TheUnited Kingdom and theBritish Empire enteredWorld War I on 4 August 1914, when KingGeorge V declared war after the expiry of anultimatum to theGerman Empire. The official explanation focused on protectingBelgium as aneutral country; the main reason, however, was to prevent a French defeat that would have left Germany in control ofWestern Europe. TheLiberal Party was in power with prime ministerH. H. Asquith and foreign ministerEdward Grey leading the way. The Liberal cabinet made the decision, although the party had been strongly anti-war until the last minute. The Conservative Party was pro-war. The Liberals knew that if they split on the war issue, they would lose control of the government to the Conservatives.
In 1907, the newLiberal government agreed to theAnglo-Russian Convention. Like the Entente, the Convention focused on resolving colonial disputes; but by doing so, it paved the way for wider co-operation and allowed Britain to refocus its naval resources in response toGerman naval expansion.[2]
In one explanation of why Britain went to war with Germany, British historianPaul Kennedy (1980) argued that a critical factor was the British realisation that Germany was rapidly becoming economically more powerful than Britain. It was in essence not a consequence of the disputes over economic trade imperialism, theBaghdad Railway, the confrontations in Eastern Europe, highly charged political rhetoric, or domestic pressure groups. Germany's reliance time and again on military aggression, while Britain increasingly appealed to moral sensibilities, also played a role, especially in portraying the invasion of neutral Belgium as (in the German view) a necessary military tactic or (in the British view) a profound moral crime. TheGerman invasion of Belgium was not the real cause of war with Britain, because the British decision had already been made as the British were more concerned with the fate of France (pp. 457–62).[clarification needed] Kennedy argues that by far the main reason was London's fear that a repeat of the war of 1870, when Prussia and the German states smashed France, would mean that a rapidly industrialising Germany, with a powerful army and navy, would control theEnglish Channel and northwest France. British policy-makers insisted that that would be a catastrophe for British security.[4]
In the immediate aftermath of theassassination on 28 June of AustrianArchduke Franz Ferdinand (the heir to theHabsburg throne) in theBosnian capital,Sarajevo, the British newspapers denounced theSerbian nationalist assassin,Gavrilo Princip, and were generally sympathetic to theAustro-Hungarian monarchy. The newspapers blamed theKingdom of Serbia for the crime, with rhetoric against "fanatics", "dangerous forces" and "reckless agitators". These responses were broadly shared across the political spectrum, with Liberal and Conservative papers expressing their shock and dismay. But by 27 July, press opinion had turned against Austria-Hungary. The national press divided along party lines, with Conservative papers stressing the obligation to support France, while Liberal papers insisted Britain had no such commitment and should remain neutral.[6][7]
As Germany and Russia became the central players in the crisis (respectively backing Austria-Hungary and Serbia), British leaders increasingly had a sense of commitment to defending France. First, if Germany again conquered France, as had happened in theFranco-Prussian War of 1870, it would become a major threat to British economic, political and cultural interests. Second,partisanship was involved. The Liberal Party was identified withinternationalism andfree trade, and with opposition tojingoism and warfare. By contrast, the Conservative Party was identified as the party ofnationalism andpatriotism; Britons expected it "to show capacity in running a war."[8] Liberal voters initially demanded peace, but were outraged when the Germans treated Belgian neutrality as a worthless "scrap of paper" (the words of German ChancellorTheobald von Bethmann Hollweg in ridiculing theTreaty of London). Germany, as part of a massive attack on France, invaded northern France through Belgium early on the morning of 4 August. The Belgians called upon Britain for military assistance under the 1839 treaty, and in response London gave Berlin an ultimatum which expired at 11 pm London time, which was ignored. KingGeorge V thendeclared war on Germany that evening.[9][10]
Before war was declared, the British newspapers gave the crisis extensive coverage but varied wildly in recommended policy options, basically covering the entire spectrum from peace to war.[11][12]C. P. Scott and theManchester Guardian maintained an intense campaign against war. It denounced a "conspiracy to drag us into a war against England’s interests", arguing that it would amount to a "crime against Europe", and warning that it would "throw away the accumulated progress of half a century".[13] The politicianDavid Lloyd George told Scott on Tuesday 4 August 1914, "Up until last Sunday only two members of the Cabinet had been in favour of our intervention in the war, but the violation of Belgian territory had completely altered the situation".[13] According to Isabel V. Hull:
Annika Mombauer correctly sums up the current historiography: "Few historians would still maintain that the 'rape of Belgium' was the real motive for Britain's declaration of war on Germany." Instead, the role of Belgian neutrality is variously interpreted as an excuse used to mobilise public opinion, to provide embarrassed radicals in the cabinet with the justification for abandoning the principal of pacifism and thus staying in office, or - in the more conspiratorial versions - as cover for naked imperial interests.[14]
Once war was declared, defence of Belgium rather than France was the public reason given for the war.Propaganda posters emphasised that Britain was required to safeguard Belgium's neutrality under the 1839 Treaty of London.[15][16]
"The Scrap of Paper - Enlist Today", 1914 British propaganda poster emphasizes German contempt for the 1839 treaty (the signature of British Foreign SecretaryLord Palmerston visible at the top), which guaranteed Belgian neutrality, as merely a "scrap of paper" that Germany would ignore.
As late as 1 August 1914, the great majority of Liberals—both voters and cabinet members—strongly opposed going to war.[17] The German invasion of Belgium was such an outrageous violation of international rights that the Liberal Party agreed with the case for war on 4 August. HistorianZara Steiner says:
The public mood did change. Belgium proved to be a catalyst which unleashed the many emotions, rationalizations, and glorifications of war which had long been part of the British climate of opinion. Having a moral cause, all the latentanti-German feelings, fueled by years of naval rivalry and assumed enmity, rose to the surface. The 'scrap of paper' proved decisive both in maintaining the unity of the government and then in providing a focal point for public feeling.[18]
"Germany Violates Belgian Neutrality": Headline inLe Soir, 4 August 1914
The Liberals succeeded in mending their deep divisions over military action. Unless theLiberal government acted decisively against the German invasion of France, its top leaders including Prime MinisterH. H. Asquith, Foreign MinisterEdward Grey, First Lord of the AdmiraltyWinston Churchill and others would resign, leading to a risk that the much more pro-war Conservative Party might form a government. Mistreatment of Belgium was not itself a fundamental cause of British entry into the war, but it was used extensively as a justification in wartime propaganda to motivate the British people.[19]
The German high command was aware that entering Belgium could trigger British intervention but decided the risk was acceptable; they expected it to be a short war, and their ambassador in London claimed civil war in Ireland would prevent Britain from assisting France.[20]
Historians looking at theJuly Crisis typically conclude that Grey:
was not a great Foreign Secretary but an honest, reticent, punctilious English gentleman... He exhibited a judicious understanding of European affairs, a firm control of his staff, and a suppleness and tact in diplomacy, but he had no boldness, no imagination, no ability to command men and events. [Regarding the war] He pursued a cautious, moderate policy, one that not only fitted his temperament, but also reflected the deep split in the Cabinet, in the Liberal party, and in public opinion.[21]
The majority of theLabour Party, which as a member of theSecond International had opposed the war, also shifted to support after the German invasion of Belgium with the exception of some members such as its secretaryRamsay MacDonald. The rest of the Labour Party leadership underArthur Henderson calculated that the war would be brief and that opposing it would cost the party at the next general election.[22]
Canada automatically joined the war, and vigorously recruited volunteers.
Until late July,British politics was focused on the threat of a possiblecivil war inIreland. In 1912 the government had presented anIrish Home Rule bill thatIrish nationalists demanded; under the terms of theParliament Act 1911, by which theHouse of Lords retained the right to delay legislation by up to two years, it was due to become law in 1914. TheUlster Protestants demanded separate treatment; by mid-1914 the government was offering a six-year opt-out to the six counties which would eventually becomeNorthern Ireland, but not the permanent exemption which they demanded. Both sides in Ireland had smuggled in weapons, set up militias with tens of thousands of volunteers, were drilling, and were ready to fight a civil war. TheBritish Army itself was paralyzed: during theCurragh Incident officers threatened to resign or accept dismissal rather than obey orders to deploy into Ulster. Elements of theConservative and Unionist Party supported them.
On 25 July the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia became known, and the cabinet realized that war with Germany was increasingly likely. TheGovernment of Ireland Act 1914 was enacted into law, but was suspended for the duration of hostilities, with the issue of Ulster still unresolved.[23] Grey told theBritish Parliament on 3 August, "The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. [Prolonged cheers.] The general feeling throughout Ireland, and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad, does not make that a consideration that we feel we have to take into account. [Cheers.]"[24]
The king's declaration of war automatically involved alldominions,colonies, andprotectorates of theBritish Empire, many of whom made significant contributions to theAllied war effort, both in the provision of troops and civilian labourers.
^Avner Cohen, "Joseph Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne and British foreign policy 1901–1903: From collaboration to confrontation."Australian Journal of Politics & History 43#2 (1997): 122-134.
^Christopher Clark,The Sleepwalkers (2012) p. 539.
^Meilyr Powel, "The Welsh press and the July Crisis of 1914."First World War Studies 8.2-3 (2017): 133-152.online[dead link]
^Adam James Bones, "British National Dailies and the Outbreak of War in 1914."International History Review 35.5 (2013): 975-992.
^Trevor Wilson,The Downfall of the Liberal Party 1914-1935 (1966) p 51.
^Nilesh, Preeta (2014). "Belgian Neutrality and the First world War; Some Insights".Proceedings of the Indian History Congress.75: 1014.JSTOR44158486.
^Adrian Gregory, "A Clash of Cultures: The British Press and the Opening of the Great War," inA Call to Arms: Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Newspapers in the Great War, edited by Troy R. E. Paddock, (Praeger, 2004) pp 15–49.
^Hale,Publicity and Diplomacy: With Special Reference to England and Germany, 1890-1914 (1940) pp 446-70.
^Scott,Five Weeks: The Surge of Public Opinion on the Eve of the Great War (1927) pp 99–153
^Isabel V. Hull,A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War (Cornell UP, 2014) p, 33
^Bentley B. Gilbert, "Pacifist to interventionist: David Lloyd George in 1911 and 1914. Was Belgium an issue?."Historical Journal 28.4 (1985): 863-885.
^Zara S. Steiner,Britain and the origins of the First World War (1977) pp 235-237.
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