| Battle of Rennell Island | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theGuadalcanal campaign of thePacific Theater ofWorld War II | |||||||
_low_in_the_water_on_30_January_1943.jpg) USS Chicago low in the water on the morning of 30 January 1943, from torpedo damage inflicted the night before | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 United States |  Japan | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| William Halsey Jr. Robert C. Giffen | Jinichi Kusaka[1] Rinosuke Ichimaru Seigō Yamagata | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 1aircraft carrier 2escort carriers 3heavy cruisers 3light cruisers 8destroyers 14fighters[2] | 43medium bombers[3] | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 1 heavy cruiser sunk 1 destroyer heavily damaged 85 killed[4] | 12 medium bombers destroyed 60–84 killed[5] | ||||||
TheBattle of Rennell Island (Japanese:レンネル島沖海戦,Hepburn:Renneru-shima oki kaisen) took place on 29–30 January 1943. It was the last majornaval engagement between theUnited States Navy and theImperial Japanese Navy during theGuadalcanal campaign of World War II. It occurred in theSouth Pacific betweenRennell Island andGuadalcanal in the southernSolomon Islands.
In the battle, Japanese land-basedtorpedo bombers, seeking to provide protection for theimpending evacuation of Japanese forces from Guadalcanal, made several attacks over two days on U.S. warships operating as atask force south of Rennell Island. In addition to approaching Guadalcanal with the objective of engaging any Japanese ships that might come into range, the U.S. task force was protecting anAllied transport ship convoy carrying replacement troops there.
As a result of the Japanese air attacks on the task force, theheavy cruiserUSS Chicago was sunk, thedestroyerUSS La Vallette was heavily damaged, and the rest of the U.S. task force was forced to retreat from the southern Solomons area. Partly because they turned back the U.S. task force in this battle, the Japanese successfully evacuated their remaining troops from Guadalcanal by 7 February 1943, leaving it in the hands of the Allies and ending the battle for the island.
On 7 August 1942, Allied forces, consisting primarily of U.S. troops, landed on Guadalcanal,Tulagi, and theFlorida Islands in theSolomon Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and to secure the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of isolating the major Japanese base atRabaul while also supporting the AlliedNew Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.[6]
The last major attempt by the Japanese to drive Allied forces from Guadalcanal and Tulagi was defeated during the decisiveNaval Battle of Guadalcanal in early November 1942. Thereafter, theJapanese Navy was able to deliver only subsistence supplies and a few replacement troops toJapanese Army forces on Guadalcanal. Because of the threat from Allied aircraft based atHenderson Field on Guadalcanal, plus nearby U.S.aircraft carriers, the Japanese delivered these supplies at night, usually bydestroyer orsubmarine, in operations the Allies called the "Tokyo Express."[7] These supplies and replacements were not enough to sustain Japanese troops on the island, who by 7 December 1942, were losing about 50 men each day from malnutrition, disease, and Allied ground or air attacks.[8] On 12 December 1942, the Japanese Navy proposed that Guadalcanal be abandoned. Despite initial opposition from Army leaders, who still hoped that Guadalcanal could eventually be retaken from the Allies, on 31 December 1942 theImperial General Headquarters, with approval from theEmperor, agreed to evacuate all Japanese forces from the island and establish a new line of defense for the Solomons onNew Georgia.[9]
The evacuation was code-namedOperation Ke (ケ号作戦), and was scheduled to begin on 14 January 1943.[10] An important element in the plan was anair superiority campaign starting 28 January 1943, to inhibit Allied aircraft or warships from disrupting the final stage of theKe operation, which was the actual evacuation of all Japanese troops from Guadalcanal.[11]
Allied forces misinterpreted theKe preparations as the beginning of another Japanese offensive to try to retake Guadalcanal.[12] At the same time, AdmiralWilliam Halsey Jr., the Allied theatre commander, was under pressure from his superiors to complete the replacement of the2nd Marine Regiment, which had been in combat on Guadalcanal since August, with freshU.S. Army troops.[13] Halsey hoped to take advantage of what he believed was an impending Japanese offensive to draw Japanese naval forces into a battle, while at the same time delivering the replacement Army troops to Guadalcanal.[14] On 29 January 1943, Halsey sent fivetask forces toward the southern Solomons area to cover the relief convoy and to engage any Japanese naval forces that came into range. These five task forces included twofleet carriers, twoescort carriers, threebattleships, 12cruisers, and 25 destroyers.[15]
Leading this array of task forces was Task Group 62.8, the troop convoy of four transports and four destroyers.[16] Ahead of the troop convoy, betweenRennell Island and Guadalcanal, was Rear AdmiralRobert C. Giffen's Task Force 18 (TF 18), a close support group ofheavy cruisersUSS Wichita,Chicago, andLouisville,light cruisersMontpelier,Cleveland, andColumbia; escort carriersChenango andSuwannee; and eight destroyers. Giffen commanded TF 18 fromWichita.[17] A fleet carrier task force—centered on the carrierEnterprise—steamed about 250 mi (220 nmi; 400 km) behind TG 62.8 and TF 18. The other fleet carrier and battleship task forces were about 150 mi (130 nmi; 240 km) farther back. Giffen, withWichita and the two escort carriers, had just arrived in the Pacific after participating inOperation Torch in theNorth African Campaign.[18] Also,Chicago had just arrived back in the South Pacific, after completing repairs from damage suffered during theBattle of Savo Island almost six months before.[17]
In addition to protecting the troop convoy, TF 18 was charged with rendezvousing with a force of four U.S. destroyers, stationed at Tulagi, at 21:00 on 29 January in order to conduct a sweep up "The Slot" through New Georgia Sound north of Guadalcanal the next day to screen the unloading of the troop transports at Guadalcanal.[3] The escort carriers, under Commodore Ben Wyatt, and travelling at 18 kn (21 mph; 33 km/h), were too slow to allow Giffen's force to make the scheduled rendezvous, so Giffen left the carriers behind with two destroyers at 14:00 and pushed on ahead at 24 kn (28 mph; 44 km/h).[19] Wary of the threat from Japanese submarines, which Allied intelligence indicated were likely in the area, Giffen arranged his cruisers and destroyers for anti-submarine defense, not expecting an air attack. The cruisers were aligned in two columns, spaced 2,500 yd (2,300 m) apart.Wichita,Chicago, andLouisville, in that order, to starboard, andMontpelier,Cleveland, andColumbia to port. The six destroyers were in a semicircle 2 mi (1.7 nmi; 3.2 km) ahead of the cruiser columns.[3]
Giffen's force was tracked by Japanese submarines, who reported its location and movement.[19][20] Around mid-afternoon, based on the submarine reports, 16Mitsubishi G4M Type 1bombers from the705 Air Group (Misawa Kōkūtai) and 16Mitsubishi G3M Type 96 bombers from the701 Air Group (Mihoro Kōkūtai) took off from Rabaul carrying torpedoes to attack Giffen's force. One G3M turned back with engine trouble, leaving 31 bombers in the attack force. The leader of the 705AG aircraft was LieutenantTomoo Nakamura and Lieutenant Commander Joji Hagai commanded the 701AG planes.[3][21]
At sunset, as TF 18 headed northwest 50 mi (43 nmi; 80 km) north of Rennell Island and 160 mi (140 nmi; 260 km) south of Guadalcanal, several of Giffen's ships detected unidentified aircraft onradar 60 mi (52 nmi; 97 km) west of their formation. Having previously insisted on absolute radio silence, Giffen gave no orders about what to do about the unidentified contacts, or any orders at all, for that matter.[17] With the setting of the sun, TF 18'scombat air patrol (CAP) from the two escort carriers returned to their ships for the night, leaving Giffen's ships without air cover.[22]
The radar contacts were the approaching Japanese torpedo bombers, who circled around to the south of TF 18 so that they could attack from the east, with the black backdrop of the eastern sky behind them. From this direction, the Japanese bombers were hidden by the night sky, but Giffen's ships were silhouetted against the twilight of the western horizon. The 705AG aircraft attacked first, beginning at 19:19. Nakamura's aircraft missed with all of their torpedoes and one was shot down byanti-aircraft fire from Giffen's ships.[23]
Believing the attack was over, Giffen ordered his ships to cease zigzagging and continue towards Guadalcanal on the same course and at the same speed. Meanwhile, a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft began droppingflares and floatlights to mark the course and speed of TF 18 for the impending attack by Hagai's bombers.[24]
At 19:38, 701AG attacked, hittingChicago with two torpedoes, causing heavy damage and bringing the cruiser to a dead stop. Another torpedo hitWichita but did not explode. Two bombers were shot down by anti-aircraft fire, including Hagai's; he was killed. At 20:08, Giffen ordered his ships to reverse direction, to slow to 15 kn (17 mph; 28 km/h) and to cease firing their anti-aircraft guns. The absence of muzzle flashes concealed the ships from the Japanese aircraft, who all departed the area by 23:35.[23][25] In pitch darkness,Louisville managed to take the crippledChicago under tow and slowly headed south, away from the battle area, escorted by the rest of TF 18.[26]
_tows_USS_Chicago_(CA-29)_during_the_Battle_of_Rennell_Island_on_30_January_1943.jpg)
Halsey immediately took steps to try to protectChicago, notifying the escort carriers to make sure they had a CAP in place at first light, ordering theEnterprise task force to approach and to augment the escort carrier CAP, and sending the fleettugNavajo to take over the tow fromLouisville, which was achieved at 08:00.[24] Between daybreak and 14:00, numerous Japanese scout aircraft approached TF 18. Although they were all chased away by the CAP, they observed and reported the position ofChicago. At 12:15, Lieutenant Commander Kazuo Nishioka led a force of 11 G4M torpedo bombers from the751 Air Group (Kanoya Kōkūtai), based atKavieng and staging throughBuka, New Guinea, launched to attack the damaged U.S. cruiser. An Australiancoastwatcher in the Solomon Islands warned the U.S. forces of the bombers and estimated their arrival time as 16:00. However, Halsey ordered the other cruisers to leaveChicago behind and head forEfate in theNew Hebrides. They departed at 15:00, leaving behind six destroyers to protectChicago andNavajo.[27]
At 15:40,Enterprise was 43 mi (37 nmi; 69 km) away fromChicago, with ten of herfighters forming a CAP over the damaged cruiser. At this time, four of the CAP fighters chased and shot down a scouting G4M bomber. At 15:54,Enterprise's radar detected the incoming bombers and launched 10 more fighters. The escort carriers, however, had difficulties in getting their aircraft launched and their aircraft did not attack the bombers until the engagement was over.[28]
At first, the Japanese bombers appeared to be trying to approach and attackEnterprise but turned towardChicago after sixEnterprise CAP fighters began to engage them. Four other CAP fighters chased the 751AG aircraft as they entered the anti-aircraft fire fromChicago's escorting destroyers. Two of the bombers were shot down before they could release their ordnance. Six more were shot down moments later, but not before they dropped their torpedoes.[29]
One torpedo hit the destroyerUSS La Vallette in her forward engine room, killing 22 of her crew and causing heavy damage.Chicago was hit by four torpedoes, one forward of the bridge and three others in her engineering spaces. Captain Ralph O. Davis ofChicago ordered the ship to be abandoned, and she sank, stern first, 20 minutes later.Navajo and the escorting destroyers rescued 1,049 survivors fromChicago,[30] but 62 of her crew died.[31] A final attack force of Japanese torpedo bombers failed to find the remaining U.S. ships.Navajo tookLa Vallette under tow, and all of the remaining ships of TF 18 made port at Espiritu Santo without further incident.[32]
The Japanese widely publicized the results of the engagement, claiming to have sunk a battleship and three cruisers.[33] The U.S. on the other hand, tried to conceal the loss ofChicago from the public for some time, with AdmiralChester Nimitz threatening to "shoot" any of his staff who leaked the loss ofChicago to the press. Halsey and Nimitz blamed Giffen for the defeat and wrote this in Giffen's official performance report for the period.[34] The defeat and resulting recriminations did not affect Giffen's career; he continued to lead Allied battleship and cruiser task forces in the Pacific until 1944 and was later promoted tovice admiral.[35]
With Japanese aircraft engaged with TF 18, the Allied transports completed their mission of replacing the remaining marines on Guadalcanal over the last two days in January 1943. During this time, the other Allied task forces, including the two fleet carrier task forces, took station in theCoral Sea, in anticipation of an expected Japanese offensive in the southern Solomons.[33]
With TF 18 forced to retreat, very few Allied naval forces were left in the immediate Guadalcanal area, allowing the Japanese to retrieve most of their remaining ground forces from Guadalcanal over three nights between 2 and 7 February 1943. This left any remaining Allied ships in the area highly exposed to Japanese attacks. Because the Allies believed that the Japanese were not evacuating, but actually sending in more reinforcements, U.S. destroyers and troop transports were proceeding with normal amphibious operations in western Guadalcanal despite losing the heavy firepower of TF 18. The destroyerDe Haven was sunk by Japanese planes with 167 men killed and the destroyerNicholas was slightly damaged and suffered two killed. ThreePT boats,PT-37,PT-111, andPT-123, were sunk by Japanese forceson the same day as the sinking ofDe Haven with the loss of 15 sailors.[36][37] The Allies were not aware of the Japanese withdrawal until it was over,[10] but the evacuation of 11,000 starving troops and the loss of one cruiser became a footnote to the securing of Henderson Field and Guadalcanal, which provided the air support springboard to successfully complete the Solomon Islands campaign, a major turning point in the Pacific War.[38]
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