| Raid on Bardia | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theSiege of Tobruk, during theSecond World War | |||||||
 British commandos in landing craft | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 United Kingdom Australia |  Germany Italy | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Lieutenant Colonel Colvin | Erwin Rommel | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| A Battalion Layforce RTR Troop HMS Glengyle HMS Coventry HMAS Stuart HMAS Voyager HMAS Waterhen HMS Triumph | |||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 1 killed 70 captured | 1 artillery battery destroyed 1 supply dump destroyed | ||||||
TheRaid onBardia was an amphibious landing at the coastal town ofBardia inNorth Africa byBritish Commandos over the night of 19/20 April 1941 during theSecond World War. The raid was carried out byNo. 7 Commando, also known as A BattalionLayforce, together with a small detachment from theRoyal Tank Regiment; the raiders were supported by five navy ships and a submarine. The raid destroyed an Italianartillery battery and a supply dump. It was deemed a success despite the loss of 71 men. The more lasting strategic effect of the raid was the diversion of a German armoured brigade from the front line to provide rear area security.
In January 1941, anad hoc force of 2,000 commandos, known as Layforce, was sent fromGreat Britain to take part in raiding operations in theMediterranean. Under the command ofColonelRobert Laycock, the force comprisedNo. 7 Commando,No. 8 (Guards) Commando,No. 11 (Scottish) Commando, atroop fromNo. 3 Commando and theFolbot section. On their arrival in Egypt in March 1941, the force was strengthened by the amalgamatedNo. 50 Commando andNo. 52 Commando. To disguise from theAxis powers that a large force of commandos had arrived in the theatre, 7, 8, 11 and 50/52 Commandos were camouflaged as A, B, C and D Battalions Layforce.[1][2]
In early 1941,Operation Compass was a big British and Commonwealth victory against the Italian troops in Egypt and Cyrenaica, the eastern province of Libya. GeneralArchibald Wavell ordered a large part ofXIII Corps (Lieutenant-GeneralRichard O'Connor) toGreece as part ofOperation Lustre in theBattle of Greece.Adolf Hitler responded to the Italian disaster by orderingUnternehmen Sonnenblume (Operation Sunflower), the dispatchof the newAfrika Korps to North Africa as reinforcements for the Italians, to prevent their collapse. TheAfrika Korps had fresh troops, better equipment and tanks and a charismatic commander,Erwin Rommel. When Rommel arrived in North Africa along with six Italian divisions, including theTrento andAriete, his orders were to remain on the defensive.[3][4]
In the first Italo-German offensive, the Axis force raided and quickly defeated the British atEl Agheila on 24 March, exploited the success and by 15 April had pushed the British back to the Libyan–Egyptian border atSollum andbesieged Tobruk. Lieutenant-GeneralPhilip Neame, the new commander of XIII Corps (re-named HQ Cyrenaica Command after the transfers to Greece), O'Connor, and Major-GeneralMichael Gambier-Parry, commander of the2nd Armoured Division, were captured. The Western Desert Force HQ took over under Lieutenant-GeneralNoel Beresford-Peirse, who was recalled from East Africa. An armoured brigade group of the 2nd Armoured Division had been used to provide forces for the Greek campaign and the rest of the division in Cyrenaica had lost most of its tanks to mechanical breakdowns and fuel shortage. Several Axis attempts to seize Tobruk failed and a front line was formed on the Egyptian border.[5] In April 1941, the plans for the deployment of Layforce were changed; their first operation would be a raid onBardia.[6]
The Bardia raid was planned for the night of 19/20 April for A Battalion, Layforce to disrupt Axis lines of communication and inflict as much damage as possible to installations and equipment. The plan called for the simultaneous landing of A Battalion and a troop of tanks from theRoyal Tank Regiment on four beaches byLanding Craft Assault (LCA). The landing force would be transported to the area byHMS Glengyle, escorted by theanti-aircraft cruiserHMS Coventry and thedestroyersHMAS Stuart,Voyager andWaterhen. Off Bardia, one LCA could not be lowered and there were difficulties releasing the others. When they did get going and approached the beaches, they were expecting to see lights to guide them in, which were to have been set up by the Folbot section but the Folbot section had been delayeden route whenfriendly fire causedHMS Triumph, thesubmarine transporting them, to submerge and take evasive action.[7]
The main landing force, running late, were landed on the wrong beaches. The landings were unopposed and the commandos made their way inland to destroy their objectives. Bardia was found to be empty of Italian or German forces and faulty intelligence resulted in some objectives being missed, as they were not where they were supposed to be or they did not exist. The commandos managed to destroy an Italian supply dump and an Italian coastalartillery battery before returning to their LCAs to re-embark. The raid would have passed without loss to the commandos but for the death of a commando officer by friendly fire from an over-alert commando and the capture of 70 men who, after getting lost, ended up on the wrong evacuation beach and becameprisoners of war.[8]
Despite the limited results and seventy casualties, the raid on Bardia had considerable strategic effect. The Germans diverted the greater part of an armoured brigade from Sollum, where it was beginning to exert heavy pressure on theWestern Desert Force and kept it for some time guarding rear areas. Layforce was less fortunate, being used as normal infantry, a role for which it was neither equipped nor trained. As one of the few reserve forces available, it was sent to take part in theBattle of Crete; fighting as the rearguard they lost 600 men before being evacuated.[9] C Battalion was not sent to Crete but instead toLebanon, where they lost over 120 men fighting in thebattle of the Litani River. The steady drain of manpower without the replacement system of normalBritish Army battalions meant that Layforce was left in an ineffective state and was disbanded in July 1941.[10]
The authorEvelyn Waugh, who took part in the raid, related in an article he wrote forLife Magazine in November 1941, that the Germans "sent a strong detachment of tanks and armoured cars to repel the imagined invasion". In his diary published in 1976, a very different picture emerged of incompetence by the commandos, against virtually no opposition.[11]
