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Anti-Hungarian sentiment (also known asHungarophobia,[1][2]Anti-Hungarianism,Magyarophobia[3] orAntimagyarism[4]) is dislike, distrust, discrimination, orxenophobia directed against theHungarians. It can involve hatred, grievance, distrust, intimidation, fear, and hostility towards theHungarian people,language andculture. It can range from negative personal feelings of hatred to institutionalized, violent persecution.
Most of the anti-Hungarian sentiment and incidents still occur today in Hungary's neighboring countries (modern Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Ukraine), as their predecessor states received large historical Hungarian territories. Following World War I, theTreaty of Trianon in 1920 led to the separation of 32% of ethnic Hungarians, along with many entirely Hungarian-populated regions, from their historical Hungarian motherland.
During the existence of theKingdom of Hungary and Croatia, theBanate of Bosnia was accused of holding the alleged Cathar anti-popeNicetas. Given that the Kingdom of Hungary and Croatia was under heavy Catholic influence, and Bosnia had a decentralized religious practice,Pope Honorius III would preach about invading Bosnia to pacify Nicetas, whilst Hungary would be able to incorporate Bosnia into its control.[5] Later, in 1235, Hungary, with the justification of Pope Gregory IX would launch theBosnian Crusade in order to subdue the Banate under its control.[5] However, in 1241, the Mongols invaded Hungary. As a result, the Hungarian troops abandoned the crusade and returned to Hungary to bolster their armies against the Mongols.[6] Bosnia would then regaining its previously conquered territory.[7] This conflict would fuel anti-Hungarian sentiment within the state, which even lasted beyond theOttoman conquest of Bosnia.[8]
During the era of theHabsburg monarchs, the court inVienna was influenced by Hungarophobia, but the Hungarian landowner nobles also showed signs ofGermanophobia.[9] In the 18th century, after the end ofRákóczi's War of Independence, many immigrants came to the underpopulated southern parts of theKingdom of Hungary: for instance, 800 new German villages were established.[10] The authorities preferred non-Hungarian settlers. The Habsburgs regarded the Hungarians as "politically unreliable", and consequently they were not allowed to settle in the southern territories until the 1740s.[11] The organized resettlement was planned by the Habsburgs. The resettlement policy was characterized as anti-Hungarian,[12][13] as the Habsburgs feared an uprising of Protestant Hungarians.[14]
DuringHungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–1849, thousands of Hungarians were murdered inTransylvania (now part ofRomania) in nine separate incidents during the1848–1849 massacres in Transylvania.
Following several days of massacres of Hungarians in Abrudbánya (todayAbrud, Romania),Avram Iancu issued the order, "No more killing; those who remain, until now, let them live." But the order did not find unanimous approval, a Romanian lancer even challenged Iancu: "Well, why did you swear us on the mountain that we should not leave even a cat alive, much less a Hungarian soul? – By God, I will kill, and we will kill them all."[15]
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Mihály Károlyi had become prime minister of Hungary as a result of the 1918Aster Revolution. Mihály Károlyi yielded to President Wilson's demand for pacifism by ordering the unilateral self-disarmament of the Hungarian army. At the time of the collapse, theHungarian Royal Honvéd army still had more than 1,400,000 soldiers.[16][17] This happened under the direction of Minister of WarBéla Linder on 2 November 1918[18][19] On the request of the Austro-Hungarian government, an armistice was granted to Austria-Hungary on 3 November 1918 by the Allies.[20] Disarmament of its army meant that Hungary was to remain without a national defence at a time of particular vulnerability. The unilateral self-disarmament made the occupation of Hungary directly possible for the relatively small armies of Romania, the Franco-Serbian army, and the armed forces of the newly established Czechoslovakia.[21][22][23]
Austria-Hungary collapsed afterWorld War I, and the subsequentTreaty of Trianon in 1920 established Hungary's current borders, resulting in the loss of 72% of its historical territory, majority of itseconomy, 58% of its population, and32% of its ethnic Hungarians. Two-thirds of territory of the Kingdom of Hungary was ceded toKingdom of Romania,Czechoslovakia,Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,First Austrian Republic,Second Polish Republic andKingdom of Italy.
Minorities inCzechoslovakia in 1918 to 1939 enjoyed personal freedoms and were properly recognized by the state, although they suffered from "indirect" forms of discrimination (such as anti-minority gerrymandering). There were three Hungarian and/or Hungarian-centric political parties:
AfterWorld War II,Czechoslovakia became a communist state; during the transition to a communist one-party state, decrees declaring the legality of the collective punishment of and permitting the forced[24] expulsion of German and Hungarian minorities from ethnic enclaves inCzechoslovakia, as well as stripping them of Czechoslovakian nationality came into effect, and Hungarians were forcibly relocated toSudetenland, on the borders of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak government deported more than 44,129 Hungarians from Slovakia to the Sudetenland for forced labor[25][26] between 1945 and 1948,[26] and theBeneš decrees remain legally in effect in theCzech Republic and Slovakia.[27]
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InSlovakia, Hungarian and pro-Hungarian political parties are a stable part of the political system. Anti-Hungarian sentiment had been criticized particularly during the third government ofVladimír Mečiar. In the past, so-called "Hungarian card" had been used mainly by theSlovak National Party (SNS)[31] against the granting of a special status to the Hungarian minority; it argued for the complete assimilation of the Hungarian minority into Slovak society.[verification needed] It considers that Hungarians in Slovakia are actually overprivileged.[31][32] After personnel changes in the presidium, SNS abandoned similar rhetoric and formed a common government with pro-HungarianMost-Híd in 2016.
Anti-Hungarian rhetoric of some far-right organizations[who?][citation needed] inSlovakia is based on historical stereotypes and conflicts in the common history as interpreted from nationalistic positions and recent events.[citation needed] In such interpretations, the arrival of old Hungarian tribes is described as the occupation by barbarian tribes and contributed to the destruction ofGreat Moravia. Other negative sentiments are related to the period ofMagyarization, the policy of interwar Hungary, the collaboration of Hungarian-minority parties with the Hungarian government againstCzechoslovakia, theFirst Vienna Award and theSlovak–Hungarian War.[33] Hungary is accused of still trying to undermine the territorial integrity of Slovakia, and local minority politicians are accused ofirredentism.[33] However, anti-Hungarian sentiment is not typical even for all far-right organisations, and the leader of theSlovak Brotherhood emphasized the need for collaboration with Hungarian far-right organisations againstmaterialism andmulticulturalism.[33]
Women, Slovak or not, used to be required to affix the Slovak feminine marker-ová (used fordeclension of feminine names) at the end of their surname.[34]
One incident of ethnically motivated violence against Hungarians in Slovakia is theHedvig Malina case. A 23-year-old Hungarian student girl Malina fromHorné Mýto claimed she was severely beaten and robbed on 25 August 2006 inNitra after speakingHungarian in public. She claimed her attackers wrote "SK (probably Slovakia) without parasites", and "Hungarians to the other side of the Danube" on her clothes.[35][36][37] The Slovak authorities charged Malina with perjury, the police initiated criminal prosecution against Malina, who, in turn, brought the case to the Constitutional Court.[38] In August 2007, a former high-ranking police officer, Jozef Šátek, filed a complaint against Slovak Prime MinisterRobert Fico, Kaliňák and Packa, claiming that they hadabused their power in connection with the Malina case.[39] In October 2007,Tom Lantos, Hungarian-bornDemocratic member of theUnited States House of Representatives, asked Prime Minister Fico to distance themselves from theBeneš decrees,[40] for a reasonable process in the Malina case, and to treat members of theHungarian minority as equals.[41][42] Lantos also blamed Fico for creating the climate for anti-Hungarian sentiments by including "voluntarily in his coalition individuals with known ultra-nationalist, anti-Hungarian attitudes".[43] Malina then took her case to theEuropean Court of Human Rights, challenging what she calls the "inhuman and humiliating" conduct of the Slovak officials.[36] On 8 November 2011 the European Court of Human Rights approved the Slovak government's apology. The Slovak Government expressed its regret, saying that "some elements of Malina's case raised doubts over whether her rights stipulated by the European Convention of Human Rights may have been violated."[44]
A football match inDunajská Streda also caused tensions between Slovakia and Hungary when Hungarian fans were badly beaten by the Slovak police.[45]
The majority and the Hungarian minority describe their coexistence mostly as good. For example, in a public survey in 2015, 85.2% of respondents characterized their coexistence as good (63.6% rather good, 21.6% very good) and only 7.6% as bad (6.3% rather bad, 1.3% very bad).[46]
In 2025, a 20-year-old Hungarian man was stabbed inBratislava because he was speaking Hungarian. While waiting in line for food, a Slovak man approached a group of Hungarians who were chatting and asked why they were speaking Hungarian, they replied "because we are Hungarians". The aggressive Slovak individual told them to go to the other side of theDanube (toHungary) to eat if they speak Hungarian, a sentiment commonly expressed by extremist groups. The local Hungarian party has described the incident as a hate crime. Hungarian students organised a protest after the attack.[47][48]
DuringWorld War I, Romania had been forced into a separate peace with the Central Powers. The World War I turned in favor of theEntente powers, Romania reentered the conflict on 10 November 1918, just one day before the general armistice. Although Romania violated the terms of theTreaty of Bucharest, the victorious powers ultimately placed no obstacles, and continued to tolerate Romania's unlawful actions. Romania not only breached the agreements by launching a military campaign to occupy Transylvania on 12 November – one day before theArmistice of Belgrade – but also by crossing the demarcation line established at that armistice, the Mureș River, on 8 December. Taking advantage of the passivity of the Budapest government, which had renounced armed resistance, Romanian forces occupied a large portion of the territories they had claimed.[49]
After World War I, at Gyulafehérvér (nowAlba Iulia) theRomanian National Assembly proclaimed theUnion of Transylvania with Romania on 1 December 1918. In the assembly, 1,228 delegates present declared their intention forTransylvania, theKörös region, theBanat, andMáramaros – altogether 26 historic counties of theKingdom of Hungary – to unite with theKingdom of Romania. Although the decision of Romanians was the result of a unilateral resolution, it completely deprived the Hungarians of Transylvania of their right to self-determination. The opinion of the Hungarian population no longer interested anyone. Although theSzékelys at the end of November, and the Hungarians of Kolozsvár (nowCluj) on 2 December, also declared that they did not wish to belong to Romania, their voices no longer reached the ears of the Entente powers. The Treaty of Trianon in 1920 drew a border that placed 1,658,045 Hungarians under Romanian rule, although the territory granted was smaller than what Romania had originally demanded.The nation-state ambitions ofGreater Romania, once realized, were soon followed by the swift abandonment of the noble promises made at the Assembly of Alba Iulia. Instead, the Romanian state increasingly sought to assert its perceived national grandeur at the expense of the Hungarian population and to redress what it regarded as historical grievances. After 1920, the Hungarians, now a detached ethnic minority, found themselves facing a harsh new reality in which they were compelled to wage a bitter struggle for even the smallest remnants of their cultural and national identity.[49]
In Transylvania, memorials and monuments commemorating Hungarian historical events or Hungarian personalities have often been subject to destruction from the Romanian authorities, organizations or civilians.
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The first such attacks began before 1918. One example was the bombing attack in December 1913 against theMillenium Monument, so-called "Árpád statue" on top of Cenk (Tâmpa) Mountain in Brassó, which was actually a monument commemorating the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin. In his bookSzobor a hegyen – A Cenk-tetőn lévő Árpád-szobor története (Statue on the Mountain – The History of the Árpád Statue on Cenk Peak), István Kovács Lehel writes about the background of the attack and one of the perpetrators, who was financed by the secret service in Bucharest.[50]During the Romanian troops' occupation of Transylvania (1918–1919) and immediately after the Treaty of Trianon (1920), and especially during the changing regimes, many Hungarian monuments were removed, repurposed, or demolished by the Romanian state.
Exact data on how many statues and monuments were removed, demolished, or destroyed by the Romanian authorities in the territories annexed from Hungary to Romania between 1920 and 1940 is hard to be told, but their enormous number is illustrated by the fact that in the city of Kolozsvár (Cluj-Napoca) alone, 4 monuments (the Guardian of the Carpathians statue, the statues of the conquering leaders, the Szamosfalva national defense monument, and Queen Elizabeth's memorial stone), 12 statues (KingFranz Joseph I,Queen Elisabeth,István Széchenyi,Miklós Wesselényi, politiciansImre Mikó, Countess Ilona Nemes, writerMiklós Jósika, writer and priest János Kótsi Patkó, actors Gyula E. Kovács and Ferenc Gyulai, doctors József Brandt and Zsigmond Purjesz), 8 other symbols considered Hungarian (the establishment of the university library, the founding of the botanical garden, the 1848 union, Indalik, generalJózef Bem, poetSándor Petőfi memorial plaques, the Hungarian crown and coat of arms on the Matthias Corvinus statue, and the Hungarian-themed stained glass windows of the Catholic St. Michael's Church) were removed or destroyed.[51] This amounts to a total of 24. The above list also shows that not only statues of Hungarian rulers and politicians were removed, but also those of artists, doctors, and writers, because of the simple fact that they were Hungarians.
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Here are several well-documented examples of Hungarian monuments in Transylvania that were removed, destroyed, or demolished by Romanian state before and after the Treaty of Trianon (1920).
- The statue called theGuardian of the Carpathians, created by sculptor Ferenc Szeszák and erected in Kolozsvár in 1915, was destroyed by Romanian troops marching in on Christmas Day 1918.[52]
-Statue ofJózef Bem fromTârgu Mureș (Marosvásárhely)was knocked down and removed by Romanian occupying forces on 28 March 1919.[53]
-Iron Székely Soldier Monument fromSzékelyudvarhely (Odorheiu Secuiesc). Erected 1917, it was pulled down and destroyed by Romanian authorities on February 9, 1919 (in wake of war changes) as part of the removal of Hungarian military-heritage monuments.[54]
-Bust of poet Ferenc Kölcsey fromSzatmárnémeti (Satu Mare). He was born in the village ofSződemeter, near the city. The bust of the Hungarian poet dedicated in 1864 was toppled on the night of December 20–21, 1920; later removed entirely in 1947 and stored in museum.[54]
-Statue ofLajos Kossuth fromArad. The statue, created 1909, was boarded up in 1921, and a 1925 government decree ordered its demolition; dismantling began July 27, 1925.[54]
-Statue of KingLadislaus I of Hungary from Nagyvárad (Oradea), dedicated to the founder of the city in 1893, the statue was dismantled on July 13, 1923; its place was replaced by an equestrian statue of King Ferdinand I of Romania.[54]
-Monument of Liberty (“Szabadság Obeliszk”) from Arad. Originally dedicated 1880 to Hungarian generals of 1849; removed in 1925 on Romanian government order, components stored; later re-erected in 2004 in “Reconciliation Park”.[55]
- The Romanian authorities also attempted to remove the monument to King Matthias I Corvinus in Cluj-Napoca, but their first attempt proved difficult. They eventually gave up on removing it, citing his alleged Romanian origins. However, the Hungarian state symbols (theHoly Crown of Hungary and the Hungarian coat of arms) were removed from it, and a plaque was placed on it stating that King Matthias, a "Romanian" who "attacked his nation," was "defeated by his own nation".[56]
In Romania, theCeaușescu regime gave great focus to theancient history ofTransylvania.[57]National communism in Romania made historical personalities of Hungary (such asJohn Hunyadi,Pál Kinizsi orGyörgy Dózsa)[58][59] go throughRomanianization and become more central figures in Romanian history.[57]
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Since the fall of communism, Romania’s political landscape has periodically featured parties, organizations, and public figures promoting strong nationalist discourses. Representatives of the Hungarian minority and certain Romanian figures who disagree with their narrative and actions accuse them of using anti-Hungarian rhetoric, seeking to curtail or completely remove the existing rights of Hungarians, questioning the right of Hungarians to live on the land of their ancestors, claiming that their demands for autonomy, national symbols, language use threaten the territorial integrity of Romania, organizing Romanian nationalist marches in cities inhabited by Hungarians, or occupying and transforming military cemeteries where Hungarian soldiers are buried and regularly holding nationalist demonstrations there.
Vatra Românească (meaning “The Romanian Stove/Hearth/Home”) is a Romanian nationalist organization founded on 7 February 1990 in Târgu Mureș (Transylvania).[60] According to its own charter, professors and jurists established it in reaction to what they perceived as the “irredentist Magyar (Hungarian) UDMR” (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania) and to defend the rights of Romanians in Transylvania.[61] Ideologically, it is widely considered an ultranationalist group, with elements of xenophobia, anti-Hungarian chauvinism, and even antisemitism.[62][61]
Several analysts and historians argue that Vatra Românească had close links to former Securitate (the communist secret police) structures.[63] Vatra Românească frames the Hungarian minority as a threat to Romanian national unity. In its early documents, it rejected any Hungarian autonomy in Transylvania, arguing that such demands undermine the rights of the Romanian majority.[64] According to internal strategy documents (leaked or reported), the organization supported “forms of intimidation … until the most capable Hungarian leaders are either marginalized or neutralized.”[65] Their narrative often portrays Hungarians (and other minorities) as “foreign elements” in “Greater Romania” who must be assimilated or contained.[65] They frequently mobilized public demonstrations against Hungarian cultural or political claims, for example protesting language rights, Hungarian symbols, or Hungarian-language education.[66]
Some of their anti-Hungarian actions- In March 1990, during the so-called“Black March” from (Marosvásárhely / Târgu Mureș), Vatra Românească reportedly organized and financed the transport (via buses) of Romanian villagers into the city.[67] Vatra disseminated propaganda via handbills and via its press organ (Cuvîntul Liber) warning against “anti-Romanian cultural genocide” by Hungarians.[68] At that time, there were violent clashes that caused several deaths: according to many organisations' reports, among them the US Department of State, Vatra played a role in stirring ethnic tensions, and some of its members were involved in the turmoil.[62][69]
- In 2004, Vatra Românească organized protests in Arad against the re-erection of the “Thirteen Martyrs Monument” or "Freeom Monument" dedicated to the executed Hungarian generals of 1848–49, removed by Romanian authorities in 1925, arguing that the monument should be given to Hungary.[70]
- In more recent times, they continued demonstrations against Hungarian-language demands: for example, in Marosvásárhely, they protested against Hungarian-language public administration, a Hungarian medical faculty, and Hungarian symbols.[66][60]
Gheorghe FunarThe most well-known figure of Vatra Românească isGheorghe Funar, who led the organization from 1992 to 1997. In addition to his actions and declarations, some of which could even be described as comical, such as when, as mayor of Cluj-Napoca, he had many public objects (e.g., benches, garbage bins, street poles or sidewalks) painted in the Romanian national colors (red, yellow, and blue),[71] or as when he said that there are so many Hungarians in Cluj because the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ/UDMR) paid Romanians to declare themselves Hungarian,[72] he carried out many acts and made speeches that were offensive and threatening to Hungarians.
- He broke international law in 1997 by having the Hungarian flag removed from the newly opened Hungarian consulate in Cluj.[73]
- He also hung a banner pointing toward the Hungarian Consulate in Cluj with the inscription: “This is the seat of the Hungarian spies in Romania.”[74]
- In a televised debate in 2014, Funar told an RMDSZ senator:Tell our interlocutor … that we live in Romania (…)and do not use a single word from the language of the horses (calling Hungarian language like this),because Romanian is the official language of Romania … He can speak Hungarian in Budapest; here he must use Romanian. … If I become president, no one will speak Hungarian — not even on Romanian state television. However, the Romanian court did not find Funar's reference to the Hungarian language as the language of horses or his threat to ban it to be offensive, which proves once more that the Romanian justice system does not consider insults and threats against Hungarians to be a crime.[75]
- He has also denied the existence of the Hungarian minority in Romania, asserting that “there are no Hungarians in Romania … Here there are only Romanian citizens.”[76]
Partidul România Mare (PRM), orGreater Romania Party, is a Romanian nationalist political party founded in 1991 byCorneliu Vadim Tudor and Eugen Barbu. According to PRM’s own website, their goals include national unity, territorial integrity, Romanian sovereignty, and “re-awakening” the national ideal.[77] But according to independent observers, its ideology encompasses strong Romanian nationalism, irredentism (the concept of restoring the historic “Greater Romania”), social conservatism, populism, soft Euroscepticism, and anti-Hungarian sentiment.[78] Over time, the party has been described as far-right and xenophobic.[79]
The party frames the Hungarian minority (especially in Transylvania) as a threat to Romanian national unity. It views minority rights or autonomy demands as undermining Romania's territorial integrity.[80] PRM’s irredentist ideology (restoring “Greater Romania” borders) also implicitly or explicitly contests the historical presence of Hungarians in Transylvania.[81] In its media and rhetoric, the party has deployed anti-Hungarian chauvinism, associating Hungarians with foreign influence, disloyalty, or as a “fifth column.”[82] The party has mobilized around nationalist protests and discourses whenever Hungarian cultural or political claims have become prominent, especially in Transylvania. For example, it has strongly opposed bilingual signage or Hungarian-language administration.[83]
Corneliu Vadim Tudor
The party's most well-known and notorious figure is Corneliu Vadim Tudor, who was a writer, journalist, poet, and politician. Tudor was known as a court poet for the late dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu.[84] He was accused of collaborating with the notorious Romanian secret police, the Securitate, under the pseudonym Cornel during the communist era.
[84] After the fall of Communism, he led PRM from its founding until his death. He was known for his combative, xenophobic, and ultranationalist rhetoric.[84] PRM under Tudor played a major role in mainstreaming xenophobic, nationalist discourse in post-communist Romania.[85] Tudor used his platform (the weekly România Mare) to spread nationalist and xenophobic ideas, including strong anti-Hungarian content.[86]
In his television appearances, at demonstrations that drew large crowds, and in his articles, Tudor often made nationalist and racist remarks that were offensive to Hungarians and stirred up anti-Hungarian sentiment among Romanians. Some examples:
-In a TV interview, he described what he called “hungarita” (a pejorative term) as a “chronic disease”:Hungarians came late into Europe … since then, they displace others … this is the chronic illness of Hungarian-ness.[87]
- In earlier writings (1990), he used dehumanizing language: referring to Hungarians as “Asiatic hordes” and “beastly”:On top of that all, we have the beastly attacks … by the Asiatic hordes … just for the mere fact that they speak Romanian!,And now … the Hungarians, who are Asiatic, hinder us … on our way to re-enter the concert of values of our continent!.[88]
TheCivic Forum of the Romanians of Covasna, Harghita and MureșRomanian:Forumul Civic al Românilor din Covasna, Harghita și Mureș, (FCRCHM), founded in 2005, in the Diocese of Covasna-Harghita of the Romanian Orthodox Church, to coordinate the ethnicRomanians atCovasna,Harghita andMureșcounties,[89] has been accused of being anti-Hungarian.[90][91][92] FCRCHM describes itself as a civil-society umbrella organisation coordinating Romanian cultural, educational and community associations in the counties of Covasna, Harghita and Mureş.[93] Its stated objectives include “preserving Romanian identity” in an area where Romanians are a numeric minority, and promoting what it calls “normalised Romanian-Hungarian coexistence”.[94] The Forum’s communications often frame Hungarian-community symbolic or political moves as threats to Romanian identity in those counties — thereby positioning the Romanian‐minority in a defensive posture, claiming that not Hungarians are discriminated, but Romanians "in their own country".[94][95]
The FCRCHM openly opposes proposals for autonomy of theSzékely Land (Székelyföld, Ţinutul Secuiesc), which they always put in quotation marks, or call it "așa numitul" (so-called), questioning its existence.[94] In a 2010 memorandum the Forum stated that the Hungarian minority’s adoption of a flag, coat of arms and anthem is evidence of a “closed ethnic mass … stuck between its own obsessively segregationist mental boundaries”.[94]
The Forum frequently issues statements accusing local Hungarian-majority administrations (in Covasna, Harghita, sometimes Mureş) of discriminating against ethnic Romanian residents (in services, public signage, cultural funding). For example:
“In Harghita and Covasna we have reached a never-before-seen level of discrimination with respect to Romanian-language speakers … events financed with public funds have no Romanian inscriptions or translations.” – Dragoş Burghelia, President of FCRCHM said.[96] In contrast, researches show the opposite of what the FCRCHM claims. In Covasna and Harghita counties, where more than 70% of the population is ethnic Hungarian, Hungarians are disadvantaged compared to Romanians in terms of jobs and wages.[97][98] Hungarian-language signage is lacking in localities with large Hungarian populations,[99] flags, national symbols[100][101], Hungarian inscriptions are persecuted by the authorities,[102], thus, the Hungarian-speakers are disadvantaged,[103] not the Romanians. Romanians occupy the majority of leading positions in state institutions and companies, and also in the local police and justice (for example, in 2013 inCovasna County with a 73.74% Hungarian majority population, out of 55 judges only 5 were Hungarian-speaking, out of 50 prosecutors only 2 spoke Hungarian, and about 95% of the police could speak only Romanian)[104] of these counties.
The Forum also issued statements in response to Hungarian community commemorations or initiatives, e.g., accusing them of “instigating ethnic tensions”.[105]
One of the goals of the Forum is to ban "ethnic-based parties", referring, of course, to the Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania.[106]
Because the counties of Covasna, Harghita, and part of Mureş are Hungarian-majority (Ethnic Hungarians / Székelys), many of the Forum’s positions are seen by Hungarian-language media or commentators as reactive to Hungarian-community claims (e.g., of autonomy, bilingual signage, local symbol change).[107][108]
The Romanian-language media actively responds to the Forum's attention-grabbing appeals regarding the use of the Hungarian language and symbols or the "dangers" of autonomy, convincing them that Romanians are in danger, while ignoring the needs, wishes, or grievances and threats faced by the Hungarian community.
Noua Dreaptă (English:The New Right) is a Romanian far-right organization, whose founder, Tudor Ionescu, openly embraces the doctrine of theLegionary Movement (Iron Guard) that existed between the two world wars.[109][110] The movement's values are strongly linked to Orthodox Christian tradition: the group sees the nation not only as an ethnic community, but also as a religious one.[111] Some argue that Noua Dreaptă selectively adopts the Iron Guard (Legionnaire) tradition, not inheriting all elements, but only those that align with its current political goals.[112] According to many, the organization's program contains elements of "orthodoxy, legionary doctrine, racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and homophobia, and explicitly fights against a "multicultural and multiracial society".[111][109][113] In addition, they support the unification of Romania and Moldova (“unconditional union”): this nationalist and historical narrative is an important part of the organization’s identity.[109] The New Right is not only nationalist, but also part of a transnational far-right network.[111]
Noua Dreaptă explicitly rejects territorial autonomy demands for the "so-called" (as they and other Romanian nationalists call it) Székely Land in Romania, framing such demands as a threat to the unity and sovereignty of the Romanian nation.[114] In their rhetoric and mobilization, they often frame the Hungarian minority’s cultural or political aspirations (e.g., autonomy, bilingualism) as irredentist or foreign “revisionism.” For instance, they organized a demonstration “against Hungarian irredentism” (in Hungarian: “magyar irredentizmus”) in Arad.[115] Their events sometimes deliberately provoke symbolic confrontation: on Romanian national day (1 December), Noua Dreaptă has held rallies in Hungarian-majority cities (e.g., Sfântu Gheorghe / Sepsiszentgyörgy) as a demonstration of Romanian national sovereignty.[116]
Alliance for the Union of Romanians (Romanian:Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor,AUR) is a Romanian nationalist, right-wing/populist party founded on 19 September 2019.[117][118]
Ideologically, it is often described as far-right / radical right, with elements of revolutionary nationalism, Christian right worldview, neo-Legionarism, and populism.[117][119] It also promotes unification of all Romanians, including unifying Romania with Moldova.[118] Scholars see in AUR a recycling of interwar nationalist/legionary discourse. For example, MindcraftStories argues that AUR “reuses many of the themes of the far-right in interwar Romania.”[120] During theCOVID-19 epidemic, AUR used anti-vaccine and conspiracy theories together with populism, nationalism, and anti-establishment rhetoric to rapidly rise in popularity among the voters.[119] From a socio-ideological perspective, it also draws on a reinterpretation of Romanian “national-communism” and sovereignty narratives.[121]
Analysts characterize AUR as xenophobic and nationalist, combining its Christian-conservative ideology with an anti-ethnic minority rhetoric.[122] Party members often label Romanian politicians who represent political positions that are not sufficiently "national" from the AUR's point of view as "not truly Romanian."[123]
AUR and George Simion repeatedly turned symbolic disputes (graves, crosses, flags, autonomy demands) into national controversies that mobilised supporters. Valea Uzului (Úz völgye) is the clearest example.[124] Rhetoric attacking UDMR and Hungarian cultural claims has translated into demonstrations, provocative symbolic actions and—in some cases—physical harassment by sympathisers. Monitoring groups reported an uptick in assaults and intimidation in 2025.[125][126] As AUR gained seats and media visibility, its messaging helped legitimise more confrontational behaviour by supporters (football-related violence and street clashes are symptoms).[127][32]
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A number of actions and statements can be linked to the party and were directed against the Hungarian minority. Some of these actions were violent and intimidating to Hungarians. They also grossly violated international customary law regarding mutual respect for military graves.
- The organization of the violent occupation of the military cemetery in Valea Uzului in May-June 2019. But more will be said about this later.George Simion was highly visible as an organiser/participant and used the episode politically. The event is widely understood as the launching pad of George Simion’s prominence and later AUR mobilisation.[128]
- George Simion publicly argued that ethnic-based parties (explicitly naming the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania) “have no place in Parliament” and proposed to ban ethnically founded parties — a clear political attack on the legal, parliamentary Hungarian minority party (this rhetoric became part of AUR’s platform/discourse).[125] In contrast, it is worth noting that before 1918, there was a Romanian national party in the Hungarian parliament in Budapest (Romanian National Party), which was able to operate undisturbed in Hungary until Transylvania was annexed to Romania.[129]
- One of the party's MPs, Dan Tanasă, became known for traveling around Székely Land and repeatedly reporting local governments, mayors' offices, cultural institutions, and companies that, in his opinion, had illegally displayed Székely flags, symbols, or Hungarian-language inscriptions on buildings, products, etc.[130][131][132]
- AUR-aligned activists and some supporter groups have been connected to stadium incidents and fan xenophobia in cities with significant Hungarian populations (Cluj/Kolozsvár among them), with reports of chants, harassment, and occasional physical assaults at matches. The most common nationalist slogan at Romanian soccer matches is the now-familiar chant: "Out with the Hungarians from the country!" These anti-Hungarian chants have become so commonplace in stadiums that it is no longer necessary for the matches at which these are shouted to be against Hungarian teams. Romanian fans often use banners with slogans and images that deeply offend and threaten the Hungarian minority. Monitoring groups have flagged sport-related anti-Hungarian aggression as part of the broader pattern.[32][133][134][135]
- In Romanian cities with a Hungarian majority (Sfântu Gheorghe,Târgu Secuiesc, etc.), the AUR and the allied Romanian nationalist (Calea Neamului,Noua Dreaptă) and Orthodox religious groups (Frăția Ortodoxă) often (usually on Romanian national holidays like 1st December) hold provocative marches, carrying banners and placards with anti-Hungarian inscriptions, shouting anti-Hungarian slogans (likeOut from the Hungarians from the country,Transylvania is Romanian), and singing songs celebrating the annexation of Transylvania to Romania. Hungarian representatives have pointed out that these are organized to provoke violent conflict with the local Hungarian population, which can then be exploited for their political purposes. Hungarian organizations and the Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania always urge Hungarians not to respond to these provocations, and the Hungarian population has complied with these requests.[136][137][138][139][140]
- In May 2025, Romanian influencers affiliated with AUR visited many Hungarian-majority villages and towns (Bodoc,Bixad,Valea Crișului,Ilieni,Turia,Catalina, Târgu Secuiesc,Zăbala,Tușnad,Miercurea Ciuc,Siculeni,Ciceu, etc.) in the region of Székely Land (Covasna and Harghita counties), entering mayor's offices, where they insulted employees and behaved violently.[141][142]
Calea Neamului (“Way of the Nation”) (sometimes translated as Path of the People) is a Romanian nationalist organisation, often linked with far-right, neo-legionary elements. Its leadership includes Mihai Tîrnoveanu, who acts as its president.[143][144][145] The organisation is closely associated with Frăția Ortodoxă (“Orthodox Brotherhood”), another nationalist / religious-nationalist group.[146] Calea Neamului frames itself as defending the Romanian national identity, the Romanian Orthodox faith, and “the legacy of Romanian heroes.” It also mobilises around memory, history, and commemorations (especially related to Romanian military history).[143]
Their anti-Hungarian narrative's central themes are as follows:
- They consistently emphasise that Transylvania (and other historically contested regions) is “pământ românesc” (“Romanian land”). For instance, during a protest inBăile Tușnad (a Hungarian majority town), participants carried a banner reading “Ceva este etern: Transilvania pământ românesc” (Something is eternal: Transylvania Romanian land).[147]
- They challenge Hungarian cultural-political claims (such as autonomy) by framing them as threats to Romania’s national unity and sovereignty.[148]
- During a large nationalist procession at the Valea Uzului military cemetery, they displayed a banner with extremely provocative text: “Hungarians, go back to Mongolia, from where you came”, and “Hungary is not on Europe’s map.”[149]
Calea Neamului often organizes or participates in anti-Hungarian Romanian movements or actions:
- Usually on national holidays as 1st December (the Union Day), Calea Neamului organises provocative demonstrations in Hungarian majority towns' main squares, trying to provoke the Hungarian population to react, by chanting anti-Hungarian slogans, using loudspeakers to play Romanian patriotic songs, and waving Romanian flags.[148]
- After the illegally installed concrete crosses from the Hungarian war cemetery of Valea Uzului were removed in July 2023, again illegally, Calea Neamului erected 150 Romanian wooden crosses in the military cemetery. Authorities opened a criminal investigation.[150]
- Mihai Tîrnoveanu, president of Calea Neamului, posed in front of the Hungarian Parliament with a Romanian flag, celebrating the anniversary of the 1919 Romanian army’s occupation of Budapest.[145]
Calea Neamului often organizes anti-Hungarian demonstrations and protests during visits by Hungarian politicians, government officials, and state leaders to Transylvania. These demonstrations are sometimes violent. On one occasion, Romanian nationalists led by Calea Neamului attacked the Hungarian president herself.
- On October 30, 2025, members of Calea Neamului and Frăția Ortodoxă, carrying Romanian flags and banners, violently attempted to break into the perimeter of the Tusványos summer camp, where Hungarian PMViktor Orbán was holding a speech. The police stopped them from breaking into the camp and getting into a fight with the Hungarians there.[151]
- On April 12, 2023, a Romanian crowd led by Calea Neamului disrupted the unveiling of the poet Ferenc Kölcsey's statue inCarei (Nagykároly), which was attended byKatalin Novák, then President of the Hungarian Republic, with anti-Hungarian chants and banners. The violent Romanians got so close to Novák that they almost spat on her.[152]
TheGreat Union Day, Romania's main national holiday, is celebrated on 1 December. It commemorates the Great National Assembly of Alba Iulia in 1918, at which the Romanian representatives proclaimed their intention for Transylvania and other Hungarian territories to unite with Romania.
[153] Since 2020, Romania also officially marks 4 June as Trianon (the day the Treaty of Trianon was signed in 1920). The law establishing “Trianon Treaty Day” frames the day as an occasion for cultural, scientific, and educational events about a major episode in Romania's modern history.[154] During the debate on the draft in the Chamber of Deputies,Hunor Kelemen, president of theDemocratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ), said: "What happened a hundred years ago is understandably a source of great joy for the Romanian nation, but it is a huge loss for the Hungarian nation and the Hungarians living in Romania, and even the Trianon law passed by the Romanian parliament cannot change that fact".[154] For the Hungarian minority, 1 December and 4 June mark two related historical facts: the political transfer of Transylvania,Banat andPartium from the Kingdom of Hungary to Romania (the post-war settlement) and the formal international recognition of those borders (Trianon). Many Hungarians view these dates as reminders of territorial loss, social dislocation, and the beginning of a long period in which Hungarian communities outside Hungary became minorities in newly formed states. Observers and commentators note that celebrating both the Act of Union (December 1) and the Trianon settlement (June 4) close together intensifies the feeling of historical grievance.[155] So Romania was not content with choosing as its national holiday the day on which the Hungarians lost their ancestral homeland and became a minority (December 1), with all the negative consequences that entailed, but also designated another day as a holiday that has the same significance for Hungarians.[156]
There have also been Romanian articles and writings criticizing the choice of these days as Romanian national holidays. For example, in an article the Romanian publicist Sabina Fati writes:By establishing Romania's National Day on December 1, politicians in Bucharest have already excluded Hungarians from the country's most important holiday, without considering that a day that would unite the two communities, Romanian and Hungarian, would have been more useful than one that divides them, andThe law commemorating the Treaty of Trianon (June 4) is not only a duplication of the anniversary of Transylvania's union with Romania, but also a way of showing Hungarians utter contempt.[157][unbalanced opinion?]
Also Romanian historians, such asLucian Boia, have admitted that the choice of these national holidays was a mistake, because instead of choosing a day that would unite the Romanians and the Hungarians, they chose a day that would divide them.[158][unbalanced opinion?]
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After 1918, the Romanian state constructed a national pantheon in which figures likeAvram Iancu,Horea, Cloșca (Ion Oarga), Crișan (Marcu Giurgiu), orIoan Axente Sever became celebrated as symbols of Romanian unity and resistance in Transylvania.
Hungarians accuse them of conducting gruesome massacres against the Hungarian civilian population from Transylvania, killing many thousands of people of all genders and ages, and burning down many cities and villages. Despite knowing about the Hungarian stance towards them, Romania did not stop their official cult.[159][160][161] Although the Hungarians historical memory says that these men were involved in violent episodes against Hungarian civilians during theRevolt of Horea, Cloșca, and Crișan of 1784 and theHungarian War of Independence of 1848-1849, Romanian historiography, text books and political discourse presents them primarily as defenders of the oppressed and champions of social and national justice.[162][163]
In Romanian textbooks, these personalities are described as heroes who fought against “foreign domination” and feudal exploitation, their actions portrayed as part of a just struggle for freedom and equality.[164] The massacres of Hungarian civilians—such as those inAiud (Nagyenyed - 8–17 January 1849),Abrud (Abrudbánya - 9 and 17 May 1849),Zlatna (Zalatna - 22–24 October 1848), andIghiu (Magyarigen - 29 October 1848) (see:1848–1849 massacres in Transylvania)[165]—
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are rarely detailed, and when mentioned, they are usually attributed to the chaos of war rather than deliberate ethnic violence.[166][167] By contrast, Hungarian and international scholars often describe these events as organized attacks or pogroms, estimating at least 7500-8000 Hungarian civilian victims.[168] The same can be said about the Romanian writings about Axente Sever the deaths of 800 Hungarian civilians in Aiud (Nagyenyed),[169] when his troops entered the town on 8 January 1849, are not mentioned.[170]
Although the cult of the Romanian historical figures listed above causes the Hungarian minority to continue to suffer historical pain, Romanian memory politics takes no account of this.
Books, articles school textbooks that appear in the Romanian language present Horea, Cloșca, Crișan, Avram Iancu, and Axente Sever as great national heroes without mentioning the deeds for which the Hungarians accuse them.[171][172]
When, on rare occasions, Romanian historians (such as Marius Diaconescu) attempt to point out that Romanians also committed massacres in 1848–1849, they come under fierce attack from their colleagues who support the continued concealment, from the Romanian public opinion, of historical truth.[166][173]
In January 2024, adocudrama with the titleAvram Iancu against the Empire was presented in the cinemas to the Romanian public. This film presents him as usual: the lonely hero, who fights against the Hungarians presented negatively, and who was betrayed by the Habsburgs too, without mentioning anything about the massacres in Abrud, Aiud, Zlatna, etc.[174]
In addition to these, there are numerous statues and monuments dedicated to the controversial historical figures mentioned above in Transylvanian cities like the statues of Avram Iancu from Cluj-Napoca,[175] Turda,[176] Târgu Mureș,[177] Horea, Cloșca, and Crișan from Cluj-Napoca,[178] Alba Iulia (Gyulafehérvár),[179] Turda (Torda),[180] or Axente Sever in the village which bears his name.[181]
In addition, a bunch of localities, schools, institutions, and airports are named of Avram Iancu (Avram Iancu (disambiguation); the leaders of the 1784 peasants revolt (Horea, Alba,Horia, Constanța,Cloșca, Satu Mare,Crișan, Tulcea,Crișan, Satu Mare); or Axente Sever (Axente Sever, Sibiu, "Axente Sever" Middle School from Aiud,[182] "Axente Sever" Theoretical High School from Mediaș (Meggyes)[183]) bear their names.
Since the 1990s, the Romanian state has denied the existence ofSzékely Land as a legitimate historical or administrative region.[184]
Although Székely Land existed for centuries before the creation of modern Romania — with its own seats (székek), local self-government, and distinctive cultural identity[185] — Romanian officials frequently insist that “Székely Land does not exist” and that it is merely an “invention” of Hungarian nationalism.[184]
After 1989, the Romanian authorities systematically opposed the public use of Székely symbols, such as the blue-and-gold Székely flag and historical coats of arms of the Székely seats. Prefects and local courts repeatedly ordered mayors and county councils — particularly in Harghita and Covasna — to remove these flags and emblems from town halls, schools, and public institutions.[186] The usual argument was that such symbols “do not represent the Romanian people” or “create ethnic segregation,” even though they function as regional emblems rather than national ones.[187]
Several local governments attempted to register Székely coats of arms as official symbols on flags of counties, towns, or villages, but these efforts were often blocked or annulled by Bucharest authorities on the same grounds. Meanwhile, Romanian national symbols could freely be displayed in Hungarian-majority towns, creating a clear double standard.[188]
Romanian media coverage has generally framed Székely self-identification as separatist or extremist, portraying local autonomy initiatives as threats to national unity.[189] However, Hungarian and international observers note that the Székely symbols are peaceful expressions of regional heritage, comparable to those of other European minority regions (such as South Tyrol).[190]
Since the early 1990s and especially after 2000, Romanian authorities have repeatedly ordered local councils, mayor's offices and other public institutions in Hungarian-majority areas to remove Hungarian and Székely flags from public buildings and flagpoles.
For example, in Civic Association for Dignity in Europe (ADEC), founded by the known Romanian right wing politicianDan Tanasă-led cases local courts ordered the removal of Hungarian flags from the city-hall in Székelyudvarhely/Odorheiu Secuiesc in 2021.[191] In one case the Covasna County Council building flew US, Israeli, German, Hungarian and Székely flags, yet the court ordered only the Hungarian and Székely flags to be removed — leaving the other national flags intact; critics argue this demonstrates discriminatory treatment of the Hungarian community and its national symbols.[192] According to Romanian state commentary, the region called “Székely Land” is not an administrative unit and hence the flag has no legal basis for display on public buildings, a position used to justify such removals.[5] In sport, the Romanian Football Federation warned and fined the club FK Csíkszereda in 2025 for use of Hungarian and Székely flags and symbols at a match, citing ethnic sensitivity and violation of disciplinary rules.[193] While Romanian law (Law 75/1994 and later 141/2015) regulates the Romanian national flag and the flags of counties/municipalities, it is ambiguous or silent on the flags of traditional regions or national minorities — critics say this ambiguity is used to suppress Hungarian/Székely symbols while allowing other foreign national flags freely, hence reflecting a double standard.[194] The mentioned Romanian law only prohibits the use of other countries' flags, but the Székely flag is not the flag of any other country, so Romanian law does not apply to it.[194] Nevertheless, Romanian authorities refer to this law when they order the Székely flags to be removed.[194] In contrast, there are no known similar enforcement actions in Hungary against Romanian flags displayed in Hungarian municipalities or public buildings, illustrating the asymmetry in how minority versus majority symbols are treated in these countries.
At the end of 2008, Romanian far-right politician Dan Tanasă, known for his anti-Hungarian actions, filed a complaint with the National Council for Combating Discrimination. He objected to the county library director competition inSfântu Gheorghe (Sepsiszentgyörgy) requiring knowledge of both Romanian and Hungarian. He argued that applicants for the director position should not be required to know Hungarian. This requirement had been introduced because, at that time, 74.5% of Sfântu Gheorghe's population, and approximately the same percentage ofCovasna County's population, was ethnic Hungarian, and many of the library's books were in Hungarian. The council ruled that the requirement constituted discrimination, limiting access to public employment for those who did not know Hungarian. County Council President Sándor Tamás challenged the decision in court, arguing that it was reasonable for the director to know Hungarian, given that three-quarters of the county's and its capital's population was ethnic Hungarian. In 2011, after several appeals, theBrașov Court of Appeal agreed with Tănasă, annulled the competition for the library director's job, and obliged the director, Szabolcs Szonda, to repay nearly three years of "unlawfully" received salary.[195]
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Anti-Hungarian statements, often using false or distorted claims, are common in Romanian public life, the media, and online, which has led to an increase in anti-Hungarian reactions in Romanian public opinion.
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There have been occasions when the Romanian president himself has made such inflammatory anti-Hungarian statements.[207] Hungarian media reported that anti-Hungarian sentiment had risen sharply and quoted Hungarian minority leaders saying Romanian parties and politicians were using the “Hungarian card”. This means that they made negative statements about Hungarians, and theHungarian danger (usually that they want to take back Transylvania from Romania) that stirred up anti-Hungarian sentiment among Romanians, thereby distracting their attention from the difficult economic and political situation and the public scandals affecting them.[208][209]
Some examples.[undue weight? –discuss]
- In September 2017, a Romanian influencer running the YouTube channelMilitianul posted a biased and edited video titled “A stranger in my own country,” in which he accused Hungarian employees at a Kaufland buffet in Odorheiu Secuiesc of refusing to serve him because he asked forMititei in Romanian. Shortly thereafter, the chain refuted the influencer's claims, pointing out that they had just opened and had not yet baked the mititei, which the YouTuber himself had seen, so they were unable to serve him at that very moment, and not because he was Romanian.[210] In any case, because of the video, Romanian social media and part of the press were flooded with anti-Hungarian articles, videos, and comments. In September 2017 (a few days after the incident), Hungarian politicians from Transylvania reported the operator of theMilitianul YouTube channel for inciting ethnic hatred, but after years of inaction, the police closed the case in 2023 without pressing charges, stating that it had already expired.[211]
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- On May 19 2019, the Romanian TV network B1 aired a talk show in which the journalist Radu Banciu made false allegations against the Hungarian community concerning the Valea Uzului military cemetery, claiming Hungarians “want to eliminate Romanian flags and symbols.” The anti-discrimination council fined B1 and Banciu for anti-Hungarian speech.[212]
- According to a Hungarian-language watchdog, on 29 April 2020, the president of Romania,Klaus Iohannis made “unprecedented and severe” anti-Hungarian statements, when in a public speech he claimed that the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania and the Romanian Social Democratic Party had agreed that Székely Land would get autonomy, which meant national security threats and “selling Transylvania to the Hungarians.”[207]
- On Dec 7 2023, SenatorDiana Șoșoacă in the Romanian Parliament shouted anti-Hungarian remarks at her Hungarian-minority colleague, who was speaking on the parliamentary podium.[213]
- In April 2025, the monitoring siteSzékely Monitor documented how two Romanian politicians posted alarming, factually false Facebook posts about a Hungarian-language initiative—claiming it was forced language use, territorial autonomy, and “anti-Romanian”. These posts triggered a wave of hate comments (“Out with the Hungarians from Romania!”) from the Romanian online public.[214]
- In 2025, a Romanian nationalist influencer, Bogdan Lupea, said that minorities (Hungarians, Jews, Roma) should be removed from Parliament and called Hungarian MPs “anti-national.”[215]
In May 2025, during Romania's presidential campaign, a Romanian posted a TikTok video calling for the expulsion and extermination of Transylvanian Hungarians, using extreme hate speech and cursing words towards Hungarians, calling them repeatedlyBozgors (a curse word used by Romanians against Hungarians). Sándor Tamás, the Hungarian president ofCovasna County Council, filed a complaint under Article 369 of the Penal Code, which punishes public incitement to hatred or discrimination. However, prosecutors inTulcea County dismissed the case, claiming the outburst was merely “sarcasm” and posed no social danger. They justified this by referencing thePerinçek v. Switzerland case, arguing it fell under free expression, although the two cases had nothing in common (Doğu Perinçek did not instigate against Armenians, did not call for their expulsion or extermination; he just declared that theArmenian genocide from 1915 to 1917 did not exist). Despite acknowledging procedural errors, authorities closed the case without charges, highlighting a double standard in handling anti-Hungarian hate speech.[216]
While in the years around Trianon, Hungarian monuments were mainly attacked by the authorities, since 1989, they have been vandalized mostly by Romanian civilians.
Some examples:
- In 1992, the monument ofZeicani (Zajkány), erected in 1896, commemoratingJohn Hunyadi's victory over the Ottomans was toppled, probably with heavy machinery, dragging its mace with it and throwing it in Lake Ostrov.[217] All this shows that it was not a simple act of vandalism.[218] In 1993, the mace was recovered from the lake and taken to a museum in Sarmizegetusa, but it then disappeared entirely by 1994.[218] In April 2003, the remaining parts of the pedestal were removed and the site cleared; effectively, the monument ceased to exist.[218] Researchers contend the magnitude and logistics of the operation suggest the involvement or at least tacit allowance of authorities, and that no full accountability has been established for the perpetrators.[219]
- Unknown perpetrators have repeatedly vandalized the monument on the outskirts of Gyergyószárhegy (Lăzarea), which commemorates the victory of the Székelys over the Tatars. The iron chain surrounding the monument has disappeared several times, and in November 2013, two of the columns surrounding the obelisk were knocked down.[220]
- Several road monuments and memorial plaques in Harghita/Mureş county border areas were shot at, damaged, or removed in April 2014; perpetrators not identified.[221]
- The Statue of Liberty (Arad) (commemorating Hungarian martyrs of 1849) was spray-painted with Romanian national colours and insults targeting Hungarians in February 2015.[222]
- In early August 2015, unknown persons vandalized the monument to Sándor Petőfi in the central park of Újszentes (Dumbrăvița, Timiș), a town neighboringTimișoara. They tore down the relief, presumably made of artificial stone, depicting the poet's face from the memorial column in front of the Reformed church, and it fell to the ground and broke into pieces.[223]
- A bronze plaque with an inscription by Romanian historianNicolae Iorga was installed on 18 September 2020, without permission, on the pedestal of the Hungarian kingMatthias Corvinus's monument, insulting the king and Hungarians.[224]
- In early February 2021, the Monument of the Székely Martyrs from Marosvásárhely was painted in red-yellow-blue colors by unknown persons, and an inscription was also written on it.[225]
- The Székely flag was torn down from the Turul statue fromSâncrăieni (Csíkszentkirály) by supporters of a Bucharest football team in April 2025; described as a violent anti-Hungarian act.[226]
In the period after the 1989 Romanian Revolution, these were many cases when members of the Hungarian minority were verbally attacked by Romanians who heard them speaking Hungarian. Unfortunately, there have also been cases where doctors or healthcare workers have insulted patients of Hungarian ethnicity because they spoke Hungarian or, in their opinion, did not speak Romanian well enough.
Some examples.
- On 17 Feb 2016 a doctor in a children's hospital in Cluj‑Napoca (Kolozsvár) humiliated a 17-year-old girl from the Székely region because she did not speak Romanian well. The girl, who came from an area with 90-100 % Hungarian population, had been hit by a bus earlier that day, resulting in the breaking of 4 of her toes, and, after letting her to wait many hours, the doctor questioned her why she didn't know the country's official language and treated her and her companions disrespectfully, threatening to send her away without being treated.[227]
- In September 2017, a Hungarian fifth-grader in Bistrița-Năsăud County was verbally and physically attacked and beaten by two Romanian classmates because she was speaking Hungarian with her friends during a break at school. When the Romanian pupils were asked why they did that, they said that they were bothered by the fact that the girl spoke Hungarian.[228]
- In Sfântu Gheorghe in May 2021, a supermarket manager ordered employees not to speak Hungarian among themselves and rebuked customers speaking Hungarian.[229]
- In July 2021 a bus driver on the Cluj–Finișel route forbade Hungarian-speaking passengers from speaking Hungarian, telling them, “We live in Romania, we speak Romanian here.”[230]
- On February 2, 2025, in Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár), a paramedic demanded that a Hungarian-speaking woman use Romanian instead of Hungarian when she tried to explain to her mother what happened to her friend who suffered a stroke. But the paramedic demanded her in an offensive and raised voice to speak Romanian.[231]
- In September 2025 in Cluj-Napoca a well-dressed woman verbally assaulted a woman speaking on the phone to a client from Hungary, shouting “Speak Hungarian at home, not on the streets of Cluj-Napoca!”, and calling her "Bozgoroaică" (the feminine version of the anti-Hungarian term Bozgor).[232]
Since 1989 there have been repeated incidents in Transylvania where ethnic Hungarians were physically assaulted and beaten after speaking Hungarian in public, a pattern documented by minority monitors and the Council of Europe.[233] These beatings usually occure when Romanians hear Hungarian individuals or groups speaking Hungarian among each other.[234]
Some examples.
- In April 2010 several Hungarian young people were violently attacked and beaten inMediaș (Meggyes) during an Easter-time celebration by a group of 6 Romanians who broke in by force in the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania's facility, an episode recorded in local monitoring reports.[235]
- On 15 May 2010, 6 Hungarian young people were assaulted in Kézdivásárhely (Târgu Secuiesc). There were three journalists in the group. They were attacked because they spoke in their mother tongue, Hungarian. A group of 10 Romanians provoked the fight. The attackers shouted at them not to speak Hungarian.[235]
- In early August 2012 in Oradea (Nagyvárad) two Hungarian youths were playing basketball with their three Romanian friends. They were attacked by 12 Romanians, who, hearing them speaking Hungarian, attacked only them (the 2 Hungarians), kicking them, then hitting them with a metal baseball bat and forcing them to recite the Romanian anthem. According to the forensic medical report, the two assaulted youths suffered injuries that healed within four days. The Romanian aggressors at the police stated that the Hungarians attacked them and forced them to sing the Hungarian anthem.[234]
- On a late February morning in 2017, three Hungarian-speaking youths were attacked in Cluj-Napoca by a group of Romanians, and a Romanian man struck down one of the Hungarians with the butt of a gas pistol. At the police, the Romanian aggressors defended themselves by saying that they saw the Hungarians speaking in Hungarian and laughing, and because they did not understand them, they thought that they were laughing at them.[236]
- In the Spring of 2024, an underage gymnast of Hungarian ethnicity became the victim of severe ethnic abuse by his Romanian colleagues at the training camp atReșița. Two of his Romanian colleagues applied severe, violent treatment, while the others watched passively. They tied the Hungarian gymnast to a radiator, cut his hair totally bald, stripped him naked, forced him to consume alcohol, lay on top of him and mimicked sexual contact, shouting at him “ungure, ungure” (You Hungarian, you Hungarian).[237]
- On June 1, 2025, in Floreşti (a suburb ofCluj-Napoca) a Hungarian husband and his wife were verbally and then physically assaulted after speaking Hungarian; the attacker dragged chains on the man's arm and shouted “go to Hungary”.[238]
- In 2025 there have been reports of groups of young Hungarian supporters and individuals attacked after speaking Hungarian in Cluj (Kolozsvár) and nearby towns, with victims describing severe injuries.[239]
Romanian authorities’ reactions have been uneven: some investigations led to arrests or prosecutions, but in several high-profile cases prosecutors either downgraded charges or closed files, prompting criticism from Hungarian representatives and international bodies.[240] For example, after the incidents at Cluj (April 2025), authorities initially stated they found no evidence of ethnic motivation.[241] In the Kézdivásárhely attack the victims complained that only some perpetrators were turned over to police, and they feared the case would be reduced to a simple street fight rather than being treated as ethnically motivated.[235]
Romanian-language media tend to report such events as isolated incidents or hooliganism rather than systemic ethnic attacks; Hungarian-language media and minority watchdogs frame them as continuing anti-Hungarian violence.[215]
_place_name_signs_in_Transylvania%2c_on_which_the_Hungarian_place_names_were_defaced_and_damaged_by_unknown_persons.jpg)
Since 1989, the vandalism of Hungarian-language place-name signs and other Hungarian inscriptions in Transylvania has been a recurring issue, often reflecting underlying ethnic and political tensions. These acts typically involve defacing or painting over only the Hungarian portions of bilingual or trilingual signs, especially in Transylvania.[242] Motivations range from nationalism and anti-Hungarian sentiment to political provocation linked to debates about language rights, autonomy, and minority identity.[243] While some perpetrators have been identified and prosecuted — for example, inSzékely Land in January 2020[244] — most cases remain unresolved, and few are classified as hate crimes. Authorities often treat them merely as acts of vandalism rather than ethnically motivated offenses. Despite occasional court rulings affirming the legality of bilingual signs, enforcement and protection remain inconsistent.[245] The recurring nature of these incidents highlights the persistent fragility of interethnic relations and minority rights in post-communist Romania.[246]
John Hunyadi was a prominent Hungarian military leader and one of the wealthiest landowners inKingdom of Hungary, he is best known for his fights against theOttoman Empire. He was the father of KingMatthias Corvinus of Hungary. In 2025, in Belgrade, a Romanian man tore down the Hungarian flag from the memorial stone honoring the Hungarian heroes ofSiege of Belgrade and replacing it with a Romanian ribbon. He talked about his own beliefs, that "how Hungarians are stealing Romanian history" and that John Hunyadi is actually a "Romanian hero", and he regularly replaces the Hungarian ribbon with a Romanian one, thus "restoring the truth".[247]
Following the 1989 Romanian Revolution, in early 1990, anti-Hungarian sentiments began to rise sharply among Romanians, as the Hungarian community started to demand mother-tongue education and the restoration of Hungarian-language institutions abolished by the Communist regime.[248][249] It should be emphasized that Hungarians peacefully requested the restoration of these rights. One of these was the silent demonstration for Hungarian schools initiated by Transylvanian Hungarian writerAndrás Sütő for Hungarian education, in which tens of thousands of Hungarians participated in every major city in Transylvania on February 10, 1990, holding a book and a candle in their hands.[248] And, Hungarian students at the medical university in Marosvásárhely staged a sit-in strike demanding the reinstatement of Hungarian-language education.[250] At the same time, in response to these demands, nationalist Romanian rhetoric escalated: Romanian leaders — includingIon Iliescu, Co-Founding Leader of theNational Salvation Front, the provisional executive power in Romania — warned publicly of Hungarian “separatism.”[251] At the same time, Romanian nationalist organizations like Vatra Românească were active in Maros county; they accused the Hungarian community of plotting to detach Transylvania, and mobilized support from rural Romanians.[250] The Vatra activists also spread rumors that Romanians were being abused by Hungarians, and incited the Romanian population of Marosvásárhely's surrounding villages against Hungarians.[250] In the context of a predominantly Hungarian town, it is notable that Romanian nationalist organisations were successful in fostering an anti-Hungarian sentiment amongst the Romanian population by disseminating information that, in the eyes of the Hungarians, seemed reasonable and normal. An exemplar of this was that the owners of a pharmacy had written its name, next to the Romanian, also in the Hungarian language on the shop's windowsill.[252]
Certain Romanian media outlets and public figures have claimed that the 1990 ethnic conflict in Târgu Mureș was organized by Hungarian secret services to annex Transylvania to Hungary.[253][254]
However, the Romanian state judiciary has failed to conduct a detailed investigation of the events and their background despite repeated demands made almost exclussively by Hungarian public figures, political organizations and NGOs. These started already in 1990, immediately after the bloody events. On 22'nd March 1990, the Hungarian government formally requested an impartial investigation into the events in question and the subsequent conviction of those deemed responsible. On 24 March, the RMDSZ issued a statement calling for an impartial investigation into the events in Marosvásárhely. On 25 March, a significant number of prominent Hungarian intellectuals collaborated in the drafting of a joint protest, which was addressed to the government. Among other demands, an impartial international legal commission was called for, with a view to investigating the causes of the conflict.[255]
Following 1990, Hungarian representatives, along with Hungarian victims and their relatives, made repeated requests for an impartial investigation into the events in question. However, these requests were consistently disregarded by the Romanian state.[256] In 2017, Zsolt Bíró, who was then representing the Hungarian Civic Party in the Romanian Parliament, submitted a petition to the Romanian Prosecutor General requesting an investigation into the events of 1990.[257] In the absence of an investigation into these events by the Romanian state with the aim of identifying the perpetrators, the families of the Hungarian victims submitted a complaint to theEuropean Court of Human Rights in 2018.[258] Despite all this, the Romanian state has still not investigated the events in Târgu Mureș. This finding underscores the sensitivity of the issue for the Romanian state and suggests a reluctance to address it directly. If the responsibility for this incident lay with the Hungarian side, it is unlikely that they would have made repeated requests for an investigation, and it is equally implausible that the Romanian authorities would have been so indifferent to these requests.
June 2019 seemed to revive the anti-Hungarian ethnic riots that took place in Târgu Mureș in 1990. In June 2019, a Romanian crowd broke into the former Austro-Hungarian military cemetery inValea Uzului, behaving aggressively with the Hungarians who were praying there peacefully, then breaking the gate of the cemetery and consecrating crosses for Romanian war heroes who actually were not buried there.[259]
The background to all this is as follows. The Úz River flows through the Eastern Carpathians and joins the Trotuș River (in Hungarian Tatros) at Dormánfalva (Dărmănești) in Bacău County.
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The valley was the site of significant battles during World Wars I and II, and the now-deserted village of Valea Uzului (Uzvölgye) is located there. The cemetery was established in 1917 by Austrians and Hungarians as the burial place for the fallen heroes of WWI battles, and has also been used during WWII for the same purpose.[260] Although the area was assigned to Harghita County when it was established in 1968, that same year, the county's communist leaders handed over the cemetery in the Valea Uzului — along with the Hungarian border guard barracks built in 1942 — to Bacău County for ten years of use. Despite the 10 years having long expired, Bacău County began considering the area its own. This ultimately led Dărmănești local government to feel entitled to transform the military cemetery in Valea Uzului without permission in spring 2019.[261] The local council inDărmănești (Dormánfalva), a town of 8,600 inhabitants located inBacău County and which does not have jurisdiction over the cemetery, began a so-called “renovation” on the cemetery grounds, erecting concrete crosses and a memorial to Romanian war heroes that are in fact buried in a neglected cemetery near the neighbouring former village of Poiana Uzului.[260] The council of Dărmănești, however, scheduled the inauguration of the newly and illegally erected Romanian war memorial.
The Romanians claimed that Romanians were also buried there and attacked the cemetery.
Eager to protect the burial site of their fallen heroes, some 1,000 ethnic Hungarians formed a human chain in silent prayer around the graveyard.[259] Nationalist Romanians — mainly football hooligans — traveled by bus on 6 June 2019 to the Valea Uzului military cemetery and joined other local Romanians. Despite police presence, several from the Romanian crowd eventually broke through the police cordon and the fence and tore open the cemetery gate. Some members of the Hungarian group were physically attacked and injured.
The Romanians also desecrated Hungarian graves.[259] The Romanian Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Defense have said that only they have the right to make reconstructions or changes in the cemetery, and they did not give anyone right to erect memorials or crosses there in 2019, thus the action of the Romanians was illegal.[262][263]
Despite Romanian court decisions proving that only one Austrian-Hungarian citizen of Romanian ethnicity was buried there, the others being mainly Hungarians, ordering the removal of the illegally installed Romanian crosses,[124] the nationalist Romanian politicians like George Simion use these legal decisions of the Romanian authorities to present these as an attack to the Romanian nation and incite the Romanians against the Hungarians.[264]
Ignoring court rulings and taking advantage of the inaction and the tacit support of the Romanian authorities, Romanians organized by nationalist parties and anti-Hungarian organizations like AUR, Calea Neamului, return since then, to the cemetery several times a year, using military holidays as a pretext. When they are there, they shout nationalist slogans and "commemorate" the Romanian dead "buried there," constantly "enriching" the cemetery with new Romanian crosses.[265][266][267][268]
Hungarian speakers first settled in Zakarpattia (Hungarian:Kárpátalja) in the 800s. The region was part of the Kingdom of Hungary from then till 1918. Before the Holocaust and Soviet deportations, there were approximately 250,000 Hungarian speakers in Zakarpattia, around 27% of the total population.[269]They constituted majorities or pluralities in several towns and cities, including Mukachevo (Hungarian:Munkács.) Many of these Hungarian speakers were also Jews. Today, Hungarian speakers are around 15% of the population in Zakarpattia, numbering around 150,000, forming majorities or pluralities along the Hungarian border and in some towns, including Berehove (Hungarian:Beregszász.)
The European Council, the Venice Commission[270] and the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation have argued the Ukrainian state discriminates against Hungarian speakers.[271] The Hungarian Human Rights Foundation said of new reforms legislated in December, 2023:
"We note with regret that the adopted law still does not allow the use of minority languages at the level of higher administrative units (district, county). At the local settlement level, use of language rights remains subject to the majority decision – meaning that enforcement of language rights will not be implemented in most locales ... The law links linguistic rights to the concept of “traditional” settlement of the minority and sets the minimum level at 10%. Accordingly, in locations where the minority population does not reach this threshold (i.e. those in diaspora) will have no language rights at all, which further accelerates their assimilation. The legislation affects only the linguistic rights of minorities; other minority rights are completely left out. The law still does not provide for the free use of national symbols, nor does it provide the conditions to ensure political representation for minorities. Several clauses of the law are discriminatory or merely declarative, which can lead to arbitrary interpretation. The meaning of several legal terms remains unclear. This raises further questions, primarily relating to the right to native-language education alongside the state language. The law still does not comply with all the recommendations of the Venice Commission; does not ensure the rights guaranteed to minorities in the Constitution and other international documents; and does not restore the full range of previously existing minority rights."[271]
At the same time, László Zubánics, head of the Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Ukraine, said these reforms 'essentially gave the Hungarian community of Zakarpattia the opportunity to ensure its own existence for another 30 years.'[272]
Ukrainian politicianViktor Baloha and his son Andrij have both made remarks described as Hungarophobic. The former alleged Hungarian prime ministerViktor Orbán was responsible for his ban from theSchengen Area while Andrij, the mayor ofMukachevo, removed aTurul statue from the city's castle.[273][274]
The slursBozgor,Bozgoroaică andBozgori are pseudo-Magyar terms of possible Romanian or Slavic origin describing Hungarians. A view is that it means "homeless" or "stateless".[278]N. Sándor Szilágyi [hu] speculated that the word is a combination of the Hungarian slurba(s)zd meg ("fuck you") and the Romanian word forHungarian, namelyungur.[279]
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