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Anti-Sunnism, also described asAnti-Sunni sentiment, orSunniphobia; the "fear or hatred of Sunnism and Sunnites"[1] ishatred,prejudice,discrimination,persecution, orviolence againstSunni Muslims.[2]
Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab claimed to be a Sunni Muslim reformer of 18th century Arabia.[3] The religiousclergy of theOttoman Empire considered him and his supporters to be heretics and apostates.[4] They were labelled with the termWahhabi. During the 19th century, theBritish colonial government in India placed anti-colonial Sunni scholars on trial in what became known as the "Great Wahhabi Trials" to suppress an imagined "Wahhabi conspiracy".[5][6]
To be aWahhabi is officially a crime inRussia.[7][8] In Russian aligned Central Asian dictatorships, the term "Wahhabi" is used to refer to any unsanctioned religious activity. As a result, any Sunni Muslim, whether modernist, conservative, political or apolitical, is a potential target.[9]
In response to9/11 World Trade Centre Bombings, theUnited States and its allies launched a controversial policy of an unprecedentedcounter-terrorism effort on an international scale dubbed as thewar on terror.[10] It was characterised by the infamous words "You are either with us or against us".[11] Both this approach, as well as the purpose of a War on Terror has been questioned.[12][13] It has also been accused of inciting various forms ofIslamophobia on a global scale.[14][15]
The "War on Terror" rhetoric has been adopted by otherauthoritarian regimes.[16] Russia has frequently invoked the "Wahhabi" label to target Sunni Muslims.[17][18][19] Russia has employed its own "War on Terror" in theSecond Chechen War, in the insurgency in the North Caucasus, and currently in theRussian intervention in the Syrian Civil War.[20]
In a sectarian twist, War on Terror rhetoric has also been weaponised by Shiite rulers ofIran[21][22] who adhere toKhomeinism, even frequently cooperating with the US.[23] Iranian officials commonly invoke the "Wahhabi" label to further its sectarian identity politics in the region.[24] Even prior to the war on terror, Iranian leaders likeAyatollah Khomeini andRafsanjani had invoked the Wahhabi label describing Sunnis as "heretics" to stir up Sunniphobia and Iran's policy of exporting itsKhomeinist revolutions.[25][26] The curriculum ofKhomeinist seminaries in Iran are known for their sectarian depictions againstSunni Muslims, often portraying Sunnis and revered figures in Sunni history as "Wahhabis".[27]
Omair Anas argues that after the war on terror, an imagined Wahhabi conspiracy replaced the United States as Iran's "Great Satan".[28] In this vein,Qassem Soleimani, the former chief of Iran'sIRGC, said that Wahhabism had Jewish roots.[29][30]Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General ofHezbollah labelled "Wahhabism" as "more evil than Israel".[31] In 2016,Iranian Foreign MinisterJavad Zarif wrote an article inThe New York Times entitled "Let Us Rid the World of Wahhabism", wherein he described Wahhabism as a "theological perversion" and "a death cult" that has "wrought havoc", and argued that "virtually every terrorist group abusing the name of Islam" was inspired by Wahhabism.[32][33][34]
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In response to the growth of theSunni Islam, theSafavid dynasty killed many Sunnis, attempted to convert them to Shi'ism, many of the burials of the Sunni saints were burnt by the orders of Safavid shahs, the Sunni states were also occupied.[35][36] They also cursed the first three caliphs of Sunni Muslims, and alsoAisha andHafsa, the daughters of first two caliphs and the wives of the Islamic prophet.[37][38]
Ismail I made new laws for Iran and the lands he controlled:
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The post-Saddam government installed after the2003 invasion of Iraq has been responsible for systematic discrimination ofSunni Muslims inbureaucracy, politics, military, police, as well as allegedly massacring Sunni Muslim prisoners in a sectarian manner.[53] TheDe-Ba'athification policy implemented after the toppling of the Baathist regime has mostly been targeting Sunni civil servants, politicians and military officials; leading to anti-Sunni discrimination in thebureaucracy and worsening of the sectarian situation inIraq.[54] Many Sunnis were killed following the2006 al-Askari mosque bombing during theIraqi civil war.
International organizations like theHuman Rights Watch have condemned Iraqi government and Iran-backed militant groups of committing sectarian massacres against the Sunni minority in Iraq, stating that these atrocities constituted "crimes against humanity".[55]
The massacre was allegedly committed by Shia militants, as a revenge for ISIS atrocities, in the Sunni village of Barwana, allegedly killing 70 boys and men.[56]
On 9 July 2006, in theHay al-Jihad area ofBaghdad, the capital ofIraq, an estimated 40 Sunni civilians were killed in revenge attacks carried out by Shia militants from theMahdi Army.[57]
On 22 August 2014, Shia militants killed at least 73 people in an attack on the SunniMus`ab ibn `Umair mosque in the Imam Wais village ofIraq, the attack occurred during theFriday prayers, where many of the Sunnis were attending their prayers.[58] At the time of the attack, there were about 150 worshippers at the mosque. The Iran-backedAsaib Ahl al-Haq militant group, a splinter group of theImam Ali Brigades, are suspected to be the perpetrators.[59][60]
Sunni-majority provinces in Iran are neglected by the government, leading to socio-economic disenfranchisement and high rates of poverty.[61][62][63] Iran's first Supreme LeaderKhomeini had held anti-Sunni religious views, which was also reflected in the geo-political strategy he outlined in his "Last Will and Testament".[64] During the events of 1979 Revolution, Sunni-majority cities inKhuzestan,Western Azerbaijan andGolestan provinces were targets of sectarian attacks by Khomeinist militants. Many Sunni religious leaders and intellectuals who had initially backed the revolution were imprisoned during the 1980s.[65]
Political discriminations have since been normalized, with Sunnis being denied representation in government bodies such as theGuardian Council and theExpediency Council which are reserved for the Shias.[66] It has also been argued that Sunnis are marginalized by the IranianMajlis, with less than 6% of the seats being permitted for Sunnis since the establishment of the parliamentary body in 1980;[67][68] the percentage ofSunnis in Iran is usually estimated to be 5-10%,[69] but some Sunni leaders have claimed it to be "between 12 and 25 percent".[70]
After Khomeini's death in 1989,Iran began publicly exporting Anti-Sunni rhetoric throughpropaganda andKhomeinist media outlets across theIslamic World, in increasing proportions particularly since the 2000s.[71] Ethnic minorities that are predominantly Sunni, such as theKurds,Balochs, andTurkmens suffer the brunt of religious persecutions and numerousMasajid (mosques) of these communities are routinely destroyed by the security forces.[72]
In 2007, government tightened restrictions on Sunni religious schools and universities; and forced Sunni religious students to study in Khomeinist institutes.[73] In 2011, Iran imposed restrictions that blocked Sunni Muslims from holding their own separateEid prayers at the city ofTehran.[74] Discrimination against Sunnis had increased since 2021, due to authoritarian policies of hardline Former PresidentIbrahim Raisi.[75]
In a brutal massacre known as "Bloody Friday" conducted in September 2022,IRGC andBasij forces opened fired and killed over 90 Sunni protesters duringJumu'ah prayers nearJameh Mosque of Makki inSistan-Balochistan, the largest Sunni mosque in Iran. Some worshippers had gone out of the mosque and marched on the police station across the street in protest against the recent alleged rape of a Baloch girl by a policeman, throwing stones and molotov cocktails; the security forces responded with fire and continued to shoot at the worshippers as some of them retreated back into the mosque. As of October 2022, the massacre is the deadliest incident that occurred as part of the military crackdown on2022 Iranian protests.Molwi Abdolhamid Ismaeelzahi, popular BalochIslamic scholar and spiritual leader of Iran'sSunni Muslim minority, who led the prayers, denounced the regime for the massacre and its "absolute lies" stereotyping the regular Sunni worshippers as Baloch separatists.[76][77][78] In an unusual speech condemningAli Khamenei andIranian army for the violence and bloodshed, Abdul Hamid declared:
"Thesupreme leader of the Islamic Republic, as the commander-in-chief of thearmed forces, as well as other officials are all responsible, and no one can evade this responsibility.."[79]
In May 2023 alone, Iran executed at least 142 individuals (78, or 55% of them, on drug-related charges), its highest monthly rate since 2015. At least 30 of those executed were from theSunniBaluch minority.[80][81]
Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Sulaymân al-Madanî ash-Shâfi'î, as quoted in the book 'Ashadd ul-Jihâd', declared his belief a heresy and formally excommunicated him by issuing a fatwâ, the text of which said: " This man is leading the ignoramuses of the present age to a heretical path. He is attempting to extinguish Allah's light, but Allah will not permit His light to be extinguished.
Abstract: In the late 1860s and early 1870s the British colonial government in India suppressed an imagined Wahhabi conspiracy, which it portrayed as a profound threat to imperial security.
In Russia and Central Asia, public figures and the media see Wahhabism as the inspiration for religious revival and Islamic political movements. During the Soviet era, official apprehensions emerged about an 'Islamic threat' posed by Sufi orders as nests of secret conspiracies against the communist system. In the post-Soviet era, Sufism has assumed a positive connotation as a moderate form of Islam opposed to Wahhabism, which has become a sort of bogeyman in public discourse. Pejorative use of the term cropped up in the late Soviet era, when members of the official religious establishment castigated proponents of expunging ritual of non-scriptural elements for 'importing' Wahhabism, thus implying that it is alien to the region's heritage. Many Russians believe that after the Afghan war, Wahhabis infiltrated Central Asia to spread their version of Islam. Thus, in 1998, political leaders of Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan declared their readiness to confront 'a threat of aggressive fundamentalism, aggressive extremism and above all Wahhabism. This is what we have currently in Afghanistan and in troubled Tajikistan.' The government of Uzbekistan tags unsanctioned religious activity with the Wahhabi label. The problem with this outlook is that it conflates differences among a variety of Muslim religious movements, which include militant and reformist political tendencies alongside utterly apolitical ones. Thus, a leading Tajik modernist who favours a blend of democracy and Islam has been branded a Wahhabi even though he has ties to Sufi circles
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)When, in September 2001, the right-wing Republican president of the US proclaimed the 'war on terrorism', which he also dubbed a 'crusade', George W. Bush was soon joined in such battle by his staunch British ally Tony Blair, a Labour prime minister. A populist prime minister of the conservative coalition in Australia, John Howard faithfully entered the fray on behalf of this nation, which likewise imagines itself to have a special relationship with the USA. All these allies participated in the unlawful invasion of Afghanistan the following month, in the name of this war on terrorism, and of Iraq eighteen months later. The forces of all three countries are still in Afghanistan, with very little difference to this fact having been made by the now Democratic presidency in the US, the now Tory-led coalition in the UK, or the now Labor government in Australia. Really, existing labour parties - when in government, that is - have taken a very similar stance in relation to securing militarily the US-led global empire to that of their conservative opponents. All have participated similarly in state crime in the 'war on terror'; indeed all have been comparably complicit in what I call 'empire crime'
Beyond genuine national security threats, countries across the world capitalized on the conflation of Islam with terrorism to serve discrete national interests. This American War on Terror furnished nations with license, and more importantly, a policing template and language to profile and persecute their Muslim minority populations. American Islamophobia, buoyed by swift state action including the War in Afghanistan and the USA PATRIOT Act, manifested in a surge of vigilante violence against Muslims and "Muslim-looking" groups and had global impact
Many of the regimes and movements labeled as Wahhabi in the contemporary era do not necessarily share the same theological and legal orientations. The reality is that Wahhabism has become such a blanket term for any Islamic movement that has an apparent tendency toward misogyny, militantism, extremism, or strict and literal interpretation of the Quran and hadith that the designation of a regime or movement as Wahhabi or Wahhabi-like tells us little about its actual nature. Furthermore, these contemporary interpretations of Wahhabism do not nec- essarily reflect the writings or teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab
In political, as well as religious matters, any Muslim who challenges the status quo is at risk of being labeled a Wahhabi. This is how the KGB and its post-Soviet successors have used the term. In fact, the KGB may have played a large role in promoting its use
Pejorative use of the term cropped up in the late Soviet era, when members of the official religious establishment castigated proponents of expunging ritual of non-scriptural elements for 'importing' Wahhabism, thus implying that it is alien to the region's heritage.Many Russians believe that after the Afghan war, Wahhabis infiltrated Central Asia to spread their version of Islam. Thus, in 1998, political leaders of Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan declared their readiness to confront 'a threat of aggressive fundamentalism, aggressive extremism and above all Wahhabism. This is what we have currently in Afghanistan and in troubled Tajikistan. The government of Uzbekistan tags unsanctioned religious activity with the Wahhabi label. The problem with this outlook is that it conflates differences among a variety of Muslim religious movements, which include militant and reformist political tendencies alongside utterly apolitical ones. Thus, a leading Tajik modernist who favours a blend of democracy and Islam has been branded a Wahhabi even though he has ties to Sufi circles.
In one of their meetings, the member of the Iranian delegation had a message for the American government: "Iran was prepared to work unconditionally with the United States in the "war on terror" and if they could work with [the Americans] on this issue, it had the potential to fundamentally transform U.S.-Iranian relations." Commenting on this, reporter John Richardson said that such a statement had "seismic diplomatic implications" ... Hilary Mann, who had just joined the National Security Council staff as its resident Iran expert and Ryan Crocker, a senior State Department official, sit with Iranian officials who expressed their will to cooperate with the Americans and re-establish diplomatic relations." Pg.16 "I an interview with Barbara Slavin in 2005, former Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps' chief commander, Mohsen Rezaie, stated that the Islamic Republic played an "important role" in capturing Kabul as members of IRGC "fought alongside and advised the Afghan rebels who helped U.S. forces topple Afghanistan's Taliban regime" in the months after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Such a stance is further emphasized by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who discussed the war on Afghanistan on CBS on November 11, 2001, two days before the fall of Kabul and asserted that "there [were] some Iranian liaison people, as well as some American liaison people working with the same Afghan forces." Besides, Slavin confirms the Iranian role and argues that members of the IRG Qods Brigade were on the field when the Alliance, with U.S. air support, took control of Kabul."... "The American-Iranian cooperation did not end after the successful overthrow of the Taliban regime. The rapprochement between the two arch-foes was further illustrated in their collaboration to create an interim post-Taliban government in Afghanistan. Whereas, Iran's role in the "war on terror" was largely secret, its role in forming a "broad-based, multiethnic, politically balanced, freely chosen" government was rather direct as the American and Iranian diplomats met and collaborated via the Six plus Two group.
However, by equating takfirism and Wahhabism, Iran further muddies the water of identity politics. It is a way of confusing the sectarian dynamic in Iraq and Syria, by asserting that the other side is not actually Sunni, but rather an extreme ideological movement (takfirism) that is beyond the pale of Islam and, therefore, not even Islamic. Like the case of the Saudi grand mufti, such rhetoric allows Iranian officials to indulge in their own game of takfir—articulating who is and who is not a Muslim and justifying actions accordingly. To neutral observers of Wahhabism, such accusations might touch on truth, but as a foreign policy tool, they only beget further acrimony from Iran's Sunni neighbors.
Khomeini declared that the Saudi rulers, "these vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back," and announced that Mecca was in the hands of "a band of heretics."32 Once more, the Saudis were transformed into what the speaker of the parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, called "Wahhabi hooligans." Rafsanjani recalled the nineteenth-century Wahhabi massacres (of Shi'ites) in Najaf and Karbala, the Wahhabi destruction of Islamic monuments in Medina (venerated by Shi'ites), and the Wahhabi burning of libraries (containing Shi'ite works). The Wahhabis "will commit any kind of crime. I ask you to pay more attention to the history of that evil clique so that you can see what kind of creatures they have been in the course of their history."33 This represented a deliberate attempt to fuel a present crisis with the memory of past sectarian hatreds."
Iranian statements pandered to the belief still held by Shi'ites that the fanatic Saudis were driven by their own misguided beliefs to kill innocent Shi'ite pilgrims. Khomeini declared that the Saudi rulers, "these vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back," and announced that Mecca was in the hands of "a band of heretics." Once more, the Saudis were transformed into what the speaker of the parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, called "Wahhabi hooligans." Rafsanjani recalled the nineteenth-century Wahhabi massacres (of Shi'ites) in Najaf and Karbala, the Wahhabi destruction of Islamic monuments in Medina (venerated by Shi'ites), and the Wahhabi burning of libraries (containing Shi'ite works). The Wahhabis "will commit any kind of crime. I ask you to pay more attention to the history of that evil clique so that you can see what kind of creatures they have been in the course of their history." This represented a deliberate attempt to fuel a present crisis with the memory of past sectarian hatreds.
Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of a group that has been fighting Israel for decades, declared on Tuesday that "Wahhabism is more evil than Israel," Lebanon's Al Akhbar newspaper reported."... "In other words, things have gotten so bad that Hezbollah, Israel's mortal enemy, now considers Wahhabis — that is, fellow Muslims — to be worse than Israel. Bear in mind, this is coming from the same man who has described Israel as "a cancerous entity and the root of all the crises and wars" and pledged that Israel's destiny "is manifested in our motto: 'Death to Israel.'
Since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, militant Wahhabism has undergone a series of face-lifts, but underneath, the ideology remains the same — whether it's the Taliban, the various incarnations of Al Qaeda or the so-called Islamic State, which is neither Islamic nor a state."...... "Over the past three decades, Riyadh has spent tens of billions of dollars exporting Wahhabism through thousands of mosques and madrasas across the world. From Asia to Africa, from Europe to the Americas, this theological perversion has wrought havoc. As one former extremist in Kosovo told The Times, "The Saudis completely changed Islam here with their money." Though it has attracted only a minute proportion of Muslims, Wahhabism has been devastating in its impact. Virtually every terrorist group abusing the name of Islam — from Al Qaeda and its offshoots in Syria to Boko Haram in Nigeria — has been inspired by this death cult.
In September, the New York Times published an op-ed by Iran's foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, entitled "Let Us Rid the World of Wahhabism." Zarif contends that Wahhabist Islam has become a plague, unleashing terrorism and murderous tumult across the Middle East and throughout the world. He calls Wahhabism a "theological perversion" that has "wrought havoc" and had a "devastating" impact in Islamic communities. The violence committed by jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda is a direct result of "Riyadh's persistent sponsorship of extremism," he argues, and this violence is at the root of the current conflicts in the Middle East. He accuses Saudi Arabia of "playing the 'Iran card'" to induce its allies to take part in the Syrian and Yemeni wars, and he concludes that "concrete action against extremism is needed." Even though Riyadh caused the mess, Zarif "invite[s]" Saudi Arabia to be part of the solution. That gesture rings hollow given the accusatory tone of the piece. It is clearly a polemic against Iran's neighbor and archrival, another salvo in their ongoing cold war.
12 out of the 277 members of the Assembly of Religious Experts are Sunni
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