Apportionment is the process by which seats in alegislative body are distributed amongadministrative divisions, such as states or parties, entitled torepresentation. This page presents the general principles and issues related to apportionment. Theapportionment by country page describes the specific practices used around the world. TheMathematics of apportionment page describes mathematical formulations and properties of apportionment rules.
One example of deliberate malapportionment is seen in bicameral legislatures: while one house, often called a house of commons or representatives, is based on proportional representation,[a] the other is based on regional representation. This is modeled after theConnecticut Compromise, which formed the basis of theUnited States Senate.
Fundamentally, the representation of a population in the thousands or millions by a reasonable size, thus accountable governing body involves arithmetic that will not be exact. Although weighing a representative's votes (on proposed laws and measures etc.) according to the number of their constituents could make representation more exact,[1] giving each representative exactly one vote avoids complexity in governance.
Over time, populations migrate and change in number. Governing bodies, however, usually exist for a defined term of office. Whileparliamentary systems provide for dissolution of the body in reaction to political events, no system tries to make real-time adjustments (during one term of office) to reflect demographic changes. Instead, anyredistricting takes effect at the next scheduled election or next scheduledcensus.
In some representative assemblies, each member represents a geographic district. Equal representation requires that districts comprise the same number of residents or voters. But this is not universal, for reasons including the following:
Infederations like theUnited States andCanada, the regions, states, or provinces are important as more than mere election districts. For example, residents of New York State identify as New Yorkers and not merely as members of some 415th Congressional district; the state also has institutional interests that it seeks to pursue in Congress through its representatives. Consequently, election districts do not span regions.
Malapportionment might be deliberate, as when the governing documents guarantee outlying regions a specific number of seats.Denmark guarantees two seats each for Greenland and the Faroe Islands;Spain has a number of designated seats andCanada's apportionment benefits its territories. Remote regions might have special views to which the governing body should give dedicated weight; otherwise they might be inclined tosecede.
A lowest common denominator between adjoining voters exists, the "voting place" or "administrative quantum" (for example, a municipality, aprecinct, a polling district) traditionally designed for voting convenience, tending to unite small clusters of homes and to remain little changed.[clarification needed] The government (or an independent body) does not organize the perfect number of voters into an election district, but a roughly appropriate number of voting places.
The basis for apportionment may be out of date. For example, in the United States, apportionment follows the decennialcensus. The states conducted the 2010 elections with districts apportioned according to the 2000 census. The lack of accuracy does not justify the present cost and perceived intrusion of a new census before each biennial election.
A perfectly apportioned governing body would assist but does not ensure good representation; voters who did not vote for their district's winner might have no representative who is disposed to voice their opinion in the governing body. Conversely, a representative in the governing body may voice the opinions held by a voter who is not actually their constituent, though representatives usually seek to serve their own constituents first and will only voice the interests of an outside group of voters if it pertains to their district as well or is of national importance. The representative has the power, and in many theories or jurisdictions the duty, to represent the whole cohort of people from their district.
Forparty-list proportional representation elections the number of seats for a political party is determined by the number of votes. Only parties crossing theelectoral threshold are considered for apportionment. In this system, voters do not vote for a person to represent their geographic district, but for apolitical party that aligns with the voter's philosophy. Each party names a number of representatives based on the number of votes it receives nationally.
This system tallies (agglomerates) more of the voters' preferences. As in other systems parties with very few voters do not earn a representative in the governing body. Moreover, most such systems impose a threshold that a party must reach (for example, some percentage of the total vote) to qualify to obtain representatives in the body which eliminates extreme parties, to make the governing body as orderly in non-proportionate systems. With the minimum votes threshold version, if a subtype ofsingle-issue politics based on a local issue exists, those parties or candidates distancing themselves from a broad swathe of electoral districts, such as marginalsecessionists, or using a marginalminority language, may find themselves without representation.
The vast majority of voters elect representatives of their philosophies. However, unlike district systems (or the hybrid models) no one elects a representative that represents them, or their specific region, and voters might reduce personal contact with their representatives.
Apportionment methods for party-list proportional representation include:
Malapportionment is the creation of electoral districts with divergent ratios of voters to representatives. For example, if one single-member district has 10,000 voters and another has 100,000 voters, voters in the former district have ten times the influence, per person, over the governing body. The malapportionment can be measured byseats-to-votes ratio. Malapportionment may be deliberate, for reasons such as biasing representation toward geographic areas or a minority overequality of individuals. For example, in afederation, each member unit may have the same representation regardless of its population.
The effect might not be just a vague empowerment of some voters but a systematic bias to the nation's government. Many instances worldwide arise in which large, sparsely populated rural regions are given equal representation to densely packed urban areas.[5] As an example, in theUnited States, the Republican Party benefits from institutional advantages to rural states with low populations, such thatthe Senate and thePresidency may reflect results counter to the total popular vote.[b]
Unequal representation can be measured in the following ways:
By theratio of the most populous electoral district to the least populous. In the two figures above, the ratio is 10:1. A ratio approaching 1:1 means there are no anomalies among districts. In India in 1991, a ratio of nearly 50:1 was measured.[6] TheReynolds v. Sims decision of theU.S. Supreme Court found ratios of up to 1081:1 in state legislatures. A higher ratio measures the severity of the worst anomalies, but does not indicate whether inequality is prevalent.
By the smallest percentage of voters that could win a majority in the governing body due to disparities in the populations of districts. For example, in a 61-member body, this would be half the voters in the 31 districts with the lowest populations. It is persuasive to show that far fewer than 50% of the voters could win a majority in the governing body. But it requires additional research to conclude that such an outcome is realistic: whether the malapportionment is systematic and designed to bias the body, or is the result of random factors that give extra power to voters whose interests are unlikely to coincide.[7]
Even when electoral districts have similar populations, legislators may draw the boundaries to pursue private agendas; seeGerrymandering.
Another form of malapportionment is called reactive malapportionment, which can come about in three ways. The first is the impact of abstentions, in which a lower turnout in a constituency means fewer votes are needed to win there. This can be seen in the UK through the Labour Party's strength in inner city areas where turnout is lowest. The second is the impact of minor parties, which works in a similar way; more votes going to smaller parties means fewer votes are needed for the two larger parties. This form of malapportionment benefits the largest party in an area where minor parties excel. Finally, the instance of a minor party winning a constituency denies victory to one of the two main parties.[8]
Modern bicameral parliaments have often one house representing the population, and a second house representing regions. The regional house in most cases has the same number of deputies from every region, and prevents populous regions dominating the rest of the country, introduced with theSwiss diet, later improved and popularized by theUS Senate andConnecticut compromise in the USA, a system copied by many other countries parliaments.
1955 System – InJapan, malapportionment benefits theLiberal Democratic Party, who have ruled for over 60 years (with two brief periods in opposition, totaling 5 years). This has been the subject of multiple Japanese Supreme Court cases.[9][10][11]
TheConstitution of Australia guarantees each of the six founding states an equal number of Senators in theAustralian Senate, regardless of population, but this would not necessarily apply to other states were they admitted or created. It also does not mandate any Senators in theNorthern Territory andAustralian Capital Territory, and Parliament has only seen fit to provide these non-state Territories with two Senators for each Territory. In addition to the general malapportionment these requirements create between the most populous states and the least, which saw former Prime MinisterPaul Keating describe the Senate as "unrepresentative swill", it also means that the Australian Capital Territory has four less Senators than Tasmania despite their populations being roughly equal. The two Senators for each territory also face re-election every election, rather than every second election, depriving the Territories of the stability that comes from long-term representation in the Senate.
TheConstitution of Australia mandates a minimum of five members per original state in theAustralian House of Representatives. This has the effect of creating a malapportionment where Tasmania has a significantly lower amount of voters per seat than the rest of the country, giving Tasmania two additional seats than they would have without this 5 seat minimum.
Bjelkemander – malapportionment inQueensland, during the 1970s and 1980s, designed to benefit the rural-basedCountry Party who were able to govern uninhibited during this period. The system was named afterSir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, who was leader of the Country Party andPremier of Queensland for 20 years during this period. Bjelke-Petersen's administration eventually became embroiled incorruption and lost an election to the Labor Party, who removed the malapportionment.
Playmander – malapportionment existed inSouth Australia from 1938 to 1968. It was designed to benefit the rural-basedLiberal and Country League, allowing them to rule with majority of seats, even when the opposing Labor Party won the popular vote. The system was named afterSir Thomas Playford, who was leader of the LCL andPremier of South Australia for 26 years during this period. The malapportionment was mostly removed by LCL leaderSteele Hall who was embarrassed at how undemocratic it was.
TheWestern Australian Legislative Council had a malapportionment that clearly favoured the rural conservative National Party, with the state split into electoral regions with significant differences in voter numbers. After the Labor Party won a landslide victory in both houses in the2021 Western Australian state election they abolished the electoral region system, replacing it with a single statewide constituency electing 37 members via optional preferential voting. This created a one-vote, one-value system.[13]
TheUnited States Constitution guarantees each state two Senators in theUnited States Senate regardless of population. For instance, the state ofCalifornia has 70 times the population of the state ofWyoming, but each has two Senators, making those who live in California vastly underrepresented. In the 21st century, this system benefitswhite Americans (who are more likely to live in smaller states) and theRepublican Party (there are more small red states, than small blue states), who wield political power disproportionate to their numbers. This has grown more impactful asbipartisanship has become less common, with Senators increasingly voting along party lines.[14]
In theantebellum period new states were admitted in a pattern of oneslave state and one free state each, creating a balance in the Senate despite the population total of the free states far exceeding that of slave states by the1850 US census. California being admitted as a free state under theCompromise of 1850 broke the pattern and theThirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution abolished slavery in all states by 1865, making the issue moot.
^Not to be confused withproportional representation, an electoral system that typically electsmultiple members of a party to a legislature based on that party's percentage of a popular vote.
^For instance, although the Republican candidate has won the popular vote in only one of the eight presidential elections from 1992 through 2020 (that in 2004), theElectoral College vote - and, thus, the presidency - has been won by the Republican candidate in three of those eight contests (the additional instances being in2000 and2016).
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