Some Anti-Erdoganists accused Erdoğan and hisAKP of beingNeo-Ottomanists, likening it toPutinism.[1][2][3] Since 2015, critics have accused Erdoğanism of being a fascist ideology.[4][5]
Despite many criticising Erdoğan due to the perception of him being an Islamist, most Islamists criticise Erdoğan and his rule, as well as Erdoğanists due to them being an extremecult of personality.[6] TheFelicity Party is among the fiercest Anti-Erdoganist parties in Turkey, which claims that Erdoğan is only anopportunist who uses religious rhetoric to maintain popular support.[7][8]
Although Erdoğan had initially improved the rights ofKurds in Turkey,[9] he began to lose more and more Kurdish support starting in 2015 because of his alliance with theMHP. Erdoğan often baselessly accuses Kurds who criticise his policies of beingPKK supporters, which further disillusions the ones who do not support the PKK.[10] Even conservative Kurds, of whom many were once staunch Erdoğan supporters, had ceased their support due to his increasing nationalism.[11] During the2023 elections, when Erdoğan pushed a very strong nationalist rhetoric, the majority of Kurds did not vote for him, and many conservative Kurds were repulsed by his nationalism to the point they viewed the opposition as a better alternative.[12][13] Many Kurds denied that Erdoğan was an Islamist, and claimed that he was a mere "Green Kemalist".[14]
TheIslamic State rebuffs Erdoğan as a "taghut", and his supporters as "kuffar". In the 4th edition ofRumiyah, the Islamic State called on people to "ask Allah for help and attack Turkey" and to "stab those who support theAKP".[21][22]
Alparslan Kuytul, aSalafi cleric, is a staunch critic of Erdoğan. Kuytul advocated for a Sharia system and also believed that Erdoğan is a taghut. Kuytul refers to the AKP as ZKP (Oppressive Development Party).[23]
^"The Blackballers' Club".The Economist. December 16–22, 2006. pp. 10–11. Archived from the originalon February 24, 2021.
^Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove; Fernandes, Desmond (2008). "Kurds in Turkey and in (Iraqi) Kurdistan: A Comparison of Kurdish Educational Language Policy in Two Situations of Occupation".Genocide Studies and Prevention.3 (1): 45–46.doi:10.3138/gsp.3.1.43.
