| Battle of Wadi Akarit | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theTunisian campaign of theSecond World War | |||||||
 Gabès and the Tunisian Campaign. | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 New Zealand Free France Greece |  Italy Germany | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Bernard Montgomery | Giovanni Messe | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 3 divisions | 24,500 (estimated) | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 1,289 32 tanks | 7,000 prisoners | ||||||
 | |||||||
TheBattle of Wadi Akarit (Operation Scipio) was anAllied attack from 6 to 7 April 1943, to dislodgeAxis forces from positions along the Wadi Akarit inTunisia during theTunisia Campaign of theSecond World War. The Gabès Gap, north of the towns ofGabès andEl Hamma, is a passage between the sea and impassable salt marshes. The51st (Highland) Infantry Division breached the defences and held abridgehead, allowing the passage of their main force to roll up the Axis defences. After several determined counter-attacks, the Axis forces withdrew and theEighth Army, underGeneralBernard Montgomery, pursued towardTunis, until reaching Axis defensive positions atEnfidaville.
After theMareth Line in southern Tunisia had been outflanked inOperation Supercharge II, through theTebaga Gap, Axis forces had withdrawn to theWadi Akarit, north of Gabès. This position had been identified long before byErwin Rommel as a good defensive position with secure flanks and a short supply route toSicily. Rommel had wanted to withdraw there after theSecond Battle of El Alamein, as it was the best place to resist the Eighth Army and prolong the Axis presence in Africa. With the British held at Wadi Akarit, all available troops in Tunisia could repulse theFirst Army (nominally British but with American and French units under command) to the west, before dealing a similar blow to Montgomery.[1] The Gabès Gap was the last readily defensible position before the Eighth Army reachedSfax and formed a continuous front with the First Army advancing from the west.[2]
Wadi Akarit lay on an east–west line, from theMediterranean Sea in the east and the impassable salt marshes atSebkret el Hamma (the east end of theChott el Djerid) to the west. There were no flanks to turn as there had been at the Tebaga Gap and no opportunity to disperse the defenders by attacking at several points, as at the Second Battle of El Alamein; a frontal attack on prepared defences was unavoidable.[3] From the coast, the defence line followed Wadi Akarit for 5 miles (8.0 km), which was impassable to armour and then a wider section of drywadi, backed by a long hill, Djebel er Roumana, the last of a line of high ground that forms the northern boundary of the Chott. The approaches to Djebel er Roumana were obstructed by an anti-tank ditch and there were more defence works to the west, although the broken ground was a significant obstacle.[4]
Allied advance units had advanced throughOudref and reached the Wadi Akarit on 30 March but limited their activity to patrols and probing the Axis defences. Three divisions were chosen for the initial assault:51st (Highland) Infantry Division on the right,50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division in the centre and the4th Indian Infantry Division on the left.[5] In the week before the battle, British and American bombers began round-the-clock attacks on the defenders.[6]
Eighth Army had spent the previous week regrouping ready for the assault whilst the enemy was pounded almost continually by British and American air forces.
— Ford[6]
Instead of attacking between Jebel Fatnassa, a steep 800-foot (240 m) hill and the junction with the 50th (Northumbrian) Division,Major-GeneralFrancis Tuker, the 4th Indian Division commander, persuaded General Montgomery to attack Jebel Fatnassa using infantry trained inmountain warfare. Jebel Fatnassa was defended by the ItalianXXI Corps with troops of the80th Infantry DivisionLa Spezia, the101st Motorised DivisionTrieste and the German164thLeichte Afrika Division.[7] The Fatanassa feature was taken and the 4th6th Rajputana Rifles advanced as far as the plain behind the hills nearly 5 miles (8.0 km) beyond, taking2,000 prisoners. The 4th Indian Division was not able to exploit the success further, because the BritishX Corps was held up by German counter-attacks.[8]
The 50th (Northumbrian) Division met determined resistance from Italian marines, well dug in at Wadi Akarit and plentifully supplied with automatic weapons and grenades but the British pressed forward, despite high casualties among the 6th Battalion,Green Howards; two senior officers, six senior NCOs and junior officers and 118 other ranks were killed.[9][10]
When we were about ten yards away we had reached the top of the slit trench and we killed any of the survivors.... It was no time for pussy footing, we were intoxicated with rage and had to kill them to pay for our fallen pal.
— Bill Cheall[9]
The Green Howards took Point 85 and held it against counter-attacks. The 1/4th BattalionEssex Regiment of the 4th Indian Division made contact with the 50th (Northumbrian) Division on the right flank and helped them to cross an anti-tank ditch.[11]
The 51st (Highland) Division attacked with the152nd Brigade and seized the top of Roumana, then made a gap through the minefield and the anti tank ditch on the left flank. The153rd and154 brigades attacked the coastal defences and took2,000 prisoners.[12] A battalion of the 101st Motorised DivisionTrieste was destroyed and prisoners were taken from the90th LightAfrika Division, one regiment of which counter-attacked at9:00 a.m. and caused a short delay before being repulsed.[13]
Messe ordered the 164thLeichte Afrika Division to move from the position in the western hills to the centre and in the afternoon sent the15th Panzer Division to join with the 90th Light Division and counter-attack the 101st Motorised DivisionTrieste positions captured by the 51st (Highland) Division. The 15th Panzer Division arrived just before the British tried to exploit their success and counter-attacked. (The10th and21stPanzer divisions, which had been opposite the USII Corps during theBattle of El Guettar were also moved towards the British attack.)[14]
Three German counter-attacks were made during the afternoon, mainly against the 51st (Highland) Division on Djebel Roumana, against positions held by the 7th Battalion,Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who repulsed the attacks.[15] As dark fell, the Axis position had become untenable, the defenders having been severely depleted. Messe reported the situation toHans-Jürgen von Arnim;Albert Kesselring and the Italian command inRome urged the army group commander to continue the battle but Arnim ordered a retreat to theEnfidaville position, about 150 miles (240 km) to the north.[16]
The2nd New Zealand Division and1st Armoured Division began a pursuit across the coastal plain, which changed from semi-desert toolive groves which offered opportunities for ambush. There was little resistance until close to Enfidaville and about6,000 prisoners were taken, sometimes surprised to see Allied troops beyond the supposed front line and large amounts of material (including captured American supplies) were taken.[17]
At dawn on 7 April, it was found that the Axis forces had quietly withdrawn. The 15th Panzer Division had suffered many losses, the 164thLeichte Afrika Division had lost most of its weapons and vehicles and at least three Italian divisions had to be amalgamated into one unit; the 80th Infantry DivisionLa Spezia was reduced to1+1⁄2 infantry companies, the 101st Motorised DivisionTrieste to three weak battalions and the 16th Motorised DivisionPistoia and the 90th Light divisions had many casualties.[18] The strength of the1st Army had been 106,000 men, of whom 7,000 prisoners had been taken.[19] The Eighth Army had 1,289 casualties and lost 32 tanks.[20]
At El Guettar, the II US Corps operation to cut off Axis forces during the Wadi Akarit attack had been held up but the retirement from Wadi Akarit forced the Italians to withdraw. On 7 April, the Americans raced down the El Guettar–Gabès road, where it met advanced troops of the Eighth Army at5:00 p.m.[21] Alexander moved the II US Corps to the north, because the Eighth Army was better prepared for the final offensive.[22] The pursuit covered 140 miles (230 km) north of Wadi Akarit, Sfax andSousse were captured. The Axis troops fell back to defensible positions north and west of Enfidaville, 25 miles (40 km) south of Cape Bon. The mountains descend to the sea, with a narrow passage toHammamet. The area was held until the Axis surrender in North Africa and Eighth Army units were moved towardsMedjez el Bab opposite Tunis, for the final operations of the Tunisian Campaign.[23][24]
(Allied units taken from Playfair et al. (1966) unless indicated)[25]
(Axis units taken from Playfair et al. (1966) unless indicated)[28][a]
