| Battle of Mindoro | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of thePacific Theater ofWorld War II | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 10,000 American troops | 1,200 Japanese troops | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 151 killed (18 Army, 133 Navy) 271 wounded (81 Army, 190 Navy) | ~200 dead 15 captured 375 wounded | ||||||
TheBattle of Mindoro (Filipino:Labanan sa Mindoro) took place duringWorld War II between the forces of theUnited States andJapan, inMindoro Island in the centralPhilippines, from 13–16 December 1944, during thePhilippines Campaign.
Troops of theUnited States Army, supported by theUnited States Navy andU.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF), made anamphibious landing on Mindoro and defeatedImperial Japanese Army (IJA) forces there. There was no significant opposition from theImperial Japanese Navy, nor from the Japanese Army and Navy Air Forces, except forkamikaze (suicide) attacks on American ships.
The Japanese force in Mindoro was not large, and was eliminated in three days. The Army was assisted in the campaign byguerrillas from the local Filipino population.
The U.S. captured Mindoro to establish airfields there, which would be infighter range ofLingayen Gulf in northernLuzon Island, where thenext major amphibious invasion of the Philippines was planned. Ground-based fighter cover was necessary for this operation. Mindoro could also serve as the advanced base for U.S. troops going to fight in Luzon.
For the invasion of Luzon, U.S. forces needed air bases that were closer to the northern island thanLeyte Island. Mindoro was the logical choice. Located not too far south of Luzon, and being about one-half the size ofNew Jersey, Mindoro is mostly covered by hills and mountains, with a few narrow plains along its seacoasts. Almost daily rains and high humidity, caused by clouds moving up from the south trapped by the high peaks made it a breeding ground formalaria and other tropical diseases. However, Japanese defenses on the island were minimal.
The airfields recently constructed at Leyte were deemed unreliable, so potential additional airfields in Mindoro appealed toGeneral of the ArmyDouglas MacArthur, the commanding general of this theater of operations.
But taking Mindoro was a daunting task. The northeastern coast was best suited for amphibious landings, but was exposed to what was left of Japanese air power on Luzon, so this was ruled out. The town ofSan Jose on the southwest corner, though nearer toMangarin Bay, Mindoro's best deepwater port, was the spot chosen by his planners.
TheU.S. Sixth Army underLieutenant GeneralWalter Krueger was assigned to seize Mindoro. Krueger, in turn, gave the task toMajor General Roscoe B. Woodruff's24th Infantry Division, with the19th Infantry and the separate503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team ofLieutenant Colonel George M. Jones to spearhead the assault.
The main threat to the amphibious assault vessels and supporting warships was land-based Japanese kamikaze planes. The Japanese had begun the deadly practice as a desperate measure during the final stages of theBattle of Leyte and widened its use by December 1944.
In early December, USAAF and USN airplanes attacked Japanese air bases to destroy potential kamikazes before they could attack. U.S. aviators claimed more than 700 planes destroyed on the ground.
On 13 December 1944, two days before the scheduled assault on the island, kamikazes struck at the Navy task force bringing the landing force. Thelight cruiserUSS Nashville was hit by a kamikaze, killing over 130 men and wounding another 190.Brigadier General William C. Dunkel, the commander of the landing force, was among the injured. Other kamikaze attacks damaged twotank landing ships (LSTs, for Landing Ship, Tank) and disabled several other ships.

On 15 December, the invasion of Mindoro began. The clear weather allowed the full use of American air and naval power, including six escort carriers, three battleships, six cruisers and many other support warships against light Japanese resistance. Because of inadequate airstrip facilities in Leyte, the 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team came ashore inMangarin Bay with the landing force instead of jumping. Destroyers provided fire support for the troop landings and anti-aircraft protection for the ships in the transport area. Two LSTs struck by kamikazes were abandoned and sank.
In one heroic action, thedestroyerUSS Moale (DD-693), under the command of Commander Walter M. Foster, went alongside the burningLST-738 (which was loaded with aviation fuel and ordnance) to rescue crewmembers. Several explosions aboardLST-738 caused damage toMoale as she pulled away. Some pieces of shrapnel were two feet square and they put four holes inMoale's hull. Gunner's Mate Ed Marsh reported that a one-gallon jar ofvaseline from the LST's cargo splattered on one barrel of his twin 40 mmBofors AA gun, providing unwelcome lubrication.Moale suffered one fatality and thirteen wounded. In addition,Moale also rescued 88 survivors.
There were 1,000 defending Japanese soldiers stationed on Mindoro. Another 200 survivors from ships sunk off Mindoro en route to Leyte were also present. The defenders were outnumbered and outgunned. Some 300 Japanese manning an air raid warning station at the island's northern end put up a stiff fight against a company of the 503rd, but except for mopping up, the island was secure within 48 hours.
The defending Japanese forces on Mindoro suffered some 200 killed and 375 wounded. The survivors fled into the jungles, where they lurked till the end of the war. The 24th Infantry Division lost 18 men and had 81 wounded.
By the end of the first day, Army engineers were at work preparing airfields. Two were completed in thirteen days. These airfields allowed U.S. aircraft to provide direct support for the Luzon invasion. The Mindoro airfields were also used by long-range bombers, especially USAAFB-24 Liberators, to attack Japanese shipping fromFormosa to Luzon. These bombers also operated over theSouth China Sea, and combined with the Navy to blockade shipping between Japan and south-east Asia.