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| Brusilov offensive (Fourth Battle of Galicia) | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theEastern Front ofWorld War I | |||||||||
 Left: Plan of May. Right: Frontline at the end of Brusilov offensive in September 1916. | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
 Russian Empire |  Austria-Hungary German Empire Ottoman Empire | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| Aleksei BrusilovNicholas II[b]Mikhail Alekseyev[c]Alexey KaledinVladimir SakharovDmitry ShcherbachevPlaton LechitskyMikhail Diterikhs | Conrad von HötzendorfJoseph FerdinandEduard von BöhmAlexander von LinsingenPaul von HindenburgFelix von BothmerCevat Pasha | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| Initial: 40+ infantry divisions (573,000 men) 15 cavalry divisions (60,000 men) Overall: 1,732,000 in 61 divisions | Initial: 39 infantry divisions (450,000 men) 10 cavalry divisions (30,000 men)[3] Overall: 2,500,000 in 54 Austrian divisions, 24 German divisions and 2 Ottoman divisions[1][d][4] | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
Total: 1,000,000[8][9][10] – 1,440,000[11][12] casualties |
Total: 1,000,000[16] – 1,500,000 casualties[17][1][7][18][19] | ||||||||
TheBrusilov offensive (Russian:Брусиловский прорыв,romanized: Brusilovskiĭ proryv,lit. 'Brusilov's breakthrough'), also known as theJune advance,[20] orBattle of Galicia-Volhynia,[21] of June to September 1916 was theRussian Empire's greatest feat of arms duringWorld War I, and among themost lethal offensives in world history. The historian Graydon Tunstall called the Brusilov offensive the worst crisis of World War I forAustria-Hungary and theTriple Entente's greatest victory, but it came at a tremendous loss of life.[22] It was arguably the most successful offensive in the entirety of the First World War.[23] The victory contributed to a morale upsurge among the Russian troops. In 1917,Nicholas II planned a general offensive along the entire front in order to end theCentral Powers.[24] After the victory, thePetrograd conference [ru] was held at which the post-war structure of the world was discussed.[25] Even despite the losses, the Russian armies were still being reinforced with new forces, the number of weapons increased, and new railways were being built.[26]The offensive's success led Russia's allies to reconsider their positions on postwar territorial concessions, including the status ofAnatolia and theBosphorus Strait.[27]
The offensive involved a major Russian attack against the armies of theCentral Powers on theEastern Front. Launched on 4 June 1916, it lasted until late September. It took place in easternGalicia (present-day northwesternUkraine), in theLviv andVolyn Oblasts. The offensive is named after the commander in charge of theSouthwestern Front of the Imperial Russian Army, GeneralAleksei Brusilov. The largest and most lethal offensive of the war, the effects of the Brusilov offensive were far-reaching. It relieved German pressure on French forces atVerdun, and helped to relieve the Austro-Hungarian pressure on theItalians. It inflicted irreparable losses on theAustro-Hungarian Army, and inducedRomania to finally enter the war on the side of the Entente. The human and material losses on the Russian side also greatly contributed to the onset of theRussian Revolution the following year.[11] It was the largest battle inWorld War I according to the total losses and forces of the parties.
Under the terms of theChantilly Agreement of December 1915, Russia,France,Britain andItaly committed to simultaneous attacks against the Central Powers in the summer of 1916. Russia felt reluctantly obliged to lend troops to fight in France andSalonika, and to attack on theEastern Front, in the hope of obtaining munitions from Britain and France.[28]
In March 1916 the Russians initiated the disastrousLake Naroch offensive in theVilnius area, during which the Germans suffered only one-fifth as many casualties as the Russians. This offensive took place at French request – GeneralJoseph Joffre had hoped that theImperial German Army would transfer more units to the east after theBattle of Verdun began in February 1916.[29]
Besides the complacency felt by the Germans and Austro-Hungarians after their successful defense of Russian attacks that winter and March, the Austro-Hungarians were in the midst of implementing their plans to knock Italy out of the war.Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf had transferredKövess' troops from theBalkans as well as fourdivisions from the Eastern Front. According toPrit Buttar, "To make matters worse, many of the experienced divisions on the Eastern Front were withdrawn and sent to the Alps, and replaced by formations largely composed of new inexperienced recruits."[30]
At a war council held with senior commanders and the tsar in April 1916, General Aleksei Brusilov presented a plan to theStavka (the Russian high command), proposing a massive offensive by his Southwestern Front against theAustro-Hungarian forces inGalicia. Brusilov's plan aimed to take some of the pressure offFrench andBritish armies in France and theRoyal Italian Army along theIsonzo Front and, if possible, to knock Austria-Hungary out of the war.[31]
GeneralAlexei Evert, commander of theRussian Western Army Group based in Smolensk, favored a defensive strategy and opposed Brusilov's proposed offensive.TsarNicholas II had taken personal command of the Imperial Russian Army in September 1915. Evert was a strong supporter of Nicholas and theRomanovs, but the emperor approved Brusilov's plan. The offensive aimed to capture the cities ofKovel andLviv (in present-day western Ukraine); theCentral Powers had recovered both these cities in 1915. Although the Stavka had approved Brusilov's plan, his request for supporting offensives by the neighboringfronts (theWestern under Evert andNorthern underAleksey Kuropatkin) was denied.[32]
On 26 May, the tsar issued orders for accelerating the start of the Russian summer offensive, in response to pleas from the Italians facing Conrad's offensive. Brusilov would attack on 4 June, and the rest of the Russian army ten days later. Brusilov choseAlexey Kaledin's Eighth Army to spearhead the capture ofLutsk and Kovel. Kaledin's attacking force included the XXXII Corps in the south, the VIII and XL Corps in the center, and XXXIX Corps in the north. The Russians fielded 148 infantry battalions against the 53 battalions in ArchdukeJoseph Ferdinand's Fourth Army. Further south on the Austro-Hungarian front werePaul Puhallo von Brlog's1st Army,Eduard von Böhm-Ermolli's2nd Army, andKarl von Pflanzer-Baltin's7th Army.[30]: 136–146
Mounting pressure from the western Allies caused the Russians to hurry their preparations. Brusilov amassed four armies totaling 40 infantry divisions and 15 cavalry divisions. He faced 39 Austro-Hungarian infantry divisions and 10 cavalry divisions, formed in a row of three defensive lines, as well as German reinforcements that were later brought up.[33] Deception efforts on the Russian side were intended to conceal the point of attack.[34] They included false radio traffic, false orders sent by messengers who were intended to be captured, and equipment displays including dummy artillery.[33][34] Brusilov, knowing he would not receive significant reinforcements, moved his reserves up to the front line. He used them to dig entrenchments about 300 m × 90 m (328 yd × 98 yd) along the front line. These provided shelter for the troops and hindered observation by the Austrians.[33]
Brusilov extended his army's trenches forward as far as possible, in some cases to within 100m of the Austro-Hungarian positions. Tunnels were also dug below the Russian barbed wire, allowing the entanglements to remain intact during the Russian attack. By these methods Brusilov hoped to lessen the exposure, and increase the surprise, of his attacking troops. Instead of massed formations, each of Brusilov's armies would attack along a 15 km wide sector of their choice, attacking in waves with two reinforced infantry corps.[30]: 127, 144
On 4 June, the Russians opened the offensive with heavy artillery fire. Alexander Winogradsky's artillery brigade used 76mm guns to open 24 breaches in the Austro-Hungarian defenses, coordinated in advance with the infantry commanders. Winogradsky wrote, this was followed by a "creeping barrage in front of the assault infantry...while the 152mm howitzers and 122mm guns attacked hard points." This was followed by attacks by infantry in Kaledin's 8th Army,Vladimir Viktorovich Sakharov's 11th Army,Dmitry Shcherbachev's 7th Army, andLechitsky's 9th Army.[30]: 140–146
On 5 June, according to Prit Buttar, "...the Russian gunners resumed their careful demolition work of the defences of Joseph Ferdinand's4th Army... After two days of careful artillery fire and infantry attacks, Kaledin was confident their success was close. His troops hadoverrun both the first and second lines of enemy defences, and had inflicted heavy losses on the Austro-Hungarian 4th Army." Ferdinand was almost out of artillery ammunition, had used all of his reserves, and was forced to seek help fromLinsingen'sArmy of the Bug to the north.[30]: 150–152
By the end of 6 June, The X and UU Corps, plusSándor Szurmay's Corps, of the Austro-Hungarian 4th Army, had been pushed back to theStyr and beyond, while Kaledin's XL and II Corps pushed onward to Lutsk. By the end of 7 June, the 4th Army retreat was unstoppable, with many elements of the X Corps surrendering when caught against the river, or casualties in attempts to cross. 4th Army supplies abandoned in Lutsk went up in flames as the Russians occupied the town. Further south, Pflanzer-Baltin's7th Army was pushed back to theStrypa, as Shcherbachev's Seventh Army capturedJazłowiek.[30]: 155–165
The first major attack was against the 117,800 strong Austro-Hungarian 4th Army, in the northernmost sector of the front.[35] The initial attack was successful, and the Austro-Hungarian lines were broken, enabling three of Brusilov's four armies to advance on a wide front (see:Battle of Kostiuchnówka). Within four days of the offensive, the Austro-Hungarian 4th Army saw its strength fall by nearly 70 per cent, from 117,800 men to just 35,000. The southern sector was held by the Austro-Hungarian 7th Army, which by 8 June lost 76,200 of its 194,200 soldiers.[36]
Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was replaced byKarl Tersztyánszky von Nádas as 4th Army commander, and Hugo Martiny was replaced by Gustav Smekal as X Corps commander. After four days into the offensive, Buttar states, "Brusilov's revolutionary tactics had been stunningly successful: artillery had been used with a precision that was unprecedented; infantry had worked their way close to the defences before launching their attacks; and those attacks had not used the traditional lines of men that were so easy for machineguns and defensive artillery to destroy." However, Brusilov was informed by Alexeyev that Evert's West Front would not be able to commence their attacks before 18 June. Meanwhile, Linsingen orderedFriedrich von Bernhardi to gather German forces for a counterattack.[30]: 153–165
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On 8 June, in response to appeals for help from Conrad,Erich von Falkenhayn organized five German divisions under the command of Linsingen, concentrating them near Kovel for a counterattack. Brusilov moved to protect his northern flank, while all of his armies continued to maintain pressure all along his Southwest Front.[30]: 170–178
On 9 and 10 June, Lechitsky's 9th Army advanced upon Doroschoutz, Okna and Czarny Potok, as Pflanzer-Baltin's 7th Army troops retreated. According to Buttar, "It was a graphic demonstration of Brusilov's theories. Pressure across a broad front forced the defenders to commit their reserves and left no sectors that could release troops to aid others." By 11 June, Pflanzer-Baltin'sGruppe Benigni and XII Corps were forming new defensive lines to the west, as his XI Corps retreated south across thePrut. According to Buttar, adding those killed, wounded, or taken prisoner, "...the Austro-Hungarian 7th Army was a shadow of its former self."[30]: 178–182
On 11 June,Felix Graf von Bothmer'sSouth Army prepared a counterattack usingArthur Arz von Straußenburg's VI Corps. However, Scherbachev was ready and the front line remained unchanged.[30]: 183–184
On 11 June, while pursuing the Austro-Hungarian Army inBukovina, Russian forcesinadvertently crossed intoRomanian territory, where they overwhelmed the border guard atMamornița and had a cavalry patrol disarmed and interned atHerța. Having no intention to force the hand of the Romanian government, the Russians quickly left Romanian territory.[37][38]
Lechitsky kept the XXIII and XLI Corps moving westward, while the XII and XI Corps advanced south to captureCzernowitz, and III Cavalry Corps threatenedKolomea. By 12 June his Russian troops were attacking Austro-Hungarian positions along thePruth, and crossing that river by 14 June. By then, the Austro-Hungarian losses amounted to 205,000, of which 150,000 were prisoners.[30]: 185, 193
On 17 June, the Russians captured Czernowitz, and Alexeyev transferred the 3rd Army from Evert's West Front to Brusilov's Southwest Front. Meanwhile, Bothmer's South Army prepared to attack southwards, hoping Pflanzer-Baltin's Seventh Army could hold its ground.[30]: 202–206
On 18 June, Lechitsky was able to capture Kolomea. On 19 June, Russian cavalry, led byMikhail Promtov crossed theSiret, and on 20 June reached theCarpathian Foothills. However, by the end of June, Southwest Front's casualties amounted to a costly 285,000.[30]: 209, 225
On 15 June, Linsingen ordered a counterattack, concentrating around the Lutsksalient formed by Kaledin's offensive. Attacking forces included Puhallo's 1st Army, Tersztyánsky's 4th Army,Georg von der Marwitz's German X Corps, andGruppe Bernhardi. However, after three days of fighting, little was changed in the position of the front lines, even after the addition ofGruppe Falkenhayn on 21 June. Linsingen then decided to reinforce that attack group in a thrust towards Lutsk, but under the command of Marwitz, with the attack to commence on 30 June. Brusilov was preparing his own continued offensive, withLeonid Lesh's 3rd Army advancing towardsPinsk, Kaledin's 8th Army towards Kovel, the 11th Army towardsBrody, while the 7th and 9th Armies continued their advance. Brusilov met the German attacks on the Lutsk salient flanks by attacking in turn the German flanks. However, the Germans achieved only moderate success, pushing back the Russian XLV Corps 5 km.[30]: 211–231
From 27 June to 3 July 1916, Brusilov carried out, on his own initiative, the deportation of 13,000 German civilians from theVolhynian areas that had been conquered during the offensive.[39]
On 2 July, Evert's West Front finally started its offensive, withAlexander Ragoza's Fourth army attacking north ofBaranovichi. Yet, according to Buttar, "it was in almost every respect a replay of the disastrous attacks of March...an imprecise artillery bombardment, mass infantry attacks that struggled to make progress and lacked sufficient support to sustain early gains...". On 9 July, Evert suspended the operation, with the 4th Army losing 80,000, having advanced only 5 km. Likewise,Kuropatkin's Northern Front offensive in mid-July failed to appreciably change the front line.[30]: 231–235
On 4 July, attacks by Lesh's 3rd Army and Kaledin's 8th Army forced Linsingen to withdraw westwards to theStochod river on 6 July. On 5 July ArchdukeKarl took command of the new12th Army, while on 9 July, Kövesz 3rd Army was created from a portion of Pflanzer-Baltin's 7th Army that had retreated westward. Pflanzer-Baltin remained in command of the 7th Army that had retreated towards the Carpathians.[30]: 239–242
Recognizing Southwest Front had the best chance to advance the Russian front lines, Ragoza's 4th Army was dispersed into Brusilov's 2nd and 10th Armies, and Brusilov was givenBezobrazov's Guards Army. Southwest Front now had a force of 700,000 men, compared to an opposition force of 421,000. Brusilov planned to advance towards Kovel on 20 July. Before then, on 16 July, the Siberian Corps forcedGruppe Marwitz to retreat back to the River Lipa. In an attempt to strengthen Marwitz, Puhallo's 1st Army was disbanded, and redistributed to Marwitz and Böhm-Ermolli's 2nd Army.[30]: 245–250
On 23 July, Sakharov's 11th Army attacked towardsBrody, capturing it on 28 July, forcing Böhm-Ermolli's 2nd Army 7 km to the west. On 28 July,Hindenburg was placed in command of the front up to the Austro-Hungarian 2nd Army, with Archduke Karl in command from that point south.[30]: 254, 259–261
On 24 July, artillery preparations began for the Russian assault in theBattle of Kovel. According to Buttar, "The fighting that extended from 28 July into early August was curiously disjointed...Although Lesh, Bezobrazov and Kaledin all launched their attacks on the same day, none of them were able to maintain their efforts for long..." Lechitsky's 9th Army and Shcherbachev's 7th Army made simultaneous attacks further south, with Lechitsky able to advance the front line to outsideStanislau, capturing it on 11 August.[30]: 262–279, 292
On 7 August, Brusilov resumed his offensive to take Kovel. By 8 August, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians had stopped the Russians, and on 9 August, Brusilov halted any further attempt to take Kovel. The offensive was essentially over, according to Buttar, "Attacks continued on until the autumn rains turned the roads to mud, but other than add to the already terrible casualty list, nothing was achieved."[30]: 282–289, 294, 297
Brusilov's operation achieved its original goal of forcing Germany to halt its attack on Verdun and transfer considerable forces to the East. Afterward, the Austro-Hungarian Army increasingly had to rely on the support of the German Army for its military successes. On the other hand, the German Army did not suffer much from the operation and retained most of its offensive power afterward. The early success of the offensive convinced Romania to enter the war on the side of theEntente, which led to thefailure of the 1916 campaign. The Brusilov Offensive was the high point of the Russian effort during World War I, and was a manifestation of good leadership and planning on the part of theImperial Russian Army coupled with great skill of the lower ranks. According toJohn Keegan, "the Brusilov Offensive was, on the scale by which success was measured in the foot-by-foot fighting of the First World War, the greatest victory seen on any front since the trench lines had been dugon the Aisne two years before".[40]
The Brusilov offensive commanded by Brusilov himself went very well, but the overall campaign, for which Brusilov's part was only supposed to be a distraction, because of Evert's failures, became tremendously costly for the imperial army, and after the offensive, it was no longer able to launch another on the same scale. Many historians contend that the casualties that the Russian army suffered in this campaign contributed significantly to its collapse the following year.[41][page needed] The operation was marked by a considerable improvement in the quality of Russian tactics. Brusilov used smaller, specialized units to attack weak points in the Austro-Hungarian trench lines and blow open holes for the rest of the army to advance into. These were a remarkable departure from thehuman wave attacks that had dominated the strategy of all the major armies until that point during World War I. Evert used conventional tactics that were to prove costly and indecisive, thereby costing Russia its chance for a victory in 1916.
The irony was that other Russian commanders did not realize the potential of the tactics that Brusilov had devised. Similar tactics were proposed separately by French, Germans and British on theWestern Front and employed at theBattle of Verdun earlier in the year. The tactics would henceforth be used to an even greater degree by the Germans, who usedstormtroopers andinfiltration tactics to great effect in the 1918Spring Offensive.[42]
With the benefit of hindsight, it has been stated that Russia was not able to take advantage of its success nor cement it. In Russian society, pessimism regarding Russia's prospects in the war and distrust in the competence of its military and political leadership would continue to grow in 1916.[43]
Russian casualties were considerable, numbering between 500,000[6] and 1,000,000.[44] Austro-Hungarian losses were around 616,000,[45] while estimates place German losses at between 148,000[13] and 350,000[46][page needed]. The Brusilov offensive is considered one of themost lethal offensives in world history.
However, the figure of 500,000 Russian casualties refers only to the period from May 28 to July 13, 1916, that is, the first stage of the offensive of the Russian Southwestern Front. A calculation from Russian military archives gives the following figure: 62,155 killed, 376,910 wounded and 59,802 missing. Total of 497,967 men for Russian Southwestern Front in just the first 1.5 months of the battle.[47] And the losses of Austria-Hungary and Germany were 1,000,000[16] to 1,500,000[48][49][50][51] men for the period from June to December 1916.
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