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Battle of Baekgang

Coordinates:36°00′00″N126°40′01″E / 36.0000°N 126.6670°E /36.0000; 126.6670
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
663 battle of Goguryeo–Tang War
Battle of Baekgang
Part ofGoguryeo–Tang War
Date27–28 August 663 (of the Lunar calendar)
4–5 October 663 (of the Julian calendar)
Location
Baengma River (Lower reaches of theGeum River),Korea
ResultTang andSilla victory
Belligerents
Tang China
Silla Korea
Yamato Japan
Paekche Korea
Commanders and leaders


Strength
  • 13,000 Tang troops
  • 170 Tang ships
  • Unknown number of Silla support cavalry
  • 42,000 Yamato troops
  • 800 Yamato ships
  • Unknown number of Paekche restoration troops
Casualties and losses
Unknown, but much lighter than opposing forces400 ships; 10,000 troops; 1,000 horses
‹ ThetemplateInfobox Chinese/Korean is beingconsidered for deletion. ›
Battle of Baekgang
Hangul
백강 전투
Hanja
白江戰鬪
Revised RomanizationBaekgang jeontu
McCune–ReischauerPaekkang chŏnt'u
Campaigns and battles of theGoguryeo–Tang War
First campaign, 644–648

Intermission, 648–658

Second campaign, 658–662

Baekje Campaign & Japanese intervention

Third campaign, 666–668

TheBattle of Baekgang (Korean백강 전투;Hanja白江戰鬪) orBattle of Baekgang-gu, also known as theBattle of Hakusukinoe (Japanese:白村江の戦い,romanizedHakusuki-no-e no Tatakai / Hakusonkō no Tatakai)[a] inJapan, and as theBattle of Baijiangkou (Chinese:白江口之战;Chinese:白江口之戰;pinyin:Bāijiāngkǒu Zhīzhàn) inChina, was a battle betweenPaekche restoration forces and their ally,Yamato Japan, against the allied forces ofSilla andTang China. The battle took place in theBaengma River (Korean백마강;Hanja白馬江) or Baek River (Korean: 백강; Hanja: 白江), which is the lower reach of theGeum River inJeollabuk-do province, Korea. The Silla-Tang forces won a decisive victory, compelling Yamato Japan to withdraw completely from Korean affairs and crushing the Paekche restoration movement.[1]

Background

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In the first half of the first millennium CE, theKorean Peninsula was divided into three kingdoms –Paekche,Silla, andGoguryeo. These three kingdoms were rivals, and had engaged each other in wars for dominion over the peninsula for several centuries. In addition to the inter-Korean rivalry, Goguryeo had been engaged in frequent warfare with the ChineseSui and Tang dynasties. While the three Korean kingdoms were not always military enemies, their alliances frequently shifted. For example, Silla and Paekche were allied against Goguryeo from the late 420s to the early 550s. Later in 553, Silla betrayed its former ally and wrested control of the entireHan River basin from Paekche.[2]

In 660, the coalition troops of Silla andTang China attacked Paekche, resulting in the annexation of Paekche by Tang China.[3][4] A Buddhist monkDochim (도침;道琛) and the former Paekche generalBuyeo Boksin rose to try to restore their country. They welcomed the Paekche princeBuyeo Pung back from Japan to serve as king, with Juryu (주류, 周留, in modernSeocheon County,South Chungcheong) as their headquarters.[1] Although Paekche restoration forces had some initial success against Tang and Silla troops, by 662, they were in serious trouble, and their area of control was confined to the fortress of Churyu and its immediate vicinity. As their situation went from bad to worse, Buyeo Pung had Gwisil Boksin killed for fear of insurrection.[5]

Paekche and Yamato Japan had been long-standing allies by this time, and their royal houses were related,[6] so Paekche royals resided in Japan throughout the centuries as a token of goodwill to ask for favors from Japan, but also acting as spies (but only when Paekche was eliminated were Princes Buyeo Pung and his brother, and no other Paekche royal prior, came to be listed in theNihon Shoki as "hostages." Of note, there have also been cases ofNihon Shoki deliberately recording visiting foreign diplomats as "hostages" such asKing Muyeol of Silla[7] who entered and left Japan for a diplomatic mission with China without being waylain, in but a span of few months). The fall of Paekche in 660 came as a terrible shock to the Yamato royal court.Empress Saimei said:

"We learn that in ancient times there have been cases of troops being asked for and assistance requested: to render help in emergencies, and to restore that which has been interrupted, is a manifestation of ordinary principles of right. The Land of Paekche, in its extremity, has come to us and placed itself in our hands. Our resolution in this matter is unshakable. We will give separate orders to our generals to advance at the same time by a hundred routes."[8]

Crown Prince Naka no Ōe, later to becomeEmperor Tenji, and Empress Saimei decided to dispatch an expeditionary force led byAbe no Hirafu to help the besieged Paekche restoration forces. The troops were largely local strongmen (kuni no miyatsuko) drawn from mostly western Honshū, Shikoku, and especially Kyūshū, although some warriors were also from Kantō and northeastern Japan.[9]

Empress Saimei moved the capital to the Asakura temporary palace near the shipyards in northernKyūshū to personally oversee the military campaign. As the main fleet set sail, theMan'yōshū records Empress Saimei composing awaka:[10]

熟田津に 船乗りせむと 月待てば 潮もかなひぬ 今は漕ぎ出でな
Nikita tsu ni funanori semu to tsuki mateba, shio mo kanahinu: ima ha kogiide na.
I was going to wait for the moon to rise before embarking from Nikita bay, but the tide is up: go, row out now!

Around August 661, 5,000 soldiers, 170 ships, and the general Abe no Hirafu all arrived in territory controlled by the Paekche restoration forces. Additional Japanese reinforcements, including 27,000 soldiers led byKamitsukeno no Kimi Wakako (上毛野君稚子) and 10,000 soldiers led byIohara no Kimi (廬原君), arrived in 662.[11]

The battle

[edit]

In 663, Paekche restoration forces and the Yamato navy convened in southern Paekche with the intent to relieve the capital of the Paekche restoration movement in Churyu, which was under siege by Silla forces. The Yamato navy was to ferry ground troops to Churyu via the Geum River and lift the siege. However, Tang also sent 7,000 soldiers and 170 ships to blockade Yamato reinforcements from relieving the capital.[12]

On 4 October 663 (27 August by the lunar calendar), the advance guard of the Japanese fleet tried to force their way, but using common doctrine and strong formation, the Tang ships held firm, repelling the attacks and displaying greater tactical sophistication than the Japanese fleet.[13]

On 5 October 663 (28 August by the lunar calendar), the second day of the battle, the arrival of Japanese reinforcements made their forces several times larger than the Tang fleet arrayed against them. However, the river was narrow enough where the Tang fleet could cover their front and protect their flanks as long as they maintained their ordered battle lines. The Japanese were confident in their numerical superiority and attacked the Tang fleet at least three times throughout the entire day, but the Tang fought off each attack. Towards the end of the day, the Japanese became exhausted, and their fleet lost cohesion through their repeated attempts to break through Tang lines. Sensing the right moment, the Tang fleet moved reserves and counterattacked, breaking both the left and right flanks of the Japanese, enveloping their fleet and crowding in the ships so they could not move or retreat. Many Japanese fell into the water and drowned, and many of their ships were burned and sunk. The Yamato generalEchi no Takutsu was killed after striking down more than a dozen men in close quarters combat.[14]

Japanese, Korean, and Chinese sources all point to heavy Japanese casualties. According to theNihon Shoki, 400 Japanese ships were lost in the battle.[15]

Retrospective discussions

[edit]

In recent times, many scholars are puzzled over the reasons behind Yamato going through much effort to protect Paekche, a foreign kingdom. Author Bruce Batten remarked:

"Why the Japanese should have thrown themselves with such vigor into a war that, if not quite an intramural Korean conflict, had at least no direct bearing on Japanese territory, is not easy to answer."[16]

The battle, as well as all the preparation behind it, is believed to illustrate (aside from any other documentation) the strong ties between Yamato Japan and Paekche of Korea transcending the usual interstate military, political, or economic interests. Linguist J. Marshall Unger suggests, based on linguistic evidence, that Paekche could represent a remnant proto-Japanese or para-Japanese community, which had stayed behind on the Korean peninsula after theYayoi migrations, but still maintained a conscious connection to the Yayoi people and their descendants.[17] Regardless, the phenomenon of eliterefugees fleeing political conflict on the peninsula and settling in Yamato had been recurring in waves since at least the 5th century.[18]

Another theory is that Yamato wanted to keep an ally on the Korean peninsula that was on good terms with them. Following theSilla–Goguryeo and Kaya–Paekche–Wa War and with the fall ofKaya confederacy to Silla in 562, the Yamato Kingship must have faced a dilemma on whether or not to participate in a full-scale war, something Japan never experienced prior to the Battle of Baekgang. However, since Silla-Wa hostility was at its all-time high and with Kaya gone, Yamato ultimately decided to aide Paekche, their last remaining ally in East Asia, and reinstateBuyeo Pung, the last heir of Paekche as king. However, this preparation did not come easy within Japan. Prior to theIsshi incident, the most powerful clan, theSoga clan, was reluctant about participating in foreign battles, and it was only when Prince Naka no Ōe (Emperor Tenji) and Nakatomi no Kamatari (Fujiwara no Kamatari) assassinatedSoga no Iruka and came into power did Japan become proactive in aiding Paekche. In fact, due to much overlap within historical records, recent analysis theorize that Buyeo Pung and Fujiwara no Kamatari were thesame individual, hence why they were heavily invested in reviving Paekche despite all odds.[19][20][21]

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^According to theNihon Kokugo Daijiten and theKōjien,suki means "village" in "old/ancient Korean". The entry forsuki in theKokugo Daijiten uses the spelling inkatakana,スキ, to reflect the fact that it's a foreign word.

References

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  1. ^abMaldonado, Álvaro (2019). "A study of Baekje-Yamato relation changes with a focus on Baekje's capitals".Asiademica.13: 119.
  2. ^"Three-Kingdom Era: Koreans bring culture to Japan". 25 November 2011.
  3. ^Ebrey, Walthall & Palais 2006, 106–107.
  4. ^Seth, Michael J. (2020).A concise history of Korea : from antiquity to the present. Lanham.ISBN 978-1-5381-2897-8.OCLC 1104409379.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  5. ^Sajima, Naoko; Tachikawa, Kyoichi (2009).Japanese Sea Power: A Maritime Nation's Struggle for Identity(PDF). Foundations on International Thinking on Sea Power. p. 105.
  6. ^Sajima, Naoko; Tachikawa, Kyoichi (2009).Japanese Sea Power: A Maritime Nation's Struggle for Identity(PDF). Foundations on International Thinking on Sea Power. p. 3.
  7. ^나, 행주 (October 2006)."왜 왕권과 백제ㆍ신라의 「質」 : 왜국의 「質」 導入ㆍ受容의 의미 :왜국의 「質」 導入ㆍ受容의 의미".동양사학회 학술대회 발표논문집 (in Korean):269–292.
  8. ^Batten, Bruce (2006).Gateway to Japan: Hakata in War and Peace, 500–1300. University of Hawaii Press. p. 21.
  9. ^Batten, Bruce (2006).Gateway to Japan: Hakata in War and Peace, 500–1300. University of Hawaii Press. p. 21.
  10. ^Kudō Rikio, Ōtani Masao, Satake Akihiro, Yamada Hideo, Yamazaki Yoshiyuki, ed. SNKBT:Man'yōshū, 4 vols. Iwanami, 1999–2003, book 1 poem 8.
  11. ^Sajima, Naoko; Tachikawa, Kyoichi (2009).Japanese Sea Power: A Maritime Nation's Struggle for Identity(PDF). Foundations on International Thinking on Sea Power. p. 105.
  12. ^Sajima, Naoko; Tachikawa, Kyoichi (2009).Japanese Sea Power: A Maritime Nation's Struggle for Identity(PDF). Foundations on International Thinking on Sea Power. p. 16.
  13. ^Sajima, Naoko; Tachikawa, Kyoichi (2009).Japanese Sea Power: A Maritime Nation's Struggle for Identity(PDF). Foundations on International Thinking on Sea Power. p. 16.
  14. ^Sajima, Naoko; Tachikawa, Kyoichi (2009).Japanese Sea Power: A Maritime Nation's Struggle for Identity(PDF). Foundations on International Thinking on Sea Power. p. 105.
  15. ^Sajima, Naoko; Tachikawa, Kyoichi (2009).Japanese Sea Power: A Maritime Nation's Struggle for Identity(PDF). Foundations on International Thinking on Sea Power. p. 16.
  16. ^Batten, Bruce L. (1986)."Foreign Threat and Domestic Reform: The Emergence of the Ritsuryō State".Monumenta Nipponica.41 (2): 212.doi:10.2307/2384665.JSTOR 2384665.
  17. ^The Role of Contact in the Origins of the Japanese and Korean Languages, University of Hawai'i Press, 2009
  18. ^Herman Ooms,Imperial Politics and Symbolics in Ancient Japan, University of Hawai'i Press, 2009
  19. ^Seki, Yuji (15 August 2019)."対半島外交失敗の歴史で見える「中臣鎌足」の正体 百済王子が中大兄皇子をそそのかし邪魔になった蘇我氏を滅ぼした".日本ビジネスプレス (in Japanese).
  20. ^"【萌える日本史講座】蘇我氏のルーツは渡来人?".産経新聞:産経ニュース (in Japanese). 7 August 2018.
  21. ^"日本書紀を語る講演会 第7回 乙巳の変 封印されたその真実|なら記紀・万葉".www3.pref.nara.jp.

Bibliography

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  • Aston, W. G. (translated by) 1972 Nihongi: Chronicles of Japan from the Earliest Times to A.D. 697. Published by Charles E. Tuttle Company: Tokyo, Japan.
  • Ebrey, Patricia Buckley; Walthall, Anne; Palais, James B. (2006),East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political History, Boston:Houghton Mifflin,ISBN 978-0-618-13384-0
  • Farris, William Wayne 1995Heavenly Warriors: The Evolution of Japan's Military, 500–1300 AD. United States: Published by The Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge.
  • Jamieson, John Charles.The Samguk sagi and the Unification Wars. Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1969.

External links

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36°00′00″N126°40′01″E / 36.0000°N 126.6670°E /36.0000; 126.6670

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