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Anti–People's Republic of China sentiment

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Opposition to the Chinese government
Not to be confused withAnti-Chinese sentiment.
"Chinazi" flag duringHong Kong's protest in August 2019
Anti–People's Republic of China sentiment
Traditional Chinese反中華人民共和國
Simplified Chinese反中华人民共和国
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu Pinyinfǎn Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó
Bopomofoㄈㄢˇ ㄓㄨㄥ ㄏㄨㄚˊ ㄖㄣˊ ㄇㄧㄣˊ ㄍㄨㄥˋ ㄏㄜˊ ㄍㄨㄛˊ
Wade–Gilesfan3 Chung1hua2 Jên2min2 Kung4ho2kuo2
Alternative Chinese name
Traditional Chinese反中
Simplified Chinese反中
Literal meaningAnti-China
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu Pinyinfǎn zhōng
Bopomofoㄈㄢˇ ㄓㄨㄥ
Wade–Gilesfan3 Chung1
Second alternative Chinese name
Traditional Chinese反華
Simplified Chinese反华
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu Pinyinfǎn huá
Bopomofoㄈㄢˇ ㄏㄨㄚˊ

Anti–People's Republic of China sentiment (Chinese:反中華人民共和國),[1][2][3][4] also known asanti-China (Chinese:反中 or 反華),[note 1]anti-PRC,anti-CCP, oranti-Beijing sentiment,[9] is antipathy to thePeople's Republic of China (PRC). "Anti-PRC" is different from "anti-Chinese sentiment" in cultural and ethnic contexts, but they sometimes appear at the same time and are described as "Sinophobia".[10][11][12]

Reasons cited for opposing the People's Republic of China include the policies ofits government and the rulingChinese Communist Party (CCP), the suppression ofdemocracy in China,human rights abuses,intelligence activities,diplomatic practices,threats to dissidents, oppression ofsecessionist movements, as well as negative impressions of itsnationals.

Concerns over the increasing economic and military power of China, its technological prowess and cultural reach, as well as international influence, has been attributed to drive negative media coverage of China. This is often also exhibited by policymakers and politicians.[13][14][15]

Statistics and background

[edit]
Results of 2025Pew Research Center poll[16] "% who have a(n) favorable/unfavorable opinion of China"(default-sorted by decreasing negativity of each country)
Country polledFavorableUnfavorableDifference
 Japan
13%
86%
-73
 South Korea
19%
80%
-61
 Sweden
18%
79%
-59
 United States
21%
77%
-56
 Australia
23%
76%
-53
 Germany
29%
67%
-38
 Netherlands
30%
66%
-36
 India
21%
54%
-33
 Canada
34%
63%
-29
 Israel
33%
59%
-26
 France
36%
58%
-22
 Turkey
35%
56%
-21
 United Kingdom
39%
56%
-17
 Spain
37%
53%
-16
 Poland
35%
43%
-8
 Italy
45%
52%
-7
 Hungary
51%
42%
+9
 Brazil
51%
40%
+11
 Argentina
47%
32%
+15
 Greece
56%
36%
+20
 South Africa
57%
36%
+21
 Mexico
56%
34%
+22
 Indonesia
65%
32%
+33
 Kenya
74%
22%
+52
 Nigeria
81%
13%
+68
Results of 2022Morning Consult poll[17][needs update] "Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of China?" (default-sorted by increasing negativity of each country)
Country polledPositiveNegativeNeutralDifference
 Pakistan
82%
13%
5%
+69
 Russia
74%
9%
17%
+65
 Nigeria
74%
16%
10%
+58
 Bangladesh
62%
14%
24%
+48
 Peru
58%
23%
19%
+35
 Colombia
57%
23%
20%
+34
 Thailand
54%
20%
26%
+34
 Saudi Arabia
57%
26%
17%
+31
 Mexico
49%
20%
31%
+29
 Indonesia
46%
18%
36%
+28
 South Africa
54%
28%
18%
+26
 United Arab Emirates
55%
31%
14%
+24
 Chile
48%
34%
18%
+14
 Brazil
43%
31%
26%
+12
 Argentina
44%
33%
23%
+11
 Malaysia
45%
40%
15%
+5
 Singapore
41%
41%
18%
0
 Romania
38%
39%
23%
-1
 Turkey
38%
45%
17%
-7
 Philippines
37%
45%
18%
-8
 Spain
31%
47%
22%
-16
 Israel
32%
52%
16%
-20
 Italy
27%
53%
20%
-26
 Vietnam
28%
58%
14%
-30
 Czech Republic
23%
56%
21%
-33
 Poland
22%
55%
23%
-33
 India
24%
59%
17%
-35
 Belgium
18%
56%
26%
-38
 France
15%
57%
28%
-42
 Ireland
18%
62%
20%
-44
 United States
16%
62%
22%
-46
 Netherlands
15%
62%
23%
-47
 Canada
14%
62%
24%
-48
 United Kingdom
14%
62%
24%
-48
  Switzerland
19%
69%
12%
-50
 Norway
16%
70%
14%
-54
 Austria
14%
70%
16%
-56
 Australia
13%
69%
18%
-56
 Germany
13%
69%
18%
-56
 Sweden
12%
73%
15%
-61
 Japan
7%
78%
15%
-71
 South Korea
5%
88%
7%
-83

In 2013,Pew Research Center from the United States conducted a survey on sinophobia, finding that China was viewed favorably in half (19 of 38) of the nations surveyed, excluding China itself. The highest levels of support came from Asia inMalaysia (81%) andPakistan (81%); African nations ofKenya (78%),Senegal (77%) andNigeria (76%); as well as Latin America, particularly in countries heavily engaging with the Chinese market, such asVenezuela (71%),Brazil (65%) andChile (62%).[18]

Anti-China sentiment

[edit]

Anti-China sentiment has been clearly evident in the West and other Asian countries. In the 2013 Pew Research survey, only 28% of Germans and Italians and 37% of Americans viewed China favorably while in Japan, just 5% of respondents had a favorable opinion of the country. 11 of the 38 nations viewed China unfavorably by more than 50%. Japan was polled to have the most anti-China sentiment, where 93% saw the People's Republic in a negative light. There were also majorities in Germany (64%), Italy (62%), and Israel (60%) who held negative views of China. Germany saw a large increase of anti-China sentiment, from 33% disfavor in 2006 to 64% in the 2013 survey, with such views existing despite Germany's success in exporting to China.[18] Anti-PRC rhetoric in English-speaking countries tends to flow from security agencies to governments to the media.[19]

Positive views of China

[edit]

Respondents in theBalkans have held generally positive views of China, according to 2020 polling. AnInternational Republican Institute survey from February to March found that only in Kosovo (75%) did most respondents express an unfavourable opinion of the country, while majorities inSerbia (85%),Montenegro (68%),North Macedonia (56%), andBosnia (52%) expressed favourable views.[20] AGLOBSEC poll on October found that the highest percentage of those who saw China as a threat were in the Czech Republic (51%), Poland (34%), and Hungary (24%), while it was seen as least threatening in Balkan countries such asBulgaria (3%), Serbia (13%), and North Macedonia (14%). Reasons for threat perception were generally linked to the country's economic influence.[21]

According toArab Barometer polls, views of China in theArab world have been relatively positive, with data from March to April 2021 showing that most respondents inAlgeria (65%),Morocco (62%),Libya (60%),Tunisia (59%), andIraq (56%) held favourable views of the country while views were less favourable inLebanon (38%) andJordan (34%).[22]

Impact of COVID pandemic

[edit]
Further information:Chinese government response to COVID-19 andCOVID-19 misinformation by China

Global polling in 2020 amidst theCOVID-19 pandemic reported a decrease in favourable views of China, with anIpsos poll done in November finding those in Russia (81%), Mexico (72%), Malaysia (68%), Peru (67%) andSaudi Arabia (65%) were most likely to believe China's future influence would be positive, while those in Great Britain (19%), Canada (21%), Germany (24%), Australia (24%), Japan (24%), the United States (24%) and France (24%) were least likely.[23] A YouGov poll on August found that those in Nigeria (70%), Thailand (64%), Mexico (61%), andEgypt (55%) had more positive views of China regarding world affairs while those in Japan (7%), Denmark (13%), Britain (13%), Sweden (14%), and other Western countries had the least positive views.[24]

History

[edit]

Mao era and Cold War

[edit]

In 1949, when theSecond Chinese Civil War was terminated and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established inmainland China, the existing Republic of China (ROC)retreated toTaiwan. However, in the earlyCold War, the PRC was not recognized by many Western countries and was often referred to as "Red China",[25] with the ROC being called "Free China".[26] Until 1971, according to thepermanent members of the United Nations Security Council (which consisted of the ROC, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), 'China' was the ROC controlling Taiwan, not the PRC controlling mainland China. At the time, the Republic of China and its Western allies openly opposed the PRC, asserting that the ROC was the only legitimate 'China'.[citation needed]

During the Cold War, anti-Chinese sentiment became a permanent fixture in the media of theWestern world andanti-communist countries following the establishment of thePeople's Republic of China in 1949.[citation needed] From the 1950s to the 1980s, anti-Chinese sentiment was high in South Korea as a result of theChinese intervention against theSouth Korean army in theKorean War (1950–1953).[citation needed]

In theSoviet Union, anti-Chinese sentiment became high following thehostile political relations between the PRC and the USSR from the late 1950s onward, whichnearly escalated into war between the two countries in 1969. The "Chinese threat", as it was described in a letter byAlexander Solzhenitsyn, prompted expressions of anti-Chinese sentiment in the Russian dissidentsamizdat movement.[27]

"Anti-CCP" can be used in a similar sense to "anti-PRC" due to the country being a one-party state.[28]: 262 

After the Chinese economic reform

[edit]
See also:Chinese imperialism

As the People's Republic of China's external power grows under sustained economic growth, the surrounding countries have become more concerned about the external expansion of the People's Republic of China throughstate capitalism, and its long-term tendency towards hegemony andneo-imperialism, with its nationalistic sentiments and territorial disputes with neighboring countries, which has led to the emergence of Chinese threat theories within each country.[29][30][31][32] For example, theSunflower Student Movement in Taiwan reflects the anxiety of Taiwanese young people in Taiwan about the threat of China, especially the influence of China on Taiwan's internal democratic development through its political and economic power.[29] 2012, whenTsai Ing-wen, chairman of theDemocratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan, andWang Dan, an exiled dissident from China, had a conversation, Tsai Ing-wen suggested that the DPP was not against China, but against the hegemony and undemocratic nature of the People's Republic of China.[33] Andrew Chubb traces a shift in rhetoric surrounding China in Australia, which he refers to as the securitization of Chinese influence, to the political campaign of Prime MinisterMalcolm Turnbull. The use of anti-PRC rhetoric by the Turnbull campaign had the end-impact of creating a "a 'toxic environment' for Chinese-Australians, especially in public and political life" and worsened relations between Australia and China. Chubb notes that this trend of securitzation of discourse, flowing from intelligence agencies to politicians to the media is replicated in other English-speaking Liberal democracies.[19]

Definition and interpretation of anti–PRC sentiment

[edit]

Opposition to the People's Republic of China does not necessarily equate to opposition to or disapproval of theChinese people orculture, but "anti-PRC" is often equated with "anti-Chinese" because the government of the People's Republic of China is considered by most countries in the international arena to be the sole legitimate government of China and the sole representative of the Chinese people in China.[citation needed] The PRC government equates its counter-discussion of its regime or policies with "anti-Chinese" (反華), which means total rejection and opposition to China, its Chinese people or culture. InHong Kong, for example, pro-Communists have launched a website calledAgainst the pan-Democrats, for the sake of Hong Kong (反泛民,救香港), which categorizes pan-Democrats as anti-Chinese "Hanjian scum" (漢奸人渣) and "anti-China and stirring up trouble in Hong Kong" (反中亂港).[34]

InThe Third Chinese Imagination: The Chinese Factor and Democracy in Taiwan (第三種中國想像:中國因素與台灣民主), published by Wu Jiemin (吳介民), an associate researcher atAcademia Sinica in Taiwan, it was argued that the People's Republic of China (PRC) factor threatened the development of Taiwanese democracy. However, he advocated treating thegovernment of the People's Republic of China and themainland Chinese people separately, and believed that a third way should be established between the two directions of pro-PRC and anti-PRC. He hoped that Taiwan would have positive interactions with democrats and civic organizations in mainland China, and would not only focus on the government of the PRC and theChinese Communist Party. Former Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) ChairmanFrank Hsieh was interviewed byChina Times on January 14, 2014; he believes that although Taiwan is opposed to being ruled by the PRC government, this sentiment should not be extended to the Chinese people, and should not be negative towards spouses or students from mainland China who come to Taiwan to study and survive.Lin Yi-hsiung, also the former chairman of the DPP, advocated that Taiwan should develop positive interactions with the People's Republic of China and refrain from engaging in international political confrontation, a view supported by the celebrityDong Zhisen.[35][36][37]

By region

[edit]

Greater China

[edit]

Hong Kong

[edit]
See also:Hong Kong–Mainland China conflict andHong Kong nationalism

After the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese Civil War, some anti-Communist Mainlanders moved southward to Hong Kong to establish their roots, including members of the Kuomintang, intellectuals and capitalists. Tens of thousands moved to Hong Kong in 1949 to escape theChinese Communist Revolution. The population of Hong Kong increased from 1.8 million in 1947 to 2.2 million in 1951. As mainland Chinese fled to Hong Kong over the next 30 years, the population of Hong Kong increased by 1 million every 10 years. Those who experienced hunger and political struggle under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) internalized strongeranti-communist sentiments than Hong Kongers who did not experience CCP rule.[38]

Hong Kong marches on 1 July, 2014. The sign reads, "We stand united against China".

AlthoughHong Kong'ssovereignty was returned to China in 1997, only a small minority of its inhabitants consider themselves to be exclusively Chinese. According to a 2014 survey from theUniversity of Hong Kong, 42.3% of respondents identified themselves as "Hong Kong citizens", versus only 17.8% who identified themselves as "Chinese citizens", and 39.3% gave themselves a mixed identity (a Hong Kong Chinese or a Hong Konger who was living in China).[39] By 2019, almost noHong Kong youth identified as Chinese.[40]

The number of mainland Chinese visitors to the region has surged since the handover (reaching 28 million in 2011) and is perceived by many locals to be the cause of their housing and job difficulties. In addition to resentment due to political oppression, negative perceptions have grown through circulating online posts of mainlander misbehaviour,[41] as well as discriminatory discourse in major Hong Kong newspapers.[42][43] In 2013, polls from theUniversity of Hong Kong suggested that 32 to 35.6 per cent of locals had "negative" feelings for mainland Chinese people.[44] However, a 2019 survey of Hong Kong residents has suggested that there are also some who attribute positive stereotypes to visitors from the mainland.[45]

In a 2015 study, mainland students in Hong Kong who initially had a more positive view of the city than of their own mainland hometowns reported that their attempts at connecting with the locals were difficult due to experiences of hostility.[46]

Mainland China

[edit]

In the 1980s, in the face of a high level of economic disparity with Hong Kong, Taiwan, andWestern countries compared to mainland China, some Chinese society and intellectuals followed the overallWesternization theory.[47]

The modern cultural trend of the Chinese continent in the 1980s, represented by the documentaryRiver Elegy that preceded the1989 Tiananmen Incident, completely denied China and Chinese civilizations.[48][49]

In the 21st century, against the backdrop of China's economic rise and strengthening of its national power, Chinese society has become dominated by nationalist sentiments.[50]

Xinjiang

[edit]
See also:Persecution of Uyghurs in China andXinjiang conflict
A Uygur protest inMelbourne, Australia

After theIncorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China under Mao Zedong to establish the PRC in 1949, there have been considerable ethnic tensions arising between the Han Chinese and Turkic Muslim Uyghurs.[51][52][53][54][55] This manifested itself in the 1997Ghulja incident,[56] the bloodyJuly 2009 Ürümqi riots,[57] and the2014 Kunming attack.[58] China has since suppressed the native population and createdinternment camps for purported counter-terrorism efforts, which have further fueled resentment in the region.[59]

Taiwan

[edit]
See also:Opinion polling on Taiwanese identity,One Country on Each Side,Taiwan independence movement, andCross-strait relations

After 1949, due to the defeat in the Chinese Civil War, the Republic of China (ROC) government under theKuomintang (KMT)retreated to Taiwan, claiming that it still had full sovereignty overmainland China; the People's Republic of China (PRC), which was established in mainland China, also claimed to be the sole legitimate representative of China, claiming sovereignty over all Chinese territories (including Taiwan), but it has not yet been able to rule Taiwan.[60][61] Many young people in Taiwan identify solely as "Taiwanese".[62] They are wary of closer ties with China, like those in the Sunflower Student Movement.[63] According to a 2020 survey from Taiwan'sMainland Affairs Council, Taiwanese believe that China is unfriendly to Taiwan.[64]

Taiwan's mainpolitical parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are some described as "anti-China".[65][66] The DPP is expressing its opposition to Chinese "imperialism" and "colonialism".[65]

In 2016, "Islanders' Anti-China Coalition", a radical anti-communist organization, was formed; they actively support Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Inner Mongolian independence.[citation needed]

Tibet

[edit]
See also:Sino-Tibetan War andSelf-immolation protests by Tibetans in China
Anti-Chinese government protest byTibetans in India in 2008

Tibet has complicated relations with the rest of China. Both Tibetan and Chinese are part of theSino-Tibetan language family and share a long history. TheTang dynasty andTibetan Empire did enter intoperiods of military conflict. In the 13th century, Tibet fell under the rule of theYuan dynasty but it ceased to be with the collapse of the Yuan dynasty. The relationship between Tibet with China remains complicated until Tibet was invaded again by theQing dynasty. Following theBritish expedition to Tibet in 1904, many Tibetans look back on it as an exercise of Tibetan self-defense and an act of independence from the Qing dynasty,as the dynasty was falling apart.[67] This event has left a dark chapter in their modern relations. TheRepublic of China failed to reconquer Tibet but the later People's Republic of Chinaannexed Tibet and incorporated it as theTibet Autonomous Region within China. The14th Dalai Lama andMao Zedong signed theSeventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, but China was accused of not honoring the treaty[68] and led to the1959 Tibetan uprising which was successfully suppressed by China,[69] resulting in the Dalai Lama escaping to India.[70]

Tibetans again rioted against other Chinese rule twice, in the1987–1989 Tibetan unrest[71] and2008 unrest, where they directed their angers againstHan andHui Chinese.[72] Both were suppressed by China and China has increased their military presence in the region, despite periodic self-immolations.[73]

East Asia

[edit]

South Korea

[edit]
See also:China–South Korea relations

Anti-Chinese sentiment in Korea was created in the 21st century by cultural and historical claims of China and a sense of security crisis caused by China's economic growth.[74] In the early 2000s, China's claim over the history ofGoguryeo, an ancient Korean kingdom, caused tensions between both Koreas and China.[75][76] The dispute has also involved naming controversies overPaektu Mountain (orChangbai Mountain in Chinese).[77] China has been accused of trying to appropriatekimchi[78] andhanbok as part of Chinese culture,[79] along with labelingYun Dong-ju aschaoxianzu, which have all angered South Koreans.[80]

Anti-Chinese sentiments in South Korea have been on a steady rise since 2002. According to Pew opinion polls, favorable views of China steadily declined from 66% in 2002 to 48% in 2008, while unfavorable views rose from 31% in 2002 to 49% in 2008.[18] According to surveys by the East Asia Institute, positive views of China's influence declined from 48.6% in 2005 to 38% in 2009, while negative views of it rose from 46.7% in 2005 to 50% in 2008.[81] A 2012BBC World Service poll had 64% of South Koreans expressing negative views of China's influence, which was the highest percentage out of 21 countries surveyed including Japan at 50%.[82]

Relations further strained with the deployment ofTHAAD in South Korea in 2017, in which China started its boycott against Korea, making Koreans develop anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea over reports of economic retaliation by Beijing.[83] According to a poll from the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies atSeoul National University in 2018, 46% of South Koreans found China as the most threatening country to inter-Korean peace (compared to 33% for North Korea), marking the first time China was seen as a bigger threat than North Korea since the survey began in 2007.[84] A 2022 poll from the Central European Institute of Asian Studies had 81% of South Koreans expressing a negative view of China, which was the highest out of 56 countries surveyed.[85]

Japan

[edit]
See also:China–Japan relations

After the end of theSecond Sino-Japanese War andWorld War II in 1945, the relationship between China and Japan gradually improved. However, since 2000, Japan has seen a gradual resurgence of anti-Chinese sentiment. Many Japanese people believe that China is using the issue of the country's checkered history, such as theJapanese history textbook controversies, manywar crimes which were committed by Japan's military, and official visits to theYasukuni Shrine (in which a number of war criminals are enshrined), as both a diplomatic card and a tool to make Japan ascapegoat in domestic Chinese politics.[86] TheAnti-Japanese Riots in the Spring of 2005 were another source of more anger towards China among the Japanese public. Anti-Chinese sentiments have been on a sharp rise in Japan since 2002. According to the Pew Global Attitude Project (2008), 84% of Japanese people held an unfavorable view of China and 73% of Japanese people held an unfavorable view of Chinese people, which was a higher percentage than all the other countries surveyed.[87]

Central Asia

[edit]

Kazakhstan

[edit]
Further information:China–Kazakhstan relations

In 2018, massive land reform protests were held inKazakhstan. The protesters demonstrated against the leasing of land to Chinese companies and the perceived economic dominance of Chinese companies and traders.[88][89] Another issue which is leading to the rise of sinophobia in Kazakhstan is theXinjiang conflict and Kazakhstan is responding to it by hosting a significant number of Uyghur separatists.[citation needed]

Kyrgyzstan

[edit]
Further information:China–Kyrgyzstan relations

While discussing Chinese investments in the country, a Kyrgyz farmer said, "We always run the risk of being colonized by the Chinese".[90]

Survey data cited by theKennan Institute from 2017 to 2019 had on average 35% of Kyrgyz respondents expressing an unfavourable view of China compared to 52% expressing a favourable view; the disapproval rating was higher than that of respondents from 3 other Central Asian countries.[91]

Tajikistan

[edit]
Further information:China–Tajikistan relations andChina–Tajikistan border

Resentment against China and Chinese people has also increased inTajikistan in recent years due to accusations that China has grabbed land from Tajikistan.[92] In 2013, the Popular Tajik Social-Democrat Party leader, Rakhmatillo Zoirov, claimed that Chinese troops were violating a land-ceding arrangement by moving deeper into Tajikistan than they were supposed to.[93]

Southeast Asia

[edit]

Malaysia

[edit]

Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been social media posts claiming the initial outbreak is "divine retribution" for China's treatment of its MuslimUyghur population.[94]

Cambodia

[edit]
See also:Cambodia–China relations

The speed of Chinese resident arrivals inSihanoukville city has led to an increase in fear and hostility towards the new influx of Chinese residents among the local population. As of 2018, the Chinese community in the city makes up almost 20% of the town's population.[95]

Philippines

[edit]
See also:China–Philippines relations,2018 Metro Manila banners,South China Sea Arbitration, and2025 Philippine espionage case

Thestandoff inSpratly Islands andScarborough Shoal between China and thePhilippines contributes to anti-China sentiment among Filipinos. Campaigns to boycott Chinese products began in 2012. People protested in front of the Chinese Embassy and it led the embassy to issue a travel warning for its citizens to the Philippines for a year.[96]

Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, scholar Jonathan Corpuz Ong has lamented that there is a great deal of hateful and racist speech on Philippine social media which "many academics and even journalists in the country have actually justified as a form of political resistance" to the Chinese government.[97] In addition, the United States government reinforced Filipinos' suspicion of China amidst the territorial disputes by conductinga disinformation campaign that amplified Filipinos' erosion of trust in Chinese COVID-19 vaccines and pandemic supplies.[98]

In 2024, theChinese-Filipino community in the Philippines expressed concerns over the increased anti-Chinese sentiment from Filipinos resulting from issues surrounding thePOGO businesses and investigations on the background ofAlice Guo, the dismissed mayor ofBamban accused by Filipino authorities of having connections with a POGO business in the said municipality.[99]

Indonesia

[edit]
See also:China–Indonesia relations

In recent years,[when?]disputes in theSouth China Sea led to the renewal of tensions. At first, the conflict was contained between China and Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, with Indonesia staying neutral. However, accusations about Indonesia's lack of activities to protect its fishermen from China's fishing vessels in theNatuna Sea[100] anddisinformation about Chinese foreign workers have contributed to the deterioration of China's image in Indonesia.[101][102]

Coconuts Media reported in April 2022 of online groups in the country targetingChinese-Indonesian women for racialised sexual abuse.[103] On the other hand, a 2022 online poll done byPalacký University Olomouc had little more than 20% of Indonesian respondents viewing China negatively while over 70% held a positive view.[104][105]

Myanmar

[edit]
See also:China–Myanmar relations

The ongoingethnic insurgency in Myanmar and the1967 riots in Burma against the Chinese community displeased the PRC, which led to the arming of ethnic and political rebels by China against Burma.[106] Resentment towards Chinese investments[107] and their perceived exploitation of natural resources have also hampered the Sino-Burmese relationship.[108]

In November 2023, pro junta supporters held protests in Naypyidaw and Yangon accusing China of supportingOperation 1027 rebels,[109][110] with some Yangon protesters threatening to attack China for its support.[111]

Vietnam

[edit]
See also:China–Vietnam relations

The two countries' shared history includes territorial disputes, with conflict over theParacel and Spratly Islands reaching apeak between 1979 and 1991.[112][113][114]

Anti-Chinese sentiments had spiked in 2007 after China formedan administration in the disputed islands,[113] in 2009 when the Vietnamese government allowed the Chinese aluminium manufacturerChinalco the rights to mine forbauxite in theCentral Highlands,[115][116][117] and when Vietnamese fishermen were detained by Chinese security forces while seeking refuge in the disputed territories.[118] In 2011, following a spat in which a Chinese Marine Surveillance ship damaged a Vietnamese geologic survey ship off the coast of Vietnam, some Vietnamese travel agencies boycotted Chinese destinations or refused to serve customers with Chinese citizenship.[119] Hundreds of people protested in front of the Chinese embassy in Hanoi and the Chinese consulate in Ho Chi Minh City against Chinese naval operations in the South China Sea before being dispersed by the police.[120] In May 2014, massanti-Chinese protests againstChina moving an oil platform into disputed waters escalated into riots in which many Chinese factories and workers were targeted. In 2018, thousands of people nationwide protested against a proposed law regarding Special Economic Zones that would give foreign investors 99-year leases on Vietnamese land, fearing that it would be dominated by Chinese investors.[121]

According to journalistDaniel Gross, anti-Chinese sentiment is omnipresent in modern Vietnam, where "from school kids to government officials, China-bashing is very much in vogue." He reports that a majority of Vietnamese resent the import and usage of Chinese products, considering them of distinctly low status.[122] A 2013 book on varying host perceptions in global tourism has also referenced negativity from Vietnamese hosts towards Chinese tourists, where the latter were seen as "making a lot more requests, complaints and troubles than other tourists"; the views differed from the much more positive perceptions of young Tibetan hosts atLhasa towards mainland Chinese visitors in 2011.[123]

In 2019, Chinese media was accused by the local press of appropriating or claimingÁo dài, which angered many Vietnamese.[124][125]

South Asia

[edit]

Afghanistan

[edit]

According toThe Diplomat in 2014, the Xinjiang conflict had increased anti-China sentiment in Afghanistan.[126] A 2020Gallup International poll of 44 countries found that 46% of Afghans viewed China's foreign policy as destabilizing to the world, compared to 48% who viewed it as stabilizing.[127][128]

Bhutan

[edit]

The relationship betweenBhutan and China has historically been tense and past events have led to anti-Chinese sentiment within the country. Notably, the Chinese government's destruction of Tibetan Buddhist institutions in Tibet in 1959 led to a wave of anti-Chinese sentiment in the country.[129] In 1960, the PRC published a map inA Brief History of China, depicting a sizable portion of Bhutan as "a pre-historical realm of China" and released a statement claiming the Bhutanese "form a united family in Tibet" and "they must once again be united and taught the communist doctrine". Bhutan responded by closing off its border, trade, and all diplomatic contacts with China. Bhutan and China have not established diplomatic relations.[130] Recent efforts between the two countries to improve relations have been hampered by India's strong influence on Bhutan.[131][132]

India

[edit]
See also:China–India relations,Sino-Indian border dispute,1987 Sino-Indian skirmish,Sino-Indian War, andNathu La and Cho La clashes

On 2014, India in conjunction with theTibetan government-in-exile have called for a campaign toboycott Chinese goods due in part to thecontested border disputes India has with China.[133][134]

The2020 China–India skirmishes resulted in the deaths 20 Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese soldiers, in hand-to-hand combat using improvised weapons.[135]

Following the skirmishes, a company fromJaipur, India developed an app named "Remove China Apps" and released it on theGoogle Play Store, gaining 5 million downloads in less than two weeks. It discouraged software dependence on China and promoted apps developed in India. Afterwards, people began uninstalling Chinese apps likeSHAREit andCamScanner.[136]

Nepal

[edit]
See also:Sino-Nepalese War andSino-Nepalese relations

Chinese outletCGTN published a tweet aboutMount Everest, calling itMount Qomolangma in theTibetan language and saying it was located in China's Tibet Autonomous Region, which caused displeasure from Nepalese and IndianTwitter users, who tweeted that China is trying to claim the mount from Nepal.[137]

Sri Lanka

[edit]
Main article:China–Sri Lanka relations

There were protests against allowing China to build a port and industrial zone, which will require the eviction of thousands of villagers around Hambantota.[138] Projects on the Hambantota port have led to fears among the local protestors that the area will become a "Chinese colony".[139] Armed government supporters clashed with protestors from the opposition that were led by Buddhist monks.[139]

Western Asia

[edit]

Israel

[edit]
See also:China–Israel relations

Israel and China have a stable relationship, and a 2018 survey suggested that a significant percentage of the Israeli population have a positive view of Chinese culture and people.[140] This is historically preceded by Chinese support for Jewish refugees fleeing from Europe amidst World War II.[141] Within China, Jews gained praise for their successful integration, with a number of Jewish refugees advising Mao's government and leading developments in revolutionary China's health service and infrastructure.[142][143][144]

However, these close relations between the early Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the small Jewish-Chinese community have been hampered in recent years under theadministration ofCCP general secretaryXi Jinping and rise of nationalist sentiment in China, with Jews monitored since 2016, an occurrence reported widely in Israeli media.[145][146]

Turkey

[edit]

On July 4, 2015, a group of around 2,000 Turkish ultra-nationalists from theGrey Wolves linked to Turkey's MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) protesting against China'sRamadan fasting ban in Xinjiang mistakenly attackedSouth Koreantourists in Istanbul,[147][148] which led to China issuing atravel warning to its citizens traveling to Turkey.[149]Devlet Bahçeli, a leader from MHP, said that the attacks by MHP affiliated Turkish youth on South Korean tourists was "understandable", telling the Turkish newspaperHürriyet that: "What feature differentiates a Korean from a Chinese? They see that they both have slanted eyes. How can they tell the difference?".[150]

A Uyghur employee at a Chinese restaurant was attacked in 2015 by the Turkish Grey Wolves-linked protesters.[151] Attacks on other Chinese nationals have been reported.[152]

According to a November 2018INR poll, 46% of Turks view China favourably, up from less than 20% in 2015. A further 62% thought that it is important to have a strong trade relationship with China.[153]

Europe

[edit]

Czech Republic

[edit]

Anti-Chinese sentiment has experienced a new growth due to closer ties between theCzech Republic and Taiwan and led to a deterioration of the Czech Republic's relations with China.[154][155] Czech politicians have demanded China to replace its ambassador and criticizing the Chinese government for its alleged threats against the Czech Republic, further worsening China's perception in the country.[156]

France

[edit]
See also:China–France relations

French farmers protested after a Chinese investor purchased 2,700 hectares of agricultural land in France.[157] A 2018 survey byInstitut Montaigne has suggested that Chinese investments in France are viewed more negatively than Chinese tourism to the country, with 50% of respondents holding negative views of the former.[158] 43% of the French see China as an economic threat, an opinion that is common among older and right-wing people, and 40% of French people view China as a technological threat.[158]

It was reported in 2017 that there was some negativity among Parisians towards Chinese visitors,[159] but other surveys have suggested that they are not viewed worse than a number of other groups.[160][161][162]

Germany

[edit]

Two surveys have suggested that a percentage of Germans hold negative views towards Chinese travellers, although it is not as bad as a few other groups.[163][164]

Italy

[edit]
See also:China–Italy relations

In 2010, in the Italian town ofPrato, it was reported that many Chinese people were working in sweatshop-like conditions that broke European laws and that many Chinese-owned businesses don't pay taxes.[165] Textile products produced by Chinese-owned businesses in Italy are labeled as 'Made in Italy', but some of the businesses engaged in practices that reduce cost and increase output to the point where locally owned businesses can't compete with. As a result of these practices, the 2009 municipal elections led the local population to vote for theLega Nord, a party known for its anti-immigrant stance.[165]

Russia

[edit]
Main article:China–Russia relations

After the Sino-Soviet split the Soviet Union producedpropaganda which depicted the PRC and the Chinese people as enemies. Soviet propaganda specifically framed the PRC as an enemy of Islam and all Turkic peoples. These phobias have been inherited by the post-Soviet states in Central Asia.[166]

Although Russia had inherited a long-standing dispute over territory with China overSiberia and theRussian Far East with the breakup of the Soviet Union, these disputes were formerly resolved in 2004. Russia and China no longer have territorial disputes and China does not claim land in Russia; however, there has also been a perceived fear of a demographic takeover by Chinese immigrants in sparsely populated Russian areas.[167] Both nations have become increasingly friendlier however, in the aftermath of the 1999 US bombing of Serbia, which theChinese embassy was struck with a bomb, and have become increasingly united in foreign policy regarding perceived Western antipathy.[168][169]

A 2019 survey of online Russians has suggested that in terms of sincerity, trustfulness, and warmth, the Chinese are not viewed especially negatively or positively compared to the many other nationalities and ethnic groups in the study.[170][171] An October 2020 poll from the Central European Institute of Asian Studies[172] found that although China was perceived positively by 59.5% of Russian respondents (which was higher than for the other 11 regions asked), 57% of respondents regarded Chinese enterprises in the Russian far east to varying degrees as a threat to the local environment.[173]

Spain

[edit]

A Central European Institute of Asian Studies poll in 2020[172] found that although Spaniards had worsening views of China amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, it did not apply to Chinese citizens where most respondents reported positive views of Chinese tourists, students, and the general community in Spain.[174]

Sweden

[edit]
See also:China–Sweden relations

In 2018, a family of Chinese tourists was removed from a hostel in Stockholm, which led to a diplomatic spat between China and Sweden. China accused the Swedish police of maltreatment as Stockholm's chief prosecutor chose not to investigate the incident.[175] A comedy skit later aired onSvenska Nyheter mocking the tourists and playing on racial stereotypes of Chinese people.[176][177] After the producers uploaded the skit toYouku, it drew anger and accusations of racism on Chinese social media,[178] the latter of which was also echoed in aletter to the editor from a Swedish-Chinese scholar[179] toDagens Nyheter.[180] Chinese citizens were called on to boycott Sweden.[181] The next year, Jesper Rönndahl, the host of the skit, was honoured by Swedish newspaperKvällsposten as "Scanian of the Year".[182]

Relations further worsened after the reported kidnap and arrest of China-born Swedish citizen and booksellerGui Minhai by Chinese authorities, which led to three Swedish opposition parties calling for the expulsion of China's ambassador to Sweden,Gui Congyou, who had been accused of threatening several Swedish media outlets.[183][184] Several Swedish cities cut ties with China's cities in February 2020 amid deteriorating relations.[185] In May 2020, Sweden decided to shut down all Confucius Institutes in the country, citing the Chinese government's meddling in education affairs.[186] Some Chinese in Sweden have also reported increased stigmatisation during the COVID-19 pandemic.[187] A 2021 YouGov poll had 77% of Swedish respondents expressing an unfavourable view of China, with no other country more negatively viewed in Sweden except forIran and Saudi Arabia.[188]

Ukraine

[edit]
Main article:China–Ukraine relations

During theRussian invasion of Ukraine, thepro-Russian Chinese government media stance along with reports of chauvinistic comments about Ukrainian women andpro-Russian sentiment by some Chinese netizens led to the fueling of anti-Chinese sentiment in Ukraine. In response, the Embassy of China in Kyiv, which originally encouraged citizens to display Chinese flags on their cars for protection while leaving Ukraine, quickly urged them not to identify themselves or sport any signs of national identity.[189][190] In a 2023Razumkov Centre opinion poll 60% of Ukrainians had a negative view of China[191] - up from 14% in 2019.[192]

Americas

[edit]

Argentina

[edit]

Since the 1990s there has been a large wave of immigration of Chinese citizens, mainly fromFujian province. The main business in which the Chinese are dedicated in Argentina isgrocery stores and on several occasions they have been accused of unplugging therefrigerators of fresh products during the night to pay cheaper electricity bills. During the social outbreak of 2001, derived from theeconomic crisis of that year in Argentina, several Chinese-owned supermarkets were attacked.[193]

Brazil

[edit]

Chinese investments in Brazil have been largely influenced by this[clarification needed] negative impression.[194]

Canada

[edit]

Anti-Chinese sentiment in Canada has been fueled by allegations of extreme real estate price distortion resulting from Chinese demand, purportedly forcing locals out of the market.[195]

United States

[edit]
See also:China–United States relations

In the2010 United States elections, a significant number[196] ofnegative advertisements from both major political parties focused on a candidates' alleged support forfree trade with China which were criticized byJeff Yang for promoting anti-Chinesexenophobia.[197] Some of the stock images that accompanied ominous voiceovers about China were actually ofChinatown, San Francisco.[197] These advertisements included one produced byCitizens Against Government Waste called "Chinese Professor", which portrayed a 2030 conquest of the West by China and an ad by CongressmanZack Space attacking his opponent for supporting free trade agreements likeNAFTA, which the ad had claimed caused jobs to be outsourced to China.[198]

In October 2013, a child actor onJimmy Kimmel Live! jokingly suggested in a skit that the U.S. could solve its debt problems by "kill[ing] everyone in China."[199][200]

Donald Trump, the 45thPresident of the United States, was accused of promoting sinophobia throughout his campaign for the Presidency in 2016.[201][202] and it was followed by his imposition of trade tariffs on Chinese goods, which was seen as a declaration of atrade war and another anti-Chinese act.[203] The deterioration of relations has led to a spike in anti-Chinese sentiment in the US.[204][205]

According to a Pew Research Center poll which was conducted in April 2022, 82% of Americans have unfavorable opinions of China, including 40% who have very unfavorable views of the country.[206] In recent years, however, Americans increasingly see China as a competitor, not as an enemy.[206] 62% view China as a competitor and 25% an enemy, with 10% seeing China as a partner.[206] In January 2022, only 54% chose competitor and 35% said enemy, almost the same distribution as the prior year.[206]

It has been noted that there is a negative bias in American reporting on China.[207][208][209] Many Americans, includingAmerican-born Chinese, have continuously held prejudices toward mainland Chinese people[210][211] which include perceived rudeness and unwillingness to stand in line,[212][better source needed] even though there are sources that have reported contrary to those stereotypes.[213][214][215] However, the results of a survey which was conducted in 2019 have revealed that some Americans still hold positive views of Chinese visitors to the US.[216]

A Pew Research poll which was conducted in the US in March 2021 revealed that 55% of respondents supported the imposition of limits on the number of Chinese students who are allowed to study in the country.[217]

In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of laws which explicitly discriminate against Chinese people in the United States. For example, in 2023, Florida introduced a law which bans Chinese nationals from owning property in the state, a law that has been compared to theChinese Exclusion Act of 1882.[218]

Intelligence activities
[edit]
This paragraph is an excerpt fromChinese espionage in the United States.[edit]
The United States has often accused thePeople's Republic of China (PRC) of unlawfully acquiring USmilitary technology,classified information, personnel data, andtrade secrets of US companies[219][220] in order to support China's long-term military and commercial development.[221] Alleged perpetrators include Chinese government agencies, affiliated personnel, civilian-in-name companies[222] and their network of academic or business contacts.[223]

Africa

[edit]

Anti-Chinesepopulism has been an emerging presence in some African countries.[224] There have been reported incidents of Chinese workers and business-owners being attacked by locals in some parts of the continent.[225][226] Following reports of evictions, discrimination and other mistreatment of Africans in Guangzhou during the COVID-19 pandemic,[227] a group of diplomats from different African countries wrote a letter to express their displeasure over the treatment of their citizens.[228]

South Africa

[edit]

In 2016, the South African government planned to offer Mandarin as an additional optional language along with German, Serbian, Italian, Latin, Portuguese, Spanish, Tamil, Telugu and Urdu.[229] However, the teachers union in South Africa accused the government of surrendering to Chinese imperialism.[229] As of 2017, there were 53 schools that offered Mandarin in the country.[230]

Depiction of China and Chinese in media

[edit]

Depictions of China and Chinese inAnglophone media have been a somewhat underreported subject in general, but most are mainly negative coverage.[208] In 2016, Hong Kong's L. K. Cheah said toSouth China Morning Post that Western journalists who regard China's motives with suspicion and cynicism cherry-pick facts based on a biased view, and the misinformation that they produce as a result is unhelpful and sympathetic of the resentment against China.[231]

According toChina Daily, a nationalist daily newspaper in China,Hollywood is accused of negative portrayals of Chinese in movies, such as bandits, thugs, criminals, gangsters, dangerous, cold-blooded, weak, and cruel;[232] while American, as well as European, or Asian characters in general, are depicted as saviors.Matt Damon, the American actor who appeared inThe Great Wall, has also faced criticism that he had participated in "whitewashing" through his involvement in the historical epic and Hollywood-Chinese co-produced movie, which he denied.[233]

Some sources critical of the Chinese government claim that it is Chinese state-owned media and administration who attempt to discredit the "neutral" criticism by generalizing it into indiscriminate accusations of the whole Chinese population, and targeting those who criticize the regime as sinophobic.[234][verification needed] Some have argued, however, that the Western media, similar to Russia's depictions, does not make enough distinction between CPC's regime and China and the Chinese, thus effectively vilifying the whole nation.[235]

Impact on Chinese student populations

[edit]

On occasion, Chinese students in the West are stereotyped as lacking in critical thinking skills and prone to plagiarism, or as harming the educational environment.[236]

Derogatory terms

[edit]

Cantonese

[edit]

English

[edit]
  • Cheena – same usage as 'Eh Tiong' in Singapore. CompareShina (支那).
  • Chinazi – a recent anti-Chinese sentiment which compares China toNazi Germany, combining the words "China" and "Nazi". First published by Chinese dissidentYu Jie,[238][239] it became frequently used duringHong Kong protests against theChinese government.[240][241]
  • Chicom – used to refer to aCommunist Chinese.
  • Eh Tiong (阿中) – refers specifically to Chinese nationals. Primarily used inSingapore to differentiate between the Singaporeans of Chinese heritage and Chinese nationals. FromHokkien, an abbreviation of中國 ("China"). Considered offensive.
  • Made in China – used to mock low-quality products, even to dismiss high-quality products that happen to be made in China. Term can extend to other pejoratively perceived aspects of the country.[94]
  • Wumao - used in online communities to accuse users of being government-sponsored propagandists, referring to the50 Cent Party.

Hokkien

[edit]

Indonesian

[edit]
  • CinaPKIKafir Komunis Laknatullah (God-damned Chinese Communist Infidel) Refers to non-Muslim Chinese people who are often called communist supporters of the PRC. This term has been used as a joke since theincident of blasphemy against Islam by thegovernor of Jakarta, who is of Chinese descent.[citation needed]

Japanese

[edit]
  • Tokuajin (特亜人,tokuajin) – literally "particular Asian people", term used for people from East Asian countries that have anti-Japanese sentiments. Taken fromTokutei Asia (特定アジア) which is a term used for countries that are considered anti-Japanese and have political tensions and disputes with Japan, namely North Korea, South Korea, and China.[citation needed]

Korean

[edit]
  • Jung-gong (Korean중공;Hanja中共) – literally "Chinese communist", it is generally used to refer to Chinese communists, since theKorean War (1950–1953).[citation needed]

Portuguese

[edit]
  • Xing líng (星零) - literal translation of the Portuguese expression "zero estrela" ("0 star"), to name arip-off product, associated with Chinese products.[242]

Vietnamese

[edit]
  • Ếch Trung Hoa (lit. Frog Chinese) – Derogatory slur from Vietnamese towards Chinese people meaning "frog" due to common sentiments regarding Chinese as ignorant and obnoxious due to Chinese internet censorship.[citation needed]
  • Tung Của orTrung Của orTrung Cẩu (lit.Dog Chinese) – a word that imitates the pronunciation of Mandarin Chinese Zhōngguó "中国" (China) in a mocking manner, but rarely used.[citation needed]
  • Trung Cộng orTàu Cộng (Chinese communists orCommunist China) – used, by Vietnamese anti-communists, mostly in exile, as a mockery toward China's political system and its imperialist desires.[243]

Response

[edit]

Chinese response

[edit]
See also:Anti-Western sentiment in China andRacism in China

In the aftermath of the United States bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during theNATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, there was a significant surge in Chinese nationalist sentiment, and it was intensified by the growth of patriotic movements in China, which, like patriotic movements in Russia, believe that China is engaged in aclash of civilizations or a "a global struggle between the materialistic, individualistic, consumerist, cosmopolitan, corrupt, and decadent West which is led by the United States and the idealist, collectivist, morally and spiritually superior Asia which is led by China," where the West is viewed as trying to tear China up so it can use its natural resources to satisfy its own interests and needs.[244][245]

A 2020 study among Chinese students who were studying abroad in the United States found that after they faced anti-Chinese racism, their support for the Chinese government increased.[246] Asimilar phenomenon was also reported for many Chinese students in the UK.[247]

Wolf warrior diplomacy

[edit]
This paragraph is an excerpt fromWolf warrior diplomacy.[edit]
Wolf warrior diplomacy is a confrontational form ofpublic diplomacy adopted by diplomats of thePeople's Republic of China in the late 2010s and early 2020s.[248][249][250] The phrase is derived from the Chinese action film franchiseWolf Warrior (2015) and its2017 sequel.[251][250][252] This coercive style of diplomacy[253] has been in contrast to diplomatic practices which emphasize the use of cooperative rhetoric and the avoidance of controversy (often termedTaoguang Yanghui), financial aid (checkbook diplomacy), the provision of medical supplies such as COVID-19 masks (medical diplomacy), andpanda diplomacy.[248][254][255]

Others

[edit]

In February and March 2024, Malaysian PMAnwar Ibrahim criticised the growing 'China-phobia' sentiment in Western nations, insisting that Malaysia can be friends with both China and the West.[256] China's embassy minister expressed appreciation for Anwar's comments, adding that Malaysia was a friendly neighbour and a priority in China's neighbourhood diplomacy.[257]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^Opposition to the PRC is sometimes referred to as 反華.[5][6][7][8] However, some authors draw a distinction between 反中 and 反華, and 反華 can encompass both "anti-PRC sentiment" and "anti-Chinese racism".[1][2][5]

References

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  2. ^ab紀紅兵; 內幕出版社 (August 25, 2016).《十九大不准奪權》: 反貪─清除野心家 (in Chinese). 內幕出版社.ISBN 978-1-68182-072-9.Archived from the original on August 26, 2024. RetrievedAugust 26, 2024.... 第三點,作為獨立學者,與您分享下本人"反中不反華"的觀點。
  3. ^蕭文軒; ‎顧長永; ‎林文斌 (2020).柬埔寨的政治經濟變遷(1953-2018). Lian jing chu ban shi ye gu fen you xian gong si.ISBN 978-957-08-5468-8.顯然,蘇、越所建立的「反中印支陣線」(Anti-PRC Indochina Front)獲得鞏固。
  4. ^C Wu (2020).Nationalism and Social Order in Public "Two keywords highlight attacks to the Chinese nation: anti-PRC (反中) and anti-China (反华)."
  5. ^ab"韓國反華情緒為何日益高漲?".Deutsche Welle. July 20, 2025.南韓的反華情緒究竟有多嚴重?韓媒《每日經濟》的數據顯示,2015 年對中國持負面態度的南韓人僅佔 16%;2020 年上升至 40%。近些年來,這一現象不但影響到訪韓的中國大陸遊客,部分港台遊客也感受到了韓國反華的「熱度」。
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