| Benton v. Maryland | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued December 12, 1968 Reargued March 24, 1969 Decided June 23, 1969 | |
| Full case name | Benton v. Maryland |
| Citations | 395U.S.784 (more) 89 S. Ct. 2056; 23L. Ed. 2d 707 |
| Case history | |
| Prior | 1 Md. App. 647, 232A.2d 541, vacated and remanded |
| Holding | |
| The protections against double jeopardy in the Fifth Amendment are incorporated against the states through theDue Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Marshall, joined by Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan |
| Concurrence | White |
| Dissent | Harlan, joined by Stewart |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amend. V andXIV | |
This case overturned a previous ruling or rulings | |
| Palko v. Connecticut (1937) | |
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), is aSupreme Court of the United States decision concerningdouble jeopardy.Benton ruled that the Double Jeopardy Clause of theFifth Amendmentapplies to the states.[1] In doing so,Benton expressly overruledPalko v. Connecticut.[2]
John Dalmer Benton was tried on charges oflarceny andburglary. He wasacquitted of larceny butconvicted of burglary and wassentenced to 10 years in prison.
Shortly after Benton's conviction, theMaryland Court of Appeals had ruled inSchowgurow v. State that the portion of theMaryland Constitution that required alljurors toswear to theirbelief in the existence of God was itself unconstitutional. Since the jurors in Benton's case had been selected under the unconstitutional provision, he was given the option of demanding anew trial. Benton chose to undergo a new trial, but at the second trial, the state again charged Benton with larceny even though he had been acquitted of larceny in the first trial. The second trial concluded with Benton being found guilty of both burglary and larceny.
The case was argued December 12, 1968, reargued March 24, 1969, and decided June 23, 1969. It was reargued because the original argument for which the case was grantedcertiorari was limited to consideration of two issues: "(1) Is the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment? and (2) If so, was the petitioner 'twice put in jeopardy' in this case?" At the second trial Benton's sentence of 15 years on the burglary count and five years for the larceny was to run concurrently, and afteroral argument, as Justice Marshall wrote in his opinion of the court, "it became clear that the existence of a concurrent sentence on the burglary count might prevent the Court from reaching the double jeopardy issue, at least if we found that any error affected only petitioner's larceny conviction. The case was scheduled for reargument, 393 U. S. 994 (1968), limited to the following additional question not included in the original writ: "Does the 'concurrent sentence doctrine,' enunciated in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 105, and subsequent cases, have continuing validity in light of such decisions asGinsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633, n. 2,Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54,Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-238, andSibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 50-58?"
The Supreme Court ruled that the second trial constituted double jeopardy. There was no protection against double jeopardy in Maryland from itsstate constitution, but the Court ruled that theDue Process Clause of theFourteenth Amendment incorporated the Double Jeopardy Clause of theFifth Amendment and so made it enforceable against the states. As a result, the Court overturned the larceny conviction. JusticeThurgood Marshall, writing for the majority, wrote:
It is clear that petitioner's larceny conviction cannot stand once federal double jeopardy standards are applied. Petitioner was acquitted of larceny in his first trial. Because he decided to appeal his burglary conviction, he is forced to suffer retrial on the larceny count as well. As this Court held inGreen v. United States ... 'conditioning an appeal of one offense on a coerced surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense exacts a forfeiture in plain conflict with the constitutional bar against double jeopardy.'