Berberism is aBerberethnonationalist movement that started inKabylia inAlgeria during theFrench colonial era with theKabyle myth, largely driven by colonialcapitalism and France'sdivide and conquer policy.[1] The Berberist movement originally manifested itself asanti-Arab racism,Islamophobia, andFrancophilia, that was sanctioned and sponsored by French colonial authorities.[2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10] The movement later spread to other Berber communities in theMaghreb region ofNorth Africa and was facilitated by colonial policies such as theBerber Dahir inMorocco. The Berberist movement inAlgeria andMorocco is in opposition to culturalArabization,pan-Arabism, andIslamism.[11][12]
The origins of Berberism go back to the triumph of colonial capitalism in Kabylia during theFrench colonization of Algeria. Its roots date back to the "Berber policy" of theFrench colonial empire, designed to "pacify" Kabylia.[1] French colonialists invented several ideologies todivide and rule the Algerian population, such as theKabyle myth, a racist colonial trope which asserted that the Kabyle people were more predisposed thanArabs to assimilate into "French civilization."Yves Lacoste explained that "turning the Arabs into invaders was one way of legitimizing the French presence".[13] The Berbers were elevated above the Arabs through the narrative that Berber ancestral heritage stemmed from Europe. Consequently, Arabs were associated with backwardness, which the Berbers profited from, as it granted them a higher status.[14] Prior to the creation of the ideology in the 1840s, Kabyles throughout the centuries were actively and fully engaged in theArab culture of Algeria, ever since theMuslim conquest of the Maghreb in the 7th century and the ensuingArab migrations to the Maghreb.[15]
During the period of French colonization, Arabic and Berber were declared foreign languages in Algeria with the aim to restructure Algerian identity into a more Western one. This was done in attempts to assert French dominance. The Berbers were targeted with heavy French schooling, placing them at the centre of this transformation. The strongest hold France had to advance this platform was the Berber region of Kabyle, where they espoused theKabyle myth.[16]
Despite French attempts at a Divide and Rule strategy in Algeria, Berbers were on the forefront of the Independence movement with several key leaders ofNational Liberation Front (FLN), includingHocine Aït Ahmed,Abane Ramdane, andKrim Belkacem. Furthermore, Aurès and Kabylia were amongst the principal footholds of FLN due to their geographical remoteness and widespread local support for independence. In fact, theSoummam conference, often cited as the founding act of the Algerian state, took place in Kabylia. Due to Berber regions serving as hotbeds for FLN guerillas, these regions were labelled major targets in French counter-insurgency operations. These counter-insurgency operations resulted in the devastation of agricultural lands, looting, destruction of villages, population displacement, the creation of forbidden zones, etc.[17]
Following Algerian Independence, Kabyle leaders opposed the central leadership over Arabist policies and the single-party system. These Kabyle leaders held popular backing in Kabylia and Algiers. Two years of armed conflict in Kabylia followed, leaving more than 400 dead and most FLN leaders from Kabylia exiled or executed.[18]
Currently, the construction of the opposing ideologies is argued to be political and social in nature rather than ethnic.[14] The dynamics were shifted when the Berber movement entered to make demands in the political sphere. Many of these demands arose from the region of Kabyle in Algeria. Kabylian Berbers constitute two-thirds of the Berber population and have been the strongest advocates for the Berber movement. The second-largest group are the Chaoui Berbers who reside in the Aures mountains. While the elite sphere consisted of the Kabyle population, the Chaoui played an important role due to their military influence. On the whole, the Berberophones make up roughly 25% of the Algerian population, constituting seven to eight million people.[19] In 2002, Tamazight was declared a national language in Algeria alongside Arabic to accommodate this large percentage of the population. In 2016 it was declared to be an official language, and efforts are underway to create aStandard variation of the Algerian Berber dialects.[20]
The developments of 1940 to 1950 constituted a period of social unrest in Algerian politics which would set the framework for the coming years. The emergence of the Algerian Arabism-Islamism Nationalist framework meant to combat colonialism was accompanied by the emergence of Berberism, to combat this Arabism-Islamism. The Berbers demanded for the redefinition of the society they were historically a part of (linguistically and culturally): they wanted an 'Algerian Algeria' to represent all the ethnic and cultural minorities of the nation. TheMovement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD) continued to impose the Arabism-Islamism framework and were denounced as anti-democratic by Berber activists.[21]
The MTLD refused to acknowledge these minorities because it would have hindered their advancement in the provincial elections. This led to the beginning of open conflict between Berber partisans and "Arab unity" advocates: the outbreak of the Berber crisis. At this stage, theAlgerian People's Party (PPA) and MTLD, both headquartered in Paris, had merged to advance the Berber platform. They wanted to replace the single-party state system with democracy. This 'Algerian Algeria' would include the contributions, histories and cultures of all the ethnic populations. The platform as stated by Rachid Ali revolved around the fact that the Berbers should break the status quo that they have no place in society, as Algeria does not belong to the Arab world but was instead a nation for all its citizens.[22] With the adoption of this platform, the Berber activists were seen as a threat to unity and independence by the Arabists-Islamists, on the account that "the Berbers wished to impose the Western agenda on Algeria".
The Berberist crisis of 1949 led to the formation of the Berber Cultural Movement (MCB). Its agenda was to challenge Arabism and Islamism, and opposeArabization because of its "de-frenchifying" objectives and its alleged opposition to democratic andsecular ideals. Berberists called for aWestern-style socio-political system with theFrench language andFrench culture as its vectors. It has been described asacculturationist and mimicking of Western/French culture which it seeks to replaceArab nationalism andIslamism with.[3]
The 1962 Constitution declared that Islam was the state religion and Arabic was the national language. These two aspects of identity became mutually exclusive to be Algerian. In turn, linguistic and cultural diversity was interpreted as a threat to national unity. Rapid Arabization measures were implemented after independence in 1962 which sought to spread the Arabic language throughout the country. This was largely in an attempt to reclaim and reconstruct the Algerian identity which was lost during French colonial rule.
The rise in Arabic speakers and education institutions was accompanied by the decline in the Berber speakers.[23] Linguistic ability was a large factor in Berber identification meaning its decline was a threat to the survival of the Berber identity. The Berber narrative stated that the rapid Arab-Islamic conquest was rising at the expense of the Berber identity. The Berber struggle was seen as an uphill battle.[23] Furthermore, these Arabization measures stigmatized the Berber speakers vis-à-vis the Arabic speakers through the creation of more rigid divides between the communities. Political and social power was seen to lie with the Arabs who imposed their will on the Berber minority.
The Berber Question was revived during this period. The youth of Kabyle fought for the assertion of their Berber culture in a post-independent Arabist-Islamist Algeria. Repression of Berber particularism combined with the accelerating programs of Arabization in schools and universities led to the sharpening of the divide and the eventual outbreak of the 1980Berber Spring. The catalyst was set on 10 March 1980, when the government banned a lecture given by Mouloud Mammeri on Ancient Berber poetry at the University of Tizi Ouzou. Strikes continued until 26 June. The Berber demonstrations in Algeria of that year were the first instance in the international scene where a Berber group demanded recognition on the institutional level of their culture, language, and place in society.[19] The later 1980s saw a rise in Berber associations, political parties and cultural movements. Article 56 of the 1976 constitution stated that preliminary certification was needed in order to establish associations, over which the administration had discretionary power.[19] Legally, this meant that no Berber associations could exist from 1962 until this was amended out of the constitution in 1988. Underground Berber groups could now officially register themselves, and by July 1989 there were officially 154 of these organizations.[19] Of the most notable included the Berber Cultural Movement (MCB) which held its first official meeting in July 1989 in Tizi Ouzo. The MCB comprised French intellectuals and Kabliyan students with the agenda to oppose Arabization, call for recognition of Berber culture and language, and implement a Western style democracy.[24] The MCB mobilized large groups of people and coordinated multiple protests to advance Berber culture, language, and position in civil society. However, the MCB had major limits on the account that the MCB was unable to resist the partisan tensions between the FFS and the RCD.[19]
The creation of the HCA is regarded as the first step by the government to recognize the language of the Berber population, Tamazight. The commission would be attached to the office of the President and the commissioner would be appointed by the President to oversee the initiatives undertaken to advance and institutionalize the Berber language. The HCA was officially created by a decree on 8 May 1995, meaning it was in a fragile state due to its revocability. The government refused to acknowledge Tamazight as a national language alongside Arabic, while this decree was meant "to rehabilitate one of the components of the national culture and identity of all Algerians. It [was] in no way a recognition of linguistic or cultural rights of a particular area or minority".[19]
Changes in the constitution reflected this recognition and advancement of Berber language. The 1989 constitution made no mention of Berberism and declared in its second and third articles that "Islam is the religion of the state" and "Arabic is the national and official language".[19] Whereas these two amendments were carried forward to the 1996 constitution, there was also the addition of a preamble which stated that "the fundamental components of its [Algeria's] identity are Islam, "Arabness", and Berberness. Later in the preamble, was the mention that "Algeria is the land of Islam, an integral part of the Greater Maghreb, an Arab, Mediterranean and African country," subsequently contradicting the weight of the former advancement.[19] Nonetheless, it was among the first steps towards recognition taken by the government.
Berber communities broke out in mass protest against the law which declared Arabic as the only legitimate language in Algeria. This law was originally declared in 1991 and meant to go into effect on 5 July 1998. Throughout the years Kabyle culturists had continued to oppose the implantation of this law, mobilizing again for this cause. The last Berber mobilization of this size had been the Berber springs. Tension had been built up throughout the years by this law, however the catalyst which fueled this outbreak was the assassination ofLounes Matoub on 25 June 1998, an Algerian Berber singer and activist, by theGroup Islamique Armee (GIA). Matoub had just arrived from France and was on track to release his 4th CD criticizing post-independence regime and asserting the Berber identity. On June 28, his funeral was held and 100,000 Berbers came together to protest, which resulted in the continuation of week-long outbursts of violence targeted at government property.[19] Banners titled "no peace without the Berber language," "we are not Arabs," and "pouvoir assassin, [President Liamine] Zeroual assassin" could be seen throughout the protests.[19]
The Berber policy in Morocco had roots before the beginning of theFrench protectorate in Morocco in 1912. For example, the Mission Scientifique au Maroc was started in 1903 to collect social, economic, ecological, ethnographic, political, and cultural information about Morocco first led by French orientalistEdmond Doutté then by French orientalistÉdouard Michaux-Bellaire [fr]. It also was influenced by theKabyle myth.[25] One of the purposes of the Berber policy was it being a means of control. One official said, for example, "The Berber race is a useful instrument for counteracting the Arab race... and the Makhzan itself".[26] Another was forging a new Berber identity under French influence rather than conserving the traditional Berber identity.[27]
Beginning from the 1920, the French administration also created Franco-Berber schools[28] (French:écoles francoberbères)[29] that were set up by Resident-GeneralHubert Lyautey and restricted to the Berber population.[30] These schools included theCollège d'Azrou[31] which led to the formation of a new Francophone rural Berber elite.[29][32] In these schools, French was the primary language followed by Berber.[33] The curriculum of these schools excluded religious courses,[29] theArabic language and theQuran.[34] Lyautey on the Franco-Berber schools said:
From an immediate political point of view, the schools have as objective to provide hygiene and maintain discreetly but as firmly as possible the linguistic, religious and social differences existing between the Makhzen, Islamized and Arabized, and the Berber mountain, religious but pagan and ignorant of Arabic.[35][36]
TheBerber Dahir was adhahir (decree) created by the French protectorate in Morocco on 16 May 1930. Thisdhahir changed the legal system in parts of Morocco, it replaced the pre-colonial IslamicSharia system inBerber areas with old pre-Islamic Berber laws, which many Moroccan nationalists saw as an attempt by the French to weaken the authority of theMakhzen and strengthen the autonomy of Berber tribes, causing public demonstrations and protests against the French in all Moroccan cities.[37] The new legal system inBerber communities would ostensibly be based on local Berber laws and customs rather than the authority of the sultan. The legal system in the rest of the country remained the way it had been before theFrench invasion. Lebanese princeShakib Arslan took this as evidence of an attempt to de-Islamize Morocco.[38]
The Berber Dahir reinforced a dichotomy in popular Moroccan historiography: the division of the country intoBled el-Makhzen—areas under the direct control of the Sultan and theMakhzen, or the state, (especially urban areas such asFes andRabat)—andBled es-Siba—typically geographically isolated areas beyond the direct control of the state, whereBerber languages are primarily spoken and where IslamicSharia was not applied.[39] The former was described asArab and the latter asBerber.[38]
French sociologistJacques Berque summing up the Berber policy said "it sanctioned the existence of a Berber reserve, a sort of national park which was to be sheltered from the ideologies of the plain, whether Arab or French".[25]
The "Mouvement Populaire" (MP) is the most important party that is associated with the Amazigh. It was established in 1957 byMahjoubi Aherdane. The party officially represented the rural areas, but since many Amazigh lived there it became associated with the movement.[40] In the parliament the MP was used byHassan II to counterbalance the opposition, especially theIstiqlal party. The King in turn shared royal patronage with the party leaders.[41] The King further cultivated the relationship by doing the same with other Amazigh notables.[42] This formed a strong bond between the leaders of the community and the monarchy. One of the results was that many Amazigh were in the military and until 1972 many held the rank of officer. The change in 1972 was caused by two attempted coups led by Amazigh officers.[41] But in general the ethnic group was still able to reach high positions in society.[43] As another result of the alliance Hassan II allowed the community small forms of cultural expression as long as it wasn't deemed political (this also concerned the program of the MP).[42]
In 1979 the MP did try to advance Amazigh rights through the parliament. It became important because as a result the government announced an investigation in the "Berber Question". The outcome was a recommendation that a new government organization needed to be formed to attend to the needs of the Amazigh, but the it was never realized. However the official attention provided hope for the activists that they could advance their goals.[44] Despite this, the MP failed to do anything to advance any "Berberization" and were the major party in the ruling coalition that enactedArabization in 1965.[45]
In the parliament the parties with Amazigh supporters and the Islamists opposed each other. The problem originated from the Islamists and their support of further Arabization of society. Arabization went against the adoption ofTamazight in society which was supported by parties dependent on Amazigh supporters.[46]
The 1960s were important for the Amazigh because of the founding of a number of NGOs. In 1965 the "Moroccan Amazigh Cultural Movement" (MACM) was founded.[47] The organization is a confederation of multiple (smaller) NGOs which banded together in order to better coordinate their actions.[48] The organization has grown to include over 100 organizations in the 21st century.[49] Another important organization is the "Association Marocaine de Recherche d’Échange Culture" (AMREC) which was founded in 1967.[48] The association was formed by students and intellectuals in Rabat and Paris. AMREC was established in order to promote and preserve Amazigh culture and folk art.[50] The foundation of AMREC inspired many other associations to be formed. The NGOs were responsible for organizing a wide variety of events in Morocco. They range from: Amazigh festivals, handicraft workshops, folklore expressions to musical events. The monarchy allowed these on one condition: the activities were not allowed to be political and could only be cultural expressions. The government subsidized some of the events as long as they adhered to the rules.[48]
In 1980 the "Berber Spring" broke out in Algeria. The government of Hassan II saw the public disorder in Algeria and changed its course in order to avoid a similar event in Morocco. The result was that the years of 1980-1982 were characterized by an opening in political liberties for Amazigh expression.[51] The activists were motivated by the new climate and formed many new cultural associations.[52] The king also appointed two important Amazigh figures in high positions to show his new attitude.Mahjoubi Aherdane was named the head of a newly formed cultural organization, the "Commission Nationale pour la Sauvegarde des Arts Populaires". WhereasMohamed Chafik was similarly appointed as the head of the prestigious “Le Académie Royal”. Furthermore, the king approved the release of an Amazigh journal.[51] A number of conferences were also held by the activists in which important new connections were made. One of the most important events was a conference at the "l’Universit éd’Ét éd’Agadir" in 1980. In this event it was decided to adopt the name "Amazigh" instead of "Berber".[53] In 1982 most of the freedoms granted were retracted and theYears of Lead continued.[54]
The Moroccan government adopted a change in direction from the Years of Lead in the 1990s. The regime introduced greater civil liberties, reduced human rights abuses and increased freedom of association. Although repression was still present in these years.[55][56] The increase in civil liberties resulted in the foundation of many new Amazigh associations.[57] In the year 1991 multiple NGO's came together and released a document called the "Agadir Charter".[40] The Charter was initially signed by 6 NGO's: AMREC, Tamaynut, L’Association de l’Universitéd’Été d’Agadir (AUEA), Tilelli, L’Association Ilmas and L’Association Culturelle de Sous. After it released 5 other groups signed it.[58]
The document consists out of 7 different points. The points range from demands of recognition of the Amazigh culture and identity to demands of Amazigh media.[58] The document is important because it publicly showed the unity of the different NGO's. But it also became important since the government did not answer with any forms of repression. It motivated many Amazigh to feel more confident to publicly express their culture or support Amazigh activism.[59]
The year 1994 was an important year for Amazigh activists. In May seven members of the Amazigh association Tilelli (freedom) were arrested while protesting for cultural rights.[60] They were all convicted and 3 of them received prison sentences while the rest received fines. While the group was in jail they were physically abused. This information quickly spread to the public and massive national outcry followed.[61] The human rights abuse even gained international attention.[62] The negative attention convinced the state to release the members that were still in jail and reduce the sentences of the entire group.[61]
The event convinced Hassan II that public opinion had changed in favour of the Amazigh. The result was a change in policy of the government.[46] The regime started by creating news bulletins on the national television network in Tamazight.[63] Afterwards the state increased the funding of regional radio programs on Amazigh culture, such as Radio Agadir. The concessions reached a symbolic height in August during a speech. In the speech Hassan II recognized the Amazigh culture as part of the Moroccan national identity.[61] Over the next 5 years this symbolism was repeated in other speeches.[64] The speech of 1994 caused many activists to seek out the state in the hope of realizing their demands.[65] In 1995 the king announced the intent to incorporate Tamazight in education, however when Hassan II died the program had still not been implemented.[46][66] It showed that the government still did not fully embrace the ethnic group. Another important sign that showed this was that in 1996 a law was passed to ban Amazigh names for children.[64]
The Berber gilding in Morocco shone after the speech given by the monarchMohamed VI in October 2001, inAjdir,Khenifra region. His words deflated the outburst of the Berber activists and intellectuals who, a year ago, had presented to the Palace a document referred to as the Berber Manifesto, which demanded the national and legal recognition of the Berber identity.[67]
On 17 October 2001, in the presence of his advisors, the members of the government, the leaders of the political parties and unions, and Berber activists, KingMohammed VI announced the royal decree (dahir) that established theRoyal Institute of Amazigh Culture (L'Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe, IRCAM). He defined Moroccan national identity as a composition of different cultural elements, underlined that theBerber language constituted a principal element of the national culture, and added that its promotion was a national responsibility.[68][69] The Royal Institute was charged with the promotion of Berber culture in education and media. While redefining Moroccan identity so as to incorporate Berberness. The institute has not been without criticism. The more radical activists see it as an attempts to buy off the movement and to control its actions. Meanwhile, the more moderate camp sees it as a chance to advance their cause from within the state.[70]
The establishment of IRCAM represented the first substantial change in the state's attitude towards its Berber population from a policy of subtle neglect to explicit recognition and support.[70] There was an attempt at creating a Berberist party in 2005, when Omar Louz, a long-time Berberist, former member of thePopular Movement and cofounder of theAmazigh World Congress, founded theAmazigh Moroccan Democratic Party. However, the party was banned by the Moroccan Interior Ministry on 25 November 2007 because its name infringes on the Moroccan law on political parties, which forbids parties explicitly based on ethnicity or religion.[71] It then tried to be legally reestablished under a new denomination (Izegzawen) to promote Berber identity, politicalsecularism, and Berber cultural rights, without success.
One other important achievement is the recognition of Tamazight as an official language in 2011 by King Mohamed the VI. The recognition came after the demonstrations of theArab Spring and theFebruary 20th movement (which contained many Amazigh).[72][73]
Beginning withAntonio Cubillo'sCanary Islands Independence Movement in the early 1970s, someCanarian nationalist organizations have supported Berberism to emphasize nativeGuanche cultural difference withSpanish culture and highlightSpanish colonialism.[74][75]Although the movements attracted sympathies among localCanarians, the violent terror actions that were used initially by Cubillo's movement brought about a general rejection.[76] Thus, even after Cubillo publicly renounced the armed struggle in August 1979, he failed to inspire much popular support.[77]
Currently some political organizations in theCanary Islands such as theNational Congress of the Canaries (CNC), thePopular Front of the Canary Islands (FREPIC-AWAÑAK),Alternativa Popular Canaria,Canarian Nationalist Party (PNC),[78]Nueva Canarias (NC),[79]Alternativa Popular Canaria (APC),[80]Alternativa Nacionalista Canaria (ANC),[81]Unidad del Pueblo (UP),Inekaren andAzarug espouse the pro-Berber cause in a higher or lower degree.[82] Some of the symbols and colors of the flags of the Canarian pro-independence organizations,[83] as well as the use of the word 'Taknara' (rejected by Cubillo himself) to refer to the archipelago, are seeking to represent Berber cultural roots.[84]
The Berberist movement grew out of the triumph of colonial capitalism in Kabylia and the ensuing migration of Kabyle workers to France and urban centers in Algeria. Both groups of migrants coalesced traditional village and tribal allegiances into a wider regional loyalty. What also lies at the root of Berberism is the "Berber policy" of colonial France designed to "pacify" Kabylia, a region where the last major uprisings took place in 1871. French colonialists used a number of ideologies to conquer and subjugate both country and indigenous populations.
Ben Nouaman maintains that the Berberist movement is secular, anti-Islamic, anti-Arabic and Francophile. He details the creation and objectives of the Berberist movement and Arab reactions to its creation, practices and tendencies. The ideological conflict between Arabs and Berbers was fed by French colonisation. Nouicer, an Algerian historian, claims that the French dedicated special financing to support the teaching of Tamazight and build schools for that purpose, while restricting the use of and teaching of Arabic. Teaching was a criminal act condemned under French law.
It is true, one must point out, that. Berberism is just as acculturationist and imitative of Western (French) culture as the Arabo-Islamic nationalism which it seeks to supplant. The Berberist movement in its 'anti-Arab' and extremist expression towards an exclusive and essentialist ideology similar to the 'Arabo-Islamic' dogma of 'authenticity' endorsed by Algeria's central authorities.
The political discourse of Berberist exiles was strongly "anti-Arab" and in favor of pan-Berber and the creation of a "Berber nation." For example, Muhend Aarav (Mhand Arab) Bessaoud, a militant nationalist of Kabyle origin and an officer in the military arm of the FLN during the liberation war, wrote an anti-Arabist book published in Paris in 1966. He was a strong opponent to the regime after independence and he actively collaborated in the foundation of the Berberist movement in the 1970s.
The Algerian state's linguistic project was naive in comparison and fraught with problems, the most serious of which being a Berberist (which often means anti-Arab if not anti-Muslim) opposition claiming its own dialect as a national language.
Like most modern ethnic-based identity movements, intellectuals have played a key role in articulating and disseminating the fundamental tenets of modern-day Berberism. These are mostly secular, foregrounding an ethno-linguistic identity without reference to, or even in opposition to Islam, and vocal militants often promote a crude anti-Arab position as well.
While these claims are legitimate and enjoy the support of all the Berber people, it is difficult to divorce them from Berberism, originally an anti-Arab and anti-Islamic francophone movement created by French colonialism in the 1920s.
The Berber cause should be kept outside the ideological battleground. At the moment, it is clearly being drawn into some camps which have their own ideological motivation for being anti-Muslim or anti-Arab.
Berber militants were charged with spreading hostile and intolerant anti-Arab and even anti-Islamic ideas (sponsored by Zionism and foreign countries).
An anti-Arab and anti-Islamic campaign was organised by these colons, formulating new representations of the Berber populations, notably of the 'good Kabyle Berber', Algeria's largest Berber-speaking population.
Media related toBerberism at Wikimedia Commons