| Arab Rescue Army جيش الإنقاذ العربي Jayš al-ʾInqāḏ al-ʿArabiyy | |
|---|---|
.svg) Emblem of the Arab Liberation Army | |
| Leaders | Fawzi al-Qawuqji |
| Dates of operation | 1947–1949 |
| Merged into |  IDF Minorities Unit (defectors) |
| Headquarters | Damascus,Syria |
| Active regions |  Mandatory Palestine |
| Ideology | Arab nationalism Pan-Arabism Anti-Zionism |
| Size | 6,000 |
| Allies |  Arab League Holy War Army |
| Opponents |  Yishuv (before26 May 1948)
|
| Battles and wars | |
TheArab Liberation Army (ALA;Arabic:جيش الإنقاذ العربيJayš al-ʾInqāḏ al-ʿArabiyy, better translated asArab Rescue Army (ARA) orArab Salvation Army (ASA)), was an army of volunteers fromArab countries led byFawzi al-Qawuqji. It fought on the Arab side in the1948 Palestine war. It was set up by theArab League as a counter to theArab High Committee'sHoly War Army, but in fact, the League and Arab governments prevented thousands from joining either force.[5]
At the meeting inDamascus on 5 February 1948 to organize Palestinian Field Commands, NorthernPalestine was allocated to Qawuqji's forces although theWest Bank wasde facto already under the control ofTransjordan.[6]
The target figure for recruitment was 10,000, but by mid-March 1948, the number of volunteers having joined the Army had reached around 6,000 and did not increase much beyond that figure. The actual number deployed might have been as low as 3,500, according to General Safwat. Its ranks included mainlySyrians,Lebanese,Palestinians and a few hundreds ofIraqis,Jordanians,Muslim Brotherhood fromEgypt,Circassians, andBosniaks. There were also a fewGerman,Turkish andBritish deserters.[7]
The Arab League Military Committee, with headquarters in Damascus, was responsible for the movements and servicing of the Army. The Committee consisted of GeneralIsmail Safwat (Iraq, Commander-in-Chief), GeneralTaha al-Hashimi (Iraq),Colonel Shuqayri (Lebanon), ColonelMuhammed al-Hindi (Syria) and ColonelAbd al-Qadir al-Jundi (Transjordan). All of the countries represented related toKing Abdullah's long-held plans to re-form theregion of Syria. This Greater Syria Plan (Mashru Suriya al-Kubra) had been supported by the British Empire throughout the thirties and forties.[8]
 | This sectionrelies largely or entirely on asingle source. Relevant discussion may be found on thetalk page. Please helpimprove this article byintroducing citations to additional sources. Find sources: "Arab Liberation Army" – news ·newspapers ·books ·scholar ·JSTOR(October 2023) |
Syria's reasons for building the Army of Liberation were several. Syria's PresidentShukri al-Quwatli knew that the Syrian Army was undependable and useless as an instrument of war; therefore, it was much safer for Syria to influence the situation in Palestine by building up a force that was to be paid for and armed by all the Arab League countries. Egypt was to pay for 42% of the costs, Syria and Lebanon 23%, Saudi Arabia 20%, and Iraq the remaining 15%. Just as important as the financial reasons for building an Arab League force was the need to protect the Syrian army itself. By sending the volunteer army into battle, Quwatli hope to spare Syria from exposing its own troops to defeat, which could leave the country exposed to attack from Abdullah and possibly Jewish forces. If the volunteer army were defeated, the loss and embarrassment would be borne by the Arab League in general and the Palestinians in particular, not by Syria alone.
Another advantage to an irregular army was that it could be sent into Palestine well before the British officially withdrew from their mandate on 15 May 1948. None of the Arab states were willing to declare war openly on the British. Thus, Syria would not officially be opening hostilities against the British troops, who still bore responsibility for security in Palestine. Furthermore, if the Arab countries failed to commit their armies to fight in Palestine – a possibility which seemed likely as Egypt agreed to participate only four days before the war began on 15 May 1948 – the Syrian government would still be active. It would retain leverage in Palestine and be able to tell the Syrian public that it had done more than the other Arab countries to help the Palestinians. Most importantly, however, the ALA was to be used as an instrument to nip Abdullah's Greater Syria plan in the bud and to keep him from expanding his state over half of Palestine.
The evolution of President Quwatli's military objectives in Palestine is recorded in the diaries of Taha al-Hashimi. Hashimi was an Iraqi pan-Arab nationalist and long-time intimate of Quwatli, whom the Syrian president wanted to head the Liberation Army rather than General Safwat, Egypt's candidate. Hashimi was ultimately appointed Inspector General of the ALA and placed in charge of recruitment and training of the troops at the Qatana headquarters. His office was in the Syrian Ministry of Defense and he met daily with Syria's political and military leaders.
After the United Nations General Assembly voted in support of partitioning mandate Palestine between Arab and Jewish populations -UN 181 - Hashimi records that in October 1947, and after Syria had failed to win either Saudi Arabia or Egypt over to the idea of an anti-Hashemite military alliance, Quwatli explained:
The Greater Syria plan will start from the Arab part of Palestine. Because of this I have ordered the Syrian army to move to the Syrian–Palestinian border. The force which has taken up position there is 2,500 men. Also Lebanon will send 1000 men to its border. As soon as the forces of Iraq and Jordan enter Palestine, we will enter and take al-Nasira and the North.[fn]
Quwatli's strategy in Palestine was designed from the outset to prevent Abdullah's possible advance north to Damascus. In the best case, Quwatli hoped to acquire some of northern Palestine for Syria. A second reason for Quwatli's hesitation to commit Syrian military troops was that he had failed in his early efforts to reform the army and questioned the loyalty and effectiveness of its leadership. Although the head of the military, GeneralAbdullah Atfeh, swore to the Minister of Defense in May 1947, that the Syrian army was "the best of all the Arab armies, the best army in the Middle East," the brigade commanders scoffed at this ridiculous assessment and cabled the President to warn, that "the army is not worth a red cent."[fn] Quwatli was fully aware of the problems in his military. "The real problem is to reform the Syrian army and to solve the problem of its leadership," he confided to Taha al-Hashimi in September 1947.[fn]
Until the army could be strengthened, he hoped to keep it out of the fighting. In its stead he built the Arab Liberation Army. "It is imperative that we restrict our efforts to the popular movement in Palestine," Quwatli concluded. "We must strengthen it and organize its affairs as quickly as possible."[fn] Prime MinisterJamil Mardam Bey gave a lengthier explanation for why the Syrian army could not be sent into Palestine in November 1947, and why a volunteer army was needed.
Because [the Arab governments are undependable], I have decided... on the necessity of strengthening Palestine with arms and men and organizing their affairs and appointing a leader to take charge of their matters. The popular movement in Palestine is responsible for saving the situation, with the help of the Arab governments. This is because I doubt in the unity of the Arab armies and their ability to fight together....
If the Arab armies, not least of all the Syrian army, are hit with an overwhelming surprise attack by the Jewish Haganah, it would lead to such a loss of reputation that the Arab governments would never be able to recover.
The best thing is to leave the work to the Palestinians and to supply them with the help of the Arab governments. Ensuring an effective leadership in Palestine is of paramount importance and needs to be done with the greatest of haste. If the movement is destined to failure, God forbid, then it will be the people of Palestine who fail and not the Arab governments and their armies. So long as the position of the Kings and Amirs is one of caution and plots, this is the only sound policy.[fn]
As Mardam makes clear, he knew the Syrian army could not withstand an attack by the Haganah; he knew his Arab allies were undependable; and he did not want to risk the "loss of reputation" that would inevitably ensue. That is why he and Quwatli were determined to limit their own involvement in Palestine to the ALA.
When Hashimi spoke to the President a few days later about Mardam's plan, President Quwatli reiterated Mardam's concern that the government could not withstand the Syrian army's defeat in Palestine. As he had explained to Hashimi before, "the real problem is with reforming the Syrian army and solving the problem of its leadership."[59] Because of these concerns, he said, "it is imperative that we restrict our efforts to the popular movement in Palestine. We must strengthen it and organize its affairs as quickly as possible. The trouble is that the Mufti [Hajj Amin al-Husayni] will not permit Fawzi al-Qawuqji to take the leadership in Palestine."[fn]
The next several weeks of intense negotiations between Quwatli, the Mufti, Qawuqji and other Arab leaders over the question of who would direct the popular resistance in Palestine were a complete failure; agreement was impossible. The Mufti refused to hand control over to Qawuqji. He claimed that Qawuqji would "sell" himself to the English, and added that, "if Qawuqji accepted partition, [I] will kill him with [my] own hands."[fn] The Mufti insisted that Palestine did not need the volunteer army and that all money should be given directly to him.[fn] King Abdullah, in an effort to dismiss the Mufti, claimed he could save Palestine on his own. "Why don't the Arab countries send their armies directly to [me]?" he inquired. Meanwhile, Abdullah was arming his own supporters in Palestine who rejected both the Mufti and Qawuqji.[fn] As for King Faruq of Egypt, he wanted nothing to do with any of them. He said, "The Arabs ought to get rid of all three of them: the Mufti, Abdullah, and Qawuqji."[fn] The question of who would take command of the Arab and Palestinian military campaign and what their objectives would be was never resolved.[9]
On January 8, 1948, the borders ofBritish-held Palestine were breached by a battalion of the ALA – "the Second Yarmuk Battalion" which was 330-soldiers strong and was commanded byAdib Shishakli. Entering fromSyria, the battalion set its headquarters nearTarshiha in theGalilee. On January 20, 1948, this battalion attacked KibbutzYehiam and failed. The British High CommissionerAlan Cunningham asked his government to pressure Syria to stop the invasion of the mandate territory by the ALA by threatening that theBritish Army would take action.On January 20, 1948, a second ALA Battalion, a 630-soldier-strong First Yarmuk battalion, led by the Syrian officer Mohammed Safa, entered Palestine. It crossed theDamia Bridge over theJordan River in a long convoy. An attempt by the British police to prevent their entry failed because of the intervention of theArab Legion, and so the invasion was not stopped by the British in spite of protests from theJewish Agency.Fawzi al-Qawuqji joined this regiment, which was parked nearTubas. On February 15, 1948, the battalion attacked KibbutzTirat Zvi but failed to overtake it.TheHittin Battalion, led by the Iraqi Madlul Abbas, crossed the Jordan River on the Damia bridge on 29 January 1948 and dispersed in the mountains ofSamaria.The two battalions that had come fromTransjordan split into smaller units and deployed throughout Samaria. Their task was to maintain order in the area and allowAbdullah I of Jordan to annex the area to his kingdom. Attempts by theArab Higher Committee to sow discord between the units of the ALA were unsuccessful. Paradoxically, Samaria remained one of the quieter areas in Palestine during this period thanks to the ALA. The move was made in coordination withErnest Bevin who approved of Abdullah's plan to deploy the ALA through Samaria without the knowledge of the High Commissioner, provided it does not provoke intervention by theUN Security Council or accrue criticism from other Arab countries against the United Kingdom.According to Levenberg, this disposition of forces, away from the main warfare areas and close to the Syrian border, where it could create a buffer between Syria and Transjordanian forces, indicates their real objectives and missions.[10]
Qawuqji returned to Syria to organize further forces and in March 1948 re-entered Palestine from Syria with the "Al Hussein," and "Al Qadsia" battalions, numbering 360 soldiers each. A final "Jabal al-Arab" battalion manned by 500Druze soldiers and commanded by Shakib Wahab settled in Shfar'am.
The Druze forces took part in thebattle of Ramat Yohanan. Following the fierce battle that inflicted many casualties on both sides, the battalion commanders reached an agreement with the Haganah to withdraw. Some members of the battalion, led by Ismail Qabalan, later fled from Syria and volunteered to theIDF to form the basis of its Druze forces.
On 5 March 1948 Qawuqji returned to Palestine and set his headquarters in theJaba village betweenNablus andJenin. He also set up a radio station broadcasting propaganda in Hebrew, Arabic and English.On April 4, 1948, the ALA forces attackedKibbutz Mishmar Haemek in order to take it and join forces with the Arabs ofHaifa. The campaign lasted for ten days and ended in defeat for the ALA. In Parallel, the battalion led be Sishakli was defeated in the battle forSafed duringOperation Yiftach. In addition to these battles, ALA units fought in other areas, such as thebattle of Jerusalem and the road leading to it, theSharon, and urban fighting in mixed-population cities such asJaffa. In some places these forces showed firm opposition to Jewish militias, such as at thebattle of Nabi Samuel and Tel Arish. Regardless, on May 27, 1948, Qawuqji led his northern forces back to Syria to regroup.
In June 1948 the ALA returned to the Galilee and took part in retakingMalkiya, on June 5. During the "ten days battles" ALA forces based in Tarshiha attacked Jewish forces inSejera but had to retreat whenNazareth was occupied by the IDF. During the second truce the ALA remained active taking, for example, several outposts near MoshavManof.In October 1948 the ALA succeeded in taking the post of Sheikh Abed nearManara and a counterattack by theCarmeli Brigade failed. In response, the IDF initiatedOperation Hiram to rout the ALA from its strongholds in the Galilee. The operation began as the ALA's headquarters at Tarshiha's was attacked and captured by IDF forces, including the newly establishedIsraeli Air Force. Kaukji, though, managed to escape with most of his army. Although the ALA suffered hundreds of casualties it left Palestine toLebanon largely intact. The ALA never returned to Palestine and was dismantled in the following months.
| Disposition of Arab Liberation Army Forces, March 1948 | |
| Samaria | 3,000–4,000 |
| Galilee | 1,000, in groups of 50–100 under a central command |
| Haifa | 200–300 |
| Jerusalem city | a few hundreds |
| Jerusalem district | perhaps 500 |
| Jaffa town | 200 or more |
| Gaza Subdistrict | perhaps 100 Egyptians |
| Source:Levenberg (1993), p. 200 | |
In the early summer of 1948 some Druze fighters,[quantify] mainly from Syria, along with Druze from the villages ofDaliyat al-Karmil andIsfiya onMount Carmel, defected from the Arab Liberation Army to theIsrael Defense Forces. These formed the core of the IDF's only Arabic-speaking unit, theUnit of the Minorities.[11]
Media related toArab Liberation Army at Wikimedia Commons
