayan is known asKegon and one of its major proponents wasMyōe, who also introduced Tantric practices.
The philosophy of ChineseChan Buddhism and JapaneseZen is based on various sources; these include Chinese Madhyamaka (Sānlùn), Yogacara (Wéishí), theLaṅkāvatāra Sūtra, and theBuddha nature texts. An important issue in Chan is that ofsubitism or "sudden awakening", the idea that insight happens all at once in a flash of insight. This view was promoted byShenhui and is a central issue discussed in thePlatform Sutra, a keyChan scripture composed in China.
Huayan philosophy also had an influence on Chan. The theory of the Fourfold Dharmadhatu influenced theFive Ranks ofDongshan Liangjie (806–869), the founder of theCaodong Chan lineage.[168]Guifeng Zongmi, who was also a patriarch of Huayan Buddhism, wrote extensively on the philosophy of Chan and on the Avatamsaka sutra.
Japanese Buddhism during the 6th and 7th centuries saw an increase in the proliferation of new schools and forms of thought, a period known as the six schools of Nara (Nanto Rokushū). TheKamakura Period (1185–1333) also saw another flurry of intellectual activity. During this period, the influential figure ofNichiren (1222–1282) made the practice and universal message of theLotus Sutra more readily available to the population. He is of particular importance in the history of thought and religion, as his teachings constitute a separate sect of Buddhism, one of the only major sects to have originated in Japan[169]: xi
Also during the Kamakura period, the founder ofSoto Zen,Dogen (1200–1253), wrote many works on the philosophy of Zen, and theShobogenzo is his magnum opus. In Korea,Chinul was an important exponent ofSeon Buddhism at around the same time.
Tantric Buddhism arrived in China in the 7th century, during theTang dynasty. In China, this form of Buddhism is known as Mìzōng (密宗), or "Esoteric School", andZhenyan (true word, Sanskrit:Mantrayana).Kūkai (AD774–835) is a major Japanese Buddhist philosopher and the founder of the TantricShingon (true word) school in Japan. He wrote on a wide variety of topics such as public policy, language, the arts, literature, music and religion. After studying in China underHuiguo, Kūkai brought together various elements into a cohesive philosophical system of Shingon.
Kūkai's philosophy is based on theMahavairocana Tantra and theVajrasekhara Sutra (both from the seventh century). HisBenkenmitsu nikkyôron (Treatise on the Differences Between Esoteric and Exoteric Teachings) outlines the difference between exoteric, mainstreamMahayana Buddhism (kengyô) and esotericTantric Buddhism (mikkyô).[170] Kūkai provided the theoretical framework for the esoteric Buddhist practices of Mantrayana, bridging the gap between the doctrine of the sutras and tantric practices. At the foundation of Kūkai's thought is theTrikaya doctrine, which holds there are three "bodies of the Buddha".
According to Kūkai, esoteric Buddhism has theDharmakaya (Jpn:hosshin, embodiment of truth) as its source, which is associated withVairocana Buddha (Dainichi). Hosshin is embodied absolute reality and truth. Hosshin is mostly ineffable but can be experienced through esoteric practices such asmudras andmantras. While Mahayana is taught by the historical Buddha (nirmāṇakāya), it does not have ultimate reality as its source or the practices to experience the esoteric truth. For Shingon, from an enlightened perspective, the whole phenomenal world itself is also the teaching of Vairocana.[170] The body of the world, its sounds and movements, is the body of truth (dharma) and furthermore it is also identical with the personal body of the cosmic Buddha. For Kūkai, world, actions, persons and Buddhas are all part of the cosmic monologue of Vairocana, they are the truth being preached, to its own self manifestations. This ishosshin seppô (literally: "the dharmakâya's expounding of the Dharma") which can be accessed through mantra which is the cosmic language of Vairocana emanating through cosmic vibration concentrated in sound.[170] In a broad sense, the universe itself is a huge text expressing ultimate truth (Dharma) which must be "read".
Dainichi means "Great Sun" and Kūkai uses this as a metaphor for the great primordial Buddha, whose teaching and presence illuminates and pervades all, like the light of the sun. This immanent presence also means that every being already has access to the liberated state (hongaku) andBuddha nature, and that, because of this, there is the possibility of "becoming Buddha in this very embodied existence" (sokushinjôbutsu).[170] This is achieved because of thenon-dual relationship between the macrocosm of Hosshin and the microcosm of the Shingon practitioner.
Kūkai's exposition of what has been called Shingon's "metaphysics" is based on the three aspects of the cosmic truth or Hosshin – body, appearance and function.[170] The body is the physical and mental elements, which are the body and mind of the cosmic Buddha and which is also empty (Shunyata). The physical universe for Shingon contains the interconnected mental and physical events. The appearance aspect is the form of the world, which appears as mandalas of interconnected realms and is depicted in mandala art such as theWomb Realm mandala. The function is the movement and change which happens in the world, which includes change in forms, sounds and thought. These forms, sounds and thoughts are expressed by the Shingon practitioner in various rituals and tantric practices which allow them to connect with and inter-resonate with Dainichi and hence attain liberation here and now.[170]
InSri Lanka, Buddhist modernists such asAnagarika Dharmapala (1864–1933) and the American convertHenry Steel Olcott sought to show that Buddhism was rational and compatible with modern Scientific ideas such as the theory of evolution.[171] Dharmapala also argued that Buddhism included a strong social element, interpreting it as liberal, altruistic and democratic.
A later Sri Lankan philosopher,K. N. Jayatilleke (1920–1970), wrote the classic modern account of Buddhist epistemology (Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, 1963). His studentDavid Kalupahana wrote on the history of Buddhist thought and psychology. Other important Sri Lankan Buddhist thinkers includeVen Ñāṇananda (Concept and Reality),Walpola Rahula,Hammalawa Saddhatissa (Buddhist Ethics, 1987), Gunapala Dharmasiri (A Buddhist critique of the Christian concept of God, 1988),P. D. Premasiri andR. G. de S. Wettimuny.[172]
In 20th-century China, the modernistTaixu (1890–1947) advocated a reform and revival of Buddhism. He promoted an idea of a BuddhistPure Land, not as a metaphysical place in Buddhist cosmology but as something possible to create here and now in this very world, which could be achieved through a "Buddhism for Human Life" (Chinese:人生佛教; pinyin:rénshēng fójiào) which was free of supernatural beliefs.[173] Taixu also wrote on the connections between modern science and Buddhism, ultimately holding that "scientific methods can only corroborate the Buddhist doctrine, they can never advance beyond it".[174] Like Taixu,Yin Shun (1906–2005) advocated a form ofHumanistic Buddhism grounded in concern for humanitarian issues, and his students and followers have been influential in promotingHumanistic Buddhism inTaiwan. This period also saw a revival of the study of Weishi (Yogachara), byYang Rensan (1837–1911),Ouyang Jinwu (1871–1943) andLiang Shuming (1893–1988).[175]
One of Tibetan Buddhism's most influential modernist thinkers isGendün Chöphel (1903–1951), who, according toDonald S. Lopez Jr., "was arguably the most important Tibetan intellectual of the twentieth century."[176] Gendün Chöphel travelled throughout India with the Indian BuddhistRahul Sankrityayan and wrote a wide variety of material, including works promoting the importance of modern science to his Tibetan countrymen and also Buddhist philosophical texts such asAdornment for Nagarjuna's Thought. Another very influential Tibetan Buddhist modernist wasChögyam Trungpa, whoseShambhala Training was meant to be more suitable to modern Western sensitivities by offering a vision of "secular enlightenment".[177]
InSoutheast Asia, thinkers such asBuddhadasa,Thích Nhất Hạnh,Sulak Sivaraksa andAung San Suu Kyi have promoted a philosophy of sociallyEngaged Buddhism and have written on the socio-political application of Buddhism. Likewise, Buddhist approaches toeconomic ethics (Buddhist economics) have been explored in the works ofE. F. Schumacher,[178]Prayudh Payutto,Neville Karunatilake, and Padmasiri de Silva. The study of the Pali Abhidhamma tradition continued to be influential inMyanmar, where it was developed by monks such asLedi Sayadaw andMahasi Sayadaw.
Japanese philosophy was heavily influenced by the work of theKyoto School which includedKitaro Nishida,Keiji Nishitani,Hajime Tanabe andMasao Abe. These thinkers brought Buddhist ideas in dialogue withWestern philosophy, especially Europeanphenomenologists andexistentialists. The most important trend in Japanese Buddhist thought after the formation of the Kyoto school isCritical Buddhism, which argues against several Mahayana concepts such asBuddha nature andoriginal enlightenment.[173]
The Japanese Zen BuddhistD.T. Suzuki (1870–1966) was instrumental in bringingZen Buddhism to the West and hisBuddhist modernist works were very influential in the United States. Suzuki's worldview was a Zen Buddhism influenced byRomanticism andTranscendentalism, which promoted spiritual freedom as "a spontaneous, emancipatory consciousness that transcends rational intellect andsocial convention."[179] This idea of Buddhism influenced the Beat writers, and a contemporary representative of Western Buddhist Romanticism isGary Snyder. The American Theravada Buddhist monkThanissaro Bhikkhu has critiqued 'Buddhist Romanticism' in his writings.
Western Buddhist monastics and priests such asNanavira Thera,Bhikkhu Bodhi,Nyanaponika Thera,Robert Aitken,Taigen Dan Leighton, andMatthieu Ricard have written texts on Buddhist philosophy. A feature of Buddhist thought in the West has been a desire for dialogue and integration with modern science and psychology, and various modern Buddhists such asB. Alan Wallace,James H. Austin,Mark Epstein and the14th Dalai Lama have worked and written on this issue.[180][181]
Another area of convergence has been Buddhism and environmentalism, which is explored in the work ofJoanna Macy.[182][183] Another Western Buddhist philosophical trend has been the project tosecularize Buddhism, as seen in the works ofStephen Batchelor.
In the West, Comparative philosophy between Buddhist and Western thought began with the work ofCharles A. Moore, who founded the journalPhilosophy East and West. Contemporary Western Academics such asMark Siderits,Jan Westerhoff,Jonardon Ganeri,Miri Albahari,Owen Flanagan,Damien Keown,Tom Tillemans,David Loy,Evan Thompson, andJay Garfield have written various works which interpret Buddhist ideas throughWestern philosophy.
Scholars such asThomas McEvilley,[184]Christopher I. Beckwith,[185] and Adrian Kuzminski[186] have identified cross influences between ancient Buddhism and the ancient Greek philosophy ofPyrrhonism. The Greek philosopherPyrrho spent 18 months in India as part ofAlexander the Great's court on Alexander's conquest of western India, where ancient biographers say his contact with thegymnosophists caused him to create his philosophy. Because of the high degree of similarity between Nāgārjuna's philosophy andPyrrhonism, particularly the surviving works ofSextus Empiricus,[187]Thomas McEvilley suspects that Nāgārjuna was influenced by Greek Pyrrhonist texts imported into India.[188]
Baruch Spinoza, though he argued for the existence of a permanent reality, asserts that all phenomenal existence is transitory. In his opinion sorrow is conquered "by finding an object of knowledge which is not transient, not ephemeral, but is immutable, permanent, everlasting." The Buddha taught that the only thing which is eternal isNirvana.David Hume, after a relentless analysis of the mind, concluded that consciousness consists of fleeting mental states. Hume'sBundle theory is a very similar concept to the Buddhistskandhas, though his skepticism about causation leads him to opposite conclusions in other areas.Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy parallels Buddhism in his affirmation ofasceticism and renunciation as a response to suffering and desire (cf. Schopenhauer'sThe World as Will and Representation, 1818).
Ludwig Wittgenstein's "language-game" closely parallel the warning that intellectual speculation orpapañca is an impediment to understanding, as found in the BuddhistParable of the Poison Arrow.Friedrich Nietzsche, although himself dismissive of Buddhism as yet another nihilism, had a similar impermanent view of the self.Heidegger's ideas on being and nothingness have been held by some[who?] to be similar to Buddhism today.[189]
An alternative approach to the comparison of Buddhist thought with Western philosophy is to use the concept of theMiddle Way in Buddhism as a critical tool for the assessment of Western philosophies. In this way, Western philosophies can be classified in Buddhist terms as eternalist or nihilist. In a Buddhist view, all philosophies are considered non-essential views (ditthis) and not to be clung to.[190]
TheBuddha's "middle path" strategy can be seen as one of first arguing that there is nothing that the word "I" genuinely denotes, and then explaining that our erroneous sense of an "I" stems from our employment of the useful fiction represented by the concept of the person. While the second part of this strategy only receives its full articulation in the later development of thetheory of two truths, the first part can be found in the Buddha's own teachings, in the form of severalphilosophical arguments for non-self. Best known among these is theargument from impermanence (S III.66–8) [...].
It is the fact that this argument does not contain a premise explicitly asserting that thefiveskandhas (classes of psychophysical element) are exhaustive of the constituents of persons, plus the fact that these are all said to be empirically observable, that leads some to claim that the Buddha did not intend to deny the existence of a selftout court. There is, however, evidence that the Buddha was generally hostile toward attempts to establish the existence of unobservable entities. In thePoṭṭhapāda Sutta (D I.178–203), for instance, the Buddha compares someone who posits an unseen seer in order to explain our introspective awareness of cognitions, to a man who has conceived a longing for the most beautiful woman in the world based solely on the thought that such a woman must surely exist. And in theTevijja Sutta (D I.235–52), the Buddha rejects the claim of certainBrahmins to know the path to oneness withBrahman, on the grounds that no one has actually observed this Brahman. This makes more plausible the assumption that the argument has as an implicit premise the claim that there is no more to the person than the fiveskandhas.
ForHindus, especially those in theAdvaita Vedanta tradition,Brahman is the undifferentiated reality underlying all existence. Brahman is the eternal first cause present everywhere and nowhere, beyond time and space, the indefinableAbsolute. The gods are incarnations of Brahman. It can be said that everything that is Brahman. And it can be argued that Brahman is amonotheistic concept or at least amonistic one, since all gods – presumably of any tradition – are manifestations of Brahman, real only because Brahman exists.
TheUpanishads form the foundations ofHindu philosophical thought, and the central theme of the Upanishads is the identity ofAtman andBrahman, or the inner self and the cosmic self. [...] If we adhere to the thought that the Brahman is the cosmic principle governing the universe and Atman as its physical correlate, the essence of Upanishadic thought can be succinctly stated in the formula Brahman = Atman.
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