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Battle of the North Cape

Coordinates:72°31′N28°15′E / 72.517°N 28.250°E /72.517; 28.250
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
1943 battle during the Arctic campaign of WWII

Battle of the North Cape
Part ofWorld War II

German battleshipScharnhorst,c. 1939
Date26 December 1943
Location72°31′N28°15′E / 72.517°N 28.250°E /72.517; 28.250
ResultAllied victory
Belligerents
 Germany
Commanders and leaders
Bruce FraserErich Bey 
Strength
Casualties and losses
  • 21 killed
  • 11 wounded
  • Duke of York slightly damaged
  • Norfolk damaged
  • Saumarez damaged
  • 1,932 killed
  • 36 captured
  • Scharnhorst sunk
Map

TheBattle of the North Cape was aSecond World War naval battle on 26 December 1943, part of theArctic campaign. TheGerman battleship Scharnhorst, sailed to implementOperation Ostfront an attack onArctic convoys carrying supplies from the westernAllies to the Soviet Union.Scharnhorst was brought to battle and sunk by the battleshipHMS Duke of York and its cruisers and destroyers. The Norwegian destroyerHNoMS Stord played a noticeable part in the sinking. The result increased the British advantage in major surface units. The battle was the last between British and German big-guncapital ships. It was also the penultimateengagement between battleships in history, the last being theBattle of Surigao Strait in October 1944 .[1]

Background

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Since August 1941, the western Allies had run convoys of ships from the United Kingdom and Iceland to the northern ports of the Soviet Union to provide essential supplies for their war effort on theEastern Front. These endured much hardship, frequently attacked by German naval and air forces stationed in occupied Norway. A key concern were GermanKriegsmarine battleships such asTirpitz andScharnhorst. Even the threat of these ships' presence was enough to cause disastrous consequences for the convoys, such asConvoy PQ 17 that was scattered and mostly sunk by German forces after false reports of theTirpitz sailing to intercept them. To ward off the threat of Germany's capital ships in the Arctic and to escort convoys with a high level of success, the Royal Navy had to outlay great assets.

Operation Ostfront was an attempt by the GermanKriegsmarine to intercept the expectedArctic convoys. In late December 1943, there was a Russia-boundconvoy JW 55B consisting of 19 cargo vessels under the command of the Commodore, retired Rear-AdmiralMaitland Boucher, accompanied by a close escort of two destroyers,HMCS Huron[2] andHMCS Haida,[3] among others, and an ocean escort of eight Home Fleet destroyers led byHMS Onslow. Also in the area was convoy RA 55A, returning to the United Kingdom from Russia, consisting of 22 cargo ships, accompanied by a close escort of two destroyers and four other vessels, and an ocean escort of six Home Fleet destroyers led byHMS Milne. It had arrived safely at Murmansk with its normal escorts and the additional protection by Force 1, commanded by Vice AdmiralRobert Burnett, consisting of the cruiserHMS Belfast, the flagship, and the cruisersHMS Norfolk andSheffield.[4]

Escorting the convoys to Russia was the responsibility of theHome Fleet and its commander-in-chief, AdmiralSir Bruce Fraser. Fraser wished to neutraliseScharnhorst, a major threat to the convoys, and planned a confrontation over Christmas 1943 in which convoy JW 55B would be used to draw out the enemy. Fraser expected and hoped thatScharnhorst would attempt to attack JW 55B. At a conference of the captains of the ships in his force Fraser described his plan to interceptScharnhorst at a position between the convoy and the enemy's Norwegian base. He would then approach the enemy to within 12,000 yd (11,000 m) in theArctic night, illuminateScharnhorst with astar shell, and open fire usingfire-control radar.

Convoy JW 55B had leftLoch Ewe on 20 December and was sighted two days later by aLuftwaffe aircraft which commenced shadowing. By 23 December it was clear to the British from intelligence reports that the convoy had been sighted and was being shadowed by enemy aircraft. Fraser then put to sea with Force 2 consisting of his flagship the battleshipHMS Duke of York, the cruiserHMS Jamaica andS-class destroyersHMS Savage,Scorpion,Saumarez, andHNoMS Stord of the exiledRoyal Norwegian Navy. Fraser was anxious not to discourageScharnhorst from leaving its base, so did not approach before it was necessary to do so. As JW 55B and its escorts approached the area of greatest danger on the same day, the 23rd, travelling slowly eastward 250 mi (220 nmi; 400 km) off the coast of north Norway, Burnett and Force 1 set out westward fromMurmansk while Fraser with Force 2 approached at moderate speed from the west. On 25 December,Scharnhorst (under Captain Fritz Hintze) with theNarvik-class destroyersZ29,Z30,Z33,Z34 andZ38 left Norway'sAltafjord under the overall command ofKonteradmiralErich Bey.Scharnhorst set course for the convoy's reported position as a south-westerly gale developed.[4]

Battle

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Contemporary map of the battle.
British battleshipDuke of York

Fraser received confirmation from the Admiralty in the early hours of 26 December thatScharnhorst was at sea and searching for convoy JW 55B. The stormy weather had resulted in the grounding of allLuftwaffe reconnaissance planes. With no ability to search for the British ships from the air and heavy seas hampering the movement of his ships, Rear Admiral Bey was unable to locate the convoy. Despite a German U-boat spotting the convoy and reporting its position, Bey was still not able to make contact with the British ships. Thinking he had overshot the enemy, he detached his destroyers and sent them southward to increase the search area, and the destroyers subsequently lost contact with their flagship. Fraser, preparing for the German attack, had diverted the returning empty convoy RA 55A northward, out of the area in which it was expected, and ordered JW 55B to reverse course to allow him to close. He later ordered four of the destroyers with RA 55A;Matchless,Musketeer,Opportune andVirago, to detach and join him.[5]

British heavy cruiserNorfolk

The unescortedScharnhorst encountered Burnett's Force 1 shortly after 09:00.Belfast was the first ship to obtain radar contact onScharnhorst, and the British cruisers rapidly closed the range. At a distance of nearly 13,000 yd (12,000 m), the British cruisers opened fire andScharnhorst responded with her own salvoes. While no hits were scored on the British ships, the German battleship was struck twice, with one shell destroying the forwardSeetakt radar controls and leavingScharnhorst virtually blind in a mounting snowstorm. Without radar, gunners aboard the German battleship were forced to aim at the enemy'smuzzle flashes. This was made more difficult because two of the British cruisers were using a new flashless propellant. Bey, believing he had engaged a battleship, turned south in an attempt to distance himself from the pursuers and perhaps draw them away from the convoy.[6]

Scharnhorst's superior speed allowed Bey to shake off his pursuers, after which he turned northeast in an attempt to circle round them and attack the undefended convoy. Burnett, instead of giving chase in sea conditions that were limiting his cruisers' speed to 24 kn (44 km/h; 28 mph), correctly guessed Bey's intentions and positioned Force 1 so as to protect the convoy. It was a decision that he had some personal doubts about as it would result in the cruisers losing contact withScharnhorst, and the decision was criticised by some of the British force's other officers but supported by Fraser. To Burnett's relief, shortly after noon,Scharnhorst was once again detected by the cruisers' radars as it attempted to approach the convoy. As fire was again exchanged,Scharnhorst scored two hits onNorfolk with 11-inch shells, disabling a turret and her radar.[6] Burnett's destroyers were also unable to get close enough toScharnhorst to launch a torpedo attack on the German ship. Following this exchange, Bey decided to return to port, while he ordered his destroyers to attack the convoy at a position reported by theU-boat earlier in the morning. The reported position was out of date, and the destroyers missed the convoy.[4]

Scharnhorst ran south for several hours, once again taking advantage of its superior speed. Burnett pursued, but bothSheffield andNorfolk suffered engine problems and were forced to drop back, leaving the outgunnedBelfast as the sole pursuer and dangerously exposed for a while. The lack of working radar aboardScharnhorst prevented the Germans from taking advantage of the situation, allowingBelfast to reacquire the German ship on her radar set. Bey was unaware that his ship was now sailing into a trap, with Admiral Fraser's main force steaming towardsScharnhorst's position and perfectly placed to intercept the fleeing German ship.[6] WithBelfast sending a constant stream of radio signals on theScharnhorst's position, the battleshipDuke of York battled through the rough seas to reach the German ship. Fraser sent his four escorting destroyers to press ahead and try to get into torpedo-launching positions. The main British force soon picked upScharnhorst on radar at 16:15 and were manoeuvring to bring a full broadside to bear. At 16:17Scharnhorst was detected byDuke of York'sType 273 radar at a range of 45,500 yd (41,600 m) and by 16:32Duke of York'sType 284 radar indicated that the range had closed to 29,700 yd (27,200 m).[7]

At 16:48,Belfast fired star shells to illuminateScharnhorst which was unprepared, with her turrets trained fore and aft, and clearly visible fromDuke of York.Duke of York opened fire at a range of 11,920 yd (10,900 m) and scored a hit on the first salvo, disabling[8]Scharnhorst's foremost turrets ("Anton" and "Bruno"), while another salvo destroyed the ship's aeroplane hangar.[9] Bey turned north, but was engaged by the cruisersNorfolk andBelfast, and turned east at a high speed of 31 kn (36 mph; 57 km/h).Scharnhorst was now being engaged on one side byDuke of York andJamaica while Burnett's cruisers engaged from the other side. The Germans took continuing heavy punishment fromDuke of York's 14-inch shells, and at 17:24 a desperate Bey signalled to Germany "am surrounded by heavy units".[6]

A close up view of the damage received byHMS Saumarez from an 11-inch shell fired byScharnhorst during the battle

Bey was able to put some more distance betweenScharnhorst and the British ships to increase his prospects of success. Two 11-inch shells from one of her salvoes damaged the foremast of theDuke of York, severing some of the wireless aerials and spraying the superstructure and the upper deck with splinters, and, more serious still, knocking over the radar aerial to the Type 284 gunnery control radar set.[10] These hits could not have been known to Bey, and Lt. Harold Bates, the electrical officer, despite the appalling conditions (a force 8 gale, darkness and substantial ice), climbed the mast, returned the aerial to the horizontal, and restarted the gyro-stabiliser so that within a few minutes the radar was working again. (After the battle, a myth arose that Bates had repaired the wires with his bare hands, leading to the nickname "Barehand" Bates.)[11]Scharnhorst's fortunes took a dramatic turn for the worse at 18:20 when a shell fired byDuke of York at extreme range pierced her lower armour deck and destroyed the No. 1 boiler room.[12]Scharnhorst's speed dropped to only 10 kn (12 mph; 19 km/h), and though immediate repair work allowed it to recover to 22 kn (25 mph; 41 km/h),[13]Scharnhorst was now vulnerable to torpedo attacks by the destroyers. Five minutes later, Bey sent his final radio message to the German naval command: "We will fight on until the last shell is fired."[14] At 18:50Scharnhorst turned to starboard to engage the destroyersSavage andSaumarez, but this allowedScorpion and the Norwegian destroyerStord to attack withtorpedoes, scoring two hits on the starboard side. AsScharnhorst continued to turn to avoid the torpedoes,Savage andSaumarez scored three hits on her port side.Saumarez was hit several times byScharnhorst's secondary armament and suffered 11 killed and 11 wounded.

Due to the torpedo hits,Scharnhorst's speed again fell to 10 kn (12 mph; 19 km/h), allowingDuke of York to rapidly close the range.[15] WithScharnhorst illuminated by star shells "hanging over her like a chandelier",[16]Duke of York andJamaica resumed fire, at a range of only 10,400 yd (9,500 m). At 19:15,Belfast joined in from the north. The British vessels subjected the German ship to a deluge of shells, and the cruisersJamaica andBelfast fired their remaining torpedoes at the slowing target.Scharnhorst's end came when the British destroyersOpportune,Virago,Musketeer andMatchless fired a further 19 torpedoes at her. Wracked with hits and unable to flee,Scharnhorst finally capsized and sank at 19:45 on 26 December, her propellers still turning, at an estimated position of72°16′N28°41′E / 72.267°N 28.683°E /72.267; 28.683. She was later identified and filmed at72°31′N28°15′E / 72.517°N 28.250°E /72.517; 28.250. Of her total complement of 1,968, only 36 were pulled from the frigid waters, 30 byScorpion and six byMatchless. Neither Rear Admiral Bey nor Captain Hintze were among those rescued (although both were reported seen in the water after the ship sank), nor were any other officers. British casualties, in contrast, were relatively light with only 21 killed and 11 wounded. The majority of British casualties occurred onSaumarez, with 11 of the destroyer's sailors being killed as the ship attempted to close withScharnhorst. HMSNorfolk suffered most of the remaining casualties with seven of her men being killed while the destroyerScorpion also had one of its men missing in action.[17] The Norwegian destroyerStord also suffered losses when the rough sea washed two men over board during the chase; one was washed back onto the ship by another wave, and wounded,[18] while the other was lost at sea.[19] Fraser ordered the force to proceed to Murmansk, making a signal to the Admiralty: "Scharnhorst sunk", to which the reply came: "Grand, well done."

Aftermath

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BlindfoldedScharnhorst survivors come ashore at Scapa Flow on 2 January 1944

Later in the evening of 26 December, Admiral Fraser briefed his officers on boardDuke of York: "Gentlemen, the battle againstScharnhorst has ended in victory for us. I hope that if any of you are ever called upon to lead a ship into action against an opponent many times superior, you will command your ship as gallantly asScharnhorst was commanded today".[20] After the battle Admiral Fraser sent the following message to theAdmiralty: "... Please convey to the C-in-C Norwegian Navy.Stord played a very daring role in the fight and I am very proud of her...". In an interview in theEvening News on 5 February 1944 the commanding officer of HMSDuke of York, CaptainGuy Russell, said: "... the Norwegian destroyerStord carried out the most daring attack of the whole action...".

The loss ofScharnhorst demonstrated the vital importance of radar in modern naval warfare. While the German battleship should have been able to outgun all of her opponents save the battleshipDuke of York, the early loss of radar-assisted fire control combined with the problem of inclement weather left her at a significant disadvantage.Scharnhorst was straddled by 31 of the 52 radar-fire-controlled salvoes fired byDuke of York.[21][page needed] In the aftermath of the battle, theKriegsmarine commander,GroßadmiralKarl Dönitz remarked, "Surface ships are no longer able to fight without effective radar equipment."[22]

The sinking of theScharnhorst was a major victory for the Allied war effort in the Arctic theatre and further altered the strategic balance at sea in their favour.[23] The Battle of the North Cape took place only a few months after the successfulOperation Source, which had severely damaged the German battleshipTirpitz with midget submarines as she lay at anchor in Norway. WithScharnhorst destroyed and Germany's other battleships out of service, the Allies were now for the first time in the war free from the threat of German battleships raiding their convoys in the Arctic and Atlantic. This would allow the Allies to reallocate their naval resources that had been previously tied up to counter the threat of the German 'fleet in being'. This would prove to be the final battle of battleships in European waters and was one of few major surface actions in the Second World War without air support.[1]

See also

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Footnotes

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  1. ^abHeogh 1986, p. 125.
  2. ^"A Canadian veteran remembers the "terrible" Murmansk Run". Barents Observer. 18 May 2015.Archived from the original on 12 October 2017. Retrieved30 October 2017.
  3. ^"Naval Legends: HMCS Haida | World of Warships". 28 June 2018.Archived from the original on 22 December 2021. Retrieved26 September 2019 – via YouTube.
  4. ^abcRoskill 1960, p. 321.
  5. ^Roskill 1960, pp. 321–322.
  6. ^abcdRoskill 1960, p. 322.
  7. ^Watts 1972, p. 46.
  8. ^MacIntyre 1967, p. 79.
  9. ^Watts 1972, p. 48.Turret "Bruno" was later brought back into action.
  10. ^Konstam 2020, p. 71.
  11. ^Kemp 1993, p. 179.
  12. ^Garzke & Dulin 1985, p. 172.
  13. ^Watts 1972, p. 50.
  14. ^Claasen 2001, p. 232.
  15. ^Watts 1972, p. 55.
  16. ^MacIntyre 1971, p. 437.
  17. ^"Family History - Royal Navy personnel killed and died 1914-2008".Naval-history.net.Archived from the original on 30 September 2019. Retrieved26 September 2019.
  18. ^"War veterans honored with russian medal".hordaland.no.Archived from the original on 21 May 2014. Retrieved11 August 2024.
  19. ^"Strinda Historical Association - People who died in the Navy 1940-1945".strindahistorielag.no.Archived from the original on 11 August 2024. Retrieved11 August 2024.
  20. ^Garzke & Dulin 1985, p. 176.
  21. ^MacIntyre 1971.
  22. ^Claasen 2001, p. 233.
  23. ^Roskill 1960, p. 324.

References

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  • Bredemeier, Heinrich (1997).Schlactschiff Scharnhorst [Battleship Scharnhorst] (in German). Hamburg: Koehlers Verlag. pp. 228–233.ISBN 3-7822-0592-8.
  • Claasen, Adam R. A. (2001).Hitler's Northern War: The Luftwaffe's Ill-Fated Campaign, 1940–1945. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. pp. 228–233.ISBN 978-0-7006-1050-1.
  • Garzke, William H.; Dulin, Robert O. (1985).Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.ISBN 978-0-87021-101-0.
  • Heogh, Richard (1986).The Longest Battle: The War at Sea 1939-1945. London, UK: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.ISBN 0-297-78983-X.
  • Kemp, Paul (1993).Convoy!. Casell.ISBN 0-304-35451-1.
  • Konstam, Angus (2020).North Cape 1943: The Sinking of the Scharnhorst. Bloomsbury Publisher.ISBN 9781472842091.
  • MacIntyre, Donald (1971).The Naval War against Hitler. Birkenhead: Willmer Bros.ISBN 0-7134-1172-4.
  • MacIntyre, Donald (September 1967). "Shipborne Radar".United States Naval Proceedings. 93/9/775. Annapolis, MD: William Miller.ISSN 0041-798X.
  • Roskill, Stephen W. (1960).The Offensive Part I, 1st June 1943 – 31st May 1944. History of the Second World War. United Kingdom Military Series. The War at Sea 1939–1945. Vol. III. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.OCLC 179730439.
  • Watts, Antony J. (1972).The Loss of the Scharnhorst. London: Allan.ISBN 0-7110-0141-3.

Further reading

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External links

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