| Arctic convoys of World War II | |||||||
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 View from the cruiserHMS Sheffield as she sails on convoy duty through the waters of theArctic Ocean. In the background are merchant ships of the convoy. | |||||||
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TheArctic convoys of World War II were oceangoingconvoys which sailed from the United Kingdom, Iceland, and North America to northern ports in theSoviet Union, most toArkhangelsk (Archangel) orMurmansk in Russia. There were 78 convoys, Convoy PQ 1 to Convoy PQ 18 (outbound), Convoy QP 1 to Convoy QP 15 (inbound), Convoy JW 51 – Convoy JW 67 (outbound) and Convoy RA 51 to Convoy RA 67 (inbound). Convoys ran from August 1941 to May 1945, sailing via theAtlantic andArctic oceans, with periods of no sailings during several months in 1942 and in the summers of 1943 and 1944.
About 1,400 merchant ships delivered supplies to the Soviet Union under theAnglo-Soviet Agreement and USLend-Lease programme, mainly escorted by ships of theRoyal Navy with support from theRoyal Canadian Navy, and theU.S. Navy. Eighty-five merchant vessels and 16 British warships (two cruisers, six destroyers, eight other escort ships) were lost. TheKriegsmarine lost a number of vessels including theScharnhorst-class battleshipScharnhorst, three destroyers, 30U-boats and theLuftwaffe suffered the loss of many aircraft. The convoys demonstrated the Western Allied commitment to helping the Soviet Union, prior to the opening of a second front and tied up a substantial part of Germany's naval and air forces.[1]
During theFirst World War (1914–1918), Central Powers blockades halted traffic betweenImperial Russia and itsAllies via the Black Sea and the Baltic. The Tsarist authorities sped up development of an ice-free port atRomanov-on-Murman (now Murmansk); supplies arriving via the Arctic came too little and too late to prevent the Allied collapse on theEastern Front.[2] The operation of Murmansk proved and established the feasibility of an Arctic supply-line for militarymateriel.[citation needed]
The Soviet authorities had claimed that the unloading capacity of Arkhangelsk was 300,000 long tons (300,000 t), Vladivostok 140,000 long tons (140,000 t) and 60,000 long tons (61,000 t) by thePersian Gulf route. When surveyed by British and US technicians, the capacity of the ten berths at Arkhangelsk was assessed as 90,000 long tons (91,000 t) and the same from Murmansk from its eight berths.[3] By late 1941, the convoy system used in the Atlantic had been established on the Arctic run; aconvoy commodore ensured that the ships' masters and signals officers attended a briefing before sailing to make arrangements for the management of the convoy, which sailed in a formation of long rows of short columns. The commodore was usually a retired naval officer, aboard a ship identified by a white pendant with a blue cross. The commodore was assisted by a Naval signals party of four men, who used lamps, semaphore flags and telescopes to pass signals, coded from books carried in a bag, weighted to be dumped overboard. In large convoys, the commodore was assisted by vice- and rear-commodores to direct the speed, course and zig-zagging of the merchant ships and liaise with the escort commander.[4][a]
FollowingConvoy PQ 16 and the disaster toConvoy PQ 17 in July 1942, Arctic convoys were postponed for nine weeks and much of the Home Fleet was detached to the Mediterranean forOperation Pedestal, aMalta convoy. During the lull, AdmiralJohn Tovey concluded that the Home Fleet had been of no great protection to convoys beyond Bear Island, midway betweenSpitsbergen and theNorth Cape. Tovey would oversee the operation fromScapa Flow, where the fleet was linked to the Admiralty by landline, immune to variations in wireless reception. The next convoy should be accompanied by sufficient protection against surface attack; the longer-range destroyers of the Home Fleet could be used to augment the close escort force of anti-submarine and anti-aircraft ships, to confront a sortie by German ships with the threat of a massed destroyer torpedo attack. The practice of meeting homeward-bound QP convoys near Bear Island was dispensed with and Convoy QP 14 was to wait until Convoy PQ 18 was near its destination, despite the longer journey being more demanding of crews, fuel and equipment. The newescort carrierHMS Avenger (Commander Anthony Colthurst) had arrived from the United States and was added to the escort force.[6]
The Soviet leaders needed to replace the colossal losses of military equipment lost after the German invasion, especially when Soviet war industries were being moved out of the war zone and emphasised tank and aircraft deliveries. Machine tools, steel and aluminium was needed to replace indigenous resources lost in the invasion. The pressure on the civilian sector of the economy needed to be limited by food deliveries. The Soviets wanted to concentrate the resources that remained on items that the Soviet war economy that had the greatest comparative advantage over the German economy. Aluminium imports allowed aircraft production to a far greater extent than would have been possible using local sources and tank production was emphasised at the expense of lorries and food supplies were squeezed by reliance on what could be obtained from lend–lease. At the Moscow Conference, it was acknowledged that 1.5 million tons of shipping was needed to transport the supplies of the First Protocol and that Soviet sources could provide less than 10 per cent of the carrying capacity.[7]
The British and Americans accepted that the onus was on them to find most of the shipping, despite their commitments in other theatres. The Prime Minister,Winston Churchill, made a commitment, to send a convoy to the Arctic ports of the USSR every ten days and to deliver1,200 tanks a month from July 1942 to January 1943, followed by2,000 tanks and another3,600 aircraft more than already promised.[8] In November, the US president,Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered AdmiralEmory Land of the US Maritime Commission and then the head of theWar Shipping Administration that deliveries to Russia should only be limited by 'insurmountable difficulties'.[7] The first convoy was due at Murmansk around 12 October and the next convoy was to depart Iceland on 22 October. A motley of British, Allied and neutral shipping loaded with military stores and raw materials for the Soviet war effort would be assembled atHvalfjörður in Iceland, convenient for ships from both sides of the Atlantic.[9]
From Convoy Dervish to Convoy PQ 11 the supplies to the USSR were mostly from Britain, in British ships defended by the Royal Navy. A fighter force that could defend Murmansk was delivered and protected the Arctic ports and railways into the hinterland. British supplied aircraft and tanks reinforced the Russian defences of Leningrad and Moscow from December 1941. The tanks and aircraft did not save Moscow but were important in the Soviet counter-offensive. TheLuftwaffe was by then reduced to 600 operational aircraft on the Eastern Front, to an extent a consequence ofLuftflotte 2 being sent to the Mediterranean. British-supplied tanks and aircraft helped the Soviet counter-offensive force back the Germans further than might have been possible and in January and February deliveries of tanks and aircraft allowed the Russians to have a margin of safety should the Germans attempt to counter-attack.[10]
Post-war criticism of the quality of British supplies contradicted the praise offered to theForeign Secretary,Anthony Eden, in Moscow in December, of the performance ofHurricane fighters andValentine tanks;Matilda tanks were admittedly inferior in snow but were expected to operate better in the summer. Deliveries helped to improve the long-term potential of the Soviet war economy, the 17,000 long tons (17,000 t) of aluminium sent from Britain was the equivalent to the capacity lost in the Soviet Union in the six months from October 1941 and 10,000 long tons (10,000 t) each of copper and rubber were generally useful to the Soviet economy, especially after rubber from Malaya was cut off by theMalayan campaign (8 December 1941 – 15 February 1942).Radar andAsdic improved Russian anti-aircraft defences and the naval protection of the Arctic ports. In the first winter of the war in Russia the British helped to tide the USSR over at some cost to British grand strategy; the 700 fighters and about 500 tanks sent to Russia in 1941, could have made a substantial difference to British fortunes in theMiddle East andFar East. The Germans laid plans to stop the Arctic convoys in 1942.[11]
The BritishGovernment Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based atBletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers andtraffic analysts. By June 1941, the GermanEnigma machine Home Waters (Heimish) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the olderHeimish (Hydra from 1942, Dolphin to the British). By mid-1941, BritishY-stations were able to receive and readLuftwaffeW/T transmissions and give advance warning ofLuftwaffe operations.[12]
In 1941, navalHeadache personnel, with receivers to eavesdrop onLuftwaffe wireless transmissions, were embarked on warships and from May 1942, ships gained RAF Ycomputor parties, which sailed with cruiser admirals in command of convoy escorts, to interpretLuftwaffe W/T signals intercepted by the Headaches. The Admiralty sent details ofLuftwaffe wireless frequencies, call signs and the daily local codes to the computors, which combined with their knowledge ofLuftwaffe procedures, could glean fairly accurate details of German reconnaissance sorties. Sometimes computors predicted attacks twenty minutes before they were detected by radar.[12]
The rival GermanBeobachtungsdienst (B-Dienst, Observation Service) of theKriegsmarineMarinenachrichtendienst (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to helpKriegsmarine ships elude British forces and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941,B-Dienst read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones.[13]B-Dienst had broken Naval Cypher No 3 in February 1942 and by March was reading up to 80 per cent of the traffic, which continued until 15 December 1943. By coincidence, the British lost access to theShark cypher and had no information to send in Cypher No 3 which might compromise Ultra.[14]
After the first convoy,Operation Dervish in August 1941,Arctic convoys were labelledPQ (outbound) andQP (return), ran from September 1941 to September 1942. The convoys ran twice monthly, with interruptions in the summer of 1942, when the series was suspended after the disaster of Convoy PQ 17 and again in the autumn after the final convoy of the series,Convoy PQ 18, because of the long daylight hours and the preparations forOperation Torch in November 1942. When the convoys resumed they were calledJW (outbound) andRA (return) and ran from December 1942 until the end of the war, with interruptions in the summer of 1943 and in the summer of 1944.[15] Convoys began at Iceland (usually from Hvalfjörður) and sailed pastJan Mayen Island and Bear Island to Arkhangelsk when the ice permitted in the summer months, shifting south as the pack ice increased and terminating at Murmansk, a warm water port. From February 1942 Arctic convoys assembled and sailed fromLoch Ewe in Scotland.[16]
Outbound and the reciprocal return convoys ran simultaneously with a close escort to the destination, then making the return journey with unloaded ships. A cruiser covering force sailed near the outbound convoy as far as Bear Island then transferred as the outbound and returning convoy crossed. A heavycovering force of aircraft carriers, battleships with cruiser and destroyer escorts guarded against sorties by German heavy ships likeTirpitz.[17]
The route skirtedoccupied Norway to the Soviet ports, limited by Polar ice from extensive diversions to the north and risked interception byLuftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft, bombers and torpedo-bombers, U-boats and ships. Storms, gales, fog, snow and hail were common, hiding the ships but also dispersing convoys, increasing the risk of interception. Currents and layers of cold and warm water, reduced the effectiveness ofAsdic and ice could cause severe damage to ships and put them at risk of capsize. The difficulty of ships in convoy of keeping station and of navigating in storms and constant darkness in winter was replaced by the danger of constant air and sea attacks in the permanent daylight of theMidnight sun (22 May to 22 July at Murmansk).[18]
Convoys had a standard formation of short columns, number 1 to the left in the direction of travel. Each position in the column was numbered; 11 was the first ship in column 1 and 12 was the second ship in the column; 21 was the first ship in column 2.[19]
| column 1 | column 2 | column 3 | column 4 |
|---|---|---|---|
11 Lancastrian Prince | 21 Alchiba | 31 Llanstephan Castle | 41 Trehata |
12 Esneh | 22 | 32 Alma-Ata | 42 New Westminster City |
13 Rodina | 23 | 33 Sevzaples | 43 Budyonny |
14 — | 24 Mossovet | 34 — | 44 — |
15 — | 25 Sukhona | 35 — | 45 — |
The Arctic route was the shortest, most direct and quickest route for supply convoys to the USSR, though it was also the most dangerous. Some 3,964,000 long tons (4,028,000 t) of goods were sent via the Arctic of which 93 per cent arrived. The route constituted about 23 per cent of the total aid to the USSR during the war. ThePersian Corridor was the longest and only all-weather route to the USSR but was not operational until mid-1942. Thereafter it saw the passage of 4,160,000 tons of goods, 27 per cent of the total.[21]
ThePacific Route opened in late summer 1941 but theAttack on Pearl Harbor (7 December 1941) meant that only Soviet-flagged ships could be used on the route. As Japan and the USSR observed a strict neutrality towards each other, only non-military goods could be carried.[22] A total of 8,244,000 tons of goods went via the Pacific, 50 per cent of the total.[23] A branch of the Pacific Route began carrying goods through theBering Strait to the Soviet Arctic coast in June 1942. From July to September, small Soviet convoys assembled inProvidence Bay, Siberia to be escorted north through the Bering Strait and west along theNorthern Sea Route byicebreakers and Lend-LeaseAdmirable-classminesweepers. A total of 452,393 tons passed through the Bering Strait aboard 120 ships.[24] Part of this northern tonnage was fuel for the airfields along theAlaska–Siberia Air Route. Provisions for the airfields were transferred to river vessels and barges in the estuaries of large Siberian rivers.[25] Remaining ships continued westwards and were the only seaborne cargoes to reach Archangel while the Arctic convoys were suspended during the summers of 1943 and 1944.[24]
Cargo included tanks, fighter aircraft, fuel, ammunition, raw materials and food.[26] The early convoys in particular delivered armoured vehicles and Hurricanes to make up for shortages in the Soviet Union.[27] The Arctic convoys caused changes to naval dispositions on both sides, which arguably had a big impact on events in other theatres of war. As a result of early raids by destroyers on German coastal shipping and theOperation Archery the Commando raid on Vågsøy, Hitler was led to believe that the British intended to invade Norway again. This, together with the obvious need to stop convoy supplies reaching the Soviet Union, caused him to direct that heavier ships, especially the battleshipTirpitz, be sent to Norway. TheChannel Dash in early 1942 was partly undertaken for this reason.[28]
Tirpitz and the other German capital ships tied down British resources which might have been better used elsewhere, for example combating the Japanese in the Indian Ocean. The success ofGneisenau andScharnhorst inOperation Berlin during early 1941 had demonstrated the potential German threat. As the Allies closed theMid-Atlantic gap, the air gap over the North Atlantic with very long range aircraft,Huff-Duff (radio triangulation equipment) improved airbornecentimetric radar was introduced and convoys receivedescort carrier protection, the scope for commerce raiding diminished. To defend Norway German ships and U-boats were withdrawn from Atlantic bases and became responsible for offensive operations against the Arctic convoys[29]
Aside from an abortive attempt to interdictConvoy PQ 12 in March 1942 and a raid on Spitzbergen in September 1943,Tirpitz spent most of theSecond World War inNorwegianfjords. She was penned in and repeatedly attacked until she was finally sunk inTromsø fjord on 12 November 1944 by theRoyal Air Force (RAF). OtherKriegsmarine capital ships, likeGneisenau, either never reached Norway, were chased off or were sunk (Scharnhorst). The failed attack onConvoy JW 51B, theBattle of the Barents Sea, where a strong German naval force failed to defeat a British escort of cruisers and destroyers, infuriated Hitler and led to the strategic change from surface raiders to submarines. Some capital ships were physically dismantled and armament used in coastal defences.[30] TheSiege of Leningrad was one of important destinations for supplies from the convoys. From 1941, food and munitions were delivered from British convoys to Leningrad by trains, barges and trucks. Many supplies were destroyed by theLuftwaffe and byNaval Detachment K en route. Convoys continued to deliver food in 1942, 1943 and 1944.[31]
Ultra signals intelligence gained from the GermanEnigma code-breakers atBletchley Park played an important part in the success of the convoys. German documents related to the Enigma coding machine were captured during the commando raids of Operation Archery andOperation Anklet (27 December 1941). The documents enabled the British to read messages on the home waters naval Enigma used by surface ships and U-boats in the Arctic (Heimisch, laterHydra network; Dolphin to the British) for the rest of the war.[32] In January 1942 reinforcements ofLuftwaffe bombers, torpedo-bombers and long range reconnaissance aircraft were sent to northern Norway and new command organisations established at Stavanger and Kirkenes, followed byFliegerführer Lofoten who was charged with the defence of Norway and offensive operations against Allied convoys.[33]
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The three U-boats in the area were increased to nine and another six were distributed between Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik to reconnoitre and oppose Allied landings. In May, all the U-boats came under Arctic Command and on 23 May,Admiral Scheer andPrinz Eugen joinedTirpitz at Trondheim, followed byAdmiral Hipper; by 26 MayLützow had arrived at Narvik. The British read these moves from Ultra intercepts and traffic analysis from the RAFY-station atRAF Cheadle, whicheavesdropped on communications betweenLuftwaffe aircraft and ground stations. The reinforcement of the U-boat force in the Arctic to 12 in March and 21 in August (the real number was later found to be 23) was followed, along with the transfer orders to the large German ships.[33]
Ultra led to the ambush ofPrinz Eugen by the submarineHMS Trident off Trondheim on 23 February.Prinz Eugen was badly damaged by a torpedo and the Admiralty was informed of the hit by an Enigma intercept the next day.[33] The information could not always be acted upon because much of it was obtained at short notice but the intelligence did give the Royal Navy time to prepare. The interception and sinking ofScharnhorst byHMS Duke of York was greatly assisted by ULTRA intercepts.[34]
The 1955 novelHMS Ulysses by Scottish writerAlistair MacLean, and the 1967 novelThe Captain by Dutch authorJan de Hartog, are set during the Arctic convoys.[35] The 1958 novelThe Midnight Sea by Ian Cameron (pseudonym ofDonald G. Payne, who was a Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm pilot during the convoys) is set during an Arctic Convoy on the fictitious escort carrier HMSViper in late 1944.[36] The 1967 Norwegian historic accountOne in Ten Had to Die (Hver tiende mann måtte dø) byPer Hansson is based on the experience of the Norwegian sailor Leif Heimstad and other members of the Norwegian merchant fleet during the second World War.[37] The 1973 Russian novelRequiem for Convoy PQ-17 (Реквием каравану PQ-17) byValentin Pikul depicts the mission of Convoy PQ 17.[38]
The Dervish convoy assembled atHvalfjörður and sailed on 21 August 1941.[39] It arrived at its destination,Arkhangelsk, ten days later. The convoy consisted of sixmerchant ships:Lancastrian Prince,New Westminster City,Esneh,Trehata, the elderlyLlanstephan Castle, thefleet oilerAldersdale and the Dutch freighterAlchiba. TheCommodore was Captain J. C. K. DowdingRNR. The escorts comprised thedestroyersHMS Electra,Active andImpulsive, theHalcyon-classminesweepersHMS Halcyon,Salamander andHarrier and theanti-submarine trawlersHMS Hamlet,Macbeth andOphelia. As evidence of Churchill's astute mastery of propaganda, on boardLlanstephan Castle were two journalists and the artistFelix Topolski.[40]
On 30 May 1942, the surviving ships of Convoy PQ 16 arrived, most ships to Murmansk and eight to Archangel; the convoy was such a success in war stores delivered that the Germans made greater efforts against the following convoys. Thecrane ships from Convoy PQ 16 includingSS Empire Elgar stayed at Arkhangelsk andMolotovsk (now Severodvinsk) unloading ships for over 14 months.[41]
In July 1942, Convoy PQ 17 suffered theworst losses of any Allied convoy in theSecond World War. Under attack from German aircraft and U-boats, the convoy was ordered to scatter following reports that a battle group, which included the battleshipTirpitz, had sailed to intercept the convoy (the German group did not leave port until the following day, and was soon ordered to return). Eleven of the 35merchant ships in the convoy managed to run the gauntlet ofU-boats and German bombers.[42]
In December 1942, German surface forces, including theheavy cruiserAdmiral Hipper andpocket battleshipLützow, sailed to interceptConvoy JW 51B. The German force was driven off by a combined force ofcruisers anddestroyers.[43]
In December 1943, Convoy JW 55B was attacked by the battleshipScharnhorst. Two British forces were in the area. In the Battle of the North Cape,Scharnhorst encountered British cruisers and was then sunk byHMS Duke of York and her escorts in a night action, before it could return to port. German destroyers missed the convoy, which had been diverted north, based on intelligence from theNorwegian resistance movement.[44]
The town ofPoolewe on the north-west coast of Scotland was an important port in this route. Today there are several plaques commemorating this work. A brewery commemorates the Arctic Convoys by a special brand beer namedArctic Convoy IPA.[citation needed]
| Out | Notes | Home | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dervish | Hvalfjörður–Arkhangelsk, 21–31 August | ||
| PQ 1 | Hvalfjörður–Arkhangelsk, 29 September – 11 October | QP 1 | Arkhangelsk–Scapa Flow, 28 September – 10 October |
| PQ 2 | Liverpool–Arkhangelsk, 13–30 October | ||
| PQ 3 | Hvalfjörður–Arkhangelsk, 9–22 November | QP 2 | Arkhangelsk–Kirkwall, 3–17 November |
| PQ 4 | Hvalfjörður–Arkhangelsk, 17–28 November | ||
| PQ 5 | Hvalfjörður–Arkhangelsk, 27 November – 13 December | QP 3 | Arkhangelsk – dispersed, 27 November – 3 December |
| PQ 6 | Hvalfjörður–Murmansk, 8–20 December 1941 | QP 6 | Murmansk–Scapa Flow, 24–28 January 1942 |
| PQ 7a | Hvalfjörður–Murmansk, 26 December – 12 January 1942 | QP 4 | Arkhangelsk – dispersed, 29 December – 9 January |
| PQ 7b | Hvalfjörður–Murmansk, 31 December – 11 January |
| Out | Notes | Home | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| PQ 8 | Hvalfjörður–Arkhangelsk, 8–17 January | QP 5 | Murmansk – dispersed, 13–19 January |
| PQ 9/PQ 10 | Reykjavík–Murmansk, 1–10 February | QP 6 | Murmansk–dispersed, 24–28 January |
| PQ 11 | Loch Ewe–Kirkwall–Murmansk, 7–14–22 February | QP 7 | Murmansk – dispersed, 12–15 February |
| PQ 12 | Reykjavík–Murmansk, 1–12 March | QP 8 | Murmansk–Reykjavík, 1–11 March |
| PQ 13 | Reykjavík–Murmansk, 20–31 March | QP 9 | Kola Inlet–Reykjavík, 21 March – 3 April |
| PQ 14 | Oban–Murmansk, 26 March – 19 April | QP 10 | Kola Inlet–Reykjavík, 10–21 April |
| PQ 15 | Oban–Murmansk, 10 April – 5 May | QP 11 | Murmansk–Reykjavík, 28 April – 7 May |
| PQ 16 | Reykjavík–Murmansk, 21–30 May | QP 12 | Kola Inlet–Reykjavík, 21–29 May |
| PQ 17 | Reykjavik – dispersed, 27 June – 4 July | QP 13 | Arkhangelsk–Reykjavík, 26 June – 7 July |
| August sailing postponed | August sailing postponed | ||
| PQ 18 | Loch Ewe–Arkhangelsk, 2–21 September[b] | QP 14 | Arkhangelsk–Loch Ewe 13–26 September |
| (PQ cycle terminated) | QP 15 | Kola–Loch Ewe, 17–30 November | |
| FB | Independent sailings, 29 October – 9 November | QP convoys ended | |
| JW 51A | Liverpool–Kola, 15–25 December | ||
| JW 51B | Liverpool–Kola, 22 December – 4 January 1943,Barents Sea | RA 51 | Kola–Loch Ewe, 30 December – 11 January |
| Out | Notes | Home | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| JW 52 | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 17–27 January | RA 52 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 29 January – 9 February |
| JW 53 | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 15–27 February | RA 53 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 1–14 March |
| Convoys postponed | Convoys postponed | ||
| JW 54A | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 15–24 November | RA 54A | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 1–14 November |
| JW 54B | Liverpool–Arkhangelsk, 22 November – 3 December | RA 54B | Arkhangelsk–Loch Ewe, 26 November – 9 December |
| JW 55A | Liverpool–Arkhangelsk, 12–22 December | RA 55A | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 22 December – 1 January 1944 |
| JW 55B | Liverpool–Archangel, 20–30 December[c] | RA 55B | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 31 December – 8 January |
| Out | Notes | Home | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| JW 56A | Liverpool–Archangel, 12–28 January | ||
| JW 56B | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 22 January – 1 February | RA 56 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 3–11 February |
| JW 57 | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 20–28 February | RA 57 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 2–10 March |
| JW 58 | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 27 March – 4 April | RA 58 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 7–14 April |
| Escorts only to Murmansk | RA 59 | Kola Inlet– Loch Ewe, 28 April – 6 May | |
| Convoys postponed | Convoys postponed | ||
| JW 59 | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 15–25 August | RA 59A | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 28 August – 5 September |
| JW 60 | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 15–23 September | RA 60 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 28 September – 5 October |
| JW 61 | Liverpool–Kola Inlet, 20 October – 28 October | RA 61 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 2–9 November |
| JW 61A | Liverpool–Murmansk, 31 October – 6 November | RA 61A | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 11–17 November |
| JW 62 | Loch Ewe–Kola Inlet, 29 November – 7 December | RA 62 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 10–19 December |
| JW 63 | Loch Ewe–Kola Inlet, 30 December – 8 January 1945 | RA 63 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 11–21 January |
| Out | Notes | Home | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| JW 64 | Clyde–Kola Inlet, 3–15 February | RA 64 | Kola Inlet−Loch Ewe, 17–28 February |
| JW 65 | Clyde–Kola Inlet, 11–21 March | RA 65 | Kola Inlet–Loch Ewe, 23 March – 1 April |
| JW 66 | Clyde–Kola Inlet, 16–25 April | RA 66 | Kola Inlet–Clyde, 29 April – 8 May |
| JW 67 | Clyde–Kola Inlet, 12–20 May | RA 67 | Kola Inlet–Clyde, 23–30 May |
| Convoy sailings ceased at midnight 28/29 May 1945 | Convoy sailings ceased at midnight 28/29 May 1945 |
| Convoys | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 | Total | Tonnage |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PQ/JW | 8 | 13 | 6 | 9 | 4 | 40 | |
| Ships | 64 | 256 | 112 | 284 | 95 | 811 | 5,200,000 sent |
| QP/RA | 4 | 13 | 6 | 9 | 5 | 37 | |
| Ships | 49 | 188 | 93 | 249 | 136 | 715 | 4,500,000 arr. |
| Route | GT sent | % Arr | % lost |
|---|---|---|---|
| North Russia | 3,964,000 | 93 | 7 |
| Persian Gulf | 4,160,000 | 96 | 4 |
| Black Sea | 681,000 | 99 | 1 |
| Far East | 8,244,000 | 99 | 1 |
| Soviet Arctic | 452,000 | 100 | 0 |
| Arr. UK–USSR | 343,000 | — | — |
| Totals | 17,501,000 | 16,587,000 | 488,000 |
| Sunk | UK | US | Panama | USSR | Holland | Norway | Total | GRT |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Outbound | 21 | 29 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 58 | 353,366 |
| Return | 6 | 15 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 29 | 178,317 |
| Independent | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 42,002 |
| Port | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 27,278 |
| Other | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4,872 |
| Total | 35 | 47 | 7 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 100 | 604,837 |
| Cause | Out | Ret'n | Escorted |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ship | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| U-boat | 23 | 18 | 24 |
| Bomb | 17 | 2 | 9 |
| Torpedo | 17 | 1 | 17 |
| Mine | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| Foundered | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Wrecked | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 58 | 29 | 56 |
| Cause | Straggler | Out | Ret'n |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ship | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| U-boat | 17 | 4 | 0 |
| Bomb | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| Torpedo | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Mine | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Foundered | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Wrecked | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Total | 31 | 5 | 1 |
| Name | Flag | Type | Sunk |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scharnhorst |  Kriegsmarine | Scharnhorst-classbattleship | 26 December 1943,Home Fleet |
| Friedrich Eckoldt | Kriegsmarine | Type 1934A-classdestroyer | 31 December 1942,Sheffield |
| Bremse | Kriegsmarine | Training ship | 7 September 1941,Nigeria,Aurora |
| Ulm | Kriegsmarine | minelayer | 25 August 1942,Marne,Martin,Onslaught |
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