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Boland Amendment

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
1982–84 US laws aimed at limiting federal assistance to Nicaraguan Contras

U.S. congressional opposition
to American involvement in
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United States
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Edward Boland (right), author of the Boland Amendment

TheBoland Amendment is a term describing a series of U.S. legislative amendments passed between 1982 and 1986, aimed at limitingU.S. government assistance to theContras inNicaragua. TheReagan Administration supplied funding and military training to the Contras until revelations of human rights abuses ledCongress to cut off aid through the Boland Amendment.[1] The Boland Amendment was passed over a series of five legislative amendments that increasingly restricted forms of aids and the source of the aid.[2]

The most significant effect of the Boland Amendment was theIran–Contra affair, during which the Reagan Administration circumvented the Amendment in order to continue supplying arms to the Contras.[3] This was achieved by funneling money to the Contras that was generated by secret arms sales toIran. When revealed to the public, Congress attempted to prosecuteVice Admiral John M. Poindexter,U.S. Navy (USN), and his deputy,Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North,U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), for their direct role in the affair.President Ronald Reagan, while implicated, was not directly linked to the affair and avoided similar attempts at prosecution.[4]

Background

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During the early years of the Reagan administration, acivil war raged inNicaragua, pitting the communistrevolutionarySandinista government againstContra rebel groups. The Reagan Administration and theCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA), led byWilliam Casey, covertly supported the Contras through funding and military training.[5][6][7] Public knowledge of routine human rights abuses committed by the Contra rebels led to the passage of the Boland Amendment by Congress, which cut off any appropriated funding for the Contras that would be used for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government.[8]

The Boland Amendment, proposed byEdward Boland, was a compromise because theDemocrats did not have enough votes for a comprehensive ban. The Amendment gained traction due to widespread opposition among the American public to funding the Contras as opposition to funding the Contras hovered around two to one.[9] It covered onlyappropriated funds spent byintelligence agencies (such as the CIA). Some of Reagan's national security officials used non-appropriated money spent by theNational Security Council (NSC) to circumvent the Amendment.[10] No court ever made a determination whether the Amendment covered the NSC. Supporters of the NSC actions claimed that the Boland Amendment violated theConstitution by violating the separation of powers principle, while opponents claimed that the Amendment passed in the constitutionally proscribed manner and the principle of separation of powers was not a legal defense.[11] Congress later resumed aid to the Contras, totaling over $300 million. The Sandinistas were voted out of power in 1990 with the election of opposition leaderVioleta Chamorro over the Sandinista candidate,Daniel Ortega.[12]

The Boland Amendment prohibited the federal government from providing military support that would be used to overthrow theGovernment of Nicaragua.[13] It aimed to prevent CIA funding of rebels opposed to the revolutionaryprovisional junta. The Amendment sought to block Reagan administration support for the Contra rebels, but the amendment was narrowly interpreted by the Reagan administration to apply to only U.S. intelligence agencies, allowing theNational Security Council (NSC), which is not labeled an intelligence agency, to channel funds to the Contra rebels.[14] To block the funding through the NSC, the amendment was changed to prohibit any funds for military or paramilitary operations.[15][16]

The Boland Amendment

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The first Boland Amendment outlawed U.S. assistance from the CIA andDepartment of Defense (DOD), to theContras for the purpose of overthrowing the communist Nicaraguan government, while allowing assistance for other purposes.[17] The Amendment was part of the House Appropriations Bill of 1982, which was attached as arider to the Defense Appropriations Act of 1983, named for theMassachusettsDemocrat, RepresentativeEdward Boland, who authored it. TheHouse of Representatives passed the Defense Appropriations Act 411–0 on December 8, 1982, and it was signed by PresidentRonald Reagan on December 21, 1982.[18]

The four following legislative amendments adjusted the scope of the first Boland Amendment. TheIntelligence Authorization Act, passed December 9, 1983, limited the existing obligations of the CIA and DOD to the Contras to $24 million and expanded the act to include direct or indirect support for any Nicaraguan group or individual. On October 3, 1984, aid was completely cut to the Contras and all entities of theUnited States government were prohibited from providing aid, expanding the prohibition from just the CIA and DOD. The fourth amendment, encompassing 1985-1986, provided $27 million in humanitarian aid to the Contras, and the fifth and final form of the amendment in June 1986, provided $100 million in aid to the Contras.[19]

Relationship to Iran-Contra Affair

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Officials in the Reagan Administration argued that the Boland Amendment, or any act of Congress, could not interfere with the president's conduct of foreign policy. This represented the culmination of an ongoing struggle between Congress and the President over the power of foreign policy. Since the end of World War II, Congress had taken steps to curtail unilateral foreign policy moves by the President. Two clear examples of this are the1973 War Powers Act, which required Congressional approval of troop commitments lasting longer than thirty days, and the1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment, which required a Presidential report to Congress concerning the necessity of all covert operations. The Boland Amendment represented another attempt by Congress to restrict Presidential power. The resistance of the Reagan administration via its circumvention was the flip-side of this power struggle.[20]

In this spirit, administration officials argued that the Boland Amendment, or any act of Congress, could not interfere with the president's conduct of foreign policy by restricting funds, as the president could seek funds from private entities or foreign governments.[21] In this spirit, and despite the Boland Amendment, Vice AdmiralJohn M. Poindexter, USN, and his deputy, Lieutenant ColonelOliver North, USMC, secretly diverted to the Nicaraguan contras millions of dollars in funds received from a secret deal that some alleged had explicit presidential approval – the sales ofanti-tank andanti-aircraft missiles toIran in spite of Reagan's public pledge not to deal with terrorists.[22]

President Ronald Reagan (Far Right), discusses his remarks on the Iran-Contra Affair while in the Oval Office.

On Monday, November 3rd 1986, a pro-Syrian newspaper inLebanon,Ash-Shiraa, revealed the secret deal to the world[23][24] andThe New York Times picked it up a day later on Tuesday, US election day.[25] This came asDemocrats won back control of the Senate in the 1986 elections. In public hearings of a jointHouse–Senate committee convened for purposes of investigating the affair, Democrats sought to prosecute North for his role. The final report published after the hearings blamed Reagan's passive style of leadership for allowing the conduct of foreign policy without involvement of any elected official.[26]

Legislature chronology

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A chronology fromJohn Negroponte.[27]

In December 1982H.J.RES.631 became public law 97-377 making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1983. The amendmentS.UP.AMDT.1542 by SenatorDaniel Patrick Moynihan, which aimed to prohibit the use of funds by the CIA or DOD to support military activities in Nicaragua, fell. AmendmentS.UP.AMDT.1541 by SenatorChristopher J. Dodd "to declare Congressional support for restrictions on certain types of operations in Central America" was tabled.

ButH.R.7355 made appropriations for the Department of Defense and amendmentH.AMDT.974 to it by Representative Edward P. Boland passed with a recorded vote of 411–0 to prohibit the CIA or Defense Department to use the funds of the bill for military purposes in Nicaragua.

In December 1983, for the fiscal year 1984,H.R.4185, sponsored by RepresentativeJoseph P. Addabbo, which became public law 98-212, andH.R.2968, sponsored by Boland, which became public law 98-215, limited the amount to be spent for military purposes in Nicaragua. AmendmentH.AMDT.461 by Boland to H.R. 2968 prohibited covert assistance for military operations in Nicaragua.

In December 1984, for fiscal year 1985,H.J.RES.648, became public law 98-473, and prohibited funds available to the CIA and the DOD from being used in Nicaragua for military purposes. This legislation read: "During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement or individual." This legislation also provided that after February 28, 1985, if the President made a report to Congress specifying certain criteria, including the need to provide further assistance for "military or paramilitary operations" prohibited by this statute, he could expend $14 million in funds if Congress passed a joint resolution approving such action."[28]

In December 1985, for fiscal year 1986,S.960 became public law 99-83 and also excluded military use for funds to be spent in Nicaragua.

See also

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References

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  1. ^"The Wars for Central America",We Begin Bombing in Five Minutes, University of Massachusetts Press, pp. 121–144, 2021-08-27,doi:10.2307/j.ctv1x675t8.11, retrieved2024-11-25
  2. ^Timbers, Edwin (1990)."Legal and Institutional Aspects of the Iran-Contra Affair".Presidential Studies Quarterly.20 (1):31–41.ISSN 0360-4918.JSTOR 20700112.
  3. ^Douville, Alex (2012).The Iran-Contra Affair (Report). Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. pp. 87–148.
  4. ^Douville, Alex (2012).The Iran-Contra Affair (Report). Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. pp. 87–148.
  5. ^Salehyan, Idean (2009).Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. Cornell University Press. p. 127.ISBN 978-0-8014-7754-6.JSTOR 10.7591/j.ctt7z6bx.
  6. ^Brown, Timothy (2001).The Real Contra War, Highlander Peasant Resistance in Nicaragua. University of Oklahoma Press. p. XXVI.ISBN 978-0806132525.Aug. 1979 first armed clash of the Contra War near El Chipote
  7. ^Hoekstra, Quint (2021)."Helping the Contras: The Effectiveness of U.S. Support for Foreign Rebels During the Nicaraguan Contra War (1979–1990)".Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.44 (6). RetrievedAugust 27, 2025.
  8. ^Hunt, Andrew (2021).We Begin Bombing in Five Minutes: Late Cold War Culture in the Age of Reagan. University of Massachusetts Press.ISBN 978-1-62534-577-6.JSTOR j.ctv1x675t8.
  9. ^Sklar, Holly (1988).Washington's War on Nicaragua. South End Press.ISBN 978-0-89608-295-3.
  10. ^Douville, Alex (2012).The Iran-Contra Affair (Report). Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. pp. 87–148.
  11. ^Timbers, Edwin (1990)."Legal and Institutional Aspects of the Iran-Contra Affair".Presidential Studies Quarterly.20 (1):31–41.ISSN 0360-4918.JSTOR 20700112.
  12. ^Salehyan, Idean (2009).Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. Cornell University Press.ISBN 978-0-8014-7754-6.JSTOR 10.7591/j.ctt7z6bx.
  13. ^Timbers, Edwin (1990)."Legal and Institutional Aspects of the Iran-Contra Affair".Presidential Studies Quarterly.20 (1):31–41.ISSN 0360-4918.JSTOR 20700112.
  14. ^Douville, Alex (2012).The Iran-Contra Affair (Report). Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. pp. 87–148.
  15. ^"The Truth is Stranger than Fiction". University of Sydney. Archived fromthe original on 2006-12-31.
  16. ^Theodore Draper.A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affair. New York: Hill and Wang. pp. 17–27, 51.
  17. ^Riesenfeld, Stefan A. (January 1987)."The Powers of Congress and the President in International Relations: Revisited".California Law Review.75 (1). California Law Review, Inc.:405–414.doi:10.2307/3480586.JSTOR 3480586.The Boland Amendment was part of the Joint Resolution of December 21, 1982, providing further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1983
  18. ^Congressional Limitations and Requirements for Military Deployments and Funding
  19. ^Timbers, Edwin (1990)."Legal and Institutional Aspects of the Iran-Contra Affair".Presidential Studies Quarterly.20 (1):31–41.ISSN 0360-4918.JSTOR 20700112.
  20. ^Douville, Alex (2012).The Iran-Contra Affair (Report). Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. pp. 87–148.
  21. ^Louis Fisher (October 1989). "How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?".American Journal of International Law.83 (4). American Society of International Law:758–766.doi:10.2307/2203364.JSTOR 2203364.S2CID 147213452.
  22. ^Douville, Alex (2012).The Iran-Contra Affair (Report). Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. pp. 87–148.
  23. ^Melissa Boyle Mahle (2005).Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA. Perseus Books Group. p. 29.ISBN 978-0-7867-3759-8.
  24. ^Ulrich von Schwerin (2015)."Mehdi Hashemi and the Iran-Contra-Affair".British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.42 (4): 521.doi:10.1080/13530194.2015.1028520.S2CID 218602348.
  25. ^Hijazi, Ihsan (November 4, 1986)."Hostage's Release Is Linked to Shift in Iranian Policy".The New York Times.There was also a report today in a Beirut publication that is usually well informed on Iranian affairs that said the United States had sent spare parts and ammunition for American-built fighter planes and tanks that Iran bought from the United States before the fall of Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi in 1979. [...] The Lebanese weekly magazine Al Shiraa, in its edition which went on sale over the weekend, reported what it said was the delivery by the United States of spare parts and ammunition to Iran. The magazine said the delivery came after a secret visit to Teheran by Robert McFarlane, the former national security adviser to President Reagan.
  26. ^Douville, Alex (2012).The Iran-Contra Affair (Report). Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. pp. 87–148.
  27. ^John Negroponte Nomination: Senate Confirmation Hearings, Debates, Press, LinksArchived March 24, 2007, at theWayback Machine
  28. ^Congressional Research Service, Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces and Overseas Deployments, January 10, 2001, pg. 6."Archived copy"(PDF). Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 2015-02-16. Retrieved2015-04-04.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)

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